State v. Hoppe ( 1997 )

No. 95-185
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1997
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
WALTER PAUL HOPPE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Ravalli,
The Honorable Ed McLean, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
William F. Hooks, State Appellate Defender,
Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General,
Jennifer Anders, Ass't Attorney General, Helena
Montana
George Corn, Ravalli County Attorney, Hamilton
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 21, 1996
Decided: January 30, 1997
Filed:
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3 (c), Montana Supreme Court
1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be
cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public
document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its
result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing
Company.
The Appellant, Walter Hoppe (Hoppe), appeals from the Twenty-
First Judicial District Court's revocation of his five-year
deferred imposition of sentence for felony assault and six-month
deferred imposition of sentence for domestic abuse. We affirm.
The issues before this Court are as follows:
1) Did the District Court have authority to enforce the
terms of Hoppe's deferred imposition of sentence before
the written judgment had been filed?
2) Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying
Hoppe's motion to withdraw his guilty plea?
BACKGROUND
In November of 1991, the State of Montana (State) moved the
District Court, Ravalli County, for leave to file an Information
against Hoppe. The Information charged Hoppe with committing the
crimes of misdemeanor domestic abuse and felony assault. Hoppe was
arraigned in District Court and entered pleas of not guilty to both
offenses. In July of 1992, a plea agreement was executed by Hoppe
and counsel of record. Hoppe withdrew his pleas of not guilty and
entered pleas of guilty
2
On July 21, 1992, the District Court conducted a hearing in
which it deferred imposition of Hoppe's sentence for three years on
the felony assault charge and six months on the domestic abuse
charge. The terms of the deferment were to run concurrently on
certain conditions, including the condition that Hoppe "not possess
or consume any intoxicants." After the hearing, Hoppe was released
and placed under the supervision of the Adult Probation and Parole
Division of the Department of Institutions. The District Court's
written Judgment was not filed with the clerk of court until July
31, 1992.
On July 23, 1992, eight days before the written judgment was
filed, Hoppe pled guilty to driving under the influence. The State
petitioned to revoke Hoppe's deferred imposition of sentence
alleging that his conviction for driving under the influence
constituted a violation of his conditions of probation and parole.
On August 18, Hoppe appeared with counsel before the District Court
for disposition. At the hearing, Hoppe attempted to justify his
behavior by explaining that he was merely having his last drinks of
alcohol as he was not going to be able to drink for three years
(the length of his deferral term). Following the hearing, the
District Court found Hoppe guilty of violating the terms of the
deferred imposition of sentence and revoked the deferred imposition
of sentence. Hoppe was sentenced to a five-year prison term on the
felony assault charge and a six-month term on the misdemeanor
domestic abuse charge.
In a September of 1992 hearing, Hoppe moved to withdraw his
guilty pleas. In support of his request, Hoppe alleged that his
3
attorney told him that his wife would be convicted of perjury if he
went to trial. Hoppe alleged that his counsel told him that "if I
did not plead guilty to the charges of the state, that my wife
would be charged with perjury and that she would go to jail."
Hoppe's counsel denied this characterization. Hoppe's counsel
stated that he had explained to the Hoppes that since Mrs. Hoppe
had previously given a tape-recorded statement, and that if her
trial testimony were contrary to the taped statement, there was a
possibility the State would elect to charge her with perjury. The
District Court orally denied Hoppe's motion.
Two years later, Hoppe filed a petition for post-conviction
relief. In January of 1995, the District Court ordered that the
petition for post-conviction relief be dismissed on procedural
grounds, "as all grounds asserted in the Petition are appealable
issues and, thus, Mr. Hoppe may not seek relief on those grounds
pursuant to a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief." However, the
District Court also granted Hoppe leave to file an amended petition
"regarding any ineffective assistance of counsel claims Mr. Hoppe
may wish to raise in this matter." After reviewing Hoppe's
petition, the District Court concluded that Hoppe had been given
effective assistance of counsel. The District Court issued a
Second Amended Judgment in December of 1995, declaring Hoppe guilty
of violating the terms and conditions of the deferred imposition of
sentence and designating Hoppe a non-dangerous offender. Following
the disposition of these matters before the District Court, Hoppe
filed the instant appeal challenging the District Court's
4
jurisdiction to revoke his deferred imposition of sentence and the
District Court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Both issues in this case involve the District court 's
interpretation of the law. The standard of review of a district
court's conclusions of law is whether the court's interpretation of
the law is correct. Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co.
