Sandra K. Miller v. Office of Personnel Management , 2015 MSPB 63 ( 2015 )


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  •                          UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    
    2015 MSPB 63
    Docket No. DE-0845-15-0148-I-1
    Sandra K. Miller,
    Appellant,
    v.
    Office of Personnel Management,
    Agency.
    December 16, 2015
    Christine Wolfe, Topeka, Kansas, for the appellant.
    Patrick Jennings, Washington, D.C., for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
    Mark A. Robbins, Member
    OPINION AND ORDER
    ¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
    dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons discussed below,
    we DENY the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and
    DISMISS the appeal for lack of jurisdiction for the reasons set forth in this
    Opinion and Order.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2         The appellant’s mother received Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS)
    annuity payments from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) until her
    death on December 29, 2011. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 8. OPM asserts
    2
    that, following her death, it erroneously continued to send annuity payments
    totaling $2,433.40 to the appellant’s mother at the assisted living center where
    she had resided. 
    Id. According to
    the appellant, after her mother’s death, she
    received a check in the amount of $2,212.97 from the assisted living center on
    behalf of her mother’s estate. 
    Id. at 7.
    She asserts that she returned the check
    with a letter indicating that she believed the check consisted partly of funds from
    OPM that were not the property of her mother’s estate, but rather were properly
    due to the U.S. Department of the Treasury. 
    Id. at 7,
    14. The appellant later
    received a new check from the assisted living center in the amount of $1,215.82.
    
    Id. at 7;
    Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 6 at 9. The appellant cashed the
    check and divided the proceeds among herself and the other two heirs of her
    mother’s estate, with the appellant receiving $607.91. IAF, Tab 1 at 7, 12-13.
    ¶3         OPM subsequently informed the appellant that she was overpaid $1,215.82 1
    in CSRS annuity benefits and that it intended to collect the overpayment. 
    Id. at 8.
    The appellant requested reconsideration, and on December 9, 2014, OPM
    issued a reconsideration decision affirming its initial decision and denying the
    appellant’s request for a waiver of the overpayment collection.           
    Id. at 8-11.
         OPM’s reconsideration decision advised the appellant that she could either pay
    the full amount of $1,215.82 in one lump sum or complete the enclosed
    repayment agreement and repay that amount, plus 1% interest, in 48 monthly
    installments of $25.00 and one final installment of $15.82. 
    Id. at 10.
    ¶4         The appellant filed the instant appeal of OPM’s December 9, 2014
    reconsideration decision. IAF, Tab 1.       In response, OPM asserted that it was
    rescinding its reconsideration decision because it erroneously gave the appellant
    notice of Board appeal rights. IAF, Tab 10 at 4. OPM also moved to dismiss the
    appeal on the basis that, even absent its rescission, the Board lacks jurisdiction
    1
    OPM asserts that it recovered $1,217.40, the remainder of the overpaid funds, through
    the U.S. Department of the Treasury. IAF, Tab 1 at 8.
    3
    because OPM had not issued a decision affecting the appellant’s rights under the
    CSRS, but instead was attempting to collect an improper payment constituting a
    debt collectable under 5 U.S.C. title 31.    
    Id. at 4-5.
      The administrative judge
    issued an initial decision finding that OPM’s rescission of its reconsideration
    decision divested the Board of jurisdiction and therefore dismissed the appeal for
    lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 11, Initial Decision.
    ¶5         The appellant filed a petition for review of the initial decision in which she
    asserts that the administrative judge improperly dismissed the appeal because
    OPM did not rescind its decision entirely, did not return her to the status quo
    ante, and is continuing to collect the overpayment. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6. The
    appellant further asserts that she did not receive adequate jurisdictional notice or
    an opportunity to respond to the agency’s jurisdictional arguments.        
    Id. at 7.
         Lastly, the appellant argues that recovery would cause her financial hardship and
    asserts that the Board has jurisdiction over a request that recovery of an annuity
    overpayment be waived even absent jurisdiction over the propriety of the
    overpayment itself. 
    Id. at 9.
    OPM opposed the appellant’s petition. PFR File,
    Tab 4 at 4.
    ¶6         Because the administrative judge dismissed the appeal on the basis of
    OPM’s rescission of its reconsideration decision and the appellant did not have an
    opportunity to develop the record on the relevant jurisdictional issue, the Board
    issued a show cause order permitting the appellant an opportunity to submit
    evidence and argument establishing that OPM’s decision to collect the alleged
    debt from her constitutes “an administrative action or order affecting the rights or
    interests of an individual or of the United States” under the CSRS. PFR File,
    Tab 5. In response, the appellant argues that a factual dispute over the existence
    and amount of the overpayments that OPM purports to collect under the authority
    of the CSRS affects the rights and interests of the parties and OPM’s
    reconsideration decision constitutes an “administrative action or order” under
    5 U.S.C. § 8347(d)(1). PFR File, Tab 6 at 4-5.
    4
    ANALYSIS
    ¶7         The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been
    given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation.        Maddox v. Merit Systems
    Protection Board, 
    759 F.2d 9
    , 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985).        The appellant bears the
    burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, 2 that the Board has
    jurisdiction over her appeal.    5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A).      Generally, the
    Board has jurisdiction over OPM’s determinations affecting an appellant’s rights
    or interests under the CSRS only after OPM has issued a reconsideration
    decision, and OPM’s complete rescission of its reconsideration decision divests
    the Board of jurisdiction over the appeal. See, e.g., Morin v. Office of Personnel
    Management, 107 M.S.P.R. 534, ¶ 8 (2007), aff’d, 287 F. App’x 864 (Fed. Cir.
