Byron Thompson v. United States Postal Service ( 2022 )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
BYRON L. THOMPSON, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, DA-0752-15-0590-I-1
v.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DATE: December 16, 2022
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
M. Jermaine Watson, Esquire, Dallas, Texas, for the appellant.
Theresa M. Gegen, Esquire, Dallas, Texas, for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member
Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
affirmed his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and ad ministrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly modified to
address an additional consideration in the penalty determination, we AFFIRM the
initial decision, still sustaining the removal.
BACKGROUND
¶2 The appellant was employed as a Custodian until the agency removed him,
effective July 30, 2015, based on one charge of unacceptable conduct, in which
the agency alleged that, on May 28, 2015, the appellant assaulted a member of the
public (hereinafter, the “individual”). Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 18.
According to the supporting narrative, after being notified that the individual was
disturbing customers, the appellant entered the lobby, took the individual’s
belongings, “pitched” or “threw” them outside, and pushed the individual as he
exited out the door. Id. at 24-25. The narrative then stated that the appellant
briefly reentered the facility to hand a supervisor his badge, reexited the facility,
and pushed the individual to the ground, injuring his knee. Id. The physical
altercation was witnessed by at least two Postal Service employees and one
customer, who captured part of the altercation on video using her cellular phone.
Id.¶3 The appellant filed a Board appeal, disputing the penalty and raising
disability discrimination affirmative defenses. IAF, Tabs 1, 13. The appellant
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argued that the deciding official failed to properly weigh the relevant Douglas
factors and that the penalty of removal was beyond the bounds of reasonableness.
IAF, Tab 1 at 10-14. In support, he alleged that the deciding official erred by not
considering as significant mitigating factors: (1) that he was provoked by the
individual’s use of racial slurs and epithets toward him as the individual passed
by him to exit; (2) his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); (3) the lack of
serious injury to the individual; (4) the fact that he was not criminally charged or
cited for his conduct; and (5) his 18-year length of service with no prior
discipline. Id. at 8, 13-14. He further claimed that he was not on notice of the
relevant Employee and Labor Relations policies 665.16 and 665.24 about
“Behavior and Personal Habits” and “Violent and/or Threatening Behavior.” Id.
at 14, 26-27. Finally, he alleged that, contrary to the deciding official’s finding,
he could be rehabilitated because further medical treatment had helped him
manage his PTSD. Id. at 14. He also provided discharge and progress notes from
his treatment at the Dallas Veterans Medical Center from November 2015 in
support of his claims that he had PTSD and that his mental condition significantly
impacted his behavior. IAF, Tab 13 at 9-18.
¶4 After holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
issued an initial decision affirming the appellant’s removal and denying his
affirmative defenses of disability discrimination and denial of reasonable
accommodation. IAF, Tab 1 at 2, Tab 19, Initial Decision (ID) at 2, 13, 15-16,
23. The administrative judge found that the agency proved the charge, there was
a nexus between the sustained charge and the efficiency of the service, and the
penalty of removal was reasonable. ID at 10, 16, 23. As for the penalty in
particular, the administrative judge agreed with the deciding official’s
determination that the appellant’s unjustified, intentional, and unprovoked
physical assault on a member of the public was serious misconduct that directly
related to his job duties. ID at 17-21. He also found that the deciding official
determined that the appellant’s misconduct was aggravated by the fact that it was
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witnessed by at least one postal customer, that no alternative sanction was
available, and that the appellant had no potential for rehabilitation in light of the
seriousness of his misconduct. ID at 18. The administrative judge further found
that the deciding official properly considered the appellant’s 18-year work
history, lack of disciplinary record, and remorse as mitigating factors, and the
appellant’s PTSD as only a minor mitigating factor, given his failure to show a
causal connection between his PTSD and the second physical assault . ID
at 18, 21-22. Thus, the administrative judge found no basis to disturb the
agency’s decision because the deciding official weighed all of the relevant
Douglas factors and the penalty of removal was within the bounds of
reasonableness. ID at 23.
