Marriage of Becker ( 1992 )

No. 92-143
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1992
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:
BEATRICE BECKER,
Petitioner and Appellant,
and
RODERICK R. BECKER,
Respondent and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Gallatin,
The Honorable Mark P. Sullivan, Judge presiding
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Karl P. Seel, Attorney at Law, Bozeman, Montana
For Respondent:
Helene Orenstein, Attorney at Law, Bozeman, Mont
Submitted on Briefs: August 20, 1992
Decided: November 23, 1992
Filed:
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Beatrice Klein, formerly Beatrice Becker (wife), appeals the
final judgment of the District Court for the Eighteenth Judicial
District, Gallatin County, entered on November 19, 1991. We affirm
the District Court's decision.
The issues raised on appeal are as follows:
1. Was the District Court correct in limiting testimony on
remand to that associated with determining the value of the marital
real property?
2. Were the findings of fact and conclusions of law
relating to child support and marital property erroneous?
3. Was there a lack of due process and fundamental fairness
which would warrant remand of this cause for further consideration
by the District Court?
The parties to this appeal were previously before this Court
in Cause No. 89-585, In re the Marriage of Becker (1990), 244 Mont.
469, 798 P.2d 124 (Becker I). As the original facts applicable to
this litigation are outlined in Becker I, repetition here is
unnecessary. Additional facts relevant to this appeal can be
summarized as follows.
Four issues were presented to us in Becker I. We held the
District Court did not err with regard to three of those issues.
As to the fourth, we held the District Court misinterpreted a
confusing property appraisal and improperly valued the marital real
property at $42,550. We remanded that portion of the case to the
District Court for further consideration.
Upon remand, the District Court revalued the marital real
2
property at the time of dissolution. In arriving at its
valuation, the District Court considered testimony from two real
estate appraisers, Jerry Gossel and Gary France. Based upon this
testimony, the District Court concluded the appropriate value of
the property at the time of dissolution in June 1984 was $27,500.
The District Court also refused to entertain any testimony, or
consider any evidence, pertaining to the valuation of the marital
personal property or computation of child support. The District
Court concluded, as a matter of law, that its jurisdiction upon
remand was limited to the valuation of the marital real property in
1984. It is from the District Court's refusal to consider the
entire property division and the lowered valuation of the marital
real property that wife appeals.
T
I.
Was the District Court correct in limiting testimony on remand
to that associated with determining the value of the marital real
property?
The wife contends the District Court should have considered
all issues pertaining to division of marital property upon remand.
However, this contention conflicts with our instructions to the
District Court. The issue we remanded reads, "[d]id the District
Court abuse its discretion in valuation of the marital &
property?" Becker I, 798 P.2d at 128 (emphasis added). Moreover,
our entire analysis in Becker I addresses this issue from the
standpoint of valuation of the marital real property. In light of
our instructions, we hold the District Court did not err in
3
limiting testimony to that associated with redetermination of the
value of the marital real property.
II.
Was the District Court's adherence to the prior determination
of child support and valuation of marital property erroneous?
The wife next argues the amount of back child support assessed
against her and the valuation of marital property were not
supported by the record. She claims the District Court erred in
its conclusions relating to the value of the marital personal
property and the amount of child support.
In Becker I, we addressed these issues in a different context.
In responding to the wife's contention that the District Court had
no authority to modify the dissolution decree based upon res
judicata, we held that the District Court had sufficient grounds to
modify the property settlement agreement reached between the
parties because they had circumvented the authority of the District
Court. Becker I, 798 P.2d at 127-28. In addition, we held the
District Court did not err in allowing the husband a credit for
child support payments rather than his wife's share of the real
property. Becker I, 798 P.2d at 128.
In addressing issues previously before this Court, we have
long held that the doctrine of the law of the case applies to those
issues on subsequent proceedings and appeals. When
this Court on appeal affirms in part the judgment of the
District Court, and remands for reconsideration other
parts of the appeal, those parts of the judgment which
are affirmed become the law of the case and are binding
4
upon the trial court and the parties in subsequent
proceedings on remand.
City of Missoula v. Mountain Water Co. (1989), 236 Mont. 442, 446,
771 P.2d 103, 105.
Once a decision has been rendered by this Court on a particular
issue between the same parties in a case, that decision is binding
upon the courts and the parties and cannot be relitigated in a
subsequent appeal. In re the Marriage of Gies (1985), 218 Mont.
433, 434-35, 709 P.2d 635, 636.
