Wolfe v. Schulz Refrigeration ( 1979 )


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  •                                     No. 14385
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    1979
    ROBERT WOLFE and FRANCIS WOLFE,
    his wife, d/b/a THE MINT BAR,
    Plaintiffs and Appellants,
    SCHULZ REFRIGERATION,
    Defendants and Respondents.
    Appeal from:        District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
    Honorable Edward Dussault, Judge presiding.
    Counsel of Record:
    For Appellants:
    Morrison Law Firm, Missoula, Montana
    Joan Jonkel argued, Missoula, Montana
    For Respondents:
    Boone, Karlberg & Haddon, Missoula, Montana
    Sam Haddon argued, Missoula, Montana
    Submitted:    September 19, 1979
    -- .                      .
    Decided:.. ,        . -. , -
    ...
    .,.
    &A ' ,
    =
    .
    3               ,, .   -   ---
    Filed:
    Clerk
    M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f
    t h e Court.
    c his a p p e a l i s t a k e n by t h e p l a i n t i f f s from t h e D i s -
    t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l of p l a i n t i f f s ' motion f o r a new t r i a l
    following a jury v e r d i c t f o r defendant.                     The p l a i n t i f f s a r e
    t h e owners and o p e r a t o r s o f t h e Mint Bar i n P o l s o n , Montana.
    P l a i n t i f f s purchased t h e b a r i n F e b r u a r y 1969 and managed i t
    a s a p a r t n e r s h i p u n t i l i t was d e s t r o y e d by f i r e on December
    5 , 1974.       The f i r e o r i g i n a t e d i n a s m a l l s t o r a g e room where
    c l e a n i n g m a t e r i a l s w e r e k e p t and i n which a t i m e c l o c k
    device w a s located.              The t i m e c l o c k s e r v e d t o r e g u l a t e t h e
    f l o w of e l e c t r i c i t y t o t h e b e e r c o o l e r t o p e r i o d i c a l l y
    d e f r o s t it.
    Defendant owns and o p e r a t e s a r e f r i g e r a t i o n sales and
    s e r v i c e business i n Polson.              D e f e n d a n t ' s employee r e p l a c e d
    t h e t i m e c l o c k mechanism i n p l a i n t i f f s ' b a r on August 11,
    1973.      T h i s r e p l a c e m e n t r e q u i r e d no e l e c t r i c a l w i r i n g and
    consisted s o l e l y of a t t a c h i n g four w i r e s already i n place t o
    t e r m i n a l s p r o v i d e d i n t h e t i m e c l o c k mechanism.         A t the t i m e
    of t h e o r i g i n a l i n s t a l l a t i o n , t h e w i r e s from t h e c i r c u i t
    b r e a k e r box t o t h e t i m e c l o c k were n o t p l a c e d i n c o n d u i t
    pipe.      Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t a t t h e t i m e of r e p l a c e m e n t h e
    p o i n t e d o u t t h e d a n g e r s o f t h e unencased w i r i n g t o p l a i n -
    t i f f s , b u t p l a i n t i f f s deny t h a t t h i s o c c u r r e d .    The a b s e n c e
    o f c o n d u i t e v e n t u a l l y a l l o w e d t h e i n s u l a t i o n on t h e w i r e s t o
    b e worn away as a r e s u l t o f e i t h e r v i b r a t i o n c a u s e d by a
    compressor u n i t o r by c l e a n i n g m a t e r i a l s , s u c h a s mops and
    brooms, r u b b i n g a g a i n s t t h e w i r e s .      With no p r o t e c t i v e
    c o v e r i n g on t h e w i r e s , t h e c u r r e n t a r c e d which, i n t u r n ,
    caused t h e f i r e .
    P l a i n t i f f s entered i n t o a contract f o r f i r e insurance
    w i t h T r a n s a m e r i c a I n s u r a n c e i n F e b r u a r y 1974.     A s a condi-
    t i o n f o r m a i n t a i n i n g p l a i n t i f f s a s i t s i n s u r e d s , Trans-
    america conducted a f i r e i n s p e c t i o n o f t h e p r e m i s e s on March
    1, 1974.         The i n s p e c t i o n r e p o r t d e s c r i b e d t h e e l e c t r i c a l
    s y s t e m a s "romex w i t h c i r c u i t b r e a k e r s and i t a p p e a r s t o be
    i n good c o n d i t i o n . "
    P l a i n t i f f s brought an a c t i o n f o r negligence a g a i n s t
    d e f e n d a n t t o r e c o v e r damages c a u s e d by t h e f i r e .           Defendant
    s o u g h t t o prove t h a t p l a i n t i f f s w e r e c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i -
    g e n t by f a i l i n g t o remedy t h e dangerous c o n d i t i o n of t h e
    wiring.             t h e c l o s e of t r i a l , t h e D i s t r i c t Court read
    s e v e r a l i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e jury.      Among t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s
    g i v e n w e r e I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 1 7 and 2 3 t o which p l a i n t i f f s
    objected.         I n s t r u c t i o n No. 17 s t a t e d :
    " F a i l u r e on t h e p a r t o f e i t h e r P l a i n t i f f t o l o c a t e
    o r r e c o g n i z e a d a n g e r o u s c o n d i t i o n on t h e p r e m i s e s
    o f t h e Mint B a r i s i n law a form o f c o n t r i b u t o r y
    n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t o f t h e P l a i n t i f f s i f s u c h
    f a i l u r e i s a p r o x i m a t e c a u s e of t h e damages com-
    plained of."
    I n s t r u c t i o n No. 2 3 s t a t e d :
    " I f you f i n d from t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t T r a n s a m e r i c a
    I n s u r a n c e Company, i n u n d e r t a k i n g t o i n s p e c t t h e
    p r e m i s e s and t o l o c a t e and e l i m i n a t e any f i r e
    h a z a r d s p r e s e n t , a c t e d on b e h a l f o f i t s i n s u r e d s ,
    R o b e r t Wolfe and F r a n c e s Wolfe, such a c t s of
    T r a n s a m e r i c a are imputed t o i t s i n s u r e d s , R o b e r t
    Wolfe and F r a n c e s Wolfe."
    The j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t f o r d e f e n d a n t .      Plaintiffs
    f i l e d a motion f o r a new t r i a l a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t w a s r e n -
    d e r e d , c o n t e n d i n g t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t committed r e v e r s i b l e
    e r r o r i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury.       The t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d t h e
    motion f o r a new t r i a l and p l a i n t i f f s a p p e a l e d .             I n particu-
    l a r , p l a i n t i f f s c h a l l e n g e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e i s s u e s o f
    c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e and agency a s b e i n g e r r o n e o u s s t a t e -
    ments o f t h e law.
    Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s C o u r t on a p p e a l :
    1.    Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t commit r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i n
    g i v i n g a j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n which s t a t e d t h a t f a i l u r e on t h e
    p a r t of p l a i n t i f f s t o l o c a t e - r e c o g n i z e a dangerous c o n d i -
    or
    t i o n on t h e i r p r e m i s e s w a s c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e i f s u c h
    f a i l u r e w a s a p r o x i m a t e c a u s e of t h e damages?
    2.     Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t commit r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i n
    g i v i n g a j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n which s t a t e d t h a t t h e a c t s o f a
    p a r t y w e r e imputed t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s i f t h e p a r t y a c t e d on
    b e h a l f of t h e p l a i n t i f f s where t h e r e w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i -
    dence introduced a t t h e t r i a l regarding t h e elements of
    agency?
