1st Nat. Bank v. Security Bank ( 1982 )

No. 81-301
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF P4ONTANA
1982
FIRST NATIONAL BANK & TRUST OF
WIBAUX, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
SECURITY BANK, N. A. AMBROSE H.
HEIMER, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
Ay2eal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone, The Honorable,
M. James Sorte, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants :
Ralph L. Herriott, Billings, Montana
Joseph F. Meglen, Billings, Montana
For Respondents:
Towe, Ball, Enright and Mackey, Billings,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 5, 1982
Decided: July 12, 1982
Filed: JUL 12 1 8
92
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
This appeal arises from an action for recovery on
four promissory notes, t h r e e of w h i c h were s i g n e d a n d e x e -
c u t e d b y a p p e l l a n t , Ambrose Heimer, a n d t h e f o u r t h o f w h i c h
was s i g n e d a n d e x e c u t e d b y J o s e p h Heimer a n d g u a r a n t e e d b y
Ambrose Heimer .
?'he original complaint was filed June 9, 1978, by
First National Bank and Trust of Wibaux. The remaining
p l a i n t i f f s were added subsequently. After preliminary
p l e a d i n g s t r i a l was s e t f o r May 1 4 , 1 9 7 9 .
In response t o interrogatories of February 7, 1979,
Ambrose Heimer s t a t e d , " D e f e n d a n t Ambrose Heimer i n t e n d s t o
make Edward Towe a d e f e n d a n t by way o f c r o s s - c l a i m to assert
this. "
The o r i g i n a l t r i a l d a t e was v a c a t e d i n May 1 9 7 9 a n d
leave to f i l e a n amended c o m p l a i n t p u r s u a n t to stipulation
o f t h e p a r t i e s was g r a n t e d S e p t e m b e r 4 , 1979. Edward T o w e ' s
d e p o s i t i o n was t a k e n J u l y 2 , 1980. A tentative trial date
i n O c t o b e r was v a c a t e d b e c a u s e o f i l l n e s s o f c o u n s e l , a n d i n
A u g u s t 1 9 8 0 a new t r i a l d a t e was s e t f o r S e p t e m b e r 11. On
S e p t e m b e r 4 , Heimer f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r c o n t i n u a n c e s u p p o r t e d
by an affidavit of Ralph Herriott, appellants' counsel,
c l a i m i n g G r a n t I n v e s t m e n t Funds is a p a r t n e r s h i p and n o t a l l
partners had been joined in the l a w s u i t and a l s o clainning
n o t a l l o f t h e r e a l p a r t i e s i n i n t e r e s t h a d b e e n made p a r t y
to the lawsuit. The m o t i o n was g r a n t e d , a n d a new t r i a l
d a t e s e t f o r September 30. T h a t t r i a l d a t e was v a c a t e d o n
S e p t e m b e r 1 0 and r e s e t f o r November 2 4 , a n d t h e p a r t i e s w e r e
o r d e r e d t o c o m p l e t e d i s c o v e r y b y November 1 0 , 1 9 8 0 .
On November 10, 1980, d e f e n d a n t s Ambrose and J o s e p h
Heimer filed a n amended a n s w e r , which included a counter-
claim, cross-complaint a n d two t h i r d p a r t y c o m p l a i n t s . The
District Court granted respondents' motion to strike the
amended answer, cross-complaint and third party complaints
by o r d e r o f November 24. T r i a l was held o n November 24,
1980, and judgment entered i n favor of r e s p o n d e n t s o n March
3 , 1981.
Appellants set out three issues for review by this
Court: (1) W h e t h e r the District Court erred in f a i l i n g t o
a l l o w Ambrose Heimer t o j o i n Edward Towe a n d J a m e s U p d i k e a s
third party defendants; ( 2 ) w h e t h e r t h e named p l a i n t i f f s a r e
real parties in interest; and (3) whether a t t o r n e y f e e s of
18% of t h e amount d u e o n t h e p r o m i s s o r y n o t e s w e r e p r o p e r l y
assessed.
The s o u r c e o f t h e f i r s t i s s u e i s a p p e l l a n t s ' amended
answer which included a counterclaim, cross-complaint and
two third party complaints. The amended answer, dated
November 10, 1980, included t h i r d p a r t y c o ~ n p l a i n t sa g a i n s t
Edward Towe and l a t e r J a m e s U p d i k e .
