Marriage of Gallagher , 2003 MT 124N ( 2003 )

No. 01-871
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2003 MT 124N
In Re the Marriage of:
TAMMY DIANE GALLAGHER,
Petitioner and Appellant,
and
MARK ROBERT GALLAGHER,
Respondent and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and for the County of Flathead, Cause No. DR-96-519 A,
The Honorable Ted O. Lympus, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Katherine P. Maxwell, Johnson, Berg, McEvoy & Bostock, PLLP, Kalispell,
Montana
For Respondent:
(No Respondent's brief filed.)
Submitted on Briefs: October 24, 2002
Decided: April 29, 2003
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent but shall be filed as
a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title,
Supreme Court cause number, and result to the State Reporter Publishing Company and to
West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.
¶2 Petitioner Tammy Gallagher petitioned the District Court for the Eleventh Judicial
District in Flathead County for dissolution of her marriage to Respondent Mark Gallagher.
After trial before a special master, the District Court dissolved their marriage and distributed
the marital estate. Tammy appeals the District Court's distribution of the marital estate. We
affirm the judgment of the District Court.
¶3 There are seven issues on appeal:
¶4 1. Did the Special Master abuse her discretion when she granted Mark's motion in
limine to exclude discovery material that Tammy had failed to disclose?
¶5 2. Should this Court consider the issues Tammy has raised for the first time on
appeal?
¶6 3. Did the Special Master err when she found that the proceeds from the sale of the
Yellowstone home were Mark's premarital property?
¶7 4. Did the Special Master abuse her discretion when she valued the assets that
Tammy took when the parties separated?
¶8 5. Did the Special Master abuse her discretion when she excluded assets acquired
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after separation from the marital estate but included some liabilities acquired after separation
in the marital estate?
¶9 6. Did the Special Master abuse her discretion when she failed to award Tammy one-
half of the income from the parties' rental property and a portion of the appreciation of the
marital real estate?
¶10 7. Did the Special Master abuse her discretion in her overall distribution of the
marital estate?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶11 Tammy Taylor and Mark Gallagher met in 1990 and shortly thereafter, on December
26, 1990, moved into Tammy's rental apartment and daycare business in Bend, Oregon,
where they lived for several months, until May 1990. Mark, who was self-employed in
residential construction, helped complete the "Yellowstone home" in Bend, Oregon, and
purchased the home for $87,000 in May 1990 with premarital assets. Mark did some finish
work on the house, apparently with some help from Tammy, and in the fall of 1991, they
sold the Yellowstone home and earned a $33,000 profit.
¶12 In autumn of 1991, prior to the couple's marriage, Mark was indicted on a charge of
sexual abuse of a child from his prior marriage. Mark was later acquitted of the charge but
incurred approximately $45,000 for legal fees that Mark paid through proceeds from the sale
of the Yellowstone home and a personal loan that was repaid during the parties' marriage.
¶13 Mark and Tammy were married on December 28, 1991. After moving from the
Yellowstone home, Tammy and Mark lived in an apartment where Mark worked until they
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purchased the "Minnetonka home" in January 1992. Tammy quit her daycare business,
obtained a real estate license, sold real estate, and worked part-time managing the accounting
for Mark's business.
¶14 In November 1994, Mark and Tammy sold the Minnetonka home and moved to
Columbia Falls, Montana, where they purchased a rental duplex property that rented for
$800 per month. They later purchased the current marital home in the spring of 1995 for
$90,000. Tammy sold real estate in Montana until she became pregnant in 1995 and
restarted a daycare business. Mark and Tammy had a child, T.G., on February 12, 1996.
Shortly thereafter, the parties separated and Tammy returned to Oregon with T.G., and filed
a petition for dissolution of their marriage on August 29, 1996.
¶15 On March 21, 1997, the District Court appointed Special Master Therese Fox Hash
to preside over the issues of custody, support and distribution of the marital estate. From the
time that the parties separated, they vigorously disputed visitation and custody of T.G., and
Tammy alleged that Mark had sexually abused T.G. during supervised visitation in
December 1998. Although charges were filed, they were later dropped on condition that
Mark obtain a sexual offender evaluation. That was done.
