Brown v. State ( 1997 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
ANTHEL L. BROWN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA, RICK DAY, Director of
Department of Corrections and Human Services, ,,\,IJ!,<'1 cj !;.)884
P.2d 761, 762 (Boreen I). The District Court's determination that Brown's complaint failed
to state a claim is a conclusion of law. Our standard of review of the district court's
conclusions of law is whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct. Boreen I, 884
P.2d at 762; Boreen v. Christensen (Mont. 1996), 930 P.2d 67,53 St.Rep. 1450.
Discussion
Did the District Court err in dismissing Brown's complaint on the basis
of collateral estoppel?
Brown's claims are based on the prison officials' alleged failure to correctly calculate
and apply Brown's earned good time, thus depriving him of his accurate parole eligibility
datc. The District Court dismissed these claims based on collateral estoppcl in that Brown
had raised, and this Court had dismissed, the identical claims in the 1993 Writ.
This Court has defined the doctrine of collateral estoppel as follows:
"Collateral estoppel" . . . may be considered as a branch of the doctrine
of res judicata but is distinguishable from the bar to litigation normally called
res judicata. The distinction is that res judicata bars the same parties from
relitigating the same cause of action while collateral estoppel bars the same
parties from relitigating issues which were decided with respect to a different
cause of action. [Citation omitted.] The bar that arises from collateral estoppel
extends to all questions essential to the judgment and actually determined by
a prior valid judgment. [Citation omitted.]
Boyd v. First Interstate Bank (1992), 253 Mont. 214,218, 833 P.2d 149, 151 (citing Gessell
v. Jones (1967), 149 Mont. 418,421,427 P.2d 295,296). In addition, collateral estoppel has
been defined as preventing litigation of an issue which has already been litigated and which
was necessary to the outcome of the prior suit. m,833 P.2d at 151. The Court in Bovd
identified three elements of the collateral estoppel test:
1. The identical issue raised has been previously decided in a prior
adjudication;
2. A final judgment on the merits was issued in the prior adjudication; and
3. The party against whom the plea is now asserted was a party or in
privity with a party to the prior adjudication.
w,833 P.2d at 151.
The State claims that the District Court correctly dismissed Brown's complaint on the
basis of collateral estoppel because the issues raised in Brown's complaint, although "cloaked
in the language of a personal injury or tort action" are, in essence, the same issues as
previously litigated in the 1993 Writ. In order to determine whether the issues raised in
Brown's complaint are identical to the issues raised in the 1993 Writ, and are, therefore,
barred on the basis of collateral estoppel, we must identify the issues decided in the 1993
Writ.
The t h s t of Brown's 1993 habcas pctition was that prison officials had miscalculatcd
his parole eligibility date by failing to consider an administrative rule, by applying an
unconstitutional parole statute and through miscalculation and misapplication of his earned
good time credits. Brown argued that 5 20.25.304, ARM, applied to his sentences to make
them run concurrently for parole eligibility purposes. Section 20.25.304(1), ARM, provides
that: "[ilf the inmate is received with two or more sentences running consecutively, the
sentences will be added together for parole eligibility purposes, unless the court directs
otherwise." Wc hcld that 5 20.25.304, ARM, did not affect Brown's sentenccs bccausc his
sentence and judgment specifically provided that his sentences be considered as separate
terms for parole eligibility purposes.
The parole eligibility statute applicable to Brown, 5 95-3214(1)(a), RCM (1947), (en.
1955 Sec. 94-9832; redes. 1973 Sec. 95-3214), provided that:
[n]o convict serving a time sentence shall be paroled until he has served at
least one-quarter (%) of his fUll term, less good time allowances off, as
provided in section 80-1905; . . . . A first [time] offender serving a time
sentence may be paroled afier he has served, upon his term of sentence, twelve
and one-half (12 %) years.
We held that the statute required a first time offender to serve either one-quarter of a given
sentence less good time, or 12% years, whichever was shorter. Applying the statute to
Brown, we held that he would serve one-quarter of all the sentences, except deliberate
homicide, or one-quarter of 94 years, plus 12% years flat on the deliberate homicide
sentence, since 12% years was shorter than one-quarter of his sentence on that charge (25
years), before he was parole eligible.
Finally, we held that 5 95-3214, RCM (1947), did not violate equal protection by
requiring an inmate to serve 12% years flat on a given sentence without the application of
good time. We held that requiring long term inmates to serve time without application of
good time did not violate equal protection because all long term inmates were treated the
same. Furthermore, distinctions between long term inmates and short term inmates did not
violate equal protection because, as we stated in the 1993 Writ, "[dlistinctions in the
treatment of inmates [do] not violate the Equal Protection Clause if the differences in
treatment are rational." Since there was a rational reason to require persons committing
serious crimes to serve longer sentences than persons committing less serious crimes, we
denied Brown's due process claim. Resolution of the above issues did not require us to
calculate or apply Brown's earned good time credit. We merely interpreted 5 20.25.304,
ARM, and 5 95-3214, RCM (1947), as they affected Brown's sentences and parole eligibility
date before crediting Brown with any earned good time. In the 1993 Writ we stated:
Petitioner submits various calculations regarding good time that he contends
he has earned. Respondents, however, do not necessarily agree with those
calculations, arguing instead that Petitioner has misinterpreted the statute, is
not entitled to the relief requested, and that, therefore, the amount of good time
earned is not at issue. We agree.
It is apparent from this statement and from the resolution of the issues that we did not
calculate Brown's earned good time credit in our 1993 decision.
The District Court characterized the 1993 Writ in the following manner:
Those issues regarded whether the Department of Corrections had properly
calculated Brown's parole eligibility date when considering his good time
credits and whether his due process and equal protection rights were violated.
The court found that all of Plaintiffs claims were without merit and denied his
petition for writ of habeas corpus. The issues presented here are exactly the
same.
If the District Court's allusion to "his good time credits" was intended as a reference to
Brown's earned good time credits, rather than a reference to the good time credit available
to any first time offender pursuant to 5 95-3214, RCM (1947), then it was a
mischaracterization of the issues in the 1993 Writ. As stated above, we did not consider
Brown's earned good time credit in the 1993 Writ.
We must next examine Brown's complaint to see if his claims are the same as those
litigated in the 1993 Writ and are therefore barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Certain allegations in Brown's complaint involve the same issues we decided in the 1993
Writ and were therefore properly dismissed on the basis of collateral estoppel. For example,
8
Paragraph 27 of the complaint challenges the imposition of a flat 12%years on the deliberate
homicide sentence. This issue was clearly decided in the 1993 Writ. On the other hand,
several issues raised in the complaint were not necessarily decided in the 1993 Writ.
Brown claims in Paragraphs 21-23 of his complaint that he was "awarded" certain
good time credits in Crazy Boy, et al. v. Gamble, No. DV-94-33, (Mont. March 2, 1995) for
job assignments performed from 1982 through 1992 and that prison officials failed to
recalculate his parole eligibility date to reflect this award.
Brown claims in Paragraph 24 that in 1994, Warden Mahoney issued a revision to
Inmate Policy # 505 which created an ex post facto violation as applied to him because it
granted three days good time per month for self improvement activities in lieu of the five
days granted by the policy in effect at the time Brown was sentenced.
Brown claims in Paragraph 25 of the complaint that prison officials testified during
a 1995 deposition in the case of Brown v. Day, No. CV-93-46-H-LBE, (D. Mont. October
27, 1995) that Brown's eligibility date was April 17, 1993 and that prison officials'
calculations since that deposition had not reflected this statement.
Without commenting on the merit of any of these claims we note that none of the
claims was discussed or resolved in the 1993 Writ. The court cases which Brown claims
should have given rise to recalculation of his good time credits were not decided until after
our decision in the 1993 Writ. Although the facts constituting the claim in Paragraphs 2 1-23
existed prior to the 1993 Writ, and the issue could have been decided at that time, it was not.
"The amount of good time earned is not at issue." 1993 Writ. Furthermore, Brown's claim
in Paragraph 24, based upon the 1994 revision to the inmate policy, clearly could not have
been decided in the 1993 Writ as the new policy had not yet been issued.
Because these issues were not previously decided, nor were they necessary to the
outcome of our decision in the 1993 Writ, they are not barred by collateral estoppel.
Therefore, the District Court's conclusion of law that the following claims are barred by
collateral estoppel is incorrect: (1) prison officials' alleged failure to apply good time
awarded in Crazy Boy, et al. v. Gamble; (2) prison officials' alleged failure to recalculate
Brown's good time in light of statements made by them pertaining to Brown's eligibility date
in Brown v. Day, and; (3) application of the new inmate policy to Brown constitutes an ex
post facto application of the law. We reverse the District Court's order dismissing these
claims on the basis of collateral estoppel and remand for hrther proceedings.
We concur: - /
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