(1995), 271 Mont. 459, 898 P.2d 680; Steer, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 474-75, 803 P.2d 601, 603-04. This
Court reviews a district court's sentencing decision for legality
only and will not disturb the decision unless the district court
abused its discretion. State v. DeSalvo (1995), 273 Mont. 343,
346, 903 P.2d 202, 204 (citing State v. Blanchard (1995), 270 Mont.
11, 17, 889 P.2d 1180, 1182).
DISCUSSION
1) Did the District Court have authority to enforce the
conditions of Hoppe's deferred imposition of sentence
before the written judgment had been filed?
At a July 21, 1992 hearing, the District Court deferred
imposition of sentence by explaining:
No cause appearing why sentence should not be
imposed, it is hereby the judgment of this Court that
you're guilty of the underlying offenses, to wit:
Assault, a felony, and domestic abuse, a misdemeanor.
It is further the judgment of this Court that the
imposition of sentence be deferred for a period of three
years on each count. The sentences are to run concurrent
to each other on the following conditions:
. .
5
You will not consume any intoxicants. You will not
possess any intoxicants. You will not go into any
establishment whose principal business is the sale of
intoxicants; that includes bars and casinos.
Following the hearing, the court placed Hoppe under the supervision
of Adult Probation and Parole and ordered him subject to all of its
terms and conditions. Next, Hoppe met with his probation officer
and read and signed the Montana rules of probation. The Montana
rules of probation signed by Hoppe included the following
condition:
You shall comply with all city, county, state, and
federal laws and ordinances and conduct yourself as a
good citizen. You shall report any arrests or contacts
with law enforcement to your Probation/Parole Officer
within 72 hours.
Two days after the hearing, Hoppe was arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol and subsequently pled guilty to that
charge. In light of this arrest, the State petitioned to revoke
Hoppe's deferred imposition of sentence, alleging that Hoppe
violated one of the conditions of deferment by driving under the
influence. On the same day the State petitioned to revoke Hoppe's
sentence, the District Court signed and filed the written judgment
with the clerk of court.
Hoppe contends that the District Court's oral sentence had no
final effect. He contends the District Court did not have
jurisdiction to enforce the conditions of the deferred imposition
of sentence since it had not yet been reduced to writing. In
support of this contention, Howe cites to State v. Enfinger
(1986), 222 Mont. 438, 722 P.2d 1170. In Enfinser, the district
court failed to include a dangerous offender designation at the
6
oral sentencing. On the same day it orally sentenced Enfinger, and
before filing its written judgment, the district court brought
Enfinger back into court for an additional hearing. The court
explained that it had failed to state its reasons for imposing the
sentences earlier and that it was necessary to do so. Enfinser,
722 P.2d at 1171. Over Enfinger's objections, the district court
found Enfinger to be a dangerous offender. In affirming the
district court's sentence, the Court held, "I [ilt is well
established that an oral ruling by the trial court is not a final
judgment, and that the trial court can change such ruling at any
time before the entry of written judgment." Enfinaer, 722 P.2d at
1174 (quoting State v. Diaz (N.M. 19831, 673 P.2d 501, 502.
However, this Court's holding in Enfinser that an oral sentence is
not "final" is not dispositive of the issue in this appeal.
