State v. S. Bonko ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                           11/09/2022
    DA 20-0341
    Case Number: DA 20-0341
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    
    2022 MT 225N
    STATE OF MONTANA,
    Plaintiff and Appellee,
    v.
    SAMUEL RICHARD BONKO,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the Twenty-Second Judicial District,
    In and For the County of Big Horn, Cause No. DC 2019-47
    Honorable Matthew Wald, Presiding Judge
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Jeavon C. Lang, Assistant Appellate
    Defender, Helena, Montana
    For Appellee:
    Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Brad Fjeldheim, Assistant
    Attorney General, Helena, Montana
    Gerald Ray Harris, Big Horn County Attorney, Randen Schoppe, Deputy
    County Attorney, Hardin, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: August 31, 2022
    Decided: November 9, 2022
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
    Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited and does not serve
    as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s
    quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
    ¶2     Samuel Richard Bonko appeals his convictions for felony criminal possession of
    dangerous drugs and misdemeanor resisting arrest. Bonko contends the District Court
    erred when it: (1) allowed the State to amend its Information; (2) allowed the State to call
    additional witnesses that had not been previously identified; (3) admitted evidence over
    Bonko’s objection to the chain of custody; and (4) denied Bonko’s motion to dismiss for
    insufficient evidence as to the resisting arrest charge.1
    ¶3     On June 17, 2019, officers from the Big Horn County Sheriff’s Office went to a
    truck stop to investigate a tip that Bonko was there and had an outstanding warrant for his
    arrest. Deputy Ty Cruikshank arrived first and pulled his patrol vehicle in behind a truck
    at one of the gas pumps. Deputy Cruikshank approached the person pumping gas at the
    truck, Clayvin Herrera. Herrera advised Deputy Cruikshank that Bonko was inside the
    truck. When Deputy Cruikshank knocked on the rear passenger window, Bonko moved
    from the passenger seat towards the driver’s seat and began to struggle with Herrera.
    1
    At trial, Bonko moved for a directed verdict, which is properly treated as a motion to dismiss for
    insufficient evidence pursuant to 46-16-403, MCA. State v. McWilliams, 
    2008 MT 59
    , ¶ 36, 
    341 Mont 517
    , 
    178 P.3d 121
    .
    2
    ¶4     During this time, Big Horn County Sheriff’s Sergeant Michael Atkinson arrived and
    parked his patrol vehicle in front of the truck. Bonko then put the truck in reverse and
    backed up in the direction of Deputy Cruikshank who was now standing outside his vehicle.
    Bonko then began to drive forward in an attempt to drive around Sergeant Atkinson’s
    vehicle. The truck lurched forward then came to a stop. Sergeant Atkinson observed other
    passengers inside the truck struggling with Bonko for control of the vehicle until one of
    the passengers was able to turn off the engine.
    ¶5     Sergeant Atkinson and Deputy Cruikshank ordered Bonko to exit the truck multiple
    times. When Bonko did not comply, they struggled to remove him from the truck. Deputy
    Cruikshank warned Bonko he would tase him if he continued to refuse to comply with their
    instructions to get out of the truck. Deputy Cruikshank eventually tased Bonko which
    enabled the officers to remove him from the truck.
    ¶6     While searching Bonko incident to the arrest, Sergeant Atkinson found, among other
    items, a bag containing a white crystal substance. The officers placed the seized items on
    the truck while they completed Bonko’s arrest. Deputy Cruikshank then secured the items
    seized from Bonko and transported Bonko to the jail. Deputy Cruikshank completed a
    field test of the white substance which tested positive for methamphetamine. Deputy
    Cruikshank weighed the bag with the substance at 0.39 grams. Deputy Cruikshank then
    took the bag of white substance and placed it in the evidence locker.
    3
    ¶7     The State charged Bonko with criminal possession of dangerous drugs and resisting
    arrest.2 The State’s Information stated that the alleged offenses took place “on or about
    June 18, 2019.” However, the State’s Motion to File an Information Direct as well as the
    Affidavit of Probable Cause alleged that the crimes occurred on or about June 21, 2019,
    which was the date on which the documents were filed. On the first day of trial, testimony
    during the State’s case-in-chief clarified that the actual date of the alleged offenses was
    June 17, 2019. Over Bonko’s objection, the District Court allowed the State to amend the
    Information to change the offense date to June 17, 2019. In allowing the amendment, the
    District Court noted that Bonko did not rely on the incorrect offense date for an alibi
    defense and generally acknowledged his presence when and where the offenses occurred.