¶16 On July 2, 1997, Mark requested discovery regarding numerous financial documents,
and renewed his request on October 2, 1997, when Tammy had failed to produce the
documents. On December 4, 1997, Tammy's counsel asked to be permitted to withdraw,
citing "lack of cooperation." That request was granted. Shortly thereafter, Mark filed a
motion to compel discovery of the requested documents, which the District Court granted.
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The court ordered that Tammy produce the requested documents by February 1, 1998, or
face sanctions. Tammy did not produce the documents, and on March 24, 1998, the
scheduled first day of trial, the Special Master found Tammy in contempt for her failure to
produce discovery. Since the Special Master was unable to conclude the trial that day, she
continued the trial until August 18 and 19, 1998.
¶17 Both parties obtained new counsel before trial resumed. Tammy's counsel filed a
notice of appearance on April 15, 1998, and Mark's counsel filed a notice on June 26, 1998.
Despite the change of counsel, however, Tammy failed to produce the discovery subject to
the motion to compel, and on August 11, 1998, Mark filed a motion in limine to exclude the
non-disclosed discovery. Tammy responded that the motion should be denied because of
her difficulty obtaining counsel and that her new counsel had offered Mark's counsel access
to any discovery stored at his office, but that the offer was rejected. Prior to trial on August
18, 1998, the Special Master discussed the discovery issue with counsel and granted Mark's
motion to exclude the non-disclosed discovery.
¶18 The Special Master resumed the trial on August 18 and 19, 1998, on all of the issues
before it, and with respect to the marital estate, received Mark's and Tammy's testimony in
addition to various financial documents presented by Mark and Tammy, and previous
financial disclosures filed by the parties. After trial, the proceedings were stalled while the
parties resolved Mark's requests for visitation with T.G. and while Mark obtained and paid
for a sexual offender evaluation. After the parties resolved some of the visitation issues and
Mark paid for the evaluation, the parties agreed to a status conference to determine the final
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distribution of the marital estate and the parties submitted final disclosures with respect to
income, assets, and liabilities on October 2, 2000. After the disclosure, Mark's attorney
withdrew from representation on October 30, 2000.
¶19 On November 8, 2000, the Special Master entered her Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. The Special Master found that Tammy's premarital assets were
$26,464, with premarital debts of $6,840, and that Mark's premarital assets were $88,700
with no premarital debts. The Special Master specifically found that Mark was entitled to
a credit of $33,000 for the proceeds from the sale of the Yellowstone home because "the
funds to purchase that home were derived substantially from [Mark's] assets and efforts."
¶20 The Special Master found that, as of the date of the trial, the total marital assets were
$264,784.00, and that the total marital debts were $157,967.81. The Special Master included
the following debts:
Columbia Falls home $ 69,343.83
Hungry Horse duplex 18,225.81
Bank loans & credit cards, (including debts to Ford Visa,
Dial Bank, and Costco) 28,760.63
Prudential life insurance loan 5,826.27
Other debts 35,811.27
From this, the Special Master found the net marital estate was $106,816.19.
¶21 The Special Master then provided values, using the date of trial in 1998, for marital
assets that the respective parties had taken with them at separation, and specifically
"disregard[ed] any items acquired after the parties separated." The Special Master valued
and distributed the assets as follows:
Mark Tammy
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Duplex $ 70,000 Household items $ 18,875
Marital home 90,000 Daycare items 1,310
Gallagher Const. equipment 55,889 1987 Ford Tempo 2,200
Other personal property 25,083 Other personal property 1,427
Total distributed assets $ 240,972 $ 23,812
The Special Master added the additional finding that it was impossible from testimony to
determine the amount of cash that Tammy took with her when the parties separated.
¶22 The Special Master then considered Mark's payments on the marital debt and found
that between the parties' separation in August 1996 and trial that Mark had paid $35,031.52
against the marital debt, including the following payments:
Duplex rental (principal payments) $ 16,027.41
Marital home (principal payments) 1,912.11
Credit cards (interest payments) 7,200.00
1993 Ford truck 9,892.00
¶23 The Special Master also found that Mark had paid $49,596.00 toward marital debt
since trial, which included the following payments:
Personal credit cards $ 6,631.00
Business credit cards 5,876.00
Marital home (principal payments) 1,606.00
Duplex (principal payments) 13,659.00
Business vehicles 15,106.00
Mobile home 1,792.00
Property taxes 4,926.00
The Special Master further discussed Mark's payments in Finding # 36:
[Mark] has paid a total amount of $84,627.52 on various marital debts since
the parties separated, which included payment on his business credit cards,
and personal credit cards. He has maintained the marital home in Columbia
Falls, Montana, and the rental duplex in Hungry Horse, Montana, without
contribution from [Tammy] towards the marital assets or debts. Since
separation, then, he has paid more in marital debt then [sic] the value of the
estate.
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¶24 The Special Master then made three additional specific findings:
37. [Mark] has also incurred substantial legal fees, fees for evaluations and
expenses, totaling in excess of $20,000.00, relating to the divorce,
along with defending himself in the State of Oregon for the abuse
charge.
38. Since the parties separated and the last hearing in July, 2000, [Tammy]
has incurred attorney fees, living expenses, and acquired a newer
vehicle through a bank loan.
39. Any increase of value in the marital real property from the date the
parties separated to present, is solely due to the efforts of [Mark], or the
effects of inflation, and not due to any contribution on the part of
[Tammy]. Thus, the Special Master has reflected the value of the
assets and debts as of the date of trial, in August, 1998.
¶25 The Special Master then distributed the marital estate by awarding each party the
marital assets they left with at separation and by distributing the entire marital debt to Mark.
According to the Special Master's findings, Mark and Tammy received a net distribution of
$83,004.19 and $23,812.00, respectively.
¶26 Mark and Tammy filed objections to the Special Master's findings on November 17,
2000, and the District Court ordered a hearing on the matter that was later held on April 3,
2001, and requested the parties to submit proposed findings regarding their objections. Both
parties submitted their proposed findings. The day after submitting Tammy's proposed
findings, Tammy's counsel moved to withdraw as counsel, declaring that Tammy had failed
to make payments as agreed. The District Court allowed the withdrawal on June 20, 2001.
On the issue of Tammy's objections, the District Court ordered that "[t]he matter is remanded
to the Special Master for further consideration upon [Tammy's objections], [Mark's]
Response thereto, and the record thus created."
¶27 The Special Master issued amended findings of fact and conclusions of law, which
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addressed some of Tammy's objections. However, other objections were denied.
¶28 On September 10, 2001, Tammy, appearing pro se, submitted objections to the
Special Master's amended findings, and attached to it several selected parts of the transcripts.
However, the District Court did not consider Tammy's objections and, on September 25,
2001, issued an order adopting the Special Master's amended findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and issued a decree of dissolution.
¶29 Tammy resubmitted her objections to the Special Master's amended findings on
October 2, 2001, and moved to set aside the final decree on October 22, 2001, however,
based on her notice of appeal on October 30, 2001, the District Court denied her objections
and motion as moot. The District Court additionally found that her objections were not
recognized pursuant to Rule 53, M.R.Civ.P. We now consider Tammy's appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶30 We review a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence to determine
whether the court abused its discretion. Hiebert v. Cascade County, 2002 MT 233, ¶ 22, 311
Mont. 471, ¶ 22, 56 P.3d 848, ¶ 22. We apply the same standard to a district court's decision
to grant a motion in limine to exclude evidence. City of Helena v. Lewis (1993), 260 Mont.
421, 426, 860 P.2d 698, 700.
¶31 We review a district court's division of marital property to determine whether its
findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Kovarik v. Kovarik, 1998 MT 33, ¶ 20, 287 Mont.
