Allen v. Hubbard , 309 Mont. 375 ( 2002 )


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  •                                          No. 01-561
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    
    2002 MT 95
    STEPHEN G. ALLEN and CYNTHIA A. ALLEN,
    Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants/Respondents,
    v.
    D.L. HUBBARD,
    Defendant/Counterclaimant/Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM:         District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
    In and for the County of Missoula,
    The Honorable Edward P. McLean, Judge presiding.
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Robert J. Phillips, Phillips & Bohyer, Missoula, Montana
    For Respondents:
    Richard A. Reep, Kristine J. Beal, Reep, Spoon & Gordon, Missoula,
    Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: January 17, 2002
    Decided: May 9, 2002
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1    Duncan Hubbard appeals from the Opinion and Order of the
    Fourth     Judicial     District      Court,     Missoula   County,   dismissing
    Hubbard’s appeal from small claims court as untimely.                 We affirm.
    ¶2    The following issue is dispositive of this appeal:
    ¶3    Did the District Court err by including weekends and holidays
    when it calculated the ten-day, statutory appeal time set forth in
    § 25-35-803, MCA?
    BACKGROUND
    ¶4      The relevant facts in this case are few and undisputed.
    Stephen G. Allen and Cynthia A. Allen (collectively, the “Allens”)
    sued Hubbard to recover land survey costs.                On December 12, 2000,
    Justice of the Peace Karen A. Orzech of the Justice Court, Missoula
    County, Small Claims Division, entered a judgment in Allen’s favor.
    Hubbard filed a Notice of Appeal on December 27, 2000.                   Judge
    Edward McLean dismissed Hubbard’s appeal as untimely and awarded
    fees and costs to the Allens on May 21, 2001.               Hubbard appeals the
    District Court’s dismissal.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶5    We review a district court’s conclusions of law de novo to
    determine whether they are correct.                See Babcock v. Farmers Ins.
    Exch., 
    2000 MT 114
    , ¶ 5, 
    299 Mont. 407
    , ¶ 5, 
    999 P.2d 347
    , ¶ 5.
    2
    DISCUSSION
    ¶6    Did the District Court err by including weekends and holidays
    when it calculated the ten-day, statutory appeal time set forth in
    § 25-35-803, MCA?
    ¶7    A party has ten days to file a notice of appeal with the
    district court if dissatisfied with the judgment of a small claims
    court.       See § 25-35-803, MCA.            Here, Hubbard waited fifteen
    calendar days to file his notice of appeal to the District Court.
    He argues, however, that when calculating the statutory time limit,
    a    court    should   not    include       weekends   or   holidays   in   its
    calculations.     Under such a calculation, Hubbard would have filed
    his notice of appeal exactly ten days after the date of the small
    claims court’s judgment.
    ¶8    When interpreting a statute, we look to the plain meaning of
    the words.     See State v. Fauque, 
    2000 MT 168
    , ¶ 10, 
    300 Mont. 307
    ,
    ¶ 10, 
    4 P.3d 651
    , ¶ 10.           Our aim is “simply to ascertain and
    declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to
    insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted.”
    Section 1-2-101, MCA.        If the language is clear and unambiguous, we
    do not need to conduct further interpretations.             See Fauque, ¶ 10.
    ¶9    The language of § 25-35-803, MCA, is clear concerning the
    length of time a party has to file an appeal.                It states that,
    “[a]n appeal shall be commenced by giving written notice to the