    T h i s C o u r t h a s had s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s t o c o n s i d e r t h e
    s u b j e c t of a l l e g e d e r r o r i n jury i n s t r u c t i o n s .     W e have
    previously held t h a t a p a r t y has t h e duty of r a i s i n g h i s
    o b j e c t i o n t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n a t t h e t i m e of t r i a l o r t h e
    opportunity i s l o s t .              R o b e r t s R e a l t y Corp. v. C i t y o f G r e a t
    F a l l s ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 
    160 Mont. 1
    4 4 , 154, 
    500 P.2d 956
    , 962.                 Objec-
    t i o n s t o i n s t r u c t i o n s n o t r a i s e d i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t cannot
    be r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l .       Seder v. K i e w i t
    Sons' Co.        ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 
    156 Mont. 322
    , 330, 
    479 P.2d 448
    , 452.                     We
    have a l s o r e q u i r e d a p a r t y t o s t a t e h i s ground f o r a n o b j e c -
    t i o n with s p e c i f i c i t y .     P i c k e t t v . Kyger     ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 
    1 Mont. 87
    , 96, 
    439 P.2d 57
    , 62; Kearns v . McIntyre Const. Co.
    Mont.
    Rule 51, M.R.Civ.P.,                 provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
    " O b j e c t i o n s made s h a l l s p e c i f y and s t a t e t h e p a r -
    t i c u l a r grounds on which t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i s ob-
    j e c t e d t o and it s h a l l n o t be s u f f i c i e n t i n
    s t a t i n g t h e ground of s u c h o b j e c t i o n t o s t a t e
    g e n e r a l l y t h e i n s t r u c t i o n does n o t state t h e l a w
    o r i s a g a i n s t t h e law, b u t s u c h ground o f o b j e c -
    t i o n s h a l l s p e c i f y p a r t i c u l a r l y where t h e i n -
    s t r u c t i o n i s i n s u f f i c i e n t o r does n o t s t a t e t h e
    law, o r what p a r t i c u l a r c l a u s e t h e r e i n i s ob-
    jected to."
    F i n a l l y , w e have d e t e r m i n e d t h a t , where e r r o r i s a l l e g e d
    i n a p a r t i c u l a r i n s t r u c t i o n , a reviewing c o u r t s h a l l c o n s i d e r
    the instructions i n their entirety.                            I n B r o t h e r s v . Town of
    V i r g i n i a C i t y ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 
    1 Mont. 352
    , 359, 
    558 P.2d 464
    , 468,
    we stated:
    "When d e t e r m i n i n g whether j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e
    properly given o r refused t h e reviewing c o u r t
    considers the instructions i n t h e i r entirety.
    F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e r e a d i n con-
    n e c t i o n w i t h o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n and t h e y
    a r e c o n s i d e r e d i n l i g h t of t h e e v i d e n c e adduced.
    ( C i t a t i o n o m i t t e d . ) Where t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o
    t h e j u r y i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y s t a t e t h e law a p p l i -
    cable t o t h e case, a p a r t y cannot c l a i m reversi-
    b l e e r r o r a s t o t h e g i v i n g o r denying of c e r t a i n
    instructions.                 (Citation omitted. ) "
    I n t h i s c a s e p l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t t h e giving of
    I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 7 c o n s t i t u t e d r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r .      Plaintiffs
    m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was a n o v e r b r o a d s t a t e m e n t o f
    t h e l a w i n t h a t i t imposed a d u t y on t h e p a r t of p l a i n t i f f s
    t o l o c a t e o r r e c o g n i z e a l l dangerous c o n d i t i o n s on t h e i r
    premises.          P l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n f a i l e d t o
    mention t h a t t h e law r e q u i r e d no more t h a n t h a t o f a n o r d i -
    n a r i l y p r u d e n t p e r s o n under t h e same c i r c u m s t a n c e s .          Plain-
    t i f f s argue t h a t t h e e r r o r prejudiced t h e i r s u b s t a n t i a l
    r i g h t s and was n o t c u r e d by t h e c o n t e x t of o t h e r i n s t r u c -
    t i o n s given.
    Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t I n s t r u c t i o n No. 17 was a p r o p e r
    and a c c u r a t e s t a t e m e n t of t h e l a w .        If the instruction was
    e r r o n e o u s , d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e e r r o r w a s c u r e d by t h e
    c o n t e x t of o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s and d i d n o t s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t
    o r p r e j u d i c e t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of p l a i n t i f f s .