¶5 The appellant has filed a petition for review, arguing that the administrative
judge erred in deferring to the agency’s chosen penalty of removal because the
deciding official improperly weighed some and failed to consider other Douglas
factors and erred in finding that the penalty of removal did not exceed the bounds
of reasonableness. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4, 6-9. The appellant
has not challenged, and we discern no error with, the administrative judge’s
findings that the agency proved the charge and nexus and that the appellant did
not meet his burden of proving his affirmative defenses. The agency has filed a
response. PFR File, Tab 3.
DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶6 In determining an appropriate penalty, an agency must review relevant
mitigating factors, also known as the “Douglas factors,” pursuant to Douglas v.
Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981). The Board gives due
deference to the agency’s discretion in exercising its managerial function of
maintaining employee discipline and efficiency. See Davis v. U.S. Postal Service,
120 M.S.P.R. 457, ¶ 6 (2013). Thus, the Board will modify a penalty only if it
finds that the agency failed to weigh the relevant factors or that the penalty the
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agency imposed clearly exceeded the bounds of reasonableness. Id. For the
reasons discussed below, we find that the appellant has not provided a basis for
disturbing the administrative judge’s affirmance of his removal.
The appellant has not shown that his PTSD diagnosis was a significant mitigating
factor.
¶7 The appellant argues that the deciding official should have considered his
PTSD a significant mitigating factor and that the administrative judge erred in
finding otherwise. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-9. In particular, he alleges that he should
not have been disadvantaged by the lack of medical documentation, as the agency
failed to request it. Id. at 8. Second, he claims that his PTSD caused him to feel
threatened by the individual’s “racially charged comments” and explained why he
engaged and pushed the individual. Id. He further claims that designating the
first push as defensive and the second one as aggressive because he took off his
badge in between obviates the true nature of the situation and the impact that his
PTSD had on the entire continuum of events that transpired within a matter of
seconds. Id. Finally, the appellant argues that he has rehabilitation potential
because he has controlled his PTSD, as evidenced by the fact that he had no other
altercations, despite having PTSD since 2005, and he was cleared to return to
work in December 2015. Id. at 8-9.
¶8 Even if the appellant is unsuccessful in proving his disability discrimination
affirmative defense, as here, ID at 13, 15-16, the underlying condition may
nonetheless be relevant to a Douglas factor analysis if it is a causative factor in
the charged misconduct, Walsh v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 627, 638-39
(1997). As the appellant argued that his PTSD was connected to his removal, he
must provide sufficient evidence of a causal relationship between his medical
condition and the charged misconduct. Gustave-Schmidt v. Department of Labor,
87 M.S.P.R. 667, ¶ 17 (2001). If shown, his medical condition may be entitled to
significant weight as a mitigating factor. Id.6
¶9 The administrative judge credited the appellant’s testimony and found that
the appellant only pushed the individual because the individual passed closely by
and made racially derogatory statements toward the appellant as he exited. ID
at 5-6. The administrative judge also found that subsequent to the first push, the
appellant followed the individual outside and yelled at him in an aggressive tone,
while the individual stood several feet from the appellant, unmoving with his
hands at his side; the appellant then quickly approached and opened the facility
doors to hand a supervisor his badge; and “swiftly pivot[ed]” toward and “without
hesitation” approached the individual, extended his hands and “violently” struck
the individual “with enough force to knock him to the ground.” ID at 6-8. He
further found that the individual did not charge the appellant, as the appellant
contended, and he only raised his arm into a defensive position immediately
before being struck by the appellant. Id. In making those findings, the
administrative judge credited the video and the testimony and statements of the
three witnesses over the appellant’s version of events, and we discern no reason
to disturb those findings. ID at 6-9; see Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d
1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Board must defer to an
administrative judge’s credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly
or implicitly, on observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a h earing, and
may overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficien tly sound” reasons
for doing so); Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997) (finding
no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the
evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions
on issues of credibility); Broughton v. Department of Health & Human Services,
33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).
¶10 To the extent that the deciding official and the administrative judge did not
afford any mitigating weight to the appellant’s allegation that he was provoked by
the individual’s use of racial slurs, this was error. The deciding official and the
administrative judge should have considered the appellant’s allegation in this
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regard under Douglas factor 11, “mitigating circumstances surrounding the
offense, such as . . . malice or provocation on the part of others involved in the
matter.” Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305. For purposes of our analysis, we credit the
appellant’s statements on this issue, and we make clear that the racial slurs and
behavior described by the appellant are unacceptable. We therefore modify the
initial decision to clarify that the appellant’s contention that he was provoked by
the individual’s use of racial slurs is a mitigating factor. However, as further
explained below, this offensive language does not justify the appellant’s violent
actions under the circumstances here.
¶11 The facts show that the appellant had an opportunity to retreat and avoid the
second confrontation when he reentered the facility to hand over his badge.
Therefore, while the individual’s use of racial slurs was offensive and should be
considered as a mitigating factor, it was insufficient to relieve the appellant of his
obligation to retreat when possible to avoid a physical confrontation, even if the
events occurred in a short period of time. See Harris v. U.S. Postal Service,
100 M.S.P.R. 613, ¶ 14 (2005) (finding that a customer’s offensive, profane, and
racially derogatory verbal abuse was not sufficient provocation to justify the
appellant’s violent reaction, especially given that the appellant had an opportunity
to retreat and avoid the physical confrontation). The appellant argues that Harris
is distinguishable because there the appellant was a supervisor and held to a
higher standard. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9. We disagree. The presence of that
additional aggravating factor does not alter the separate finding that provocation
does not justify violence if the appellant had an opportunity to retreat. Harris,
100 M.S.P.R. 613, ¶¶ 14, 17. As the administrative judge found, that aspect of
the holding is applicable regardless of the appellant’s position. ID at 19.
¶12 We also agree with the administrative judge’s finding that after returning
outside, the appellant, not the individual, acted aggressively without provocation
and was not justified in using any physical force, as the individual had not
initiated any physical contact. See Fuller v. Department of the Navy, 60 M.S.P.R.
8187, 190 (1993) (observing that to support a self-defense claim, an appellant must
prove by preponderant evidence that she used only as much force as was
reasonably necessary to be free of the contact), aff’d, 40 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (Table); cf. Andrus v. Internal Revenue Service, 14 M.S.P.R. 500, 502
(1983) (finding that an employee’s taunts of “what are you going to do about it?”
and continued movement towards the appellant were sufficient to provoke a
physical response). Consequently, the appellant has shown no error in the
administrative judge’s treatment of the second assault as aggressive, rather than
as defensive. Thus, for the appellant’s PTSD to significantly mitigate the
severity of the second assault, he must show that it was causally connected to his
aggressive conduct. We find that the appellant has made no such showing.
¶13 The limited medical documentation provided did not elaborate on the status
of the appellant’s PTSD at the relevant period or draw a causal connection
between his PTSD and the charged misconduct. IAF, Tab 13 at 13-19. Thus,
even if it supports his contention that his PTSD caused him to respond more
defensively than a person without PTSD would have and was exacerbated by
being asked to perform duties outside of his craft and duty station, ID at 11; IAF,
Tab 18, Hearing Recording, 1:22:00-1:33:08, 1:50:41-1:56:02, 2:09:46-2:10:55
(testimony of the appellant); see Hamilton v. U.S. Postal Service, 84 M.S.P.R.
635, ¶¶ 17, 20-22 (1999) (finding the appellant’s uncontroverted testimony that
the unexcused absences for which he was charged were due to his medical
condition was sufficient to show a causal connection between the two), it does not
explain the appellant’s decision not to retreat when the opportunity presented
itself or prove a causal connection between his PTSD and verb al harassment,
pursuit, and second push, in which he was the unprovoked aggressor, see
Gustave-Schmidt, 87 M.S.P.R. 667, ¶ 17 (finding that the appellant’s medical
evidence showing that her medical conditions negatively affected her ability to
perform her job duties was entitled only limited weight, as it did not establish that
those conditions contributed to the charged intentional misconduct). We
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therefore agree with the administrative judge that the appellant’s medical
condition was a minor, as opposed to a significant, mitigating factor. ID at 22.
