City of Missoula v. Davenport , 2006 MT 242N ( 2006 )


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  •                                       No. 05-400
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    2006 MT 242N
    CITY OF MISSOULA,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    KRISTINE DAVENPORT,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM:        The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
    In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DC 2004-515,
    Honorable Douglas G. Harkin, Presiding Judge
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    William A. Douglas, Douglas Law Firm, Libby, Montana
    For Respondent:
    Judith L. Wang, Assistant City Attorney, Missoula County
    Attorney’s Office, Missoula, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: March 22, 2006
    Decided: September 26, 2006
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Justice Patricia O. Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1        Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
    Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be
    cited as precedent. Its case title, Supreme Court cause number and disposition shall be
    included in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific
    Reporter and Montana Reports.
    ¶2        In April 1996, Kristine Davenport (Davenport) received a citation for attempted
    misdemeanor theft after leaving a Missoula grocery store with merchandise for which she
    did not pay. The following day, she entered a plea of not guilty. However, in August
    1997, Davenport, through appointed counsel, entered an Alford1 plea. In October 1997,
    she paid the prescribed fine and surcharge. In 2004, Davenport moved the Missoula
    Municipal Court to set aside her 1997 theft conviction. The Municipal Court denied her
    motion. She appealed the denial to the Fourth Judicial District Court for Missoula
    County.       The District Court affirmed the Municipal Court.     Davenport appeals the
    District Court’s denial. We affirm.
    ISSUE
    ¶3        Davenport raises numerous procedural issues on appeal, but the dispositive issue
    before us is whether the District Court was legally correct in affirming the Municipal
    Court’s denial of her motion to set aside her conviction.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    1
    North Carolina v. Alford, 
    400 U.S. 25
     (1970).
    2
    ¶4    When a defendant appeals a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty
    plea, we review the trial court’s findings of fact to determine if they are clearly
    erroneous, and conclusions of law to determine if they are correct.   State v. Leitheiser,
    
    2006 MT 70
    , ¶ 12, 
    331 Mont. 464
    , ¶ 12, 
    133 P.3d 185
    , ¶ 12.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶5    On April 11, 1996, Davenport received a citation for attempted misdemeanor theft
    after leaving a Missoula grocery store with $81.12 worth of merchandise for which she
    did not pay. The following day she appeared in Missoula Municipal Court and entered a
    plea of not guilty and requested a jury trial. Attorney Morgan Modine was appointed to
    represent her. In August 1997, Davenport entered an Alford plea, through her counsel.
    On or about October 7, 1997, she paid $270.00 in fines and surcharges.
    ¶6    This sparse background information is documented in the record but no further
    record of the original proceeding is available. According to the Missoula Attorney’s
    Office, due to limited storage space, the hard copy of the City’s file, including
    correspondence between counsel, motions to continue, plea bargain negotiations and
    Davenport’s consent to enter a plea, were all purged from the City’s files before August
    30, 2004.
    ¶7    On August 30, 2004, approximately seven years after the entry of her Alford plea,
    Davenport, with news counsel, filed a motion to set aside the 1997 conviction. It does
    not appear that she requested an evidentiary hearing or sought to obtain Modine’s file.
    She raised numerous procedural issues before the Municipal Court; however, the court
    denied her motion to set aside her conviction on the grounds that “[t]he payment of the
    3
    fine is a clear indication despite her affidavit to the contrary that she was aware of the
    entry of the Alford plea.” The Municipal Court also stated that there was no reason to
    grant Davenport’s requested relief “more than five years after she paid the fine.”
    ¶8     Davenport subsequently appealed the Municipal Court’s ruling to the Fourth
    Judicial District Court for Missoula County. The District Court affirmed the Municipal
    Court. Acknowledging the absence of the underlying record, the court relied on the
    sparse existing record showing entry of an Alford plea, exact payment of the fine and
    surcharge, and sentencing conditions.     It noted that while Davenport acknowledged
    payment of money to the Municipal Court in 1997, she denied it was for her fine and
    surcharge; however, she provided no reasonable explanation for such payment. The court
    concluded, therefore, that it was not error for the Municipal Court to determine that her
    payment of the exact amount of the fine constituted knowledge of the Alford plea and the
    sentencing conditions.
    ¶9     The District Court also posited that were it to interpret Davenport’s motion to set
    aside her conviction as a request for withdrawal of a guilty plea, the seven-year lapse of
    time between the Alford plea and Davenport’s motion “weighs heavily against” her. The
    court, relying on State v. Enoch, 
    269 Mont. 8
    , 
    887 P.2d 175
     (1994), determined that
    Davenport’s request was not made within a reasonable time.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶10 Was the District Court legally correct in affirming the Municipal Court’s denial of
    Davenport’s motion to set aside her conviction?
    4
    ¶11    It appears that both the Municipal Court and the District Court analyzed and
    decided this case on two grounds: 1) a presumption of regularity, and 2) timeliness. In a
    brief submitted to the Municipal Court, the City of Missoula advised the court that it was
    Judge Louden’s (the original presiding judge) standard practice to fully inform
    defendants of their constitutional rights, the available plea alternatives and the
    consequences of those alternatives.      The Municipal Court was also informed that
    Attorney Modine, a long-time criminal defense attorney, always carefully informed his
    clients of their constitutional rights and the consequences of entering a guilty plea, and
    that he required his clients to sign a consent form before changing a plea.
    ¶12    Based on this information, the few remaining documents from the arrest and plea
    entry, and the undisputed payment of the fine and surcharge, the Municipal Court
    presumed the regularity of the proceeding and concluded that Davenport was informed
    and aware of her actions at the time. It also concluded that given more than five years
    had lapsed between the entry of the Alford plea and the motion to set aside her
    conviction, there was no reason to grant Davenport’s request. The District Court agreed
    with the analysis of the Municipal Court.
    ¶13    First, we note that Montana law does not offer a provision that allows a court to
    vacate a conviction simply upon the motion of a defendant. State v. Howard, 
    282 Mont. 522
    , 524, 
    938 P.2d 710
    , 711 (1997). As a result, both the Municipal Court and the
    District Court based their analyses on their construction of her motion as one seeking to
    withdraw a guilty plea.      Under Howard, this was not an erroneous approach to
    5
    Davenport’s motion. Moreover, under Enoch, the District Court correctly considered the
    specific circumstances of this case and determined that the motion was untimely.
    ¶14      Second, the courts correctly recognized that a rebuttable presumption of regularity
    attaches to prior convictions. In the case before us, Davenport failed to present any direct
    evidence of irregularity that would overcome the presumption. State v. Kvislen, 
    2003 MT 27
    , 
    314 Mont. 176
    , 
    64 P.3d 1006
    . Based upon the record and the proceedings herein
    described, we conclude the District Court did not err in affirming the Municipal Court.
    ¶15      We have decided this case pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3(d) of our 1996
    Internal Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, which provides for memorandum
    opinions. It is manifest on the face of the briefs and the record that the appeal is without
    merit.
    ¶16      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    /S/ PATRICIA COTTER
    We Concur:
    /S/ KARLA M. GRAY
    /S/ JAMES C. NELSON
    /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
    /S/ JIM RICE
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-400

Citation Numbers: 2006 MT 242N

Filed Date: 9/26/2006

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014