350, ¶ 20, 954 P.2d 1147, ¶ 20. When a district court appoints a special master, the district
court "shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous." Rule 53(e)(2),
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M.R.Civ.P. We will conclude that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous only when "it is not
supported by substantial evidence, the trial court misapprehended the effect of the evidence,
or our review of the record convinces us that a mistake has been committed." Kovarik, ¶ 20
(citation omitted). "Substantial evidence" is "evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion; it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but
may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Kovarik, ¶ 20 (citing Barrett v. Asarco Inc.
(1990), 245 Mont. 196, 200, 799 P.2d 1078, 1080).
¶32 Where the district court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, we will decide
whether the district court abused its discretion when it distributed the marital estate.
Kovarik, ¶ 21. The standard for an abuse of discretion is "whether the trial court acted
arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason
resulting in substantial injustice." In re Marriage of Hayes, 2002 MT 281, ¶ 13, 312 Mont.
440, ¶ 13, 60 P.3d 431, ¶ 13 (citation omitted). When distributing the marital estate:
A district court focuses on the overall distribution of the entire marital estate
and not an item by item accounting. See In re Marriage of Baer, 1998 MT 29,
¶ 36, 287 Mont. 322, ¶ 36, 954 P.2d 1125, ¶ 36. Moreover, we do not attempt
on appeal to review every element of a complex property distribution.
In re Marriage of Hochhalter, 2001 MT 268, ¶ 37, 307 Mont. 261, ¶ 37, 37 P.3d 665, ¶ 37.
In addition, while a district court must equitably distribute the marital estate, it need not
equally distribute the marital estate. Marriage of Walls (1996), 278 Mont. 413, 416, 925
P.2d 483, 485.
DISCUSSION
ISSUE 1
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¶33 Did the Special Master abuse her discretion when she granted Mark's motion in limine
to exclude discovery material that Tammy had failed to disclose?
¶34 Tammy first contends that the Special Master abused her discretion when she granted
Mark's motion in limine to exclude potential evidence that Tammy had failed to provide
during discovery. She contends that her noted problems obtaining counsel and her counsel's
subsequent offer to allow Mark's counsel to visit her office to browse Tammy's file for non-
privileged, non-disclosed documents should excuse her from the "harsh remedy" of
exclusion that the Special Master imposed. Tammy contends that the excluded documents
included tax returns and numerous financial records from 1990 to 1997 that were critical to
the issues of the equitable distribution of the marital estate and that their exclusion subjected
her to substantial injustice.
¶35 We have held that district courts have discretionary power to control the manner in
which discovery is conducted. State of Or. ex rel. Worden v. Drinkwalter (1985), 216 Mont.
9, 12, 700 P.2d 150, 152. Rule 53(c), M.R.Civ.P. recognizes similar authority for masters.
Within the master's authority, then, is the imposition of sanctions when parties fail to adhere
to discovery guidelines. See Rule 37, M.R.Civ.P; Rule 53(c), M.R.Civ.P.. We generally
presume that the decision of a district court regarding sanctions for abuse of discovery is
correct, Cass v. Composite Industries of America, 2002 MT 226, ¶ 11, 311 Mont. 406, ¶ 11,
56 P.3d 322, ¶ 11, and generally defer to the decision of the district court (or master)
"because [it] is in the best position to know whether parties are disregarding the rights of
opposing parties in the course of litigation and which sanctions for such conduct are most
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appropriate." McKenzie v. Scheeler (1997), 285 Mont. 500, 506, 949 P.2d 1168, 1172.
¶36 In this case, the record shows that Tammy failed to produce the documents subject
to the motion in limine despite two requests, a motion to compel, and a finding of contempt,
all of which took place over the course of more than one year. The fact that these exhibits
may have been critical to Tammy illustrate why their discovery was important to Mark.
Furthermore, the offer of Tammy's counsel to allow Mark's counsel to peruse her records
was not a substitute for the specific production that had been requested.
¶37 Accordingly, we conclude that the Special Master did not abuse her discretion when
she granted Mark's motion in limine.
ISSUE 2
¶38 Should this Court consider the issues Tammy has raised for the first time on appeal?