¶14 Finally, the appellant’s decision to seek treatment for his PTSD may
indicate a potential for rehabilitation. See Hamilton, 84 M.S.P.R. 635, ¶ 19
(observing that an appellant’s action in seeking treatment for his medical
condition indicates a potential for rehabilitation). However, as noted above, he
did not show that his PTSD was causally connected to the second physical assault
and, therefore, recovery from or management of his PTSD is not necessarily
indicative of rehabilitation potential as to that misconduct. Moreover, as the
administrative judge found, there is no indication that the appellant completed the
recommended course of treatment. ID at 22; IAF, Tab 13 at 9. Accordingly, we
agree with the administrative judge’s determination that the appellant’s PTSD
should not be afforded significant mitigating weight.
The appellant has shown no error in the deciding official’s analysis of the
remaining relevant Douglas factors.
¶15 The appellant argues that the deciding official failed to consider the fact
that he was not criminally charged or prosecuted, he only pushed the individual,
and the individual suffered only minor injuries to his knee. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7.
The Board has found mitigation of a removal to a suspension appropriate in a
charge of physical assault on a coworker if the following elements are
met: (1) no serious injury resulted from the physical altercation ; (2) no weapons
were used; (3) the employee had a history of satisfactory performance; (4) the
agency did not rely upon a prior disciplinary record in selecting the penalty; and
(5) there was an element of provocation present. Faucher v. U.S. Postal Service,
41 M.S.P.R. 336, 339 (1989) (finding a 60-day suspension, not removal, the
maximum reasonable penalty when all 5 of these circumstances were present).
However, Faucher is inapplicable to this appeal because the appellant’s
misconduct involved a member of the public, not a coworker; therefore, those
considerations are insufficient to mitigate the penalty here.
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¶16 The appellant further claimed that the deciding official did not consider the
fact that the individual was not a postal customer, that the individual was causing
a disturbance to customers prior to the altercation, and that he displayed violent,
unstable behavior later that evening at the hospital where he was seeking
treatment for his knee. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. The appellant has not shown how
the individual’s nonviolent conduct before the incident and behavior later that
evening alters the findings as to the appellant’s culpability or mitigate s the
severity of his physical assault. Cf. Horn v U.S. Postal Service, 10 M.S.P.R. 420,
422-23 (1982) (finding that the appellant’s physical response was warranted when
the coworker had threatened him with physical violence 3 weeks before the
altercation, and the coworker had a long history of violent behavior and
dangerous propensities that placed the appellant and other employees in fear) .
¶17 The appellant also argues that the deciding official assigned too much
weight to the fact that at least one postal customer witnessed the altercation and
that he came into contact with the public in the performance of his duties. PFR
File, Tab 1 at 7. We discern no error with the deciding official’s decision to
consider the public nature of the altercation as an aggravating factor. See
Balouris v. U.S. Postal Service, 107 M.S.P.R. 574, ¶ 7 (2008) (identifying as
relevant to the Douglas factor analysis the fact that the altercation took place
while the appellant was on duty and in uniform, and occurred on the s treet in
front of the facility where the incident could be observed by the public) , aff’d,
No. 2008-3147 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Moreover, although the appellant emphasizes
that not all of his duties involved interactions with the public, he does not dispute
the administrative judge’s finding that he has some interacti ons with customers
because he was responsible for cleaning the public areas of the station. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 7; ID at 2. Thus, the public nature of the appellant’s position and the
altercation are relevant to his type of employment and the notoriety of his offense
and were properly considered by the deciding official.
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¶18 Accordingly, we find that the administrative judge did not err in deferring
to the agency’s chosen penalty of removal. We therefore deny the appellant’s
petition for review and affirm the initial decision.
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2
The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 U.S.C. § 1201.113. You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to see k review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by you r
chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
2
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
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within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
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you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
14
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Boar d’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 3 The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
3
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
15
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.