In contrast to Enfincfer, the present case presents the issue
of whether the court has the authority to enforce orally pronounced
conditions, rather than whether the district court has the
authority to modify a sentence. Here, Hoppe had been fully
informed of the conditions of deferment orally "rendered in open
court" as required by law. Section 46-18-102, MCA. Hoppe was
present during the District Court's oral pronouncement, he met with
his probation officer, and read and signed the Montana rules of
probation. Hoppe was fully informed of the conditions of his
deferment and he violated those conditions. We hold that Hoppe's
conditions of deferment were effective upon pronouncement in open
court and subject to enforcement from that point on. Accordingly,
7
we affirm the District Court's decision to enforce the conditions
of Hoppe's deferred imposition of sentence.
2) Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying
Hoppe's motion to withdraw his guilty plea?
A trial judge's decision not to allow the withdrawal of a
guilty plea will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion. State
v. Miller (1991), 248 Mont. 194, 197, 810 P.2d 308, 309. The
standard for allowing the withdrawal of a guilty plea is "good
cause." Section 46-16-105(2), MCA. A change of plea should be
permitted only if it appears that the defendant was ignorant of his
rights and the consequences of his act, or was unduly and
improperly influenced either by hope or fear in making the plea, or
if it appears the plea was entered under some mistake or
apprehension. Miller, 810 P.2d at 310. The three factors which
are to be considered when determining whether a defendant's guilty
plea should be withdrawn include:
1. The adequacy of the District Court's interrogation
as to the defendant's understanding of the plea;
2. The promptness of the motion to withdraw the prior
plea;
3. The fact that the defendant's plea was apparently
the result of a plea bargain in which the guilty plea was
given in exchange for dismissal of another charge.
Miller, 810 P.2d at 309. In the instant case, Hoppe does not
maintain that the plea bargain he entered into with the State was
coercive. Rather, Hoppe pled guilty believing that if he proceeded
to trial, and if his wife testified she would be prosecuted for
perjury. Since Hoppe does not contend that the plea bargain he
8
entered into with the State was coercive, we will focus on the
adequacy of the District Court's interrogation as to Hoppe's
understanding of the plea.
At the hearing to change Hoppe's plea from not guilty to
guilty, the District court inquired of Hoppe as to his
understanding of the consequences of his change of plea. The court
asked Hoppe whether he understood his rights and understood that a
guilty plea was a waiver of those rights. Further, the court
established the specific factual basis for Hoppe's plea of guilty.
Hoppe explained that he realized he was waiving many of his rights
and admitted to having committed the crime. In addition, the court
asked Hoppe whether he had been threatened, whether he understood
the terms of his plea change, whether his plea was voluntary, and
whether he was under the influence of medication. Hoppe explained
that his plea was voluntary, and that he had not been influenced in
making the plea. Following these questions, the District Court
made the following findings:
I'll find further that he understands the nature of
the charges and fully understands the consequences of his
guilty pleas; further, that there have been no promises
made to him other than the plea bargain agreement; that
he understands the sentencing judge is not bound by that
agreement; that there have been no threats made against
him; that this is a voluntary plea on his part; that he
is satisfied with the competence of his counsel; that he
is not suffering from any mental or physical disability
such as he does not understand the proceedings or such as
might induce him to plead guilty; further, I'll make the
same finding concerning the medication and that he is not
under the influence of any other drugs or alcohol.
It is clear from the record that Hoppe was fully advised as to the
consequences of a change of plea and proceeded to change his plea
voluntarily.
9
Two months after he was originally sentenced and one month
after revocation of his deferred imposition of sentence, HoPPe
moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Hoppe contended that he pled
guilty to protect his wife and his marriage vows. NOW that his
wife has left the jurisdiction and he no longer feels compulsion to
protect her, he seeks to withdraw his guilty plea. The District
Court found that the motion was not timely and that it did not
state sufficient reasons to allow withdrawal of the plea. Aside
from whether the motion was timely or not, we agree with the
District Court's holding that the grounds asserted in the motion do
not warrant a withdrawal of the plea. Hoppe's original plea was
entered after a thorough and adequate interrogation by the District
Court and was not the result of any coercion by the State or his
counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the District
Court.
We concur: