State v. Hansen ( 1981 )

No. 80-407
I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O MONTANA
O R F F
1981
T E STATE O MONTANA,
H F
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
VS .
MICKEY GENE HANSEN,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Nineteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f L i n c o l n .
Honorable R o b e r t M. H o l t e r , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For A p p e l l a n t :
Hood and Sherwood, M i s s o u l a , Montana
F o r Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
W i l l i a m Douglas, County A t t o r n e y , Libby, Montana
S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : J u n e 1 0 , 1 9 8 1
Decided: S e p t . 1 5 , 1 9 8 1
Filed: -
1 5 1981
Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f
the Court.
D e f e n d a n t , Mickey Gene Hansen, a p p e a l s from a f e l o n y
c o n v i c t i o n e n t e r e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e Nineteenth
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , S t a t e o f Montana, i n and f o r t h e County
of Lincoln.
Four i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l :
1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n a l l o w i n g t h e
S t a t e t o use, for t h e purposes of impeachment, statements
made by t h e d e f e n d a n t when e n t e r i n g a g u i l t y p l e a which was
l a t e r w i t h d r a w n by t h e c o u r t .
2. Whether the District Court erred i n admitting
evidence, over defendant's objection as to relevancy,
S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t No. 1, a mug s h o t p h o t o g r a p h o f d e f e n d a n t .
3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d when i t r e f u s e d
t o review p o l i c e r e p o r t s t o determine i f t h e r e p o r t s con-
t a i n e d e x c u l p a t o r y m a t e r i a l and w e r e , therefore, discover-
a b l e t o d e f e n d a n t u n d e r s e c t i o n 46-15-302, MCA.
4. Whether the District Court erred in denying
defendant's motion f o r a c h a n g e of v e n u e and m o t i o n f o r
individually sequestered voir d i r e .
T h i s i s t h e second t i m e t h i s c a s e h a s been before
t h i s Court. On a p r e v i o u s a p p e a l , t h e c a s e was r e v e r s e d ,
a l b e i t on o t h e r g r o u n d s . S t a t e v . Hansen ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont.
, 608 P.2d 1 0 8 3 , 37 S t . R e p . 657. The f a c t s o f t h e c a s e
a r e c o n t a i n e d i n t h a t o p i n i o n and w i l l n o t be s e t f o r t h h e r e
e x c e p t where i t is n e c e s s a r y t o do s o i n d i s c u s s i n g a n i s s u e
t h a t h a s been r a i s e d .
To d i s c u s s t h e f i r s t i s s u e i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o con-
sider the background of the f a c t s leading t o t h e problem
r a i s e d by i t . D e f e n d a n t was a r r e s t e d on S e p t e m b e r 6 , 1 9 7 8 ,
and a n i n f o r m a t i o n was f i l e d c h a r g i n g him w i t h s e x u a l i n t e r -
course without consent. D e f e n d a n t was arraigned on that
c h a r g e , p l e a d n o t g u i l t y , and t r i a l was s e t f o r J a n u a r y 1 0 ,
1979. On J a n u a r y 2 , 1 9 7 9 , d e f e n d a n t , w i t h c o u n s e l , moved t o
w i t h d r a w h i s p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y and e n t e r a p l e a o f g u i l t y .
During t h e s e p r o c e e d i n g s , i n response t o q u e s t i o n s from t h e
c o u r t , defendant denied having sexual i n t e r c o u r s e with t h e
complaining witness. At t h a t time, defendant's privately-
r e t a i n e d c o u n s e l moved t h e c o u r t t o w i t h d r a w a s c o u n s e l , and
the motion was granted. After further conversations in
court, defendant admitted the sexual intercourse, and the
c o u r t allowed h i s p l e a of guilty. The r e c o r d shows t h a t
d e f e n d a n t ' s counsel t h e n withdrew h i s motion t o withdraw a s
counsel.
S e n t e n c i n g was s e t f o r J a n u a r y 1 5 , f o l l o w i n g c o n s i d -
e r a t i o n o f a p r e s e n t e n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n by t h e c o u r t . That
presentence r e p o r t contained t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s d e n i a l of any
sexual i n t e r c o u r s e with t h e complaining witness. The c o u r t ,
on J a n u a r y 1 5 , 1979, because of the report, entered a not
g u i l t y p l e a f o r d e f e n d a n t and s e t t h e t r i a l f o r F e b r u a r y 6 ,
1979. On J a n u a r y 1 9 , 1 9 7 9 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a p p o i n t e d a
s u b s t i t u t e counsel for defendant, and t h e t r i a l was r e s e t
f o r March 6 , 1 9 7 9 .
F o l l o w i n g t r i a l and g u i l t y v e r d i c t on March 8 , 1 9 7 9 ,
d e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o f o r t y y e a r s i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n
and d e s i g n a t e d a d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r f o r p a r o l e p u r p o s e s .
A s previously noted, t h i s Court reversed t h a t convic-
tion. A new trial was set for May 6, 1980, which was
continued until June 17, 1980, when defendant hired new
counsel. New counsel presented motions for a change of
v e n u e and t o r e q u i r e t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f e v i d e n c e on J u n e 6 ,
1980. The c h a n g e of v e n u e m o t i o n was d e n i e d t h a t d a y and a
p o r t i o n of t h e motion t o produce the reports of investi-
g a t i n g o f f i c e r s was d e n i e d l a t e r . Following t r i a l , a g u i l t y
verdict was returned on June 18, 1980, and this appeal
resulted.
In h i s f i r s t issue defendant contends t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t e r r e d i n a l l o w i n g t h e S t a t e t o i n t r o d u c e , f o r impeach-
ment p u r p o s e s , s t a t e m e n t s d e f e n d a n t made w h i l e e n t e r i n g a
g u i l t y p l e a which was l a t e r w i t h d r a w n by t h e c o u r t . This
i s s u e d i r e c t l y concerns answers defendant gave t o q u e s t i o n s
p o s e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t when h e p l e a d e d g u i l t y on J a n u a r y
2, 1979. It raises for t h e f i r s t t i m e t h e problem of t h e
use of t h e s t a t e m e n t s under Rule 410, Mont.R.Evid., which
provides:
"Offer t o plead g u i l t y ; nolo contendere;
w i t h d r a w n p l e a of g u i l t y . Evidence of a p l e a
of g u i l t y , l a t e r withdrawn, o r a p l e a of n o l o
c o n t e n d e r e , o r of an o f f e r t o p l e a d g u i l t y o r
n o l o contendere t o t h e crime charged o r any
o t h e r c r i m e , o r o f s t a t e m e n t s made i n
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h any of t h e f o r e g o i n g p l e a s o r
o f f e r s , i s n o t a d m i s s i b l e i n any c i v i l o r
criminal a c t i o n , case, or proceeding against
t h e p e r s o n who made t h e p l e a o r o f f e r . This
r u l e s h a l l n o t apply t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of
v o l u n t a r y and r e l i a b l e s t a t e m e n t s made i n
c o u r t on t h e r e c o r d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h any o f
t h e f o r e g o i n g p l e a s o r o f f e r s where o f f e r e d
f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s o r i n a s u b s e q u e n t
p r o s e c u t i o n of t h e d e c l a r a n t f o r p e r j u r y o r
f a l s e statement."
A t t h e second t r i a l , following defendant's testimony
t h a t he d i d n o t have s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h e c o m p l a i n i n g
witness without her consent, t h e S t a t e used t h e s t a t e m e n t s
made on J a n u a r y 2 , 1 9 7 9 , f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s , thereby
showing that on a previous occasion the defendant had
admitted t o such s e x u a l intercourse without consent. Our
q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r s u c h s t a t e m e n t s a r e a d m i s s i b l e under t h e
l a s t s e n t e n c e of R u l e 4 1 0 , M0nt.R.Evi.d. The s t a t e m e n t s w e r e
made in connection with a withdrawn guilty plea and were
u s e d f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s and s o m e e t t h o s e r e q u i r e m e n t s
of the statute. The r e m a i n i n g q u e s t i o n is whether o r n o t
the statements were "voluntary and reliable" within the
meaning of t h e r u l e .
H u t t o v. R o s s ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 429 U . S . 28, 97 S . C t . 202, 50
L. Ed. 2d 1 9 4 , is r e l i e d on by d e f e n d a n t . I t s h o u l d be n o t e d
that the federal rules of evidence do not allow use of
statements except in perjury hearings, as contrasted to
M o n t a n a ' s R u l e 4 1 0 , which a l l o w s t h e u s e o f the statements
for impeachment p u r p o s e s a s well as for a prosecution for
perjury or f a l s e statements. I n Hutto, t h e Court s a i d :
" T h e t e s t i s w h e t h e r t h e c o n f e s s i o n was
'extracted by a n y s o r t o f threats or
violence, [ o r ] o b t a i n e d by any d i r e c t o r
i m p l i e d p r o m i s e s , however s l i g h t , [ o r ] by t h e
e x e r t i o n of any improper i n f l u e n c e . ' " 429
U.S. a t 3 0 , 97 S . C t . a t 203, 50 L.Ed.2d a t
197.
I n many ways the f a c t s of Hutto are comparable to
those here. In Hutto after entering a plea bargaining
agreement with the prosecuting attorney with regard to a
criminal charge under Arkansas law, the defendant, a t the
prosecutor's request, made a statement confessing to the
crime of embezzlement. The confession was made in the
presence of the defendant's attorney, who advised the
d e f e n d a n t o f h i s F i f t h Amendment p r i v i l e g e and i n f ormed him
t h a t t h e t e r m s o f t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g were a v a i l a b l e r e g a r d -
less of the defendant's willingness to comply with the
r e q u e s t f o r confession. Subsequently, t h e defendant withdrew
the plea bargain, r e t a i n e d new c o u n s e l , and demanded a j u r y
trial. I n t h e c o u r s e of that trial the s t a t e court ruled
that the defendant had confessed v o l u n t a r i l y and admitted
h i s statement a t the t r i a l . The d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d .
Subsequent appeals took the defendant in Hutto
t h r o u g h t h e s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o u r t s y s t e m s t o t h e Supreme
C o u r t of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t
u n a n i m o u s l y r e v e r s e d t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t o f A p p e a l s and h e l d
that (1) t h e confession was not per se inadmissible in a
c r i m i n a l t r i a l m e r e l y b e c a u s e i t was made s u b s e q u e n t t o and
a s a r e s u l t of a p l e a b a r g a i n i n g agreement t h a t d i d n o t c a l l
for such confession, and (2) that the confession was not
involuntary since it had been made in the presence of
defense counsel who had informed the defendant that the
t e r m s of t h e p l e a b a r g a i n were a v a i l a b l e r e g a r d l e s s of h i s
w i l l i n g n e s s t o comply w i t h t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s r e q u e s t f o r t h e
confession. Such s t a n d a r d s i n H u t t o a r e p r o p e r l y a p p l i c a b l e
here. See a l s o , J e n k i n s v. Anderson ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 447 U . S . 231,
100 S. Ct. 2124, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86; Raffel v. United States
( 1 9 2 6 ) , 271 U.S. 496, 46 S . C t . 5 6 6 , 70 L. Ed. 1054.
I n t h i s c a s e d e f e n d a n t was a p p e a r i n g f o r t h e p u r p o s e
of changing a n o t g u i l t y p l e a t o a g u i l t y p l e a p u r s u a n t t o a
plea bargain in which the prosecution would not seek an
increased sentence under the persistent felony offender
laws. At the January 2, 1979, proceeding, d e f e n d a n t was
r e p r e s e n t e d by p r i v a t e c o u n s e l . The c o u r t a d v i s e d d e f e n d a n t
of the charge against him, t h e maximum p u n i s h m e n t t h a t he
c o u l d r e c e i v e , and h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r , s p e e d y and i m p a r t i a l
trial. At t h a t s t a g e of t h e proceedings, defendant appar-
e n t l y became c o n f u s e d o r reluctant t o proceed, or did not
u n d e r s t a n d t h e c o n c e p t of a l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e r e f e r r e d
t o by t h e t r i a l j u d g e . A r e c e s s was t a k e n and upon r e c o n -
vening, the court continued to advise defendant of his
rights. The f o l l o w i n g i s a n e x c e r p t f r o m t h e t r a n s c r i p t o f
t h e January 2, 1979, proceeding:
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, a t t h i s p o i n t
I believe t h a t I am g o i n g t o h a v e t o move t o
withdraw a s counsel f o r t h i s i n d i v i d u a l , i n
v i e w of t h e f a c t t h a t t o p r o c e e d t o a t r i a l
o f t h i s m a t t e r would i n c u r a b r e a c h o f my
ethical obligations. The a t t o r n e y / c l i e n t
p r i v i l e g e h a s d r o p p e d down t o a p o i n t where I
f e e l I c o u l d n ' t r e p r e s e n t him.
"THE COURT: I u n d e r s t a n d , c o u n s e l and I am
going t o permit t h e withdrawal. I am g o i n g
t o a p p o i n t someone. This matter is set f o r
trial--
"THE DEFENDANT: Ya, I d i d i t .
"THE COURT: N O W , Mr. Hansen, i t i s n o t t h e
purpose of t h i s proceeding t o t r y t o g e t a
c o n f e s s i o n o u t of you. That i s n ' t the
purpose of it. B u t t h e p u r p o s e i s t o make
s u r e you u n d e r s t a n d your r i g h t s f u l l y and
c o m p l e t e l y and t h a t you a r e n ' t p l e a d i n g
g u i l t y t o a c r i m e t h a t i n d e e d you f e e l you
s h o u l d have a d e f e n s e t o . And i t p u t s
counsel i n a very, very strange place. And
i f you w i s h o t h e r c o u n s e l I w i l l g e t you
other counsel. Because sometimes people
d o n ' t s e e e y e t o e y e on t h e s e t h i n g s . But i t
i s n ' t t h e p u r p o s e of t h i s t y p e of p r o c e e d i n g
t o t r y t o g e t you t o c o n f e s s . I n other
words, I r e a l l y d o n ' t c a r e . I t d o e s n ' t make
a n y d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e C o u r t , b u t I w a n t t o be
s u r e t h a t i f i n d e e d you e n t e r a p l e a , a s you
h a v e d o n e , t h a t t h e p l e a i s i n f o r m e d and
w i l l i n g on y o u r p a r t and you a r e n o t g o i n g t o
s a y f o r e v e r more ' I was r a i l r o a d e d . ' That is
t h e p u rp o s e of t h i s t h i n g . And n o t a n y o t h e r
purpose. These a r e r i g h t s of y o u r s under t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t we a r e h e r e
d a b b l i n g w i t h t h i s m o r n i n g , and y o u r c o u n s e l
knows and t h e J u d g e p r e s u m a b l y knows them,
a n d w e d o n ' t want t o e x t r a c t f r o m you a p l e a
t h a t you d o n ' t f e e l is p r o p e r . If I don't
a s k you t h e s e q u e s t i o n s and e s t a b l i s h i n my
own mind t h e f a c t t h a t s o m e t h i n g d i d o r d i d
n o t o c c u r t h e n I am n o t d o i n g my j o b , you
see. And t h a t is why I am a s k i n g you them.
So i f you d o n o t a g r e e w i t h y o u r c o u n s e l , s a y
so. B e c a u s e he i s n o t e m b a r r a s s e d . He h a s
been i n t h i s courtroom a l o t , i n courtrooms
b e f o r e , and he u n d e r s t a n d s and h e knows. And
p e r h a p s you d o n ' t see e y e t o e y e a t t h i s
s t a g e of t h e game, and t h a t i s two d i f f e r e n t
people i n t h i s world r e a c t i n g i n d i f f e r e n t
ways t o d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . So I am n o t t r y i n g
t o g e t you t o s a y ' Y e s , I d i d i t ' o r 'No, I
didn't.' I am j u s t t r y i n g t o a s k you i f i n
y o u r own mind you f e l t t h a t t h e o f f e n s e was--
i n o t h e r w o r d s t h a t you d i d t h e o f f e n s e , t h a t
y e s , i n d e e d , t h e p r o b a b i l i t y i s t h a t you a r e
guilty.
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am g u i l t y .
"THE COURT: And i f you had a t r i a l by j u r y
t h e p r o b a b i l i t y would be v e r y g r e a t t h a t t h e y
would f i n d you g u i l t y . T h a t is what I am
t r y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h and t h a t i s why I am
a s k i n g you t h e s e q u e s t i o n s . And I d o n ' t w a n t
t o e m b a r r a s s y o u , b u t t h e y m u s t be t h e r e , s o
w i t h t h a t i n mind do you w i s h t o p r o c e e d , Mr.
Hansen?
"THE DEFENDAivT: Yes.
"THE COURT: Now, I d i d a s k you i n r e g a r d t o
t h i s m a t t e r , you d i d have s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e
w i t h t h i s p e r s o n named?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"THE COURT: And t h a t person was n o t your
spouse?
"THE DEFENDANT: No.
"THE COURT: And s h e d i d n o t c o n s e n t t o s u c h
intercourse?
"THE DEFENDANT: No.
"THE COURT: Is t h e r e a n y t h i n g Mr. Hansen
t h a t - - I h a v e e x p l a i n e d t o you t h i s m a t t e r o f
representation and I want you well
represented. Is t h e r e a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h a t a t
t h i s t i m e t h a t you b e l i e v e you want t o make a
statement t o t h e Court about?
"THE DEFENDANT: No.
"THE COURT: And s u b j e c t t o t h e v a r i o u s
explanations then you are f r e e l y and
v o l u n t a r i l y e n t e r i n g your p l e a i n t h i s
m a t t e r , is t h a t r i g h t ?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"THE COURT: I am g o i n g t o a c c e p t i t . I know
sometimes it is d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d
c o u n s e l i n some o f t h e s e c a s e s and t h e y t r y
t o make t h e m s e l v e s known, b u t we d e p e n d
somewhat on t h e c o u n s e l - - i n f a c t w e depend a
g r e a t d e a l on t h e c o u n s e l i n t h e s e m a t t e r s ,
Mr. Hansen. And b e c a u s e I know t h e c h a r a c t e r
o f y o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n I know t h a t h e would
t r y v e r y h a r d t o work i n y o u r i n t e r e s t s , y o u r
best interests. B u t t h a t i s why I am a s k i n g
you t h a t q u e s t i o n , b e c a u s e e v e n t h e b e s t
l a w y e r o c c a s i o n a l l y d o e s n ' t q u i t e see e y e t o
e y e w i t h h i s c l i e n t . You u n d e r s t a n d t h a t ?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"THE COURT: And you would f e e l you a r e on
t h e same wave l e n g t h now?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes."
A s previously noted, t h e above d i s c u s s i o n took p l a c e
b e f o r e t h e f i r s t t r i a l and was n o t u s e d by t h e S t a t e u n t i l
t h e second t r i a l a f t e r defendant, i n h i s d i r e c t testimony,
t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had n e v e r had s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h e
complaining witness. With t h a t , the S t a t e argues t h a t the
f o u n d a t i o n f o r impeachment u n d e r R u l e 4 1 0 , Mont.R.Evid., was
properly laid.
Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h i s Court should adopt any one
o f t h e f o l l o w i n g f o u r p e r se r u l e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e v o l u n t a r i -
n e s s of the questioned statements: (1) s i n c e t h e s e state-
ments were g i v e n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a p l e a t h a t t h e c o u r t
l a t e r a l l o w e d t o b e w i t h d r a w n , t h e y w e r e made i n v o l u n t a r i l y ;
(2) since the s t a t e m e n t s were g i v e n i n connection with a
p l e a b a r g a i n a g r e e m e n t , which i s i n e f f e c t a p r o m i s e , the
s t a t e m e n t s were involuntary; (3) since defendant was n o t
w a r n e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t a t t h e time o f t h e c h a n g e o f p l e a
o f h i s F i f t h Amendment p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n ,
t h e s t a t e m e n t s were i n v o l u n t a r y ; and (4) since defendant's
counsel withdrew prior to the time defendant made the
s t a t e m e n t s , t h e s t a t e m e n t s were i n v o l u n t a r y .
I n r e p l y , t h e S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t we s h o u l d e x a m i n e t h e
t o t a l i t y of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e ques-
t i o n e d s t a t e m e n t s w e r e v o l u n t a r y and r e l i a b l e . It maintains
that, given t h e q u a l i t y of t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of r i g h t s and
p r o c e d u r e by t h e t r i a l j u d g e , t h e complete l a c k of c o e r c i v e
environment, and t h e l a c k of any i n d u c e m e n t t o d e f e n d a n t ,
t h e s t a t e m e n t was v o l u n t a r y and r e l i a b l e . Therefore, the
S t a t e contends, t h e s t a t e m e n t was a d m i s s i b l e t o impeach t h e
t e s t i m o n y g i v e n by d e f e n d a n t a t t r i a l .
I n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e i s s u e w e a g a i n t u r n t o Rule 410,
Mont.R.Evid., and t o t h e c o m m i s s i o n comment on t h a t r u l e .
The c o m m i s s i o n n o t e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e f e d e r a l r u l e
a n d t h e Montana r u l e :
"This r u l e is i d e n t i c a l t o a version of
F e d e r a l R u l e 410 c o n d i t i o n a l l y a d o p t e d b y
Congress. The c o n d i t i o n was t h a t t h e r u l e
would be s u p e r s e d e d by a n y amendment t o t h e
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure inconsis-
t e n t with the r u l e . Such a n amendment was
made i n R u l e 6 1 1 ( e ) (6), F e d e r a l R u l e s o f
C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e , which was l a t e r s u b s t i -
t u t e d f o r t h i s v e r s i o n of t h e r u l e . The
Commission p r e f e r s t h e s u p e r s e d e d v e r s i o n o f
t h e r u l e b e c a u s e it a l l o w s u s e o f s t a t e m e n t s
w h e t h e r o r n o t made u n d e r o a t h , o n t h e
r e c o r d , o r i n t h e p r e s e n c e of c o u n s e l , and
most i m p o r t a n t , f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s .
The Uniform R u l e 410 ( 1 9 7 4 ) i s s i m i l a r t o t h e
f i r s t sentence of t h e r u l e b u t does n o t
i n c l u d e a p r o v i s i o n s i m i l a r t o t h e second
sentence of t h e r u l e .
"This r u l e allows an accused t o o f f e r t o
plead g u i l t y or nolo contendere o r t o with-
draw such p l e a w i t h o u t e i t h e r a c t i o n being
u s e d a g a i n s t him i n any s u b s e q u e n t t r i a l .
T h i s is intended t o a i d t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g
p r o c e s s , under s i m i l a r p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
g i v e n t o o f f e r s o f compromise u n d e r R u l e 4 0 8 ,
and t o a l l o w h i g h l y p r e j u d i c i a l e v i d e n c e t o
be excluded under c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t t h e
reasons f o r o f f e r i n g t o plead or withdrawing
p l e a s o f g u i l t y and n o l o c o n t e n d e r e would n o t
be u n d e r s t o o d by a j u r y and would a l m o s t p r e -
clude a f a i r t r i a l . The s e c o n d s e n t e n c e o f
t h i s r u l e i s added t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e a c c u s e d
d o e s n o t a b u s e t h i s r u l e and c o n t r a d i c t
earlier statements. See H a r r i s v. N e w York,
4 0 1 U.S. 2 2 2 ( 1 9 7 1 ) . The t r i a l c o u r t i s
r e q u i r e d t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t s were
' v o l u n t a r y and r e l i a b l e ' and i f c o n t r a d i c t e d ,
t h e s t a t e m e n t s may b e i n t r o d u c e d f o r the
p u r p o s e s o f impeachment o r p r o s e c u t i o n for
per jury.
" E x i s t i n g Montana l a w h a s n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y
d e a l t w i t h t h e p r o b l e m of o f f e r s t o p l e a d o r
withdraw p l e a s , a l t h o u g h a p l e a of g u i l t y
t h a t is n o t withdrawn is a d m i s s i b l e i n
subsequent proceedings. S i k o r a v. S i k o r a ,
1 6 0 Mont. 2 7 , 3 3 , 499 P . 2 d 8 0 8 ( 1 9 7 2 ) .
T h e r e f o r e t h i s r u l e i s new t o Montana law.
I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t Montana law d o e s n o t
a l l o w p l e a s of n o l o c o n t e n d e r e ; however, s u c h
a p l e a is i n c l u d e d i n t h e r u l e because it h a s
b e e n r e c o g n i z e d by Montana c o u r t s i n a c a s e
where s u c h a p l e a was e n t e r e d i n f e d e r a l
c o u r t and was r e l e v a n t t o a s t a t e c a s e .
S t a t e ex r e l . M c E l l i o t v . F o u s e k , 9 1 Mont.
4 5 7 , 461, 8 P.2d 795 ( 1 9 3 2 ) . "
I t is o b v i o u s from t h e a b o v e comment t h a t t h e commis-
s i o n chose t o allow c e r t a i n statements given i n connection
with guilty pleas and plea negotiations to be used for
impeachment purposes. Rule 410 is an exception to the
g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t a d m i s s i o n s by a p a r t y - d e f e n d a n t a r e admis-
s i b l e . T h i s e x c e p t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e comment, was g r a n t e d
t o encourage t h e use of p l e a b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t s . But,
t h e r u l e was n o t d e s i g n e d t o a l l o w a d e f e n d a n t t o a b u s e t h e
p l e a b a r g a i n p r o c e s s w i t h no p e n a l t y .
Here defendant is no stranger in court, although
r e a d i n g h i s t e s t i m o n y a t t h e h e a r i n g on J a n u a r y 2 o n e would
t h i n k i t had been h i s f i r s t time i n c o u r t . The t r i a l c o u r t
c a r e f u l l y and e x t e n s i v e l y q u e s t i o n e d d e f e n d a n t on t h e v o l u n -
t a r i n e s s of t h e p l e a , h i s understanding of the charge, the
c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h e p l e a and t h e f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r h i s p l e a .
When d e f e n d a n t w e n t back on t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s
against h i s counsel's wishes, counsel requested the court t o
withdraw as counsel because of a breach of professional
e t h i c s t h a t h e f e l t was v i o l a t e d . The c o u r t s t a t e d it would
g e t d e f e n d a n t a new a t t o r n e y , and d e f e n d a n t t h e n v o l u n t a r i l y
a d m i t t e d t h a t h e had committed t h e act.
C l e a r l y d e f e n d a n t abused t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s
here, and we sustain t h e d e c i s i o n of the trial judge in
a l l o w i n g t h e s t a t e m e n t t o be i n t r o d u c e d .
I n r e p l y t o d e f e n d a n t ' s f o u r p e r se r u l e s a g a i n s t t h e
t o t a l i t y o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r g u e d by t h e S t a t e , t h e S t a t e
notes that it was defendant here who moved the District
C o u r t t o a l l o w him t o w i t h d r a w h i s n o t g u i l t y p l e a and t o
p l e a d g u i l t y , and t o move t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o a c c e p t t h e
plea of guilty, d e f e n d a n t must establish that the guilty
p l e a was b e i n g k n o w i n g l y and v o l u n t a r i l y e n t e r e d . The c o u r t
m u s t t h o r o u g h l y e x p l o r e t h e v o l u n t a r i n e s s on t h e p a r t o f a
defendant prior to accepting a g u i l t y plea. See s e c t i o n
46-12-204, MCA.
I n S t a t e v. Azure ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 5 Mont. 189, 573 P.2d
179, this Court noted that the b e s t method to establish
v o l u n t a r i n e s s i s on a f a c t u a l b a s i s and t h a t t h i s s h o u l d b e
d o n e a t t h e time of t h e e n t e r i n g of the plea. Here t h e
trial judge did all i n h i s power to establish a factual
basis for the plea. D e f e n d a n t a d m i t t e d t h a t he had s e x u a l
i n t e r c o u r s e with t h e complaining w i t n e s s , t h a t s h e was n o t
h i s s p o u s e and t h a t t h e s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e had t a k e n p l a c e
without her consent. A r e c e n t c a s e of t h i s Court, S t a t e v.
August L e e White ( 1 9 8 1 ) , , Mont. -
1 - P.2d I
- S t .Rep. (No. 80-351, decided August 31, 1981),
noted t h a t S t a t e v. Azure, supra, requires the record to
d i s c l o s e t h e defendant has f u l l understanding of t h e crime
t o w h i c h he p l e a d s . Absent such understanding, t h i s Court
will n o t presume that t h e p l e a was made "with an under-
standing of the charge." The State agrees that Azure
requires a defendant have full knowledge of the charge
a d m i t t e d by p l e a d i n g g u i l t y .
We are satisfied that the present case meets the
r e q u i r e m e n t s of Azure and that t h e d i s p a r a t e outcomes of
-
t h i s c a s e and A z u r e a r e mandated by t h e d i f f e r e n t c i r c u m -
s t a n c e s of e a c h c a s e . F i n a l l y we n o t e t h a t , a s p r e v i o u s l y
discussed, the record in this case demonstrates that
d e f e n d a n t was s u f f i c i e n t l y i n f o r m e d t o e n t e r a p l e a t h a t was
" v o l u n t a r y w i t h u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c h a r g e , " s e c t i o n 46-12-
204, MCA. I n A z u r e t h e d e f e n d a n t was n o t s o i n f o r m e d . We
f i n d no m e r i t t o d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n h e r e t h a t h e was n o t
p r o p e r l y i n f o r m e d and s u s t a i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s a d m i s s i o n o f
t h e dispute evidence.
The n e x t i s s u e r a i s e d i s w h e t h e r S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t No.
1, a p h o t o g r a p h o f d e f e n d a n t , was p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d by t h e
t r i a l c o u r t over d e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n .
Defendant c i t e s S t a t e v. B i s c h e r t ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 1 Mont.
1 5 2 , 308 P.2d 9 6 9 , f o r s u p p o r t o f h i s p o s i t i o n . It states:
". . . p h o t o g r a p h s s t a n d on t h e same f o o t i n g
a s d i a g r a m s , maps, p l a n s and t h e l i k e , and a s
a g e n e r a l r u l e , whenever r e l e v a n t t o d e s c r i b e
a person, place, or thing, they are
a d m i s s i b l e f o r t h e p u r p o s e of e x p l a i n i n g and
a p p l y i n g t h e e v i d e n c e and a s s i s t i n g t h e c o u r t
and j u r y i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e c a s e .
"Photographs t h a t a r e c a l c u l a t e d t o arouse
t h e s y m p a t h i e s o r p r e j u d i c e s of t h e j u r y a r e
properly excluded, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f they a r e
not s u b s t a n t i a l l y necessary or i n s t r u c t i v e t o
show m a t e r i a l f a c t s o r c o n d i t i o n s . " 131
Mont. a t 1 5 9 , 308 P.2d a t 973.
H e r e , t h e S t a t e i n t r o d u c e d a p h o t o g r a p h t a k e n a t t h e t i m e of
defendant's a r r e s t . The e x h i b i t was a mug s h o t o f d e f e n d a n t
i n an unkept, messy state. Defendant contends that the
p h o t o was i r r e l e v a n t and d i d n o t go t o showing any m a t e r i a l
fact.
B i s c h e r t was a h o m i c i d e c a s e i n v o l v i n g a s m a l l c h i l d .
The fact situation there is not applicable to the fact situ-
ation here. In this case the photo was taken at the time of
defendant's arrest. It was admitted as part of the identi-
fication testimony of the victim and was corroborative of
the victim's ability to identify defendant both at trial and
at the time of the incident. A view of the photograph cer-
tainly does not arouse anyone's passion or prejudice, nor is
it inflammatory. Therefore, we find no merit to this issue.
The next issue for review is whether the trial court
erred in refusing to review police reports to determine if
they contained exclupatory material and were, therefore,
discoverable to the defendant under section 46-15-302, MCA.
Prior to trial defendant filed a motion to produce, pursuant
to section 46-15-302, MCA, asking to inspect and copy "all
papers, documents, oral or written statements . . ." in the
hands of the prosecutor. At a hearing on the motion the
State took the position that all police reports were work
product and not discoverable. Defendant relies on section
46-15-302(2), MCA, which provides in part:
"(2) . .
. This subsection does not apply to
the work product of the prosecution, which is
documents drawn up by law enforcement
officials for internal communications and law
enforcement officers' field notes, except
that any exculpatory information contained in
such documents or notes must be produced."
Defendant argues that because the offense was alleged
to have occurred some twenty-one months prior to defendant's
request at the second trial, because several officers,
including Woods and Spain, were no longer employed by the
law enforcement officials of Lincoln County, and because
there was no independent record of their investigation,
defendant was unable to determine whether their statements
c o n t a i n e d any e x c u l p a t o r y m a t e r i a l . H e , therefore, requested
t h e c o u r t t o review t h e s e p o l i c e reports and d e t e r m i n e if
t h e r e was d i s c o v e r a b l e m a t e r i a l i n them. He a l l e g e s that
t h e c o u r t d e n i e d t h e p r o d u c t i o n of t h e p o l i c e r e p o r t s m e r e l y
o n t n e p r o s e c u t o r ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e y c o n t a i n e d no e x c u l -
patory matters.
At the omnibus hearing on June 6, 1980, defendant
requested t h e c o u r t t o review t h e p o l i c e r e p o r t s t o d e t e r -
mine if t h e r e were inconsistencies in the victim's early
s t a t e m e n t s and h e r t r i a l t e s t i m o n y . The c o u r t a g r e e d t o d o
s o and d i d . The record does not indicate that defendant
focused on the testimony of Spain and Woods o r made any
w r i t t e n motion for the court to so review those reports.
For that reason, the issue is not properly before this
Court. The m a t t e r c a n n o t be u s e d t o p u t t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n
error if it was not brought specifically to the court's
attention.
The f i n a l i s s u e b e f o r e u s i s w h e t h e r the court erred
i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a c h a n g e o f v e n u e and a
motion for individually sequestered voir dire. Defendant
filed a motion for a change of venue with a supporting
a f f i d a v i t on May 3 0 , 1980, which was h e a r d and d e n i e d on
June 6, 1980. The m o t i o n was renewed, h e a r d and d e n i e d on
J u n e 1 6 , 1980. Both o f t h e s e m o t i o n s r a i s e d t h e same i s s u e s
of pretrial publicity and the publication of information
w h i c h c l e a r l y would n o t h a v e been a d m i s s i b l e a t t r i a l .
This Court recently set forth the change of venue
issues which are addressed here as going to the sound
d i s c r e t i o n of the court. See, S t a t e v. Bashor (1980), -
Mont. -, 614 P.2d 470, 37 S t . R e p . 1098. In S t a t e v.
Board ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 1 3 5 Mont. 1 3 9 , 143-144, 337 P.2d 9 2 4 , 927, we
s e t f o r t h the t e s t a s follows:
"Our c o u r t l o o k s f o r a c h a i n r e a c t i o n . It
s t a r t s with the basic premise t h a t the
a c c u s e d i s e n t i t l e d t o a f a i r t r i a l . Next i t
checks t h e p u b l i c i t y complained o f , a s t o its
c o n t e n t s and more i m p o r t a n t , a s t o i t s t o t a l
e f f e c t upon t h e ' f a i r t r i a l r i g h t . ' . . .
F i n a l l y , i t o b j e c t i v e l y c o n s i d e r s t h e end
resulk-was a f a i r t r i a l denied a s a r e s u l t of
t h e p u b l i c i t y and i t s e f f e c t s ? . . ."
W h a v e examined c a r e f u l l y t h e a l l e g a t i o n s g i v e n f o r
e
t h e r e q u e s t e d c h a n g e o f v e n u e and f i n d t h e y f a i l t o e s t a b -
lish any possibility of jury prejudice due to pretrial
publicity. As noted by the State, only two prospective
jurors, Mr. Cook and Mrs. Seekins, r e s p o n d e d t h a t t h e y had
r e a d o r h e a r d a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h e c a s e i n t h e newspaper o r on
the radio. T h e r e were two M i s t e r s Cook on t h e p r o s p e c t i v e
jury panel and both Misters Cook and Mrs. Seekins were
eliminated by peremptory challenge and therefore did not
s e r v e on t h e t r i a l j u r y . I n a d d i t i o n , Mr. S t e b a n s , who was
s e l e c t e d a s an a l t e r n a t e j u r o r , s a i d t h a t h e had r e a d some
newspapers a r t i c l e s b u t was n o t p r e j u d i c e d . However, the
a l t e r n a t e juror did not sit a s a juror in the deliberations.
T h e r e f o r e , no p r e j u d i c e t o d e f e n d a n t h a s b e e n shown.
The judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d .
We c o n c u r :