State v. J. Black ( 2021 )

07/06/2021
DA 19-0157
Case Number: DA 19-0157
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2021 MT 165N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
FILED
JUL 0 6 2021
v.
Bowen Greenwood
Clerk of Supreme Court
State of Montana
JACQUELINE BLACK,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Third Judicial District,
In and For the County of Powell, Cause No. DC-16-58
Honorable Ray J. Dayton, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Ryan P. Archibald, Bitterroot Law,PLLC, Hamilton, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, C. Mark Fowler, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Kathryn McEnery, Powell County Attorney, Deer Lodge, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 3, 2021
Decided: July 6, 2021
Filed:
Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion ofthe Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Jacqueline Black appeals from her conviction by a jury ofthe offense of conspiracy
to commit transferring illegal articles, a felony pursuant to §§ 45-4-102 and 45-7-307,
MCA. We affirm.
¶3 Black was charged with attempting to transport illegal articles into Montana State
Prison(MSP)along with two co-conspirators. Between February and March 2014, Black
communicated over 30 times with Terry Lloyd Cowan (Cowan), an inmate at MSP, often
discussing Suboxone and its transport into MSP. On March 6, 2014, Cowan received a
package with what was later identified by the crime lab as Buprenorphine/Naloxene,
cornmonly known as Suboxone, a dangerous drug pursuant to § 50-32-226(2)(g), MCA.
On March 9, 2014, Black attempted to visit Cowan but was not permitted entrance. Black
was subsequently charged.
¶4 Previously Black had been on probation for other charges, and on October 16,2017,
the parties signed a stipulation agreeing not to discuss Black's prior bad acts at trial. The
District Court ordered that the parties refrain entirely from presenting any evidence on
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"[a]ny wrongful act, allegation of rnisconduct, warrant, arrest, charge, or conviction of
[Black] for which she is not charged in this case."
¶5 On June 4,2018,the State filed a trial brief which included its exhibit list. The State
planned to introduce as evidence the visitor log that Black signed when she atternpted to
visit MSP. The log listed Black's prior felony conviction, and the State offered to redact
that portion. The State asserted "Defendant has not indicated it wishes any of the
evidence — including the recorded phone calls — redacted, and the State intends on playing
them in their entirety." Defense counsel did not respond.
¶6 In a pretrial conference, the District Court discussed the audio recordings and
possible prejudice to Black. The court stated,"We have a stipulation. We're not going to
hear about any other convictions or anything else. We've agreed to that, right?" The State
responded,
[Your] honor there is reference to it in these audio recordings as I've uh,
restated in the Pre-Trial Conference um, however, I've done my best to um,
mitigate that in the timefrarnes I'm intending on playing. Um, it doesn't
specifically list uh, what Ms. Black was in custody for in-- under probation
for I think is actually the um, phrase.
The State also responded that it had redacted Black's felony reference on the visitor log for
MSP. Defense counsel stated that he knew what the audio tapes contained and had no
objections to what the State was going to play for the jury regarding Black.
¶7 In opening statements, the State explained that Cowan and Justin Basaraba
(Basaraba) conspired with Black to transport drugs into MSP. The State told the jury that
Cowan and Basaraba would both be witnesses at trial. Basaraba agreed to testify for the
State in exchange for dismissal ofthe charge he faced as a co-conspirator. Cowan was still
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in prison and initially agreed to testify for the State. The State advised the jury to pay close
attention to the derneanor of the co-conspirators and consider their motivations in
testifying. The evidentiary basis for conviction, the State explained, would be based on
the contents of recorded phone calls and Black's visits to the prison. Defense counsel
explained that the package Cowan received with Suboxone had a return address to Kelly
Clarkson, and that Cowan and Black were friends but that Basaraba never met Black.
¶8 Once he was on the stand, Cowan stated that he was advised by an attorney not to
testify and he therefore refused to testify. Basaraba testified that he and Cowan were
cellmates at MSP,and while there, Cowan taught him how to transport Suboxone by mail.
Basaraba testified about the method that Cowan taught him and explained,"No unglue the
bottorn flap of a manila mailing envelope and re-glue it with the Suboxone strips in there
and then send it in." Cowan also told Basaraba about his friend Black. Basaraba testified
that Cowan referred to Black as both "Jackie" and "Jacqueline."
¶9 Once Basaraba was released from MSP, Cowan called him to request he assist in
transporting Suboxone into MSP. Cowan wanted Basaraba to explain to Black how to
transport Suboxone by mail. Cowan communicated this to Black on a recorded line many
thnes, including asking her repeatedly to contact Basaraba for instructions. Basaraba
subsequently spoke with a person who identified herself as Black and relayed the
instructions from Cowan on how to transport Suboxone. On cross-examination Basaraba
said that he did not know whether the person he spoke to on the phone was Black, or just
someone using her name as he had never met her in person. He also explained that on the
recorded calls with Cowan, Cowan called Suboxone "strippers".
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¶10 The State presented the audio recordings of Black speaking with Cowan as well as
recordings of Cowan speaking with Basaraba. Cowan and Basaraba spoke about
Suboxone, although as Basaraba testified, Cowan often referred to Suboxone as
"strippers." They discussed planning to transport Suboxone into MSP. In the recording of
the initial call the State presented, Basaraba did not understand what Cowan was asking
him to do when he referred to "strippers," but Cowan explained by describing the
"strippers" they had in Shelby on one occasion. Basaraba then recognized what Cowan
was speaking about and mentioned that the "strippers" had "beading patterns." At that
point Basaraba agreed to explain to Black how to "get it all ready," referring to sending
Suboxone.
¶11 Basaraba and Black did not connect for some time and Cowan called Basaraba
repeatedly to ask whether he had spoken with Black. Eventually Basaraba and Black
connected, and Cowan confirmed by thanking him for "telling [Black] how to do that."
Basaraba told Cowan that it was no problem and asked if it worked out all right. Cowan
responded happily with laughter.
¶12 The recordings confirm that Cowan asked Black to contact Basaraba. Initially Black
did not understand what Cowan was asking her to do, and Cowan assured her that once she
received the letter he had sent and after she spoke to Basaraba she would understand.
Cowan grew increasingly agitated that Black had not reached out to Basaraba. Cowan and
Black also discussed Black's recent probation and related treatment. Defense counsel did
not object to the admission of any of the recordings at trial.
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¶13 Testimony from an investigator and a mailroom supervisor from MSP corroborated
that Suboxone was sent to Cowan, that Black visited Cowan twice, and that Black and
Cowan spoke on the phone over 30 tirnes.
¶14 In closing arguments, defense counsel argued that the State did not provide evidence
to prove that Black was actually the one who sent the envelope with Suboxone to Cowan.
The State did not check for DNA on the envelope, nor did they analyze the handwriting,
and the return address on the envelope said it came from Cowan's sister's house. At the
conclusion ofthe trial, the State presented the Court with over 20 proposed jury instructions
including one that stated that Cowan was Black's co-conspirator and was charged for that
crime. Defense counsel did not object to that instruction and declined to present any jury
instructions.
¶15 Black argues on appeal that the State committed prosecutorial rnisconduct by
presenting evidence of her prior bad acts at trial after stipulating not to do so.
Section 46-20 104(2), MCA, bars review of alleged errors not objected to at trial. Thus,
we decline to review the claim here.
¶16 Black argues further that her counsel was ineffective because he failed to present
the jury instructions that he was obligated to present regarding co-conspirator testimony.
¶17 Section 26-1-303(4), MCA,requires that "the jury is to be instructed by the court
on all proper occasions that . . . the testimony of a person legally accountable for the acts
of the accused ought to be viewed with distrust." State v. Kougl, 2004 MT 243, ¶ 20, 323
Mont. 6,97 P.3d 1095; State v. Rose, 1998 MT 342, 292 Mont. 350,972 P.2d 321.
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¶18 Moreover, a co-conspirator's testimony rnust be corroborated with other evidence
pursuant to § 46-16-213, MCA,which states:
A person may not be found guilty of an offense on the testimony of one
responsible or legally accountable for the same offense, as defined in
45-2-301, unless the testimony is corroborated by other evidence that in itself
without the aid ofthe testimony ofthe one responsible or legally accountable
for the same offense tends to connect the defendant with the commission of
the offense.
If counsel requests jury instructions that are required by statute, the district court is
obligated to grant the request. Kougl,¶17;Rose,¶ 18;see also § 26-1-303, MCA. Counsel
can be found ineffective when they fail to ask the jury to be instructed to view a
legally-accountable person's testimony with suspicion when they have no plausible
justification not to do so. Kougl, ¶ 17 (citing Rose, ¶ 20).
¶19 In Kougl, we held that where the parties agreed that the defendant had accomplices,
their status was not in dispute, and therefore they were accomplices as a matter of law.
Kougl, ¶ 20(citing State v. Johnson, 276 Mont. 447, 451-53,918 P.2d 293, 295-96(1996).
"By failing to ask the court to tell the jurors that the law demands they view the
accomplices' testimony with distrust, trial counsel failed to use the law to strike at the heart
of the State's case." Kougl, ¶ 20. On the other hand, if the jury instruction would conflict
with a defense presented, it could be tactical not to present a jury instruction about
accomplice testimony. State v. Johnson, 257 Mont. 163, 163, 848 P.2d 499, 498 (1996),
overruled by City ofHelena v. Franforter, 2018 MT 193, 392 Mont. 277,423 P.3d 581.
¶20 The right to effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment and
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by Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution. We use a two-prong test in
evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Heath v. State, 2009 MT 7, ¶ 17, 348
Mont. 361,202 P.3d 118; Strickland v. Washington,466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052(1984).
Under the Strickland test, a party must establish that their attorney was deficient, and that
the attorney's deficient performance was prejudicial and deprived the party of a fair trial.
Heath, ¶ 17; Dawson v. State, 2000 MT 219, ¶ 20, 301 Mont. 135, 10 P.3d 49. The
defendant must show that there is a reasonable possibility that without counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Heath, ¶ 17
(citations omitted).
¶21 Generally, we start by asking why counsel did or did not perform as alleged and
then refer to the record to answer this question. Kougl, ¶ 14(citation omitted). Sometimes
it is unnecessary to ask why because there is no plausible justification for what counsel did.
Kougl, ¶ 15.
¶22 Here, the State's case did rely significantly on the fact that both Cowan and
Basaraba communicated with Black about gathering drugs and transporting them into
MSP. Cowan orchestrated the transport and Basaraba was key in teaching Black how to
send the Suboxone. Basaraba's testimony was a niajor component ofthe State's evidence
linking Black to the conspiracy and confirmed that Cowan asked Basaraba to teach Black
how to mail Suboxone to Cowan in MSP and that Basaraba did so. But when Cowan
refused to testify, Basaraba's testiniony was the only testimony linking Black to the
conspiracy and Basaraba had never met Black. After Cowan refused to testify, it is
plausible that defense counsel decided to avoid bringing attention to Black as part of the
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conspiracy. Based on the record, the defense strategy may have been that Black was not
involved in the conspiracy. In any event, we do not have a basis in the record to determine
whether failure to request the conspiracy-based instruction was deficient performance.
¶23 Black's counsel was not ineffective based on the record. Black can address the issue
in a petition for postconviction relief with the District Court if she so chooses.
¶24 We have deterrnined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
applicable standards of review.
¶25 Affirmed.
Chief Justice
We Concur:
Justices
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