    ¶8     During trial, Bonko objected to the bag containing the white crystal substance and
    the chain of custody log being introduced into evidence based on improper foundation and
    chain of custody. Bonko argued that the State failed to establish chain of custody because
    the State attempted to establish foundation and chain of custody exclusively through
    Deputy Cruikshank, who testified that he did not know what happened to the evidence after
    it was deposited in the evidence locker. The District Court sustained Bonko’s objection
    but allowed the State to call three additional witnesses: the evidence technician for the Big
    Horn County Sheriff’s Office; the officer who transported the items from the evidence
    locker to the crime lab; and the forensic scientist who completed the chemical analysis
    2
    The State also charged Bonko with Criminal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia but conceded
    Bonko’s motion to dismiss that charge at the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief.
    4
    report. Bonko objected to these witnesses on the basis that they had not been identified
    during discovery.
    ¶9     The District Court overruled Bonko’s objection, explaining that the testimony
    merely related to establishing chain of custody and Bonko already knew that the contents
    of the bag were placed in an evidence locker and later tested by a crime lab. The District
    Court permitted Bonko an opportunity to interview the witnesses prior to their testimony.
    After the witnesses’ testimony, the State moved to admit the bag and the chemical analysis
    report. Bonko again objected, arguing that the State failed to establish chain of custody
    because: (1) one of the arresting officers testified that, at some point during the arrest, the
    bag was briefly placed on the back of the truck; (2) one of the arresting officers testified
    that the bag looked similar to the bag he pulled out of Bonko’s pocket during the arrest;
    and (3) a bystander could have theoretically tampered with the bag during Bonko’s arrest.
    The District Court overruled Bonko’s objection.
    ¶10    At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, Bonko moved to dismiss the charges
    for insufficient evidence. The District Court denied Bonko’s motion. As to the criminal
    possession of dangerous drugs charge, the District Court reiterated its prior ruling on the
    chain of custody issue and held the evidence sufficient to sustain the charges. As to the
    resisting arrest charge, the District Court held that, when viewing the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the State, sufficient evidence existed upon which a rational trier of fact
    could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bonko resisted arrest.
    ¶11    During deliberations, the jury submitted a question, asking in relevant part: “What
    day of the week was June 17th?” The parties agreed the District Court should decline to
    5
    answer. The jury found Bonko guilty of possession of methamphetamine and resisting
    arrest.
    ¶12       “We review a district court’s decision to permit an amendment to a criminal
    complaint or information for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Hardground, 
    2019 MT 14
    ,
    ¶ 7, 
    394 Mont. 104
    , 
    433 P.3d 711
     (internal citation omitted). We review a district court’s
    ruling regarding the adequacy of the foundation for the admission of evidence for an abuse
    of discretion. State v. McCoy, 
    2012 MT 293
    , ¶ 11, 
    367 Mont. 357
    , 
    291 P.3d 568
     (internal
    citation omitted). “A district court’s ruling to allow testimony of witnesses is reviewed for
    abuse of discretion.” State v. Bowen, 
    2015 MT 246
    , ¶ 20, 
    380 Mont. 433
    , 
    356 P.3d 449
    (internal citation omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily
    without the employment of conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason
    resulting in substantial injustice.” Hardground, ¶ 7 (internal citation omitted).
    ¶13       “This Court reviews de novo a district court’s conclusion as to whether sufficient
    evidence exists to support a jury’s verdict.” City of Bozeman v. Howard, 
    2021 MT 230
    ,
    ¶ 10, 
    405 Mont. 321
    , 
    495 P.3d 72
     (internal citation omitted). When doing so, “we view
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the [State] to determine whether a rational trier
    of fact could have found all the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
    doubt.” City of Bozeman, ¶ 10 (internal citation omitted).
    ¶14       Bonko contends that the District Court abused its discretion by allowing the State
    to amend its Information. Although he concedes the amendment was as to form, he argues
    that allowing the State to correct the offense date by one day prejudiced his substantive
    rights because he relied on the date discrepancy in his defense, and “the jury was focused
    6
    and confused by the date, as indicated by the question to the court during deliberations” as
    to what day of the week the alleged offenses occurred.
    ¶15    Section 46-11-205(3), MCA, provides:
    The court may permit an information to be amended as to form at any time
    before a verdict or finding is issued if no additional or different offense is
    charged and if the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.
    We have previously held that an amendment of the information as to the alleged dates of
    the offenses was an amendment as to form that did not prejudice the defendant because the
    same crimes were charged, the elements and proof required did not change, and the
    defendant was informed of the charges against him. State v. Yecovenko, 
    2004 MT 196
    ,
    ¶ 32, 
    322 Mont. 247
    , 
    95 P.3d 145
    .3
    ¶16    As in Yecovenko, the amendment to the Information alleged the same crimes, the
    elements and proof required did not change, and Bonko was informed of the charges
    against him. Bonko’s argument that he was relying on the date discrepancy in his defense
    might have some merit if it were legal to possess methamphetamine and resist arrest in Big
    Horn County on Tuesdays but not on Mondays. As it stands, his argument fails. The
    District Court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to amend the Information.
