State v. S. Grandchamp ( 2020 )

04/28/2020
DA 18-0192
Case Number: DA 18-0192
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2020 MT 103N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
SHELDON GRANDCHAMP,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DC 17-63B
Honorable Rienne McElyea, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Kristen L. Peterson, Alexander H. Pyle,
Assistant Appellate Defenders, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Michael P. Dougherty,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Martin D. Lambert, Gallatin County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 13, 2019
Decided: April 28, 2020
Filed:
cir-641.—if
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Dirk Sandefur delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, we decide this case by memorandum opinion—it shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Sheldon Grandchamp appeals the judgment of the Montana Eighteenth Judicial
District Court, Gallatin County, denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from a
motor vehicle pursuant to a search warrant. He asserts that the warrant application failed
to state sufficient probable cause for the search and resulting seizure. We affirm.
¶3 From December 20, 2016 through January 20, 2017, the Bozeman Police
Department received at least 65 complaints reporting various items stolen from vehicles
around Bozeman. The majority reported that the thief or thieves gained entry into locked
vehicles by using a window punch. The complaints reported a wide array of stolen items
including, inter alia, a television, a snowboard, backpacks, ski clothing, tools, guns,
sunglasses, credit cards, gift cards, cash, and a replica medieval battle ax. Based on
information developed by Bozeman police including, inter alia the fruits of a search
warrant executed on a 2000 Ford Explorer, owned by a neighbor but which Grandchamp
had been driving, the State charged him with multiple counts of felony theft, criminal
trespass to vehicles, and felony possession of dangerous drugs. After the District Court
denied his motion to suppress the fruit of the search, Grandchamp pled guilty to two
2
felonies under a plea agreement that reserved his right to appeal the denial of the
suppression motion. Upon sentencing,1 he timely appealed.
¶4 In support of the suppression motion, Grandchamp asserted in District Court that
the vehicle search violated his federal and state constitutional rights to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures because the warrant application was either facially
insufficient to state the requisite probable cause, or would be upon required excision of
materially false or misleading information. Inter alia, he asserted that the application was
defective due to a materially false statement.2 He further asserted that a key statement
made to police by Grandchamp’s sister (Tiffany) was not sufficiently corroborated and was
thus invalid support for probable cause under the three-prong analysis for informant
reliability in State v. Reesman, 2000 MT 243, ¶¶ 27-46, 301 Mont. 408, 10 P.3d 83,
overruled in part by State v. Barnaby, 2006 MT 203, ¶ 42, 333 Mont. 220, 142 P.3d 809.
¶5 Upon an evidentiary hearing,3 the District Court concluded that Grandchamp
ultimately failed to meet his burden of proving that information in the warrant application
1
The Court deviated from the plea agreement recommendation and sentenced Grandchamp to
concurrent 10-year terms to the Department of Corrections with six years suspended.
2
Grandchamp asserted that the affiant’s statement that he saw through the vehicle window what
appeared to be several items “consistent with” known stolen items “covered with several blankets
to hide them from view, . . . from plain view through the [vehicle] window” was materially false
because the items could not have been hidden as alleged if he actually saw them as asserted.
3
The only evidence presented at the hearing was a copy of the vehicle warrant application and the
State’s presentation of testimony from the primary investigating officer and warrant application
affiant, Bozeman Police Detective Robert Vanuka. Grandchamp included a photograph in or with
his Reply Brief depicting the interior of the rear section of the subject vehicle.
3
was materially false or inaccurate.4 Further rejecting his assertion that the referenced
information provided by his sister Tiffany was too unreliable to be a basis for probable
cause under Reesman, the court again concluded that the application was facially sufficient
under the totality of the stated circumstances to establish probable cause for the vehicle
search and resulting seizure.5
¶6 We review denials of motions to suppress evidence for whether the lower court
correctly interpreted or applied the law and whether any material findings of fact were
clearly erroneous. State v. Massey, 2016 MT 316, ¶ 7, 385 Mont. 460, 385 P.3d 544; State
v. Marks, 2002 MT 255, ¶ 10, 312 Mont. 169, 59 P.3d 369. Montana Constitution
Article II, Section 11, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. Searches and
seizures authorized by judicial warrant on probable cause of criminal activity are
presumptively reasonable. See Mont. Const. art. II, § 11; U.S. Const. amend. IV and XIV;
Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2007).
¶7 The U.S. and Montana constitutional standards for issuance of search warrants on
probable cause is whether, when viewed in a practical, common sense manner from the
perspective of those versed in law enforcement, the facts stated on the face of the
4
Construing it in the light most favorable to the warrant, the court read the subject statement to
mean that the officer saw “an impression of” similar items under the blanket.
5
The presiding District Court judge who drew the subsequent criminal case was the same judge
who issued the ex parte vehicle warrant.
4
application are sufficient as a whole under the totality of the circumstances to establish a
reasonable likelihood of illegal activity and that evidence, contraband, or persons
connected with that activity may then be found in or about the specified person or place to
be searched. E.g., Barnaby, ¶¶ 29-30; State v. St. Marks, 2002 MT 285, ¶¶ 18, 23,
312 Mont. 468, 59 P.3d 1113; State v. Kaluza, 272 Mont. 404, 407, 901 P.2d 107, 109
(1995); State v. Rinehart, 262 Mont. 204, 210-11, 864 P.2d 1219, 1222-23 (1993); State v.
Holstine, 260 Mont. 310, 314, 860 P.2d 110, 113 (1993); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
230-45, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328-35 (1983); State ex rel. Townsend v. District Court,
168 Mont. 357, 362-63, 543 P.2d 193, 196 (1975).6
¶8 On appellate review, the sufficiency of a search warrant application is a question of
law reviewed de novo for correctness under the totality of the circumstances indicated on
the face of the application, liberally viewed as a whole in a practical, common sense manner
from the perspective of those versed in the field of law enforcement, with every reasonable
inference drawn in favor of the warrant. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 694-700,
116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661-63 (1996); Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-45, 103 S. Ct. at 2328-35. See
also State v. Forfeiture of 2003 Chevrolet Pickup, 2009 MT 25, ¶ 5, 349 Mont. 106,
202 P.3d 782 (application of constitutional standards to finite sets of facts is subject to
6
See also § 46-5-221, MCA (1967 Mont. Laws ch. 196 as amended) (codifying federal
constitutional standards).
5
de novo review); State v. Kaufman, 2002 MT 294, ¶¶ 11-12, 313 Mont. 1, 59 P.3d 1166.7
Judicial findings of probable cause for issuance of search warrants are presumed correct.
State v. Deskins, 245 Mont. 158, 162, 799 P.2d 1070, 1072 (1990); Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2685 (1978).
¶9 Here, the narrow issue on appeal is whether the application to search the subject
vehicle was deficient pursuant to Reesman for failure to manifest independent police
corroboration of Tiffany’s statement to police, upon the arrest of her companion and
Grandchamp associate (Figueroa) at their home, that various items of property at the home
(similar to property stolen in Bozeman) belonged to Grandchamp. In assessing the facial
sufficiency of a warrant application, the apparent veracity, reliability, and basis of an
informant’s referenced knowledge are highly relevant in assessing whether sufficient
probable cause exists for issuance of the requested warrant. Rinehart, 262 Mont. at 210,
864 P.2d at 1222; Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 103 S. Ct. at 2328. The apparent extent of
independent police corroboration of referenced informant information is thus similarly
important. Barnaby, ¶¶ 40-45; Gates, 462 U.S. at 241, 103 S. Ct. at 2334-35. However,
the totality of the circumstances test does not require conformance with any rigid rules for
determining the veracity, reliability, or basis of informant information, or for independent
police corroboration thereof. Barnaby, ¶¶ 40-46 (rejecting Reesman’s rigid informant
7
See also State v. Frasure, 2004 MT 242, ¶ 15, 323 Mont. 1, 97 P.3d 1101; St. Marks, ¶¶ 14, 18
(clarifying seemingly inconsistent precedential references to “substantial basis” standard of review
as “the same thing as” a conclusion of “sufficient probable cause”); Marks, ¶¶ 16-20; United States
v. Hicks, 575 F.3d 130, 136 (1st Cir. 2009); Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 569, 574 (2d Cir. 1994);
United States v. Riedesel, 987 F.2d 1383, 1391 (8th Cir. 1993).
6
information test); Gates, 462 U.S. at 229-44, 103 S. Ct. at 2328-36 (rejecting rigid
Aguilar-Spinelli test for informat information).8 Consequently, contrary to Grandchamp’s
assertion, the totality of the circumstances test did not necessarily require independent
police corroboration of Tiffany’s statement as a matter of course. See Barnaby, ¶¶ 40-46.
¶10 On its face, the search warrant application stated facts clearly showing, inter alia,
that Tiffany was Grandchamp’s sister, he and her companion (Figueroa) had recently
pawned items from the Bozeman area thefts,9 Figueroa asked Tiffany to unknowingly
return a stolen shirt to a store for him when she was in Bozeman at Grandchamp’s home,
the store confirmed to police that an unidentified couple attempted to return the shirt for a
refund as stated by Tiffany, police confirmed the property that Tiffany later disclaimed and
said belonged to Grandchamp after her companion’s arrest was similar to property stolen
in one of the Bozeman thefts, and police saw property resembling the shape of some of the
stolen Bozeman property concealed under a blanket in the back of the subject vehicle that
8
Purportedly within the framework of the totality of the circumstances test, Reesman mandated
rigid rules for piece-by-piece assessment of informant information: (1) anonymous information
may not contribute to probable cause absent independent police corroboration of that information;
(2) confidential information may not contribute to probable cause absent an accompanying
admission against criminal interest, a representation by police that the informant previously
provided reliable information, or independent police corroboration; and (3) identified informant
information may not contribute to probable cause unless independently corroborated by police or
motivated solely by good citizenship and bearing sufficient indicia of knowledge of the subject
criminal activity. Reesman, ¶¶ 28, 31-35. Reesman remains conversely vital from the standpoint
that it continues to reflect circumstances under which a search warrant application may
affirmatively demonstrate that various types of informant information are reliable bases for
probable cause. See Barnaby, ¶¶ 44-45.
9
Viewed in the light most favorable to the warrant, the application stated that this information
derived from information developed upon investigation by another police detective.
7
Grandchamp had been driving and clandestinely parking away from his residence. Viewed
in the light most favorable to the warrant, we hold that, under the totality of circumstances
evident on its face, the application stated sufficient probable cause to believe that
Grandchamp was involved in one or more of the Bozeman thefts and that evidence or
contraband connected therewith was likely present in the subject vehicle.
¶11 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
applicable standards of review.
¶12 Affirmed.
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
We concur:
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ JIM RICE
8