Custody of B.N.T. , 1998 MT 291N ( 1998 )


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    No. 98-225
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    1998 MT 291N
    IN RE CUSTODY OF B.N.T., a Minor Child
    KENNY TROMP,
    Petitioner and Respondent,
    and
    WENDY ELIZABETH MARIE ROANE COLE,
    Respondent and Appellant.
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    APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
    In and for the County of Missoula,
    The Honorable John S. Henson, Judge presiding.
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Christopher Daly, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana
    For Respondent:
    Byron Boggs, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: October 1, 1998
    Decided: December 3, 1998
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
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    Clerk
    Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
    ¶1. Pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
    Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent but shall be
    filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be
    reported by case title, Supreme Court cause number, and result to the State Reporter
    Publishing Company and to West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases
    issued by this Court.
    ¶2. Kenny David Tromp filed a petition for custody of his daughter, B.N.T., in the
    District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in Missoula County. After a hearing, a
    special master submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the
    District Court. Wendy Elizabeth Marie Roane Cole, the child's mother, moved for a
    rehearing and to extend the deadline for filing her objections to the special master's
    findings and conclusions. The District Court denied her motions. Wendy appeals. We
    affirm.
    ¶3. There are two issues on appeal:
    ¶4. 1. Did the District Court err when it denied Wendy's motion for a rehearing?
    ¶5. 2. Did the District Court err when it rejected Wendy's request to file objections to
    the special master's recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law?
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    ¶6. B.N.T. was born in Missoula in October 1993 to Kenny David Tromp and Wendy
    Elizabeth Marie Roane Cole. Kenny and Wendy separated in April 1995 and shared
    custody of B.N.T. thereafter.
    ¶7. In October 1996, Kenny petitioned the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
    District in Missoula County for sole custody of the child. Wendy and Kenny elected
    to have their case heard by a special master. A hearing before the special master was
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    held on December 16, 1997, at which Kenny and Wendy, their respective counsel,
    and a guardian ad litem for the child appeared. Kenny's fiancee at the time also
    testified; Wendy's boyfriend and roommate at the time did not appear. Various
    reports and documentary evidence were also submitted at the hearing.
    ¶8. On January 5, 1998, the special master filed recommended findings of fact and
    conclusions of law with the District Court. The special master awarded primary
    custody of B.N.T. to Kenny and ordered Wendy to pay approximately $200 per
    month for child support.
    ¶9. Shortly after the special master's recommendations were filed, Wendy retained
    new counsel. On January 13, she filed an unopposed motion to extend the time period
    in which to file objections to the recommendations, and time was extended to
    January 30, 1998. On January 26, 1998, prior to filing her objections, Wendy made a
    motion for rehearing. She asserted that she had not been allowed sufficient
    opportunity to meet with her counsel prior to the December hearing, and that she
    had not been given sufficient opportunity to present testimony at the hearing. In
    addition, she requested that the deadline by which to file her objections be stayed
    until the District Court decided her motion for rehearing. On January 29, Kenny
    filed his objection to the motion for rehearing; he did not expressly object to the
    request to stay the deadline.
    ¶10. On February 10, 1998, the District Court denied the motion for rehearing and
    the request to stay the deadline. Wendy filed a motion to reconsider the denial. The
    District Court denied the request to reconsider.
    ISSUE 1
    ¶11. Did the District Court err when it denied Wendy's motion for a rehearing?
    ¶12. We review a district court's decision regarding a motion for rehearing to
    determine whether the district court abused its discretion. See Kneeland v. Luzenac,
    Inc., 
    1998 MT 136
    , ¶ 54, 
    961 P.2d 725
    , ¶ 54, 
    55 St. Rep. 541
    , ¶ 54.
    ¶13. Wendy contends that the District Court erred when it denied her motion for
    rehearing. Her motion relied on what she claims was a lack of preparation with her
    counsel at the time, and the related failure to call her boyfriend and a counselor who
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    had worked with the parties as witnesses. Wendy alleges that her right "to have full
    legal redress" entitles her to supplement the testimony from the hearing with that of
    the two individuals. Kenny disputes Wendy's claim that she prepared with counsel