In granting respondents' motion t o s t r i k e t h e appel-
lants' amended a n s w e r , including the two third party com-
plaints, the District Court determined t h a t t h e contentions
p r o p o s e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t s c o n s t i t u t e d , " a t b e s t , " a permis-
s i v e p l e a d i n g " t h e s u b s t a n c e o f w h i c h would n o t b e e f f e c t e d
by n o t i n c l u d i n g i t i n t h e p r e s e n t t r i a l . "
Respondents argue t h a t s i n c e t h e amended a n s w e r w a s
f i l e d more t h a n t w e n t y d a y s a f t e r i t was s e r v e d a n d w i t h o u t
l e a v e of t h e c o u r t o r w r i t t e n c o n s e n t of the adverse party,
i t was n o t p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h e c o u r t . R u l e 1 5 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P.
R e s p o n d e n t s a l s o a r g u e t h e a t t e m p t t o add a d d i t i o n a l p a r t i e s
w a s d e f e c t i v e f o r t h e same r e a s o n s u n d e r R u l e 2 1 , M.R.Civ.P.
Even if t h e a p p e l l a n t s h a d moved t h e c o u r t p r o p e r l y
t o amend t h e p l e a d i n g s a n d a d d a d d i t i o n a l parties, respon-
dents claim, t h e District Court properly exercised its d i s -
cretion in granting the motion to strike in that the
amendment was u n t i m e l y .
As previously noted, the appellants' amended a n s w e r
included a cross-complaint, c o u n t e r c o m p l a i n t , a n d two t h i r d
p a r t y complaints. S i n c e t h e s e v a r i o u s c o m p l a i n t s were n o t
severed from one a n o t h e r and were included a s p a r t of the
amended a n s w e r R u l e 1 5 ( a ) , M.R.Civ . P . , governs.
A p p e l l a n t s f i l e d t h e i r amended a n s w e r o n November 1 0 ,
1980. Respondents subsequently filed a motion to strike
which is t h e o n l y method o f d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a n amended
pleading h a s been improperly f i l e d . Westlake v. District
C o u r t ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 1 1 8 Mont. 414, 1 6 7 P.2d 588; Paramount P u b l i x
C o r p . v . B o u c h e r ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 9 3 Mont. 3 4 8 , 1 9 P.2d 2 2 3 .
After a responsive pleading is s e r v e d o r twenty d a y s
a f t e r a n o r i g i n a l p l e a d i n g is s e r v e d , a p a r t y may amend h i s
p l e a d i n g o n l y by l e a v e o f c o u r t o r by w r i t t e n c o n s e n t o f t h e
adverse party. R u l e 1 5 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P.
Appellants here d i d not have w r i t t e n consent of re-
s p o n d e n t s a n d f i l e d t h e i r amendment w i t h o u t l e a v e o f c o u r t .
Therefore, the District Court did not err in granting the
m o t i o n t o s t r i k e t h e amended a n s w e r .
The second issue to be considered is whether the
named plaintiffs, F i r s t National Bank and Trust of Wibaux
(hereinafter First National), Richey National Bank, Towe
F o u n d a t i o n and G r a n t Investment Fund, are real parties in
t h i s action.
The District Court's findings of fact will not be
disturbed by this Court if they are supported by the
evidence. W a s h i n g t o n W a t e r a n d Power v . Morgan E l e c t r i c Co.
( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 2 Mont. 1 2 6 , 448 P.2d 6 8 3 ; R u l e 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o u n d t h a t F i r s t N a t i o n a l was t h e
holder of legal title to each of the promissory notes in
question and that it holds trust authority and powers
regarding each note. The c o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t F i r s t N a t i o n a l
was t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t a n d was e n t i t l e d to receive
t h e m o n i e s owed u n d e r e a c h p r o m i s s o r y n o t e .
We find substantial evidence both in the transcript
and t h e e x h i b i t s s u p p o r t i n g t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and t h e r e f o r e
a f f i r m its finding.
Appellants also claim a s error the District Court's
award of a t t o r n e y f e e s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t a w a r d e d a t t o r n e y
f e e s of 10% of the unpaid principal and interest of each
note. T h i s was t h e minimum a m o u n t a g r e e d upon i n each of
t h e n o t e s a n d was a l s o s u p p o r t e d b y a n h o u r l y d o c u m e n t a t i o n
o f a t t o r n e y time b y r e s p o n d e n t s ' counsel.
The determination of reasonable attorney fees is
w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and w i l l n o t b e
changed unless abuse of discretion i s shown. K a d i l l a k v.
Montarla D e p t . o f S t a t e L a n d s ( 1 9 8 2 ) , - Mont. -, 6 4 3 P.2d
1 1 7 8 , 39 S t . R e p . 773; G l i c k v. S t a t e o f Montana (1974), 165
Mont. 307, 528 P.2d 686; L u e b b e n v . M e t l e n ( 1 9 4 0 ) , 1 1 0 Mont.
3 5 0 , 1 0 0 P.2d 935. W e f i n d no a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n h e r e .
A£ f i rmed .
We concur:
x&P,w6.d&
Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly dissenting:
I would reverse.
Justice //