    I n a n a l y z i n g t h e s e arguments, o u r a t t e n t i o n i s f i r s t
    drawn t o t h e grounds upon which p l a i n t i f f s o b j e c t e d t o t h e
    instruction a t trial.                  There, p l a i n t i f f s s t a t e d :
    "Plaintiffs object               ...         on t h e b a s i s t h a t it
    i m p l i e s t h a t p l a i n t i f f s a r e a b l e t o l o c a t e and
    r e c o g n i z e t h e d a n g e r o u s c o n d i t i o n . The e v i d e n c e
    uncontroveried before t h e Court i n t h e case i s
    t h a t n e i t h e r p l a i n t i f f w a s informed of t h e dan-
    gerous condition, o r t h a t they recognized the
    d a n g e r o u s c o n d i t i o n , and i t i s n o t s u b j e c t t o
    c l a i m o f c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e and n o t a p r o p e r
    instruction . ,             .     a l s o o b j e c t on t h e b a s i s t h a t
    i t p l a c e s a burden upon p l a i n t i f f s Wolfes which
    i s a burden which, under t h e f a c t s of t h i s case,
    t h e l a w d o e s n o t r e q u i r e them t o assume."
    I n e s s e n c e , p l a i n t i f f s ' o b j e c t i o n was t h a t I n s t r u c t i o n
    No. 1 7 p l a c e d a h i g h e r d u t y on p l a i n t i f f s t h a n t h a t f i x e d by
    law.      This Court has previously questioned t h e sufficiency
    of t h e s p e c i f i c i t y of t h i s o b j e c t i o n i n a s i m i l a r case.            In
    LeCompte v , W a r d e l l ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 
    134 Mont. 490
    , 498, 
    333 P.2d 1028
    , 1033, w e s t a t e d :
    "Defendants contend t h a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n giv-
    i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s No. 26 and 28 o v e r t h e i r ob-
    jection.          These i n s t r u c t i o n s i n e f f e c t made de-
    f e n d a n t s l i a b l e f o r a want of care toward p l a i n -
    t i f f i f t h e y knew o r i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f r e a s o n a b l e
    care s h o u l d have known t h a t p l a i n t i f f w a s p r e s e n t
    on d e f e n d a n t s ' p r o p e r t y . The o n l y o b j e c t i o n t o
    t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s was t h a t t h e y p l a c e d a h i g h e r
    d u t y upon d e f e n d a n t s t h a n t h a t f i x e d by law.
    Whether t h i s o b j e c t i o n w a s s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c
    ...        i s doubtful."
    Assuming f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f argument t h a t t h e o b j e c -
    t i o n w a s s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c , we think t h a t the i n s t r u c -
    t i o n w a s i n f a c t erroneous.             Where t h e law o f c o n t r i b u t o r y
    n e g l i g e n c e r e q u i r e s t h a t a p a r t y a c t a s a n o r d i n a r i l y pru-
    d e n t p e r s o n under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , S t e n b e r g v. B e a t r i c e
    Foods                          Mon t .
    294,    296, t h e i n s t r u c t i o n d o e s n o t temper t h e d u t y owed w i t h
    t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n t h a t t h e law e x p e c t s no more of a p e r s o n
    than i s reasonable.
    While e r r o n e o u s , however, t h e i n s t r u c t i o n w a s c u r e d by
    t h e c o n t e x t of o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n by t h e t r i a l c o u r t .
    The o m i s s i o n of t h e r e a s o n a b l e man t e s t i n I n s t r u c t i o n No.
    1 7 i s c u r e d by I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 1 0 and 12.                See Peek v .
    F o r b e s (Colo. App. 1 9 7 0 ) , 
    470 P.2d 85
    , 88.        I n s t r u c t i o n No.
    1 2 d e f i n e s c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e i n t e r m s of n e g l i g e n c e
    and I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 0 d e f i n e s n e g l i g e n c e a s t h e want o f
    c a r e o r s k i l l of a r e a s o n a b l e and p r u d e n t p e r s o n under t h e
    same c i r c u m s t a n c e s .    The r e a s o n a b l e man t e s t i s t h e r e f o r e
    provided.
    I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 2 s t a t e d :
    " C o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e i s n e g l i g e n c e on t h e
    p a r t of a c l a i m a n t which c o n t r i b u t e d a s a p r o x i -
    m a t e c a u s e t o h i s damages. A p e r s o n who i s con-
    t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t c a n n o t r e c o v e r f o r any
    damages s u s t a i n e d by him."
    I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 0 s t a t e d i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
    ". . .       n e g l i g e n c e means want o f s u c h o r d i n a r y
    care o r s k i l l .           Such want of o r d i n a r y c a r e o r
    s k i l l e x i s t s when t h e r e i s a f a i l u r e t o do t h a t
    which a r e a s o n a b l e and p r u d e n t p e r s o n would
    o r d i n a r i l y have done under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
    o f t h e s i t u a t i o n , o r d o i n g what s u c h p e r s o n
    under t h e e x i s t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s would n o t have
    done. "
    W e hold, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s giving of
    I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 7 d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r .
    Plaintiffs'          second i s s u e c o n c e r n s whether t h e g i v i n g o f
    I n s t r u c t i o n No.   23 was r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r .     P l a i n t i f f s argue
    on a p p e a l t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n w a s e r r o n e o u s b e c a u s e i t
    f a i l e d t o r e q u i r e t h e j u r y t o f i r s t e s t a b l i s h a n agency
    r e l a t i o n s h i p b e f o r e a p p l y i n g t h e i n s t r u c t i o n and b e c a u s e it
    f a i l e d t o d e f i n e what c o n s t i t u t e s a n agency r e l a t i o n s h i p .
    I n e s s e n c e , p l a i n t i f f s ' argument i s t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i s
    incomplete.
    I n s t r u c t i o n No. 23 e s s e n t i a l l y a s k e d t h e j u r y , by em-
    p l o y i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f agency, t o impute t h e a c t s of Trans-
    a m e r i c a t o p l a i n t i f f s Wolfe.        I n t h i s way, c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i -
    gence c o u l d be imputed t o t h e Wolfes b e c a u s e Transamerica
    had o r d e r e d a n i n s p e c t i o n of t h e Mint Bar p r e m i s e s which
    r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e w i r i n g was i n good c o n d i t i o n .          Agency, o f
    c o u r s e , i s t h e f i d u c i a r y r e l a t i o n which r e s u l t s i n t h e mani-
    f e s t a t i o n of c o n s e n t by one p e r s o n t h a t t h e o t h e r s h a l l a c t
    on h i s b e h a l f and a d h e r e t o h i s c o n t r o l and c o n s e n t by t h e
    other so t o act.              B u t l e r Mfg. Co. v. J .           &   L.   Implement Co.
    ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 
    167 Mont. 519
    , 523, 
    540 P.2d 962
    , 965.
    I n reviewing t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , our f i r s t concern i s
    whether t h e r e w a s s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o w a r r a n t t h e t r i a l
    court giving the instruction.                        I n t e g r a l t o any agency r e l a -
    t i o n s h i p a r e t h e e l e m e n t s o f c o n s e n t and c o n t r o l .      With r e -
    s p e c t t o t h e element of c o n t r o l , defendant introduced a t t h e
    t r i a l a r e p o r t of t h e i n s p e c t i o n which i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e
    f i e l d m a n , who conducted t h e i n s p e c t i o n , had c o n t a c t e d t h e
    Wolfes b e f o r e making t h e i n s p e c t i o n .            However, d u r i n g t h e
    t r i a l , t h e f i e l d m a n c o u l d n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y remember c o n t a c t i n g
    t h e Wolfes b u t t e s t i f i e d t h a t i t was h i s u s u a l b u s i n e s s p r a c -
    t i c e t o do s o .       Concerning t h e e l e m e n t o f c o n s e n t , t h e b r a n c h
    manager f o r p l a i n t i f f Transamerica t e s t i f i e d t h a t , i n o r d e r -
    i n g i n s p e c t i o n s , T r a n s a m e r i c a a t t e m p t s t o p r o t e c t t h r e e peo-
    ple:    t h e company, t h e a g e n t , and t h e i n s u r e d .              In t h i s sense,
    h e t e s t i f i e d t h a t T r a n s a m e r i c a a c t e d on b e h a l f of t h e p l a i n -
    t i f f s Wolfe.       However, d u r i n g r e d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n , t h e
    b r a n c h manager a l s o a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e f i e l d m a n w a s n e v e r
    employed o r h i r e d by t h e Wolfes.