    no more than one-half hour for the hearing, and further asserts that the special
    master's findings and conclusions reflect the fair consideration that was given to B.N.
    T.'s best interests. For these reasons, he contends that the District Court did not
    abuse its discretion when it denied the rehearing.
    ¶14. Wendy cites no authority for her alleged right to have additional witnesses
    testify. Similarly, she provides no legal support for her claim that insufficient
    preparation time with her counsel renders the hearing that was conducted on the
    merits legally inadequate. She offers no factual support for her claim that she was
    prevented from rebutting accusations regarding her boyfriend. Finally, and most
    importantly, Wendy has failed to demonstrate how the lack of testimony from these
    two individuals skewed the special master's determination of the child's best interests.
    ¶15. The record reveals that Wendy had ample opportunity to testify at the hearing.
    In addition, it indicates that the special master considered at length the opinion of
    one of the "missing" witnesses, counselor Phyllis Burreson, which was admitted in
    the form of her written report. Finally, the record clearly demonstrates that the
    special master considered and gave primary weight to B.N.T.'s best interests, which
    represents the ultimate concern in this matter. See § 40-4-212, MCA.
    ¶16. The District Court considered these factors and further noted that reopening the
    litigation to permit the additional testimony would be neither efficient nor fair. We
    agree.
    ¶17. A motion for rehearing is within the sound discretion of the District Court.
    Wendy has failed to establish that the District Court abused its discretion.
    Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's denial of the motion for rehearing.
    ISSUE 2
    ¶18. Did the District Court err when it rejected Wendy's request to file objections to
    the special master's recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law?
    ¶19. Wendy contends that the District Court denied her the right to due process
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    when it refused to permit her to file objections to the special master's findings and
    conclusions after it denied her motion for rehearing. She contends that by denying
    her the opportunity to file objections, the District Court has denied her right to have
    the case determined on the merits. Wendy also asserts that she was not given
    sufficient notice about her need to file objections in the event that the petition for
    rehearing was denied. She also relies on the fact that Kenny did not expressly object
    to the request for a stay of the January 30 deadline which was made pursuant to the
    motion for rehearing. In other words, Wendy contends that the District Court should
    have decided the motion for rehearing and the request for a stay of the deadline
    separately, and that its failure to do so was error, although she once again has
    provided no legal authority for her claim.
    ¶20. Wendy apparently chose not to file her objections by the January 30 deadline in
    reliance on her hope that the findings to which she planned to object would be
    supplemented with additional testimony, pursuant to her motion for rehearing. She
    apparently felt that there was no need to duplicate her objections, or to make
    objections to the "incomplete" findings and conclusions in their present state. She
    admits in her brief that she could have made objections based on the initial findings
    and, on that basis, that she should have been allowed by the District Court to do so
    after it denied her motion for rehearing. We are more persuaded, however, by the
    admission that she could have filed her objections by January 30 but nonetheless
    failed to do so. She was, of course, free to rely exclusively on her motion for
    rehearing as the method by which she hoped to achieve a result different from the
    one proposed by the special master. However, having done so, she is not in a position
    to complain about the consequences.
    ¶21. The January 30 deadline for filing objections was never expressly set aside, nor
    has Wendy ever asserted that a different deadline applied. For Wendy to prevail
    here, we would essentially have to recognize her assumption that merely by filing for
    a stay of the deadline she had a right to expect that the request would be granted and
    that the deadline would change. However, there is no basis for giving such legal effect
    to a party's motion.
    ¶22. Accordingly, the District Court did not err when it enforced the original
    January 30 deadline and denied Wendy the opportunity to file objections after her
    motion for rehearing was denied.
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    ¶23. We affirm the decision of the District Court.
    /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
    We Concur:
    /S/ J. A. TURNAGE
    /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
    /S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
    /S/ KARLA M. GRAY
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Document Info

Docket Number: 98-225

Citation Numbers: 1998 MT 291N

Filed Date: 12/3/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014