    small claims court and serving a copy of the notice of appeal on
    the adverse party within 10 days after entry of judgment.”             Section
    3
    25-35-803(1), MCA.    Hubbard, however, urges us to look at two other
    statutory   provisions    to    conclude   that   we   should    not    include
    weekends or holidays in our calculations.
    ¶10   Hubbard first directs us to the Montana Uniform Rules for the
    Justice and City Courts (the “Uniform Rules”).              Rule 21 of the
    Uniform Rules states that “[w]hen the period of time prescribed or
    allowed is ten days or less, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and
    legal holidays shall be excluded.”          Hubbard argues that Rule 21
    applies because Rule 1(a) of the Uniform Rules states that “[t]hese
    rules, together with the Montana Justice and City Court Rules of
    Civil Procedure, govern the practice in all justice and city courts
    of the State of Montana.”       Contrasting the language of the Uniform
    Rules with that of the Montana Justice and City Court Rules of
    Civil Procedure, the latter of which specifically excludes small
    claims   actions   from   its    scope,    Hubbard     maintains   that    the
    Legislature clearly intended the Uniform Rules to apply to small
    claims actions.      Compare Rule 1, Mont. Justice and City Court
    R.Civ.P. (stating that “[t]hese rules govern the procedure in the
    justice and city courts . . . except in small claims actions.”
    (emphasis added)) with Rule 1(a) Mont. Unif. R. for the Justice and
    City Courts (stating that “[t]hese rules . . . govern the practice
    in all justice and city courts,” without mentioning small claims
    actions).    Examining    the    language   of    both   the    Small   Claims
    Procedure and the Uniform Rules, however, we cannot agree that the
    Uniform Rules apply to § 25-35-803, MCA.
    4
    ¶11   The    rules   for    Small    Claims   Procedure     vary   in     several
    significant ways from the Uniform Rules.                  For instance, Small
    Claims Procedure rules do not allow for a form of pleadings other
    than a complaint or counterclaim.             See § 25-35-607, MCA.             The
    Uniform Rules, on the other hand, allow for answers and motions for
    orders.      See Rules 8 & 9, Mont. Justice and City Court R.Civ.P.
    Additionally,     Small    Claims    Procedure    rules    limit   the    use   of
    counsel, while the Uniform Rules specifically allow counsel to
    represent a party.     Compare § 25-35-505, MCA, with Rule 14, Uniform
    Rules.      Given these differences, we cannot agree that the Uniform
    Rules necessarily apply to all procedures in small claims actions.
    ¶12   Alternatively,       Hubbard     suggests    we     apply    Rule     6(a),
    M.R.Civ.P., when calculating         the time allowed in § 25-35-803, MCA.
    Rule 6(a) states that “[w]hen the period of time prescribed or
    allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and
    holidays shall be excluded in the computation.”              In support of his
    argument, Hubbard directs us to several of our prior decisions for
    the proposition that Rule 6 applies to appeals to the District
    Court.      None of these cases, however, deals with an appeal from a
    small claims court.        See In re Adoption of S.E. (1988), 
    232 Mont. 31
    , 
    755 P.2d 27
     (applying Rule 2 of the Uniform Rules, which
    specifically cites Rule 6(a), to a post-hearing motion in district
    court); DeTienne Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Montana Rail Link, Inc.
    (1993), 
    261 Mont. 238
    , 
    862 P.2d 1106
     (interpreting Rule 6(a) in
    context of a motion for a new trial in district court); State, By
    and Through Dept. of Highways v. Helehan (1977), 
    171 Mont. 473
    , 559
    