    W e believe t h a t t h e evidence i s c l e a r l y i n s u f f i c i e n t a s
    a m a t t e r of law t o w a r r a n t t h e g i v i n g of ~ n s t r u c t i o nNo.             23
    and t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was e r r o n e o u s on t h i s ground.               ~erely
    c o n t a c t i n g a n owner and o b t a i n i n g p e r m i s s i o n t o i n s p e c t h i s
    p r e m i s e s i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t c o n t r o l t o e s t a b l i s h a n agency
    relationship.            Nor c a n one a c t on b e h a l f o f a n o t h e r where,
    as i n t h i s c a s e , a f i e l d m a n i s n o t h i r e d by t h e Wolfes t o
    c o n d u c t a n i n s p e c t i o n and t h e i n s p e c t i o n i s o r d e r e d p r i -
    m a r i l y f o r t h e b e n e f i t of a n i n s u r a n c e company.
    However, w e b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l f a c t o r s which,
    when t a k e n t o g e t h e r , n e c e s s i t a t e t h e a f f i r m a n c e of t h e judg-
    ment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t .
    F i r s t , w e n o t e t h a t p l a i n t i f f s ' grounds f o r o b j e c t i o n
    t o I n s t r u c t i o n No.   2 3 a p p e a r t o be d i f f e r e n t on a p p e a l t h a n
    they w e r e a t trial.            P l a i n t i f f s a r g u e on a p p e a l t h a t t h e
    i n s t r u c t i o n i s incomplete; it f a i l s t o r e q u i r e t h e jury t o
    f i r s t e s t a b l i s h a n agency r e l a t i o n s h i p b e f o r e a p p l y i n g t h e
    i n s t r u c t i o n and i t f a i l s t o d e f i n e what c o n s t i t u t e s a n agency
    relationship.            P l a i n t i f f s ' o b j e c t i o n a t t r i a l , however, w a s
    t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n w a s u n s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e .   At
    the t r i a l plaintiffs stated:
    "Plaintiffs object . .                  .   on b e h a l f o f Trans-
    america p a r t i c u l a r l y . Again, i t ' s a n assurnp-
    t i o n t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e d o e s n o t s u p p o r t , be-
    c a u s e i t i m p l i e s t h a t Transamerica h a s a d u t y
    t o somebody when t h e y make a n i n s p e c t i o n which
    c r e a t e s a l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n on t h e p a r t of
    T r a n s a m e r i c a , which t h e law d o e s n o t r e c o g n i z e ,
    and, a s s u c h , i t i s n o t a c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t o f
    t h e law and v e r y p r e j u d i c i a l t o P l a i n t i f f
    Transamerica i n t h i s case."
    The o b j e c t i o n t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n " i s n o t a c o r r e c t
    s t a t e m e n t of t h e law" i s n o t a s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c and s u s -
    tainable objection.                Rule 51, M.R.Civ.P.                 Where t h e ground
    of t h e o b j e c t i o n i s d i f f e r e n t , o b j e c t i o n s c a n n o t be r a i s e d
    f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l .       S e d e r v. K i e w i t Sons' Co.,
    s u p r a ; P i c k e t t v. Kyger, s u p r a ; Kearns v. McIntyre Const. 
    Co., supra
    .
    Secondly, we note that plaintiffs Wolfe failed to spe-
    cifically object to Instruction No. 23 at the trial level.
