Application of Barron ( 1976 )

I N THE SUPREME COUKT OF THE STATE OF M N A A
OTN
I N 3 E THE APPLICATION OF J . VAUGHAN RARRON
FOR A WRIT OF MANDATE
and No. 13328
!J .
WrJLLLIAM LEAPHART, C o u r t - a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l
f o r Merrel C l i n e and S h i r l e y C l i n e ,
P l a i n t i f f , Respondent
and C r o s s - A p p e l l a n t .
COUhTY LOP~PALSS
IOTJERS o f Lewis and C l a r k
County, S t a t e o f Montana,
D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s ,
-VS - No. 13345
ROBERT WOODAHL, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l o f t h e
S t a t e o f Montana and Head o f t h e Department
of J u s t i c e ,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
O R I G I N A L PKOCEED1:NG :
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellants :
J . Vaughan B a r r o n a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
S t u a r t L. K e l l n e r a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana
' o r Respondents:
Hon. R o b e r t L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a ,
Montana
J o c k 0 . Anderson, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a r g u e d ,
H e l e n a , Montana
Thomas Honzel a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana
Submitted: May 2 8 , 1976
I>ec d e d :
i
Filed: 3UL
JkfQliitHS 1. ADi8$EY
C l e r k Supreme C o u r t
Hon. W . W . L e s s l e y , D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e
James T . H a r r i s o n , d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
T h i s i s a c o n s o l i d a t i o n of an a p p e a l from t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t , Lewis and C l a r k County, and an o r i g i n a l w r i t of mandate
from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Cascade County; b o t h c a u s e s b a s i c a l l y
d e a l w i t h t h e payment f o r s e r v i c e s of a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l of
c r i m i n a l d e f e n s e of Workmen's Compensation c a s e s .
P e r i p h e r a l m a t t e r s i n t h i s a p p e a l a r e t h e c l a i m of
Timothy S. Thane, c o u r t r e p o r t e r , f o r p r e p a r a t i o n of t r a n s c r i p t s
of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t r i a l ; Leaphart, a c o u r t appointed a t t o r n e y ' s
c l a i m f o r h i s f e e s on t h i s a p p e a l i n one of t h e s e c a u s e s ; and t h e
q u e s t i o n of t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of B a r r o n ' s a t t o r n e y f e e s .
I t i s admitted t h e s e r v i c e s of t h e c o u r t appointed c o u n s e l
were performed. I t i s f u r t h e r admitted t h e f e e s f o r t h e s e r v i c e s
performed i n t h e Lewis and C l a r k County c a s e a r e r e a s o n a b l e . The
r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of c o u n s e l f e e s i n t h e Cascade County c a s e i s
not admitted.
The c e n t r a l i s s u e t o be answered on t h i s a p p e a l i s who
pays f o r t h e a t t o r n e y s ' s e r v i c e s and c o s t s . Both d i s t r i c t c o u r t s
have h e l d t h a t i n t h e s e Workmen's Compensation c a s e s t h e department
of j u s t i c e must pay.
The a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l a s head of t h e department of j u s t i c e
appeals.
These c r i m i n a l c a s e s b e f o r e us a r e t h e r e s u l t of a s t a t e -
wide program i n v e s t i g a t e d and prosecuted by t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l
a s head of t h e department of j u s t i c e .
The a u t h o r i t y t o s o a c t comes t o t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l by
s e c t i o n 79-2315, R.C.M., 1947. The s t a t u t e was e n a c t e d i n 1974
and p r o v i d e s :
"The a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l s h a l l conduct on b e h a l f of t h e
s t a t e , a l l prosecutions f o r public offenses disclosed
by an a u d i t of a s t a t e agency performed by t h e l e g i s l a -
t i v e a u d i t o r .I1
This Court p r i o r t o enactment of t h i s s p e c i a l s t a t u t e h e l d t h a t
t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l had no such a u t h o r i t y . S t a t e ex r e l .
Woodahl v. D i s t r i c t Court, 159 Mont. 112, 495 P.2d 182.
Montana's l e g i s l a t u r e f u l l y i n t e n d e d t h i s s t a t e - w i d e
program of i n v e s t i g a t i o n and p r o s e c u t i o n be c a r r e d on t o a f i n a l
c o n c l u s i o n , i n what t h e media has c a l l e d t h e Workmen's Compensa-
t i o n s c a n d a l s ; it a p p r o p r i a t e d money f o r t h a t s p e c i f i c t a s k . A
r e a d i n g of H.B. 520, Laws of 1975, makes c l e a r t h e money i s
a p p r o p r i a t e d f o r a d e f i n i t e purpose; t h e b i l l d e s c r i b e s t h a t
purpose i n t h e s e words:
!'FOR INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION DIVISION RELATED MATTERS JC *.I1 *
Armed w i t h t h e s p e c i f i c a u t h o r i t y of t h e s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n
79-2315, K.C.M. 1947, and f u r n i s h e d w i t h money by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e
f o r t h a t purpose, t h e department of j u s t i c e , a c t i n g through i t s
head, t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l , proceeded w i t h t h e t a s k . These c a s e s
a r e now b e f o r e us because t h e department of j u s t i c e i s a c t i n g
under t h e mandates of t h o s e s t a t u t e s .
W now r e a c h t h e c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n :
e Who pays f o r t h e s e
c o u r t appointed s e r v i c e s ?
The answer must come from s e c t i o n 95-1005, R.C.M. 1947,
enacted i n 1967, amended i n 1973, and i n i t s p r e s e n t form a s of
1974, and p r o v i d e s :
"Whenever, i n a c r i m i n a l a c t i o n o r proceeding, an
a t t o r n e y a t law r e p r e s e n t s o r defends any person by o r d e r
of t h e c o u r t , on t h e ground t h a t t h e person i s f i n a n c i a l l y
unable t o employ c o u n s e l , such a t t o r n e y s h a l l be p a i d f o r
h i s s e r v i c e s such sum a s a d i s t r i c t c o u r t o r j u s t i c e of
t h e s t a t e supreme c o u r t c e r t i f i e s t o be a r e a s o n a b l e com-
p e n s a t i o n t h e r e f o r and s h a l l be reimbursed f o r
r e a s o n a b l e c o s t s i n c u r r e d i n t h e c r i m i n a l pro-
ceeding. Such c o s t s s h a l l be c h a r g e a b l e t o t h e
county i n which t h e proceeding a r o s e , e x c e p t
t h a t ( a ) i n proceedings s o l e l y i n v o l v i n g t h e
v i o l a t i o n of a c i t y ordinance o r s t a t e s t a t u t e
prosecuted i n a m u n i c i p a l , c i t y o r p o l i c e c o u r t
wherein c o s t s s h a l l be c h a r g e a b l e t o t h e c i t y o r
town i n which t h e proceeding a r o s e , and ( b ) i n
a r r e s t s i n c r i m i n a l proceedings by a g e n t s of t h e
department of f i s h and game and a r r e s t s by a g e n t s
of t h e department of j u s t i c e , t h e c o s t s ( i n c l u d i n g
a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s of a t t o r n e y s appointed by t h e
c o u r t f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t ) must be borne by t h e
s t a t e agency c a u s i n g t h e a r r e s t . " (Emphasis added).
A r e a d i n g of t h i s s t a t u t e makes e v i d e n t (1) c o s t s a r e
c h a r g e a b l e t o t h e county w i t h two e x c e p t i o n s and ( 2 ) c o s t s
i n c l u d e a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s f o r a t t o r n e y s a p p o i n t e d by t h e c o u r t
i n criminal causes f o r t h e defendant.
Here, we a r e faced w i t h t h e more s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n of who
must pay under t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h i s s t a t u t e . W are dealing
e
w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of s u b d i v i s i o n ( b ) . This i s a s i n g l e sentence
s t a r t i n g w i t h t h e words " i n a r r e s t s " and concluding w i t h t h e
words "causing t h e a r r e s t . " The a t t o r n e y g e n e r a 1 , u n d e r l i n e s and
11
emphasizes t h e p h r a s e , a r r e s t s i n c r i m i n a l proceedings by
agents *** of t h e department of j u s t i c e . " He t a k e s one narrow
s t e p f u r t h e r i n h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e and i n i t s a p p l i -
c a t i o n t o t h e f a c t s h e r e , and s t a t e s t h a t i n t h e s e c a s e s no a g e n t
of t h e department of j u s t i c e p h y s i c a l l y made an a r r e s t ; t h i s i s
t r u e ; he f u r t h e r s t a t e s t h a t i n t h o s e c a s e s where a r r e s t s were
n e c e s s a r y t h e a r r e s t s were p h y s i c a l l y made by l o c a l law enforcement
a g e n c i e s o r a g e n t s , such a s t h e s h e r i f f of Toole County.
Merely t o s t a t e t h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n and t h e meaning i n f e r r e d
by t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l i s t o show and emphasize i t s narrowness.
He i n s i s t s t h e s t a t u t o r y e x c e p t i o n s d e a l w i t h and a r e i n t e n d e d t o
d e a l o n l y w i t h a r r e s t s a c t u a l l y made by game wardens and highway
patrolmen in their respective departments, fish and game
and justice.
When we consider what was actually done here in the Cline
cases now before us, we illustrate the absurdity of such a narrow
approach. There the department of justice, through Dzivi, re-
quested the warrants of arrest; the warrants, after issue by the
court, were returned to the department of justice; a telephone
call was made by an agent of the department to Sheriff Brooks
of Toole County; later a teletype copy of the warrant was sent
to the sheriff by an agent of the department of justice and
the sheriff was asked to apprehend and physically take into
custody the Clines and then notify the department of that occur-
rence; the Clines were physically taken into custody by the
sheriff, the department notified, and then the Clines were phy-
sically transported to Helena by investigators of the department
of justice.
In the other cases before us no actual physical act of
arrest was made; it is clear however that the defendants appeared
at arraignments as the result of Informations filed by officers
and agents of the department of justice. The record is barren
of any acts by any agents of any counties except Sheriff Brooks'
directed activities by the department of justice.
Is the mere ministerial physical act of arrest to determine
the operative effect of the subsection (b) exception? We think not.
Are we to say the single physical act of arrest by a
sheriff in Toole County or the lack of a physical act of arrest is
the pivotal question? Surely we must not gather the intent and
purpose of the legislature on such narrow ground.
The l e g i s l a t u r e ' s purpose of s e c t i o n 95-1005, R.C.M. 1947,
was t o a s s u r e payment of t h e s e r v i c e s of appointed d e f e n s e c o u n s e l
i n c r i m i n a l proceedings.
I n S t a t e e x r e l . Langan v. D i s t r i c t Court, 1 1 Mont. 178,
1
180, 107 P.2d 880, i t was s a i d :
" I n c o n s t r u i n g a s t a t u t e c o u r t s must look t o
t h e language employed and t h e o b j e c t sought t o
be accomplished . I '
The f u r t h e r purpose of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e was t o e s t a b l i s h a
s p e c i f i c and p r a c t i c a l payment f o r such c o u r t appointed c o u n s e l s '
services.
By t h e two amendments t o s e c t i o n 95-1005, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e
made i t c l e a r t h a t a l l c o s t s of p r o s e c u t i o n does i n c l u d e a t t o r n e y
f e e s f o r c o u r t appointed c o u n s e l ; i t was and i s a workable, p r a c t i c a l
p l a n i n t h a t i t p r o v i d e s : (1) Where t h e c a s e i s p r o s e c u t e d i n c i t y
c o u r t , t h e c i t y o r town i s r e s p o n s i b l e . ( 2 ) Where t h e department
of f i s h and game o r t h e department of j u s t i c e c a u s e s t h e a r r e s t ,
t h e n c o s t s of t h e r e s u l t i n g c r i m i n a l proceedings must be borne by
t h e agency. (3) I n other cases t h e c o s t s a r e properly chargeable
t o t h e county wherein t h e proceeding a r o s e .
The l e g i s l a t u r e s e t i n e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t
c o u n t i e s s h a l l pay. The e x c e p t i o n we a r e concerned w i t h i s
s u b s e c t i o n (b) on department of j u s t i c e . It must be g i v e n meaning
and purpose.
I n B u r r i t t and Safeway v. C i t y of B u t t e , 161 Mont. 530,
534,535, 508 P.2d 563, t h e Court s t a t e d :
11
The C o u r t ' s f u n c t i o n i s t o c o n s t r u e t h e language
of t h e s t a t u t e i n accordance w i t h i t s u s u a l and
o r d i n a r y a c c e p t a n c e , w i t h a view t o be g i v i n g
v i t a l i t y t o and making o p e r a t i v e a l l p r o v i s i o n s
of t h e law and accomplishing t h e i n t e n t i o n of
* * *.
t h e l e g i s l a t u r e when a s c e r t a i n a b l e
"The g o a l of s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i s t o g i v e
e f f e c t t o t h e purpose of t h e s t a t u t e . * 9 9 To g i v e
; ;
e f f e c t t o t h e purpose of t h e s t a t u t e a s intended
by the legislature, the context in which the
words are used is more important than precise grammatical
rules or a dictionary definition."
The phrase in subsection (b) "must be borne by the state
agency causing the arrest" goes beyond the mere act of arrest.
758, it was said:
"* * * A
if
In Doull v. Wohlschlager, 141 Mont. 354, 364, 377 P.2d
statute will not be interpreted to defeat
its evident,.object or purpose * *. The objects
sought to be achieved by legislation are of prime
consideration in interpretation of such legislation.
Corwin v. Beiswanger, 126 Mont. 337, 251 P.2d 252."
Let us look at the peripheral problems here presented.
J. Vaughan Barron serving as attorney for the defendant in
Cause No. 6537B, was allowed $9,068.74 for services rendered,
plus costs. The reasonableness of that fee has been challenged.
The statute providing such fees is section 95-1005, R.C.M.
"Whenever, in a criminal action or proceeding, an
attorney at law represents or defends any person by
order of the court, on the ground that the Derson
is financially unable to employ counsel, such attorney
shall be paid for his services such sum as a district
court or justice of the state supreme court certifies
to be a reasonable compensation therefor and shall be
reimbursed for reasonable costs incurred in the
criminal proceeding .I1 (Emphasis added. )
The record before us is barren of any evidentiary hearing,
of affidavits, of time estimates, or of guide lines used to
arrive at the reasonableness of the fee allowed to Barron by Judge
Truman G. Bradford. Such procedures must be before us, that we
may determine the reasonableness of the fees allowed. State v.
Mempa, 78 Wash 2d 530, 477 P.2d 178, 182 (1970); State v. Horton,
(qq?, .2d
34 N.J. 518, 170 A.2d 1 (1961), Gant v. State, (l),
Fa' 216 S
f
44 (1968).
W . William Leaphart seeks f e e s f o r h i s s e r v i c e s on t h i s
appeal. S t a t e ex r e l . Stephens v. D i s t r i c t Court, Mont . 9
P.2d , 33 St.Rep. 469, i s c o n t r o l l i n g , t h i s i s
allowable. He i s g r a n t e d $1,000 f o r h i s a t t o r n e y f e e on t h i s
appeal.
W deny t h e w r i t of mandamus and r e t u r n t h e cause t o t h e
e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r hn e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g i n conformity w i t h
t h e guide l i n e s suggested a s t o t h e amount and reasonableness
of J . Vaughan B a r r o n ' s f e e s and c o s t s .
I t i s conceded W. William L e a p h a r t ' s f e e s and c o s t s a r e
r e a s o n a b l e and they w i l l be g r a n t e d . W r e f e r t o our previous
e
o r d e r of June 11, 1976, on Court Reporter Thane's c l a i m f o r
transcript.
W a f f i r m t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s and hold t h e department
e
of j u s t i c e must pay t h e appointed a t t o r n e y s ' compensation and
costs.
Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief
J u s t i c e James T . Harrison.
W Concur:
e
Justices.
- 8 -
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison s p e c i a l l y concurring:
While I concur w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y i n t h e above m a t t e r ,
I d e s i r e f o r t h e information of Montana's l e g i s l a t u r e , t o put
focus upon t h e r i s i n g c o s t s of defense i n t h e v a r i o u s c o u n t i e s
of t h e s t a t e . The m a j o r i t y opinion provides t h a t t h e c o s t s a r i s i n g
o u t of c a s e s i n t h e Workmen's Compensation i n v e s t i g a t i o n s h a l l
be paid by t h e s t a t e . However, d u r i n g r e c e n t y e a r s s e v e r a l
c o u n t i e s of t h e s t a t e have had t o shoulder heavy t r i a l c o s t s
due t o t h e n e c e s s i t y of providing counsel f o r i n d i g e n t defendants.
