King v. Van Setten , 2004 MT 171N ( 2004 )


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  •                                             No. 03-013
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    
    2004 MT 171N
    KAREN JO KING AND THOMAS A. KING,
    Plaintiffs and Respondents,
    v.
    LOUIE VAN SETTEN, BETTY VAN SETTEN,
    JAY D. RATLIFF, KARI L. RATLIFF,
    CATHERINE A. DOCKTER, and SKIP LAVERDURE,
    Defendants and Appellants.
    APPEAL FROM:         District Court of the Ninth Judicial District,
    In and for the County of Teton, Cause No. DV 99-019
    The Honorable Marc G. Buyske, Judge presiding.
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellants:
    E. Lee LeVeque, Lee LeVeque Law Offices, Great Falls, Montana
    For Respondents:
    Dennis Tighe, Gregory J. Hatley, Davis Hatley Haffeman & Tighe,
    Great Falls, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: August 21, 2003
    Decided: June 29, 2004
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1     Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
    Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent but shall be filed as
    a public document with the clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title,
    Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter Publishing Company and to
    West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.
    ¶2     Karen Jo King and Thomas A. King (the Kings) brought a complaint against Jay D.
    Ratliff and Kari L. Ratliff (the Ratliffs), Louie Van Setten and Betty Van Setten (the Van
    Settens), Catherine A. Dockter (Dockter) and Skip Laverdure (Laverdure) in September of
    1999 in the Ninth Judicial District Court, Teton County. The Kings maintained that the
    waste water from the Ratliffs’ seasonal flood irrigation, which flowed onto the Kings’
    property, was a nuisance and an intentional trespass, thus the Kings sought to permanently
    enjoin the Ratliffs from diverting the waste water from the irrigation onto the Kings’
    property. In 2002, the cases against the Van Settens, Dockter, and Laverdure were dismissed
    and the case against the Ratliffs proceeded to trial. The District Court permanently enjoined
    the Ratliffs from discharging any waste water onto the Kings’ property. The Ratliffs appeal
    and we affirm.
    ¶3     We restate the issues on appeal as follows:
    ¶4     1. Whether the Kings were entitled to injunctive relief.
    ¶5     2. Whether the District Court erred when it found that the Ratliffs’ irrigation
    practices caused erosion on the Kings’ property.
    2
    ¶6     3. Whether the injunction was properly tailored.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶7     In 1998, the Ratliffs purchased property from the Van Settens. This property lies
    adjacent to and to the South of the Kings’ property. Just as the Van Settens had done before
    them, the Ratliffs grow barley on the property and flood irrigate the barley for a period of
    eight to ten days each year. After irrigation, some of the waste water flows to a culvert in
    the northeast corner of the barley field.
    ¶8     The culvert is 30-feet long and 15-inches wide and the discharge end of the culvert
    is underneath the Kings’ fence at the top of a coulee that is wholly on the Kings’ property.
    The coulee has no permanent flow of water, except for a spring, which only seeps water.
    The coulee runs in a northerly direction and connects with Muddy Creek (the Creek), which
    also runs through the Kings’ property.
    ¶9     Due to the waste water being discharged on their land, and because of a problem with
    a road over which they had an easement, the Kings brought a complaint against the Ratliffs,
    the Van Settens, Dockter, and Laverdure in September of 1999. The Kings contended, in
    their complaint, that the waste water discharge on their property was a nuisance and an
    intentional trespass. The Kings asked the District Court for damages “for erosion and
    contamination of ground water caused by [the Ratliffs’] continuing trespass and nuisance
    cause by run off water,” and for abatement of the nuisance.
    ¶10    In 2002, the cases against the Van Settens, Dockter and Laverdure were dismissed and
    the case against the Ratliffs proceeded to trial. During the trial, the parties came to an
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    agreement regarding the easement, but could not resolve the dispute concerning the waste
    water discharge. At the conclusion of the trial, the District Court determined that the Kings
    were entitled to injunctive relief because “enjoining Defendants Ratliff from discharging the
    waste water from flood irrigation on the barley field onto Plaintiffs’ property and allowing
    Defendants Ratliff to correct the problem at their means and costs best balances the equities
    in this matter.”
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶11    We review a district court’s grant or denial of an injunction to determine if the court
    manifestly abused its discretion. Shammel v. Canyon Resources Corp., 
    2003 MT 372
    , ¶ 12,
    
    319 Mont. 132
    , ¶ 12, 
    82 P.3d 912
    , ¶ 12.
    DISCUSSION
    ISSUE ONE
    ¶12    Whether the Kings were entitled to injunctive relief.
    ¶13    On appeal the Ratliffs argue that an injunction was not appropriate because there were
    legal remedies available.
    ¶14    The Ratliffs first contend, citing Curran v. Dept. of Highways (1993), 
    258 Mont. 105
    ,
    109, 
    852 P.2d 544
    , 546, that if a party’s “loss can be compensated . . . it is not an irreparable
    injury.” Though they allude to the fact that the waste water discharge onto the Kings’
    property is not an irreparable injury because the Kings can be compensated, the Ratliffs do
    not point to any evidence in the record that supports that supposition.
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    ¶15    Rule 23(a)(4), M.R.App.P., states that the argument section of a brief “shall contain
    the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor,
    with citations to the authorities, statutes and pages of the record relied on.” Because the
    Ratliffs have failed to adequately support this argument in their brief, we will not address it.
    ¶16    Next, the Ratliffs point to § 27-30-301, MCA, and the District Court’s order, which
    referred to abatement, for proof that abatement of the problem was also an available remedy.
    Section 27-30-301, MCA, reads: “The remedies against a private nuisance are: (1) a civil
    action; or (2) abatement.” As far as this court is able to discern, the problem was abated.
    The Ratliffs were not enjoined from continuing their flood irrigation practices; indeed, they
    are still free to flood irrigate. They simply cannot allow waste water to be discharged onto
    the Kings’ property. In other words, the injunction mandates abatement of the nuisance.
    Barring any further explanation from the Ratliffs of what their intent was in invoking § 27-
    30-301(2), MCA, we again refuse to consider the Ratliffs’ legal remedies argument any
    further.
    ¶17    Therefore, we conclude that the District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion
    when it enjoined the Ratliffs from permitting waste water to flood the Kings’ property.
    ISSUE TWO
    ¶18 Whether the District Court erred when it found that the Ratliffs’ irrigation practices
    caused erosion on the Kings’ property.
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    ¶19    The Ratliffs next argue that an injunction was not appropriate because the District
    Court erred in finding that the Ratliffs’ irrigation practices caused erosion on the Kings’
    property.
    ¶20    The record reveals that both Karen Jo King and Thomas A. King testified that there
    was erosion on their property due to the waste water flow. Jay Ratliff testified that “[f]rom
    [his] property . . . [he] could not see any erosion” and Van Setten, the previous property
    owner, testified that when he went out to the property, to the head of the coulee, he did not
    see any erosion. Alan Rollo, the Sun River Watershed Coordinator who was working on key
    parts of erosion issues on Muddy Creek, testified that there was minor erosion in the wooded
    area of the coulee and the area showed some instability. In addition to this testimony, both
    parties presented pictures and videotapes of the coulee area depicting erosion, according to
    the Kings, or lack thereof, according to the Ratliffs.
    ¶21    Based on this evidence, the District Court found that the “addition of the waste water
    to the coulee has caused soft, unstable soil . . . ;” that the Kings, on occasion have been
    unable to cross the bottom of the coulee because the water has eroded the banks; and that the
    banks along Muddy Creek, because of the addition of the waste water to the coulee, have
    eroded.
    ¶22    We have held:
    This Court’s function in reviewing findings of fact in a civil action tried by a
    district court without a jury is not to substitute its judgment in place of the trier
    of facts but rather it is confined to determining whether the findings of fact are
    clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P. Although conflicts may exist in the
    6
    evidence presented, it is the duty and function of the trial judge to resolve such
    conflicts.
    ...
    [I]t is the trial court’s office to resolve inconsistencies in the testimony, and
    where the evidence, fully considered, furnishes reasonable grounds for
    different conclusions, the findings of the trial court will not be disturbed.
    Meridian Minerals Co. v. Nicor Minerals, Inc. (1987), 
    228 Mont. 274
    , 282-83, 
    742 P.2d 456
    , 461.
    ¶23    Hence, we cannot and will not substitute our judgment for that of the District Court.
    We see nothing in the District Court record to indicate that the District Court’s findings as
    to erosion were clearly erroneous. As such, we hold that the District Court did not err in
    finding that the Ratliffs’ irrigation practices caused erosion on the Kings’ property.
    ISSUE THREE
    ¶24    Whether the injunction was properly tailored.
    ¶25    The Ratliffs’ last argument concerning the impropriety of the injunction is that it was
    not properly tailored and that the injunction surpassed the remedy necessary to eliminate any
    injurious features of the Ratliffs’ irrigation techniques.
    ¶26    We fail to see how this injunction was not properly tailored. As previously noted, the
    Ratliffs are still free to flood irrigate. They simply cannot allow waste water to be
    discharged onto the Kings’ property. This appears to us to be a proper balance.
    ¶27    Accordingly, we hold that the injunction was properly tailored and we affirm the
    District Court’s decision.
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    ¶28   Affirmed.
    /S/ JAMES C. NELSON
    We Concur:
    /S/ KARLA M. GRAY
    /S/ JOHN WARNER
    /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
    /S/ JIM RICE
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Document Info

Docket Number: 03-013

Citation Numbers: 2004 MT 171N

Filed Date: 6/29/2004

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014