Implicit in our holding in Becker I, 798 P.2d at 128, "that
the District Court had sufficient grounds to modify the
distribution of the assets . . . to allow the husband what he would
have received if he had been paid child support payments" is
agreement with the valuation assigned to the marital personal
property and the amount of child support. Whenever the proceedings
are sufficiently broad in their character to include the
determination of all issues existing, a party may not make
continual application for relief upon the same grounds. American
Surety Co. of N.Y. v. Kartowitz (1921), 59 Mont. 1, 6, 195 P. 99,
99. We hold the doctrine of the law of the case applies to the
valuation of the marital personal property and computation of child
support and those issues will not be addressed.
The wife also claims error in the District Court's revaluation
of the marital real property. She contends the District Court's
conclusion which placed a gross value of $27,500 on the real
property at the time of dissolution is not in accord with our
5
discussion in Becker I. However, the wife misconstrues our first
opinion and instructions on remand.
In Becker I, we held the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in placing a value of $37,000 on the marital real
property for the year 1988. The error upon which this issue was
remanded resulted from the District Court misinterpreting the real
estate appraiser's analysis as to the value of the real property in
1984. Specifically, in attempting to derive a value for the real
property at the time of dissolution in June 1984, the District
Court concluded the real property had decreased in value from 1984
until 1988. As a result, the District Court improperly concluded
the property was worth more in 1984 than in 1988. We held this
conclusion was not supported by the record. Becker I, 798 P.2d at
128. Accordingly, we remanded this portion of Becker I. Becker I,
798 P.2d at 128.
Our instructions on remand were for the District Court to
further consider the "valuation of the marital real property
consistent with this opinion." Becker I, 798 P.2d at 129-30. Our
opinion did not dictate that the District Court was bound by any
particular methodology. Upon remand, the District Court held
another hearing to determine the value of the real property.
Nothing precluded the District Court from doing so. Where a case
is remanded without direction or restriction as to the method to be
utilized for determining such an issue, "it is for the trial court
to determine in its discretion whether the record before it is
6
sufficient for this purpose or whether additional evidence should
be taken to supplement the record." Lovely and Laubach v.
Burroughs Corp. (1976), 169 Mont. 454, 456, 548 P.2d 610, 612.
Because the District Court Judge who heard this case on remand
was not involved in the previous proceedings, he felt it necessary
to conduct a hearing rather than base his decisions on the record.
Although they used somewhat different methodology, the record
reveals that both real estate appraisers who testified were in
agreement as to the approximate value of the real property in
question. When the findings of the District Court are supported by
substantial credible evidence and there is no abuse of discretion,
we will not disturb the District Court's findings concerning the
valuation of property. In re the Marriage of Porter (1991), 247
Mont. 395, 398, 807 P.2d 192, 194. We hold the appraised value of
the real property is supported by substantial credible evidence.
Finally, the wife disputes the amount of debt owing against
the real property at the time of dissolution. The record indicates
the parties stipulated that the debt against the real property in
June 1984, was $20,704. Additionally, petitioner's exhibit number
3, admitted into evidence, supports this stipulation. However, the
District Court concluded the debt against the real property in June
1984, was $21,078. The $374 discrepancy does not affect the
conscionability of the property settlement and does not require a
remand for further proceedings. In re the Marriage of Hangas
(19861, 223 Mont. 343, 347, 725 P.2d 1205, 1208.
7
III.
Was there a lack of due process and fundamental fairness which
would warrant remand of this cause for further consideration by the
District Court?
The final argument advanced by the wife is nothing more than
a rehash of issues previously addressed by this Court. Under the
guise of due process and fundamental fairness, the wife attempts to
reapply arguments previously presented. Moreover, the wife's brief
is devoid of any authority to support her contention that she in
some way has been denied due process and fundamental fairness. We
hold, contrary to the wife's contentions, that she has been
afforded all applicable procedural safeguards throughout the long
lifespan of this litigation. As we have stated previously, "there
must be an end to litigation, and in this matter it has been
reached." Carey v. Wallner (1987), 229 Mont. 57, 61, 744 P.2d 881,
884.
There is no error with the decision of the District Court.
The judgment is affirmed.
Chief Justic
8
We concur:
November23, 1992
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herebycertify that the following order was sentby United Statesmail, prepaid,to the following
named:
Karl P. See1
Attorney at Law
1705West College,Ste. A
Bozeman, MT 59715
HeleneOrenstein
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1093
Bozeman, MT 59771-1093
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREMECOURT