Tiffany Isaac v. Department of State ( 2023 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    TIFFANY ISAAC,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                  AT-0752-17-0730-I-1
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF STATE,                            DATE: February 9, 2023
    Agency.
    THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
    Tiffany Isaac, Bishopville, South Carolina, pro se.
    Marianne Perciaccante, Washington, D.C., for the agency.
    Elizabeth R. Amory, Charleston, South Carolina, for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
    Raymond A. Limon, Member
    Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
    FINAL ORDER
    ¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
    dismissed her termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction.       Generally, we grant
    petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision
    1
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.117
    (c).
    2
    contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an
    erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of
    the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either
    the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
    procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affe cted the
    outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
    that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
    closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    ). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that
    the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting
    the petition for review.      Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and
    AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.113
    (b).
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2        On    November     29,   2015,   the   agency   appointed   the   appellant,   a
    nonpreference eligible, to an excepted-service GS-04 Student Trainee (Passport
    Specialist) position under the Pathways Internship Experience Program (IEP),
    pursuant to 
    5 C.F.R. § 213.3402
    (a), Schedule D. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4
    at 94, 97-98. The appointment was intended to continue through the completion
    of the appellant’s education and work requirements, and the agency had the
    option to noncompetitively convert her to a term or permanent competitive
    service position within 120 days after she successfully completed all program
    requirements. 
    Id. at 97
    ; 
    5 C.F.R. § 362.204
    (b) (setting forth the circumstances
    under which an agency may noncompetitively convert an intern to a term or
    permanent appointment in the competitive service). Eligibility requirements for
    the IEP include maintaining a cumulative grade point average (GPA) of at least
    2.0, IAF, Tab 4 at 95, and the duration of the appointment is considered a trial
    3
    period, 
    id. at 97
    . Effective July 21, 2017, the agency terminated the appellant for
    failing to maintain a cumulative GPA of 2.0. 
    Id. at 129
    .
    ¶3           The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging her termination and
    requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. The agency filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
    for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 5. The administrative judge issued a show
    cause order in which she set forth the elements of proof required to establish that
    the appellant was an “employee” with Board appeal rights under 
    5 U.S.C. § 7511
    (a) and ordered the appellant to file evidence and argu ment on the
    jurisdictional issue. IAF, Tab 7. In response, the appellant stated that agency
    officials had discriminated against her 2 and had made “slanderous” statements
    about her; however, she did not address the jurisdictional issue. IAF, Tab 8.
    ¶4           Without holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an
    initial decision that dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the
    appellant was serving in a probationary period at the time of her termination and
    that there was nothing to suggest that she otherwise qualified as an employee
    within the meaning of 
    5 U.S.C. § 7511
    (a). IAF, Tab 9, Initial Decision (ID) at 3.
    The appellant has filed a petition for review, the agency has filed a response to
    the petition, and the appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response. Petition
    for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3-4.
    ANALYSIS
    The administrative judge correctly dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    ¶5           The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been
    given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation.               Maddox v. Merit Systems
    Protection Board, 
    759 F.2d 9
    , 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). An appellant bears the burden
    of proving by preponderant evidence that her appeal is wi thin the Board’s
    jurisdiction.      
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.56
    (b)(2)(i).       A nonpreference eligible in the
    excepted service has a statutory right to appeal a termination if she qualifies as an
    2
    The appellant did not identify the basis of the alleged discrimination. IAF, Tab 8 .
    4
    “employee” within the meaning of 
    5 U.S.C. § 7511
    (a)(1)(C).           Subsection (C)
    defines an employee as an individual who: (1) is not serving a probationary or
    trial period under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive
    service; or (2) has completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same or
    similar positions in an Executive agency under other than a temporary
    appointment limited to 2 years or less. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7511
    (a)(1)(C)(i)-(ii); see Van
    Wersch v. Department of Health and Human Services, 
    197 F.3d 1144
    , 1151 (Fed.
    Cir. 1999) (holding that subsections (C)(i) and (C)(ii) of 
    5 U.S.C. § 7511
    (a)(1)
    are alternative means of establishing jurisdiction).
    ¶6         It is undisputed that the appellant was appointed to the excepted service , is
    not preference eligible, and did not meet the requirements of either 
    5 U.S.C. § 7511
    (a)(1)(C)(i) or (ii).   Therefore, the administrative judge correctly found
    that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege facts that, if proven, would
    establish that she qualified as an “employee” with adverse action appeal rights
    under 
    5 U.S.C. § 7511
    (a)(1)(C).
    ¶7         For the first time on review, the appellant raises a claim of marital status
    discrimination and asserts that her marital status contributed to her termination .
    PFR File, Tab 1. In its decision letter effecting the appellant’s termination, the
    agency erroneously notified the appellant that she could appeal her termi nation to
    the Board if she believed that it was motivated by partisan political reasons or
    marital status, or if the termination was based on preappointment reasons and the
    agency failed to follow proper procedures. IAF, Tab 4 at 129. Under 
    5 C.F.R. § 315.806
    , which applies to probationary employees in the competitive service, an
    appellant may establish jurisdiction over her termination appeal by showing that
    marital status or partisan political reasons account for the termination, or that the
    action was procedurally improper. Because the appellant’s appointment was in
    the excepted service, however, she cannot avail herself of the rights accorded
    only to competitive-service employees. See Barrand v. Department of Veterans
    Affairs, 
    112 M.S.P.R. 210
    , ¶ 13 (holding that 
    5 C.F.R. § 315.806
     applies only to
    5
    individuals in the competitive service).     Accordingly, we do not consider the
    appellant’s claim that she was subjected to marital status discrimination. 3
    ¶8         To the extent that the appellant reasserts her claim of unspecified
    discrimination on review, we also do not consider that claim.              Absent an
    otherwise appealable action, the Board cannot consider the appellant’s allegations
    of discrimination. See Wren v. Department of the Army, 
    2 M.S.P.R. 1
    , 2 (1980)
    (finding that allegations of discrimination are not an independent source of
    appellate jurisdiction, and an underlying appeal within the Board’s jurisdiction
    must first be presented for such allegations to be considered), aff’d, 
    681 F.2d 867
    ,
    871-73 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
    ¶9         Finally, the appellant argues on review that the agency improperly
    identified her appointment date as November 29, 2017, and she asserts that this
    error demonstrates a lack of “due diligence.” PFR File, Tab 1. Contrary to the
    appellant’s assertion, the record shows that the agency correctly identified the
    date of her appointment as November 29, 2015; however, the administrative judge
    incorrectly stated that the appellant was appointed on November 29, 2017, in the
    initial decision. ID at 2; IAF, Tab 4 at 9, 97. This typographical error does not
    warrant review of the initial decision. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force,
    
    22 M.S.P.R. 281
    , 282 (1984) (explaining that an adjudicatory error that is not
    prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an
    initial decision).
    In sum, the administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed to
    nonfrivolously allege that the Board has jurisdiction over this appeal.
    Accordingly, we find that the administrative judge properly dismissed the appeal
    for lack of jurisdiction.
    3
    We also decline to address the appellant’s marital status discrimination claim because
    she has not shown that it is based on new and material evidence that was unavailable
    despite her due diligence when the record closed. See Banks v. Department of the Air
    Force, 
    4 M.S.P.R. 268
    , 271 (1980); 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    (d).
    6
    NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
    You may obtain review of this final decision. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (a)(1). By
    statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
    review and the appropriate forum with which to file.               
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b).
    Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
    Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
    appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
    statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
    jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
    immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
    filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
    limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
    Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
    below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
    about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
    should contact that forum for more information.
    (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
    judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
    Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
    within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(A).
    If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
    Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
    following address:
    4
    Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
    the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
    Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
    7
    U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20439
    Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
    relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
    contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
    http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
    for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
    Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
    any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
    discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
    were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
    was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so , you may obtain
    judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
    claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
    receive this decision.     
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
    Protection Board, 
    582 U.S. ____
     , 
    137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017)
    .              If you have a
    representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
    you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
    after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
    discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
    condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
    8
    to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
    42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
    Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
    websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
    http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
    Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
    Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
    all other issues. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7702
    (b)(1). You must file any such request with the
    EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
    this decision. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7702
    (b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
    and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
    with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
    this decision.
    If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
    address of the EEOC is:
    Office of Federal Operations
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    P.O. Box 77960
    Washington, D.C. 20013
    If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
    by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
    Office of Federal Operations
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    131 M Street, N.E.
    Suite 5SW12G
    Washington, D.C. 20507
    (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
    Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
    claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8) or
    other protected activities listed in 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
    If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
    9
    disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
    2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
    (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
    competent jurisdiction. 5   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
    review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(B).
    If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
    the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
    following address:
    U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20439
    Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
    relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
    contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our websi te at
    http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
    for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
    Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
    any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    5
    The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
    whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
    December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
    July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
    MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
    The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. 
    Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132
     Stat. 1510.
    10
    Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
    respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
    http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
    FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
    Jennifer Everling
    Acting Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.