¶39 Tammy challenges numerous findings of fact made by the Special Master and adopted
by the District Court for the first time on appeal. Tammy claims the Special Master erred
when she failed to dissipate Mark's share of the marital estate due to legal fees he incurred
defending sexual abuse allegations in 1992. In addition, Tammy contends the Special
Master erred when she made or failed to make findings regarding certain debt payments
Mark made on income-generating assets, unspecified amounts of alleged marital credit card
debt incurred by Tammy, Mark's and Tammy's respective earning capacities, and Tammy's
entitlement to maintenance.
¶40 We have held that, as a general rule, an issue raised for the first time on appeal is
untimely and cannot be considered. Akhtar v. Van de Wetering (1982), 197 Mont. 205, 209,
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642 P.2d 149, 152. We have applied a similar bar to proceedings involving masters:
Rule 53(e)(2), M.R.Civ.P., is clear that, in nonjury actions such as this, "the
[trial] court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous."
The burden of challenging the master's findings is on the party objecting; the
related burden of establishing that a finding is clearly erroneous also is on the
party objecting. The intent–implicit, but clear–of Rule 53(e)(2), M.R.Civ.P.,
is that all objections to a master's report must be timely made in a party's
written objections. In the future, objections not made to the district court at
that juncture will not be entertained by this Court on appeal.
In re Marriage of Doolittle (1994), 265 Mont. 168, 171-72, 875 P.2d 331, 334 (emphasis
added). Accordingly, we will not address the issues Tammy raises for the first time on
appeal.
ISSUE 3
¶41 Did the Special Master err when she found that the proceeds from the sale of the
Yellowstone home were Mark's premarital property?
¶42 Tammy contends that the Special Master erred by crediting the entire sale proceeds
from the Yellowstone home to Mark, because she ignored Tammy's testimony regarding her
contributions to the purchase of the Yellowstone home, including that she let Mark live with
her rent-free at her $650-per-month apartment for five months to save for the down payment,
that she sold her car for $2,000 and held a garage sale to contribute to the down payment,
and that she helped complete "finish work" on the home.
¶43 However, other testimony contradicts Tammy's contention. Mark testified that he had
worked substantially on the house as a subcontractor, that he purchased the house with his
own funds, and that he did all of the finishing work on the house. He testified that Tammy
was of little help with the finishing work. He also testified that the money Tammy gave him
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from the sale of the car was to reimburse him for work he did on the car so that it would be
marketable. In addition, no testimony established the value added by the "finish work" on
the Yellowstone home. Finally, Tammy's own testimony regarding the garage sale indicates
that the sale occurred after, not prior to, the purchase of the Yellowstone home.
¶44 We cannot conclude that the Special Master clearly erred when she found that the
entire proceeds from the sale of the Yellowstone home were Mark's pre-marital property.
ISSUE 4
¶45 Did the Special Master abuse her discretion when she valued the assets that Tammy
took when the parties separated?
¶46 Tammy contends that the Special Master erred when she valued the personal items
distributed to Tammy, despite Tammy's testimony regarding their value. She objects that
the Special Master valued her office equipment at $850, rather than $398, her household
items at $18,875, rather than $11,835, and her car at $2,200, rather than $2,000.
¶47 We have held that a district court has "the discretion to adopt any reasonable
valuation of property supported by the record." Siefke v. Siefke, 2000 MT 281, ¶ 20, 302
Mont. 167, ¶ 20, 13 P.3d 937, ¶ 20. In addition, a presumption exists in favor of the district
court's valuations of marital property. In re Marriage of Gochanour, 2000 MT 156, ¶ 34,
300 Mont. 155, ¶ 34, 4 P.3d 643, ¶ 34.
¶48 The Special Master found that:
In assigning values to any of these following items, the Special Master
attempted to adopt the values given by the party who initially acquired said
item; however, to the extent that testimony supported a different conclusion,
another value may be assigned. Both parties attempted to under- or overvalue
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an item or debt, depending on the impact to the party.