    2008). However, the Board has held that, if OPM rescinds its reconsideration
    decision after the appellant files a Board appeal and it is apparent that OPM
    does not intend to issue a new decision, the Board retains jurisdiction to
    adjudicate the merits.     See Triplett v. Office of Personnel Management,
    100 M.S.P.R. 571, ¶¶ 5-7 (2005).
    ¶8         Here, OPM has not asserted that it intends to issue a new reconsideration
    decision, and its claim in rescinding its reconsideration decision that this is a
    collection matter outside of the Board’s jurisdiction suggests that it does not
    intend to do so. IAF, Tab 10 at 4-5. Therefore, we find that OPM’s rescission of
    its reconsideration decision did not divest the Board of jurisdiction over this
    appeal. However, we find that the Board nonetheless lacks jurisdiction over this
    appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 8347(d)(1) for the reasons set forth below.
    ¶9         The Board’s jurisdiction concerning retirement matters involving the CSRS
    is defined at 5 U.S.C. § 8347(d)(1), which provides that “an administrative action
    2
    Preponderance of the evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
    person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a
    contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
    5
    or order affecting the rights or interests of an individual or of the United States
    under this subchapter [(i.e., the CSRS)] may be appealed to the Merit Systems
    Protection Board under procedures prescribed by the Board.” We find that the
    appellant has not established that OPM’s decision to collect the debt from her
    constitutes “an administrative action or order affecting the rights or interests of
    an individual or of the United States” under the CSRS. The appellant has not
    identified, and we are otherwise unaware of, any right or interest she has to the
    funds under the CSRS.       The appellant was not the annuitant or a designated
    survivor annuitant with obvious rights or interests under the applicable
    provisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 8331(9)-(11). The appellant also did not receive the
    funds either directly, as a representative of her mother’s estate, or as a third party
    with rights under the applicable provisions. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8341, 8345(e), (j).
    Although the appellant argues generally that “a factual dispute over the existence
    and amount of overpayment affects the rights and interests of the parties,” she
    has not identified any right she has to the funds under the CSRS. PFR File, Tab 6
    at 4.   Because the appellant received the funds via a check payable to her
    mother’s estate, her claim to the funds appears to derive from state probate or
    intestacy laws. See Rossini v. Office of Personnel Management, 101 M.S.P.R.
    289, ¶ 11 (2006).
    ¶10           Similarly, OPM has offered no argument or evidence to establish that its
    authority to collect this debt from the appellant, or to consider the appellant’s
    request for a waiver, is derived from the rights or interests of the United States
    under the CSRS. Thus, although the appellant may have incurred a debt to the
    Federal Government as a result of her receipt of funds from her mother’s estate,
    there are provisions of law other than the retirement statutes that grant the head
    of an executive agency the right to try to collect such a debt. See 31 U.S.C.
    § 3711(a) (stating the head of an executive agency “shall try to collect a claim of
    the United States Government for money or property arising out of the activities
    of . . . the agency”); Rossini, 101 M.S.P.R. 289, ¶ 13. Accordingly, we find that
    6
    the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s appeal of OPM’s decision
    regarding the existence and amount of the alleged debt.
    ¶11         On review, the appellant argues that the Board has jurisdiction to review
    OPM’s denial of her request for a waiver of recovery of the overpayment, even
    absent Board jurisdiction over OPM’s decision regarding the existence and
    amount of the alleged debt. PFR File, Tab 6 at 6-7. Under 5 U.S.C. § 8346(b),
    recovery of payments erroneously made under the CSRS shall be waived “when,
    in the judgment of [OPM], the individual is without fault and recovery would be
    against equity and good conscience.”       The Board has jurisdiction to review
    OPM’s final decisions on requests that recovery of annuity overpayments be
    waived. See Dubin v. Office of Personnel Management, 38 M.S.P.R. 437, 439
    (1988); 5 C.F.R. § 831.1304(a)(8), (c)(2). The basis for the Board’s jurisdiction
    to review OPM’s decisions on requests for a waiver of recovery of overpayments,
    like the Board’s jurisdiction concerning retirement matters in general, derives
    from an appellant’s rights or interests under Federal retirement law. See 5 U.S.C.