    5 P.2d 817
     (applying Rule 6(a) to Rule 6(e) in context of an appeal
    from a commissioners’ award).
    ¶13    Hubbard also relies on Rule 1, M.R.Civ.P, which defines the
    scope of the Rules of Civil Procedure.               Rule 1 states that the
    Rules “govern the procedure in the district courts of the state of
    Montana . . . with the exceptions stated in Rule 81.”                  In turn,
    Rule    81(b)   states    that   “[t]hese   rules    do    not    supersede   the
    provisions of statutes relating to appeals to or review by the
    district courts, but shall govern procedure and practice relating
    thereto insofar as these rules are not inconsistent with such
    statutes.”      We do not dispute that situations will arise where
    these three provisions must work in concert to complement each
    other.     Nevertheless, we find Hubbard’s arguments unpersuasive in
    this case.
    ¶14    The language of § 25-35-803, MCA, is unambiguous.             It clearly
    states that a party has ten days in which to file a notice of
    appeal, without mentioning the exclusion of weekends and holidays.
    The fact that other chapters of the code make such an exclusion is
    notable.    In general, the Montana Unified Rules for the Justice and
    City Courts govern justice and city courts, the Montana Rules of
    Civil    Procedure   govern      district   courts   and    the    Small   Claims
    Procedure governs small claims courts.               See generally, Rule 1,
    M.R.Civ.P.; Rule 1 Mont. Unif. R. for the Justice and City Courts;
    § 25-35-501, MCA.        Two of the three statutory regimes provide that
    courts should not count weekends and holidays when calculating
    6
    times.   The rules of Small Claims Procedure, however, offer no such
    provision.
    ¶15    We will not ignore such a noticeable absence from the Small
    Claims Procedure’s language.       If the Legislature wished to exclude
    weekends and holidays from the calculation in § 25-35-803, MCA,
    they could easily have done so, as Rule 21 of the Uniform Rules and
    Rule   6(a),   M.R.Civ.P.,   do.    Therefore,   we   conclude   that   the
    District Court was correct when it included holidays and weekends
    when calculating the ten-day limit in § 25-35-803, MCA.
    ¶16    As a final matter, the Allens request attorney’s fees and
    costs under § 24-35-806, MCA.         The section they cite, however,
    applies only to appeals from a small claims court to a district
    court.    The Allens thus cite no authority that supports their
    request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal from the District
    Court.    Therefore, we will not grant the Allens their request for
    attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal.      We note only that, as the
    prevailing party, the Allens are automatically entitled to costs
    under Rule 33, M.R.App.P.
    ¶17    Affirmed.
    /S/ JIM REGNIER
    We Concur:
    /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
    /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
    /S/ JIM RICE
    7
    Justice Patricia O. Cotter dissents.
    ¶18    I dissent.      As the Court points out at ¶ 4 of its Opinion,
    Hubbard filed a notice of appeal from a decision entered in favor
    of    Allen   in    "Justice     Court,    Missoula     County,   Small      Claims
    Division."      The Montana Uniform Rules for the Justice and City
    Courts ("Uniform Rules") apply by their own language to Justice and
    City courts.        Small Claims Court is a division of Justice Court.
    As the majority acknowledges in ¶ 10 of its Opinion, Rule 21 of the
    Uniform Rules clearly provides that, "when the period of time
    prescribed or allowed is ten days or less, intermediate Saturdays,
    Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded."              The rule is clear
    and unequivocal.        Nonetheless, the majority has concluded               that
    Hubbard should have gone beyond this Uniform Rule and performed an
    analysis of other rules, including the Montana Justice and City
    Court Rules of Civil Procedure, before determining whether Uniform
    Rule 21 actually applied to his case.              I disagree.
    ¶19   The Uniform Rules do not exclude from their purview actions
    which take place in the Small Claims division of the Justice Court.
    Hubbard was therefore entitled to rely on those rules, and should
    not   lose    his    appellate    rights      because   another   set   of   rules
    contradicts the Uniform Rules which, on their face, appeared to
    apply squarely to his case.
    ¶20 Rule 81(b), M.R.Civ.P., also supports Hubbard’s position.                    It
    provides:
    These rules [The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure] do not
    supersede the provisions of statutes relating to appeals
    to or review by the district courts, but shall govern
    procedure and practice relating thereto insofar as these
    rules are not inconsistent with such statutes.
    8
    The majority has cited no statute which specifies that intervening
    weekends and holidays are not to be included in the ten-day time
    frame set forth in § 25-35-803, MCA.   Therefore, the application of
    Rule 6(a), M.R.Civ.P., to Hubbard’s notice of appeal would not be
    inconsistent with any statutes governing Small Claims procedures.
    So, under Rule 81, Rule 6(a) ought to apply.
    ¶21   It seems to me that we should apply statutes in a manner
    consistent with Hubbard’s right to appeal, instead of seeking
    statutory interpretations which defeat it.    I dissent.
    /S/ PATRICIA COTTER
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-561

Citation Numbers: 2002 MT 95, 309 Mont. 375

Judges: Cotter, Leaphart, Regnier, Rice, Trieweiler

Filed Date: 5/9/2002

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/6/2023