Whitefish v. W. Klink III ( 2021 )

01/12/2021
DA 19-0121
Case Number: DA 19-0121
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2021 MT 9N
CITY OF WHITEFISH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM PURDY KLINK III,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DC 18-357(a)
Honorable Amy Eddy, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Cody Atkins, Hendrickson Law Firm, P.C., Billings, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Roy Brown, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Angela Jacobs, City Attorney, Mary Leffers Barry, Deputy City Attorney,
Whitefish, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: December 16, 2020
Decided: January 12, 2021
Filed:
cir-641.—if
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 William Purdy Klink, III, appeals from his conviction after jury trial in Whitefish
Municipal Court, Honorable William Hileman, Jr., presiding, of Partner or Family Member
Assault (PFMA), a misdemeanor, in violation of § 45-5-206, MCA. Klink appealed to the
District Court, Honorable Amy Eddy, presiding, contending the Municipal Court erred by
denying his request to raise the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect during trial.
The District Court affirmed Klink’s conviction.
¶3 Klink resided in Whitefish with his mother, Diane Klink. On February 25, 2018,
after Diane confronted Klink about his potential use of methamphetamine, he became
angry and made statements threatening violence against her and himself. Diane locked
herself in the bathroom and called 911. Officers responded and, after locating Diane locked
in the bathroom distraught and fearing bodily harm, they arrested Klink and cited him for
PFMA.
¶4 On past occasions when law enforcement had been called regarding Klink, he had
sought mental health treatment. On March 14, 2018, City Prosecutor Mary Leffers Barry
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wrote Emily Thomsen, Klink’s counsel,1 providing prior police reports and stating that
Klink had been diagnosed with “drug-induced schizophrenia” by Pathways treatment
center during previous stays. Barry offered a plea agreement whereby Klink would “obtain
a mental health and chemical dependency evaluation,” attend weekly out-patient treatment
sessions, and abide by treatment recommendations.
¶5 At the Omnibus Hearing on April 17, 2018, Klink gave notice of his intent to raise
the affirmative defense of justifiable use of force, and specifically indicated he would not
rely upon an affirmative defense of mental disease or defect. Trial was set for June 14,
2018, but two days before trial, Klink moved for a 90-day continuance explaining the
parties had reached a tentative agreement to resolve the case upon Klink’s completion of
an evaluation and treatment. The Municipal Court granted the motion and continued the
trial for three months, but Klink did not obtain an evaluation. Prior to trial, the City filed
a trial brief addressing Klink’s defense of justifiable use of force, and noting that Klink had
not provided notice of a defense of mental disease or defect.
¶6 During voir dire, defense counsel moved for mistrial on the ground the jury panel
represented an inadequate cross-section of the community, in violation of Klink’s due
process rights. The City objected and the Municipal Court denied the motion. In his
opening statement to the jury, defense counsel stated that Klink had a mental illness and
1
Keenan Gallagher was substituted as Klink’s counsel on March 20, 2018. Cody Atkins represents
Klink on appeal.
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that, on the night of the incident, “he was exhibiting those same symptoms.” The City
called Diane as a witness and, during cross examination, Klink’s counsel sought to question
her concerning Klink’s and Klink’s father’s history of mental illness, to which the City
objected. The Municipal Court sustained the objection and, after Diane’s testimony,
conducted a conference with the parties outside of the presence of the jury. Defense
counsel proffered jury instructions on mental disease or defect. The Municipal Court asked
why the instructions had not been provided by the pre-trial instruction deadline, to which
defense counsel answered, “we filed a notice in this case of mental disease or defect, so
there was at least in our minds the possibility of this issue coming up at trial,” and that it
was not known to the defense that Klink’s mental illness “was as clear and as acute” until
Diane’s testimony. The City responded that, contrary to defense counsel’s assertion, no
notice of a mental disease or defect defense had been given, the lawyers had discussed
“multiple times” that this issue would not be pursued at trial, the latest of which was a
phone conversation the evening before trial, and the defense had not responded to the City’s
trial brief explaining that mental disease and defect was not a trial issue. The Municipal
Court denied the defense’s request, reasoning that Klink was aware of the issue pre-trial,
failed to seek a mental evaluation after requesting time to do so, failed to disclose the
defense in the Omnibus order, failed to timely submit mental state instructions, and failed
to respond to the City’s trial brief on the issue. The trial concluded with the jury returning
a guilty verdict.