    ¶17    Bonko claims that the District Court abused its discretion when it allowed the State
    to call additional witnesses to establish foundation and chain of custody. The District Court
    carefully considered Bonko’s objections to the witnesses and concluded Bonko did not
    3
    However, when proof of an element of the charged offense, or rebuttal by the defense, “requires
    evidence of conduct on a specific date or dates,” the amendment may be considered one of
    substance. Hardground, ¶ 17.
    7
    suffer undue prejudice or surprise because the testimony of the undisclosed witnesses
    merely related to establishing chain of custody and Bonko already knew that the contents
    of the bag were placed in an evidence locker and later tested by the crime lab. To mitigate
    any potential prejudice, the District Court provided Bonko with a reasonable time and
    opportunity to interview the witnesses prior to their testimony. The District Court did not
    abuse its discretion in allowing the witnesses’ testimony.
    ¶18    Bonko contends the District Court abused its discretion when it admitted the bag of
    white crystal powder because the State failed to establish the chain of custody. Bonko
    argues that the State failed to demonstrate a continuing chain of possession because one of
    the arresting officers testified that, at some point during the arrest, an officer briefly placed
    the bag on the back of a truck within both reach and line of sight. Bonko also argues that
    the State failed to demonstrate that there was no substantial change in the bag because an
    arresting officer testified that the bag looked similar, and a bystander could have
    theoretically tampered with the bag.
    ¶19    To admit evidence, the State must show (1) a continuous chain of possession and
    (2) no substantial change in the evidence occurred while it was in the State’s possession.
    McCoy, ¶ 13 (internal citation omitted). “The State does not need to show that it possessed
    the evidence at all times . . . .” State v. Bowser, 
    2005 MT 279
    , ¶ 30, 
    329 Mont. 218
    , 
    123 P.3d 230
     (internal citation omitted). The State does not need to show that it would be
    impossible to tamper with evidence. McCoy, ¶ 13 (internal citation omitted). If the State
    satisfies these two elements, the defendant must “show that the evidence has been tampered
    with while in the State’s custody.” Bowser, ¶ 30 (internal citation omitted).
    8
    ¶20    The State established through testimony a continuous chain of possession. Deputy
    Cruikshank testified that he placed the evidence in the evidence locker. The evidence
    technician testified that the evidence was immediately checked out for transport to the
    crime lab. The officer who transported the evidence to the crime lab testified regarding
    transport of the evidence. Finally, the crime lab technician testified that she tested the
    contents of the bag, which tested positive for methamphetamine. Bonko presented no
    credible argument of a substantial change to the evidence while in the State’s possession.
    The District Court did not abuse its discretion by holding that the State adequately
    established the evidentiary chain of custody.
    ¶21    Bonko contends the District Court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss for
    insufficient evidence as to the resisting arrest charge because he did not use or threaten to
    use physical force or violence and did not know that he was being arrested.
    ¶22    Section 45-7-301(1)(a), MCA, provides:
    A person commits the offense of resisting arrest if the person knowingly
    prevents or attempts to prevent a peace officer from effecting an arrest by:
    (a) using or threatening to use physical force or violence against the peace
    officer or another.
    A person uses physical force against a peace officer when they forcefully resist the officer’s
    effort to restrain them by failing to comply with directions, pulling away from the officer,
    and making their body rigid and stiff. State v. Sutton, 
    2018 MT 143
    , ¶ 26, 
    391 Mont. 485
    ,
    
    419 P.3d 1201
    .
    ¶23    Bonko physically resisted the officers’ efforts to remove him from the truck to the
    point where, after being warned, Deputy Cruikshank had to tase Bonko in order to get him
    9
    out of the truck. Bonko’s assertion that there was insufficient evidence for a rational trier
    of fact to find he knowingly resisted arrest is not credible. As the District Court noted:
    “[T]he officers were in marked patrol cars, there was a car on each side of the vehicle which
    Mr. Bonko was in, the officers were in uniform, and clearly making clear directives to
    [Bonko] to comply.” The officers’ directives to Bonko to get out of the truck and the
    ensuing struggle lasted several minutes. Although Bonko claims he was unaware of the
    warrant that was out for his arrest, he attempted to flee in the truck as soon as Deputy
    Cruikshank approached. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a
    rational trier of fact certainly could have found all the essential elements of resisting arrest
    beyond a reasonable doubt. City of Bozeman, ¶ 10. The District Court did not err by
    denying Bonko’s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence.
    ¶24    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
    Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents
    no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent
    or modify existing precedent. Bonko’s convictions for felony criminal possession of
    dangerous drugs and misdemeanor resisting arrest are affirmed.
    /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
    We Concur:
    /S/ MIKE McGRATH
    /S/ BETH BAKER
    /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
    /S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
    10