Grimes v. Rantz , 2013 MT 118N ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                                          April 30 2013
    DA 12-0692
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    2013 MT 118N
    BURLY MICHAEL GRIMES,
    Plaintiff and Appellant,
    v.
    LIZ RANTZ, MEDICAL DIRECTOR, MONTANA
    STATE PRISON, (Individual Capacity),
    Defendant and Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM:          District Court of the First Judicial District,
    In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. BDV-2012-505
    Honorable Jeffrey M. Sherlock, Presiding Judge
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Burly Michael Grimes, self-represented; Deer Lodge, Montana
    For Appellee:
    Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General; Ira Eakin, McKenzie
    Hannan, Special Assistant Attorneys General; Helena, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: April 3, 2013
    Decided: April 30, 2013
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
    Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
    serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
    Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
    Reports.
    ¶2     Burly Michael Grimes (Grimes), appeals from the order entered in this matter by
    the First Judicial District Court on October 22, 2012, which granted the motion to dismiss
    this matter filed by Liz Rantz (Rantz). This is a declaratory action that is related to a tort
    action also filed by Grimes in the First Judicial District Court against Rantz. The tort
    action alleges negligence and violation of Grimes’s civil rights by Rantz as a result of
    Rantz’s alleged refusal, in her capacity as medical director for the Department of
    Corrections, to authorize proper medical care for Grimes. The State’s Tort Defense
    Division is defending Rantz in that action pursuant to her contract with the State, which
    provides that the State will defend and indemnify Rantz for duties performed on behalf of
    the State pursuant to § 2-9-305, MCA. Section 2-9-305, MCA, governs immunization,
    defense, and indemnification of public officers and employees.
    ¶3     Grimes filed this declaratory action “seeking a formal decree as to the Statutory
    and Contractual legal standing” of Rantz. His petition alleges, and he argues on appeal,
    2
    that Rantz is not a state employee, but rather a private contractor who is not entitled to
    legal representation or indemnification by the State. He further argues that the provision
    of Rantz’s contract with the State that provides for indemnification constitutes an illegal
    object of contract. Grimes asserts that, without a declaration as to Rantz’s legal status,
    the provisions of § 2-9-305(5), MCA, “would prohibit [Grimes] from recovering
    judgment against [Rantz] separately should the State ‘suddenly decide to take the position
    that it owes [Rantz] no duty of indemnification.’”
    ¶4     Grimes’s briefing does not address the basis for the District Court’s granting of
    Rantz’s motion to dismiss, other than to argue that he has an unspecified constitutional
    right to the declaratory ruling he requests. The District Court reasoned that the question
    of whether Rantz is a state employee or a contractor may be an issue in the tort case, but
    cannot be answered in this declaratory proceeding. Issues such as whether the State
    would be required to pay damages to Grimes would also be determined in the tort
    proceeding. Thus, the District Court concluded that there was no justiciable controversy
    in this case and that Grimes sought only an advisory opinion.
    ¶5     “The decision to dismiss a complaint for declaratory relief is within the sound
    discretion of the district court.” Renville v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 
    2003 MT 103
    , ¶ 9, 
    315 Mont. 295
    , 
    69 P.3d 217
     (citation omitted).
    ¶6     We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of
    our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for noncitable memorandum opinions. The
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    issues in this case are ones of judicial discretion and there clearly was not an abuse of
    discretion. Any legal issues are controlled by settled law and were correctly interpreted
    by the District Court.
    /S/ JIM RICE
    We concur:
    /S/ MIKE McGRATH
    /S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
    /S/ PATRICIA COTTER
    /S/ BETH BAKER
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-0692

Citation Numbers: 2013 MT 118N

Filed Date: 4/30/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014