    Rather, the record discloses that counsel for plaintiff Trans-
    america made the only formal objection.   Although the record
    is not entirely clear whether the trial court permitted
    plaintiffs to make their objections jointly or independently,
    we believe that a party has some responsibility to assert
    his objection at the trial level if he wishes to raise it on
    appeal.
    Third, we also believe that, where a party considers
    an instruction incomplete, as is the case here, it has some
    responsibility to request and provide the trial court with
    an instruction that properly covers the situation.   Pataniq
    v. Silverstone (1966), 3 Ariz-App. 424, 
    415 P.2d 139
    .   Here,
    plaintiffs wish to assert error on the basis of an instruc-
    tion being incomplete, yet no attempt or request was made
    to provide an instruction which covered the issue in question.
    Finally, we believe that the verdict was supported by
    the evidence and that, if the case were tried again, the
    same verdict would be rendered.   If the judgment is one
    which could be properly rendered consistent with the evidence
    and law of the case, error in instructions is not reversible.
    "One test that has been frequently held deter-
    minative of the prejudicial character of error
    in instructions is the correctness of the re-
    sult. If that is correct, the error is not
    reversible." Westinghouse Electric Elevator
    Co. v. LaSalle Monroe Bldg. Corporation (1945),
    326 I11.App. 598, 
    63 N.E.2d 411
    , 416.
    We hold, therefore, that there is no reversible error
    in the record and affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    We c o n c u r :
    P
    Chief J u s t i c e
    Mr.   Chief Justice Haswell, dissenting:
    I would hold that the giving of instructions 17 and 23
    constitutes reversible error entitling plaintiffs to a new trial.
    The majority correctly hold that the giving of each of
    these instructions is error.     I part with the majority in holding
    these errors harmless, however.     In my view the errors affect the
    substantial rights of the plaintiffs and cannot qualify as harm-
    less errors.    Rule 14, M.R.App.Civ.P.
    Instruction 17 flatly and unequivocally told the jury
    that failure of either plaintiff to locate or recognize the danger-
    ous condition is contributory negligence.     In my opinion the omis-
    sion of the reasonable man standard is not cured by Instruction 10
    defining negligence in terms of this test.     The two instructions
    are contradictory in my judgment.     Who can say with reasonable
    certainty which instruction the jury followed in arriving at its
    verdict?
    But the fundamental error was the giving of instruction 23.
    As stated by the majority, this instruction asked the jury, by em-
    ploying agency principles, to impute the acts of Transamerica to
    plaintiffs.    In this way contributory negligence could be imputed
    to plaintiffs because Transamerica had ordered an inspection of
    the Mint Bar premises which revealed the wiring was in good con-
    dition.    The majority hold the error harmless because of supposed
    defects in plaintiffs' objection to the instruction at the trial
    and because the same result would be reached if the case were tried
    again.
    Plaintiffs did object to the instruction at the trial on
    valid grounds that should have been sustained, specifically that
    the evidence did not support giving the instruction.    The majority
    hold the evidence is clearly insufficient as a matter of law to
    warrant the giving of this instruction.     I find no basis for re-
    quiring the plaintiffs to provide the trial court with an instruction
    that properly covers the situation as held by the majority.    This
    was defendant's instruction and the responsibility was on the
    defendant to offer an instruction correctly stating the law.
    More importantly, how could plaintiffs or anyone else offer a
    correct instruction on imputed negligence arising from an agency
    relationship where the evidence was insufficient to establish an
    agency?
    Finally to justify the giving of an erroneous instruction
    on the ground that if the case was tried again, the same result
    would be reached requires    a clairvoyance possessed by few appel-
    late judges.    In my view, predicting the result on retrial is pure
    speculation.
    Here the error cannot be harmless.   A verdict for the
    defendant could have been reached by imputing the negligence of
    Transamerica to the plaintiffs.   The substantial rights of the
    plaintiffs were thus compromised by the erroneous jury instruc-
    tion defeating the harmless error test in Rule 14, M.R.App.Civ.P.
    Chief Justice
    Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissents and will file a written
    dissent later.