State v. Mueller and Billmayer ( 2020 )

06/02/2020
DA 19-0126
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2020 MT 142N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
VAN GREGORY MUELLER and
MARTY JAY BILLMAYER,
Defendants and Appellees.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lake, Cause Nos. DC-18-337 and DC 18-326
Honorable Deborah Kim Christopher, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Roy Brown, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Steven N. Eschenbacher, Lake County Attorney, Benjamin Anciaux,
Deputy County Attorney, Polson, Montana
For Appellees:
Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Koan Mercer, Assistant Appellate
Defender, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 8, 2020
Decided: June 2, 2020
Filed:
cir-641.—if
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 The State of Montana appeals two orders from the Twentieth Judicial District
Court, Lake County, dismissing with prejudice two felony cases, State v. Billmayer and
State v. Mueller, reasoning that the State was unprepared for trial. The State argues the
District Court abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily in dismissing the two cases by
failing to make the requisite finding that dismissal was in furtherance of justice pursuant
to § 46-13-401(1), MCA. We reverse.
¶3 On January 29, 2019, the District Court sent the parties notice of a stacking
priority for three trials set for its February 11, 2019 trial term: (1) State v. Bigcrane;
(2) State v. Billmayer; and (3) State v. Mueller. Marty Jay Billmayer (“Billmayer”) was
charged with felony criminal endangerment for allegedly firing his .22 rifle seven times
in a public park in Polson while intoxicated. Van Gregory Mueller (“Mueller”) was
charged with felony criminal child endangerment for allegedly driving while under the
influence of THC, amphetamine, and methamphetamine with his young children in the
vehicle.
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¶4 On February 11, 2019, the day of the trials, the first defendant, Charlyn Bigcrane
(“Bigcrane”), failed to appear for her 9:00 a.m. trial. Defense counsel for Bigcrane stated
that he spoke with her on Friday and they had talked in person about her being at the trial.
The District Court immediately replied: “We’re done.” The court then moved to the next
case, Billmayer. The State explained that it was not prepared to go to trial in the
Billmayer case since it anticipated trying Bigcrane and had subpoenaed witnesses for that
case and not for Billmayer. The State had intended to call two officers from the Polson
Police Department and three witnesses of the shooting for the Billmayer trial. The
District Court then asked the State if there was any reason it could not get hold of its
witnesses between then and 12:00 p.m. The State replied that if it were only officer
witnesses it would be possible, depending on the officer’s schedules, but the State also
had additional witnesses who would be difficult to track down. The District Court then
granted Billmayer’s motion to dismiss the case and moved to the third case, Mueller.
¶5 At this point, the first defendant, Bigcrane, arrived for her trial and her counsel
was ready to proceed; however, the District Court stated “[t]oo late.” The State replied
that it wouldn’t object to trying Bigcrane, to which the District Court provided: “I am
quite sure you wouldn’t. But no. [Bigcrane] should be arrested for failing to appear for
her trial at the time that it was set.” The District Court then returned to Mueller. Like
Bigcrane, Mueller also did not appear for trial on time and was not present. Defense
counsel then requested to check the hallway, resulting in a pause in the proceedings.
Defense counsel returned and offered that Mueller had been seen outside the courthouse
and that the snow must have held him up. The State then requested, consistent with what
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the court had done in Bigcrane, that Mueller be arrested for failing to appear for trial.
However, the District Court replied: “He’s number three. He’s not number one. Let the
record reflect the defendant is personally present with his attorneys . . . . Is the State
ready to proceed on this matter?” The State replied that it was not prepared to proceed,
due to the same reasons given in Billmayer. The District Court then granted defendant
Mueller’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. The Court also confirmed that Billmayer
was dismissed with prejudice.
¶6 On February 13, 2019, the District Court issued an order dismissing Billmayer.
The court provided, in a hand-written addendum, the following reason as “good cause”
for dismissal with prejudice: “the State wasn’t prepared and the matter set for trial.” On
February 15, 2019, the court issued an order dismissing Mueller, also including a
handwritten addendum that “the State was not prepared to proceed to Jury Trial and the
jury pool was present and the Court had instructed the parties to be prepared in the event
the case before them did not go.” The State appeals.
¶7 We review a district court’s dismissal under § 46-13-401(1), MCA, for abuse of
discretion. State v. Pinkerton, 270 Mont. 287, 290, 891 P.2d 532, 535 (1995). A district
court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or exceeds
the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. State v. Kaarma, 2017 MT 24, ¶ 6,
386 Mont. 243, 390 P.3d 609.
¶8 The State argues the District Court wholly failed to consider whether the
dismissals were in furtherance of justice, that the dismissals did not further the interests
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of justice, and that the Court’s dismissals were arbitrary and exceeded the bounds of
reason. We agree.
¶9 A district court’s authority to dismiss a case pretrial is governed by
§ 46-13-401(1), MCA, which provides:
The court may, either on its own motion or upon the application of the
attorney prosecuting and in furtherance of justice, order a complaint,
information, or indictment to be dismissed; however, the court may not
order a dismissal of a complaint, information, or indictment, or a count
contained therein, charging a felony, unless good cause for dismissal is
shown and the reasons for the dismissal are set forth in an order entered
upon the minutes.
(Emphasis added.) Under this standard, “the authority of the court to dismiss a
proceeding is not unbridled and must be exercised in view of the constitutional rights of
the defendant and the interests of society.” State v. Schwictenberg, 237 Mont. 213, 217,
772 P.2d 853, 856 (1989). “[F]actors which a trial court should consider before
dismissing a case, either before trial or after a verdict, include weighing the evidence
indicative of guilt or innocence, the nature of the crime involved, the length, if any, of the
defendant's pretrial incarceration, and the possible harassment and burdens imposed upon
the defendant by a trial.” State v. Cole, 174 Mont. 380, 384, 571 P.2d 87, 89 (1977)
(citing People v. Ritchie, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 1104-05, 95 Cal. Rptr. 462, 466 (1971)).
In dismissing a case under § 46-13-401(1), MCA, it is mandatory that the district court
make a showing of good cause and give reasons showing that dismissing the case was
pursuant to the furtherance of justice. State ex rel. Fletcher v. Dist. Ct., 260 Mont. 410,
417, 859 P.2d 992, 996 (1993). These reasons must be in the record, “for its main
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purpose is to restrain judicial discretion and curb arbitrary action for undisclosed reasons
and motives.” Ritchie, 17 Cal. App. 3d. at 1104-05, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
¶10 Here, the District Court failed to show good cause in issuing the dismissals and
failed to show that doing so was in the furtherance of justice. To be clear, this Court has
no objection to stacking trials in the name of judicial efficiency, but the manner in which
the court treated the stacked trials here was clearly arbitrary and capricious. While a
court’s administrative trial concerns are important, those concerns must be balanced with
the interests of society. Schwictenberg, 237 Mont. at 217, 772 P.2d at 856. The District
Court dismissed with prejudice, in one sentence each, two felony cases, one involving an
individual who was allegedly shooting a rifle while intoxicated in a public park and
another involving an individual allegedly operating a vehicle with his young children in it
while he was under the influence of several illegal substances. Undoubtedly, the interests
of the citizens of Montana and society as a whole in trying these felony criminal
endangerment and child endangerment cases far outweigh the District Court’s
administrative trial concerns. Further, the record indicates the District Court was not
actually concerned with administering trials on the morning of February 11, 2019. When
presented with the opportunity to try Bigcrane, the District Court opted to order
Bigcrane’s arrest and dismiss the other two cases that were set for that morning. The
District Court lacked good cause to dismiss Billmayer and Mueller.1
1
Moreover, the arrest of Bigcrane was entirely arbitrary and unnecessary, to say nothing of
the inconvenience and lack of respect shown to the county residents who dutifully appeared for
jury duty. Bigcrane was late for a short period but nevertheless was available for trial, as were
the counsel, witnesses, and the jury.
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¶11 The foundational purpose of the Judicial Branch in this state is “to expound and
administer law in those causes properly brought before them in course of legal
procedure,” not “for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge.” State ex rel.
Perry v. Dist. Ct., 145 Mont. 287, 298, 400 P.2d 648, 653 (1965) (emphasis added). In
Schwictenberg, the district court was found to have abused its discretion when it based its
decision to dismiss a misdemeanor case on a missing court document and a prosecution
intern’s decorum. Schwictenberg, 237 Mont. at 218-19, 772 P.2d at 857. In State v. Roll,
206 Mont. 259, 261-62, 670 P.2d 566, 568 (1983), this Court denied a defendant’s
motion to dismiss his felony charges based on the fact that the prosecution, judge, and
jury failed to appear for his trial, holding the district court properly continued the case
since the “interests of society would be harmed if the charges were dismissed because of
a harmless procedural technicality.”
¶12 The District Court wholly failed to provide grounded reasons for ordering pretrial
dismissals of two felony cases with prejudice. Aside from a one sentence explanation,
the District Court failed to detail in any meaningful way that its action was in furtherance
of justice.
¶13 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal
presents no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new
precedent or modify existing precedent.
¶14 We reverse the District Court’s orders dismissing Billmayer and Mueller and
remand for these cases to be tried on the merits.
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/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We Concur:
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ JIM RICE
Justice Ingrid Gustafson, specially concurring.
¶15 I concur with reversing the District Court’s dismissal of State v. Billmayer and
State v. Mueller under the particular unique circumstances presented here. Under the
circumstances in this instance, the District Court should have proceeded to trial in State v.
Bigcrane given her case was set as the first setting, she appeared—albeit slightly late but
well before trial on any other matter could have been commenced even if all parties were
prepared to proceed—and a jury was present and ready. Had Ms. Bigcrane not appeared
at all or had she appeared significantly later—such as after the jury was excused—the
District Court’s actions would not have been an abuse of discretion. Here, the actions of
the District Court were not for good cause and did nothing to further justice and thus,
were an abuse of discretion. I am not, however, persuaded by the State’s position that it
did not prepare for trial as it anticipated State v. Bigcrane would proceed to trial and, as
such, the prosecutor “made the call” to not prepare for the scheduled trial. There are
numerous good faith means by which parties can appropriately prepare for trial when
faced with stacked dockets, simply choosing not to prepare or come to court ready for
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trial is not one of them.1 A prosecutor who intentionally appears unprepared for trial
when, as here, he or she has been provided sufficient notice to subpoena witnesses and
otherwise prepare for trial, should reasonably expect to have his or her case dismissed
with prejudice.
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
Justice Dirk Sandefur and Justice Laurie McKinnon join in the special concurring
Opinion of Justice Gustafson.
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
1
Counsel should, at a minimum, confer with opposing counsel and the court a few business days
before trial to make arrangements for how the court intends to proceed should other cases resolve
or not proceed. Counsel could issue subpoenas and advise witnesses and keep in touch with
them to assure their appearance at the time they are actually called to testify. As it appears
stacking is a relatively new occurrence in this judicial district, the court should consider holding
brief status conferences/hearings prior to sending out the jury call to get final commitment as to
what cases are going, their order of presentation, and establish the plan for what occurs if a prior
case resolves or does not proceed to trial. Like it or not, counsel and the court must work
together to develop good faith plans for handling increasingly busy trial dockets.
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