    § 8347(d)(1); Dubin, 38 M.S.P.R. at 438-39; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3(a)(2). Thus, we
    find that, absent a showing of any right or interest the appellant has to the annuity
    overpayments under the CSRS, the Board lacks jurisdiction to consider her
    request for a waiver of the overpayment.
    ¶12         Our decision is consistent with the Board’s prior analysis in Rossini,
    101 M.S.P.R. 289, ¶¶ 10-14, in which the Board questioned whether it had
    jurisdiction to consider an appellant’s request for a waiver under similar
    circumstances. In Rossini, the appellant requested a waiver of collection of an
    overpayment she received as a result of annuity payments OPM erroneously made
    to her deceased mother’s bank account following her mother’s death.
    101 M.S.P.R. 289, ¶¶ 2-3. In remanding the appeal for further development of
    the jurisdictional issue, the Board stated that it was not clear that the waiver
    provision in 5 U.S.C. § 8346(b) applied to the appellant, whose claim to the
    overpaid funds did not appear to have derived from any right or interest she had
    7
    under Federal retirement statutes, but rather from state probate or intestacy laws.
    Rossini, 101 M.S.P.R. 289, ¶¶ 12-13. The Board also noted that, although it had
    previously considered a widow’s request for a waiver of annuity overpayments
    made to her deceased husband’s bank account in Martinez v. Office of Personnel
    Management, 26 M.S.P.R. 315, 316 (1985), it did so without identifying any right
    or interest under the CSRS that the widow may have had regarding the
    overpayments.      Rossini, 101 M.S.P.R. 289, ¶ 12.        Thus, Martinez is not
    dispositive as to the jurisdictional issue presented here, and we decline to follow
    its analysis.
    ¶13          We further find that OPM’s particular collection effort in this case does not
    affect the appellant’s rights or interests under the CSRS or otherwise provide a
    basis for jurisdiction. The appellant is not receiving an annuity from OPM, and
    OPM is not seeking to collect the appellant’s debt through an administrative
    offset to some other recurring payments to the appellant. Cf. Alexander v. Office
    of Personnel Management, 114 M.S.P.R. 122, ¶¶ 7-12 (2010) (holding that the
    Board had the authority to adjust an OPM-set repayment schedule to collect an
    annuity overpayment through an administrative offset to the appellant’s recurring
    payment of benefits from the Office of Workers’ Compensation). The appellant
    asserts that her only source of income is Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
    benefits, PFR File, Tab 6 at 6, but there is no indication in the record that OPM is
    seeking to offset the appellant’s SSI benefits to recover the overpayment. Thus,
    we find that OPM’s collection effort is not a matter affecting the appellant’s
    rights or interests under the CSRS and, as such, is outside of the
    Board’s jurisdiction.
    ¶14          As the appellant argues, the Board has considered waiver requests in
    certain cases where the underlying overpayment errors were not reviewable by
    the Board; but, unlike the appellant, the individuals bringing such waiver requests
    were annuitants who had clear rights and interests to annuity payments under the
    CSRS sufficient to bring the waiver request within the Board’s jurisdiction. PFR
    8
    File, Tab 1 at 9, Tab 6 at 6-7; see, e.g., McIntosh v. Office of Personnel
    Management, 104 M.S.P.R. 544, ¶¶ 2, 6-7 (2007) (finding that the Board had
    jurisdiction to review an annuitant’s request for a waiver of overpayment
    resulting from errors in deducting life insurance benefits despite the fact that the
    Board lacked jurisdiction to review OPM’s determination that it failed to
    withhold from the annuity the correct amount of life insurance premiums); Miller
    v. Office of Personnel Management, 99 M.S.P.R. 104, ¶¶ 12-13 (2005) (same),
    aff’d, 
    449 F.3d 1374
    (Fed. Cir. 2006); Mitchell v. Office of Personnel
    Management, 97 M.S.P.R. 566, ¶¶ 3, 12 (2004) (same); Lee v. Office of Personnel
    Management, 32 M.S.P.R. 149, 152-54 (1987) (finding that the Board lacked
    jurisdiction to determine whether the annuitant was liable for health benefits
    costs that OPM had failed to deduct from his annuity payments, but reviewing the
    annuitant’s entitlement to a waiver of recovery of the resulting alleged
    overpayment). Accordingly, we find that the Board lacks jurisdiction to consider
    this appeal.
    ORDER
    ¶15         This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
    appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113(c) (5 C.F.R.
    § 1201.113(c)).
    NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
    YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
    You have the right to request review of this final decision by the U.S.
    Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to the
    court at the following address:
    U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, DC 20439
    9
    The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar days
    after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27,
    2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has held
    that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline and
    that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See Pinat v.
    Office of Personnel Management, 
    931 F.2d 1544
    (Fed. Cir. 1991).
    If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to
    court, you should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found in
    title 5 of the U.S. Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27,
    2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the U.S. Code, at our
    website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode/htm.        Additional information is
    available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance
    is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained
    within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
    http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
    for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
    Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any
    attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    FOR THE BOARD:
    ______________________________
    William D. Spencer
    Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.