The time has come, i n m opinion, f o r t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o s t u d y
y
t h e r i s i n g c o s t s of defense and adopt one of s e v e r a l methods now
i n use t o provide c o s t s of a t t o r n e y f e e s f o r i n d i g e n t defendants.
For example, i n two r u r a l c o u n t i e s of t h i s s t a t e , Pondera
and Big Horn, because of prolonged murder t r i a l s , t h e taxpayers
have had t o assume e x t r a o r d i n a r y expense. I n t h e i n s t a n c e of
Pondera County defense a t t o r n e y f e e s a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t l e v e l
amounted t o $28,000 p l u s $7,815.25 i n c o s t s . I n Big Horn County,
i n a m u l t i p l e defendant murder c a s e , a t t o r n e y f e e s amounted t o
$35,391.57 and c o s t s of $2,529.95. Both c a s e s a r e now on a p p e a l
and t h e c o s t of a p p e l l a t e counsel remains t o be determined. These
two examples, I f e e l , h i g h l i g h t t h e growing problem.
A number of j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t s of t h e s t a t e provide f o r a
f u l l time defense counsel s t a f f f o r t h e i n d i g e n t and budget t h e
c o s t s a s a p a r t of t h e j u d i c i a l budget. Whether t h e s a l a r i e s paid
a r e adequate o r n o t may be d e b a t a b l e , b u t i n s e v e r a l c a s e s we have
had c a l l e d t o our a t t e n t i o n , t h a t a defense counsel drawing a
monthly s a l a r y , a s t h e county a t t o r n e y does, has been p a i d an
a d d i t i o n a l f e e f o r some unusual c a s e t h a t h a s a r i s e n . Such an
arrangement i s t h e b e s t of two worlds, b u t i s an unnecessary burden
on t h e taxpayer.
A s t u d y by t h e N a t i o n a l Legal Aid and Defender A s s o c i a t i o n
r e l e a s e d January 7 , 1976, provides a d r a f t r e p o r t and g u i d e l i n e
f o r t h e d e f e n s e of e l i g i b l e persons. This r e p o r t c o v e r s b o t h t h e
f e d e r a l system and t h o s e of t h e v a r i o u s s t a t e s . The f e d e r a l
government s i n c e t h e passage of t h e Criminal J u s t i c e Act of
1964, h a n d l e s t h e payment of t h e d e f e n s e on a s e t f e e c o s t and
a d m i n i s t e r s i t "under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of t h e D i r e c t o r of t h e
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e O f f i c e of t h e United S t a t e s Courts".
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e from a Summary of t h e Report of
t h e Committee t o Implement t h e Criminal J u s t i c e Act t h a t throughout
t h e f e d e r a l system payments a r e made on t h e b a s i s of $50 p e r hour
c o u r t time and $20 p e r hour o f f i c e time. A r e p o r t on t h e cumula-
t i v e payments t o p r i v a t e a t t o r n e y s f o r t h e f i s c a l y e a r 1975 a s of
December 31, 1975, i n d i c a t e s t h a t under t h e f e d e r a l system t h e
following f i g u r e s cover t h e d e f e n s e of t h e i n d i g e n t i n Mortana:
Number of persons r e p r e s e n t e d ......................157
Number of c a s e s i n which counsel was p a i d ...........135
I n c o u r t compensation .............................$6,803.50
Out of c o u r t compensation .......................$30,239.86
Out of pocket e x p e n s e s , . . ....................... $2,430.19
T o t a l paid t o counsel .............. $39,473.55
Average payment t o counsel ..................... $292.39.
During t h i s p e r i o d t h e f e d e r a l government p a i d f o r the defense
of two murder c a s e s i n t h e Montana d i s t r i c t . One f e e was s e t a t
$1,570.00 and t h e o t h e r $1,914.00.
The time h a s come, i n m o p i n i o n , f o r t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o
y
e i t h e r adopt a s e t f e e system a s i s done under t h e F e d e r a l Criminal
J u s t i c e Act o r t o provide f u l l time d e f e n s e c o u n s e l i n each j u d i c i a l
d i s t r i c t of Montana.