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¶7 Klink appealed to the District Court, raising a single “Question Presented,” which
he stated as follows: “Did the Whitefish Municipal Court violate Appellant’s right to due
process by precluding Appellant from raising the affirmative defense of mental disease or
defect?” Although acknowledging the defense had failed to provide notice of the defense,
Klink argued that the circumstances justified disclosure “at a later time as the court may
for good cause permit,” pursuant to § 46-15-323(3), MCA. He made no argument
concerning the Municipal Court’s denial of his mistrial motion based upon the jury pool.
Addressing the issue raised, the District Court reasoned that Klink’s counsel had made
statements that “clearly negat[ed] his claim that he had not realized the ‘significant role’ of
Appellant’s mental illness prior” to Diane’s testimony, and concluded the Municipal Court
had not abused its discretion in denying the defense as an appropriate trial sanction under
§ 45-15-329, MCA. Klink appeals.
¶8 “On [] appeal from the Municipal Court, the District Court function[s] as an
intermediate appellate court. See §§ 3-5-303 and 3-6-110, MCA.” City of Bozeman v.
Lehrer, 2020 MT 55, ¶ 6, 399 Mont. 166, 459 P.3d 850 (citing City of Bozeman v. Cantu,
2013 MT 40, ¶ 10, 369 Mont. 81, 296 P.3d 461). Upon subsequent appeal to this Court,
we review the case “as if the appeal originally had been filed in this Court.” Lehrer, ¶ 6
(citation omitted).
¶9 On the issue raised in his appeal to the District Court, Klink argues that good cause
existed for raising the mental disease or defect defense during trial because “Diane’s
testimony changed the nature of the case.” However, we agree with the District Court’s
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determination that the record does not support this position. Klink’s mental condition,
including his prior disruptive incidents, diagnosis and treatment, was a central issue
discussed by the parties from the beginning of the case. Klink did not provide notice of
intent to rely on the mental disease or defect defense, but rather, to the contrary, gave notice
the defense would not be raised, and that the defense of justifiable use of force would
instead be relied upon. In informal discussions between counsel, the City prosecutor
repeatedly confirmed with defense counsel that the mental disease or defect defense would
not be raised at trial.
¶10 Klink also argues the Municipal Court erred by denying his motion for mistrial
because the jury panel “did not comprise a fair cross-section of the community.” However,
as Klink acknowledges, this issue was abandoned when not raised in his appeal to the
District Court, and thus he asks the issue to be reviewed as plain error. “The party
requesting plain error review bears the burden of ‘firmly convinc[ing]’ this Court that the
claimed error implicates a fundamental right and that such review is necessary.” State v.
Daniels, 2019 MT 214, ¶ 31, 397 Mont. 204, 448 P.3d 511 (citing State v. Norman, 2010
MT 253, ¶ 17, 358 Mont. 252, 244 P.3d 737).
This Court will invoke plain error review sparingly, and only if the error
claimed implicates a party’s fundamental constitutional rights and if “failing
to review the claimed error at issue may: (1) result in a manifest miscarriage
of justice; (2) leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the
trial or proceedings; or (3) compromise the integrity of the judicial process.”
Daniels, ¶ 30 (citing State v. Weaver, 1998 MT 167, ¶ 25, 290 Mont. 58, 964 P.2d 713).
Klink’s argument acknowledges that “there is no evidence that prospective jurors were
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improperly noticed to ensure random selection,” and, further, he does not satisfy his burden
of demonstrating the standards of plain error review are here satisfied.
¶11 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
applicable standards of review. The Municipal Court did not err.
¶12 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
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