Thus, the Special Master was confronted with adopting Tammy's testimony, which
undervalued these items, or Mark's testimony, which overvalued them. We conclude that
the Special Master did not abuse her discretion when she valued the assets distributed to
Tammy.
ISSUE 5
¶49 Did the Special Master abuse her discretion when she excluded assets acquired after
separation from the marital estate but included some liabilities acquired after separation in
the marital estate?
¶50 Tammy contends that the Special Master clearly erred when she excluded several
assets from the marital estate that Mark acquired after separation, most notably a truck, a
snowmobile, and a snowblower, while she did include several debts that Mark incurred after
separation as marital debt.
¶51 With respect to the calculation of the marital estate, we have recognized that "[t]he
well-settled rule in Montana is that absent unique circumstances, the marital estate should
be valued at or near the time of dissolution." In re Marriage of Lopez (1992), 255 Mont.
238, 244, 841 P.2d 1122, 1125. However:
Achieving an equitable apportionment of property is more important than
designating the moment at which the court should value the property. "The
filing of a petition, trial of the matter, or even the granting of the decree of
dissolution does not control the proper point of evaluation by the District
Court."
In re Marriage of Geror, 2000 MT 60, ¶ 14, 299 Mont. 33, ¶ 14, 996 P.2d 381, ¶ 14 (quoting
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Lippert v. Lippert (1981), 192 Mont. 222, 226, 627 P.2d 1206, 1208). In In re Marriage of
Wagner (1984), 208 Mont. 369, 378, 679 P.2d 753, 757-58, we stated:
To include in the valuation of the marital estate any accumulation of financial
wealth or, conversely, the increase in financial liabilities of either spouse
subsequent to the termination of the "marital relationship" may effectuate an
injustice and frustrate the intended purpose of division of marital property.
¶52 In this case, we first conclude that there are unique factual circumstances such that
it was appropriate for the Special Master to exclude the assets acquired by the parties after
separation. First, the record is abundantly clear that, after the petition for divorce was filed,
Mark and Tammy completely severed their "marital relationship." Tammy moved to Oregon
with T.G. and Mark was left with a substantial portion of the marital assets and all of the
marital debt to which Tammy contributed nothing after August 1996. Second, neither party
alleges nor is there any evidence that any of the post-separation assets were acquired by the
sale of marital assets. The record suggests instead that the assets were acquired through
either Mark's efforts or with credit that was not included as part of the net marital liabilities.
¶53 For these reasons, we conclude that the Special Master did not abuse her discretion
when she excluded assets acquired after the parties separated from her calculation of the net
marital estate.
¶54 In addition, Tammy contends that the Special Master erred when she included debts
that Mark incurred after separation in her calculation of the net marital debt.
¶55 After reviewing the testimony, we conclude that the Special Master did include some
debts incurred by Mark after separation, including debts from a Costco credit card
($1,597.21), a Dial Bank credit card, ($1,560.13), and approximately several thousand
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dollars from a Prudential life insurance loan (up to $5,828.77). However, Tammy cites no
authority that forbids the Special Master from considering debts incurred after the parties
separated. To the contrary, § 40-2-202(1), MCA, specifically provides that a court may
equitably distribute each asset and liability of the parties, and in our decision in Lippert, 192
Mont. at 226, 627 P.2d at 1208, we remarked that "[t]he time for proper valuation cannot be
tied to any single event in the dissolution process." We suggested that in certain
circumstances, "selection of a single evaluation point for determining net worth of the parties
could create an inequitable disposition." Lippert, 192 Mont. at 226-27, 627 P.2d at 1208.
¶56 Here, we note that Mark was shouldered with the entire marital debt burden between
the time of separation and the time that the Special Master issued its findings of fact and
conclusions of law. To require that Mark, in an effort to preserve the substantial marital
assets, incur separate non-marital debt would be unfair. In addition, we point out that § 40-
2-106, MCA, provides that a spouse may be liable for "expenses for necessaries of the
family," and to the extent that Mark likely incurred some of this additional debt as a result
of his need to provide for "necessaries" while paying on the substantial marital debt, we
cannot conclude that the Special Master abused her discretion when she credited some debts
incurred solely by Mark to the marital estate.
ISSUE 6
¶57 Did the Special Master abuse her discretion when she failed to award Tammy one-
half of the income from the parties' rental property and a portion of the appreciation of the
marital real estate?
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¶58 Tammy also contends that the Special Master clearly erred when she failed to award
Tammy one-half of the rental value of the duplex, when she failed to properly credit Tammy
for the fact that Mark lived "rent-free" at the marital home, and when she failed to award
Tammy anything for appreciation of the marital real property after the trial in August 1998.
She contends that these omissions were inequitable since Mark has received credit for
payments he made on the marital real property debt despite her allegation that Mark received
a net income from the rental properties even after he made such debt payments.
¶59 In response to Tammy's objections, the Special Master concluded that Tammy's
failure to provide her share of the mortgage payments and other costs should preclude her
from a share of the rental value.
¶60 We agree with the Special Master's conclusion that it would be inequitable at this
point for Tammy to contend, after abandoning her obligations to the parties' marital property,
that she did not adequately profit from that property. Therefore, we conclude that the
Special Master did not abuse her discretion when she declined to give Tammy a share of the
rental value of the home and duplex property.
¶61 Tammy also contends that the Special Master erred by failing to award her a share
of the appreciation of the marital property from the time of trial until the time of the Special
Master's findings of fact. The Special Master stated, however, in her amended findings of
fact that:
[T]here was credible evidence regarding the value of the real property as of
the time of the trial. The value at that time would reflect any pre-separation
contribution on the part of [Tammy]. [Mark] continued to make the payments
on the real property and continued to maintain and improve the property,
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without contribution from [Tammy] and while paying on the marital debt.
For reasons that we have expressed above, we agree with the conclusion of the Special
Master and cannot conclude that it was an abuse of discretion to deny Tammy a credit for
the appreciation of marital property when she failed to contribute to the preservation or
maintenance of the property.
ISSUE 7
¶62 Did the Special Master abuse her discretion in her overall distribution of the marital
estate?
¶63 Based on Tammy's previously stated objections, she contends that the Special Master
erred and abused her discretion when she distributed the marital estate.
¶64 After reviewing the Special Master's findings and calculations regarding the parties'
marital assets and liabilities, we conclude that the Special Master's distribution was not
inequitable. As stated previously, Mark entered the marriage with almost $89,000 in assets
while Tammy had $26,000 in assets and $7,000 in debts. At the time of trial, the marital
assets totaled $265,000, with marital liabilities of $158,000. After the distribution of the
assets and liabilities, Mark obtained a net estate of $83,000, while Tammy obtained a net
estate of $23,000. Given the additional fact that Mark paid an additional $84,000 in net
marital debt to achieve the status quo of the parties prior to their marriage, we conclude that
the Special Master did not abuse her discretion when she distributed the marital estate.
¶65 Finally, we need not address Tammy's contention that the Special Master erred when
she noted legal fees that Mark paid in this matter. The Special Master specifically stated that
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"[i]n the allocation of marital debt and assets, there was no consideration of 'debiting' for
attorney fees, regardless of the parties incurring same." Nor does there appear any evidence
to suggest that this was not the case.
¶66 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
We Concur:
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
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Justice Jim Rice dissenting.
¶67 I respectfully dissent. The Court does some impressive footwork in order to affirm
the District Court’s granting the proceeds from sale of the marital home to Mark, despite
Tammy’s contributions (Issue 3); excluding from the marital estate assets acquired by Mark
after separation (Issue 5), but including in the estate debts incurred by Mark after separation
(Issue 5); and, failing to award Tammy any portion of the marital rental income (Issue 6),
which Mark had used to pay down marital debt (Issue 2), and then using Mark’s debt
reduction to justify the distribution of the estate favoring Mark (Issue 7). Although I concur
with the Court’s resolution of Issues 1 and 4, I dissent from the remaining issues, as I
conclude therefrom that the distribution of the estate was not equitable to Tammy. I would
reverse and remand on those issues.
/S/ JIM RICE
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