Marquise Clark v. Department of Justice ( 2022 )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
MARQUISE A. CLARK, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, CH-0752-15-0288-I-2
v.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DATE: October 21, 2022
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Randall C. Cahill, Esquire, Saint Louis, Missouri, for the appellant.
Darrel C. Waugh, Esquire, Stockton, California, for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member
Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
sustained his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).
BACKGROUND
¶2 The appellant was a GL-08 Correctional Officer, Senior Officer Specialist,
for the agency’s Federal Bureau of Prisons, stationed at Federal Correctional
Institution Greenville. Clark v. Department of Justice, MSPB Docket
No. CH-0752-15-0288-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, Tab 13 at 31.
The agency imposed the appellant’s removal for unprofessional conduct for his
failure to provide a urine sample and absence without leave (AWOL). IAF,
Tab 13 at 33-35. The appellant filed a formal complaint of discrimination in
which he asserted that the action constituted race, age, and sex discrimination.
Id. at 9. The agency issued a final agency decision finding no discrimination. Id.
at 12-28. The appellant then filed the instant appeal challenging the removal.
IAF, Tab 1.
¶3 The administrative judge issued an initial decision sustaining the removal.
Clark v. Department of Justice, MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-15-0288-I-2, Refiled
Appeal File (RAF), Tab 25, Initial Decision (I-2 ID). The appellant filed a
petition for review, and the agency responded in opposition to his petition.
Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.
3
DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
The administrative judge properly sustained the charge of failure to provide a
urine sample.
¶4 The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s decision to sustain the
failure to provide a urine sample charge because he asserts, as he did below, that
his position was not subject to random drug testing, the individuals who requested
that he submit the urine sample did not have the authority to do so, and there were
other suspicious circumstances regarding the collection of the sample. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 12-13, 16-24, 26-27. The administrative judge found that the appellant’s
position was subject to random drug testing because the agency performs such
testing under its Drug Free Work Place Program, the deciding official and other
witnesses testified that they had undergone random drug testing, the appellant’s
testimony indicated that he knew he could be subject to random drug testing , and
he did not otherwise provide any reason that his position was exempt from
random drug testing. I-2 ID at 6; Hearing Transcript (HT) at 35-37 (testimony of
the appellant), 114 (testimony of the appellant’s supervisor), 183 (testimony of
the Health Service Administrator), 283, 314 (testimony of the deciding official);
IAF, Tab 13 at 145-49.
¶5 Each agency is required to establish a drug testing program for its
employees. Executive Order 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (Sept. 15, 1986). The
extent to which employees are tested and the criteria for testing is to be
determined by each agency, taking into account factors such as the nature of the
agency’s mission and the duties of its employees. Id. The drug testing program
for the Federal Bureau of Prisons is governed by Program Statement 3735.04,
Drug Free Workplace (June 30, 1997). IAF, Tab 13 at 138-54. Under this
program, testing-designated positions subject to random drug tests include
“positions assigned to locations where employees may establish eligibility for
Federal law enforcement retirement.” Id. at 145-46. We find that the appellant
satisfied this criterion because all Federal Bureau of Prison employees are, by
4
statute, eligible for law enforcement retirement after meeting the age and service
requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 8412(d). 5 U.S.C. § 8401(17)(D)(i). In fact, the
appellant’s Standard Form 50 indicates that his retirement plan was “M,”
described as “FERS AND FICA SPECIAL,” RAF, Tab 13 at 31, which reflects a
law enforcement officer or firefighter retirement plan. See Office of Personnel
Management, CSRS and FERS Handbook, 2 Payroll Office Reporting of
Withholdings and Contributions, ch. 80, § 80A5.1-3 (Apr. 1998), available at
https://www.opm.gov/retirement-services/publications-forms/csrsfers-
handbook/c080.pdf. We therefore agree with the administrative judge that the
agency correctly identified the appellant’s position as a testing-designated
position.
¶6 The administrative judge next found that the appellant was ordered to
provide the sample by authorized individuals. I-2 ID at 6-9. Under the agency’s
policy, only Health Service Administrators (HSAs) and Assistant HSAs are
authorized to collect urine samples. IAF, Tab 13 at 144. The appellant claimed
that the Inmate Systems Officer, and not the HSA, requested to take his urine
sample. Id. at 73-74. The administrative judge found that the appellant was not
credible as to this point because his version of events was contradicted by other
witness testimony and by documentary evidence and was inherently improbable.
I-2 ID at 6-8; HT at 119-20 (testimony of the appellant’s supervisor), 196-97
(testimony of the HSA), 440-43 (testimony of the Inmate Systems Officer); IAF,
Tab 13 at 54, 57, 66, 72-74. Thus, she found that the HSA, who was authorized
to do so, requested the sample. I-2 ID at 8. She also found that the appellant’s
supervisor had the authority to order him to provide the sample. I -2 ID at 8-9.
The appellant argued that his supervisor did not have such authority because his
shift had ended 5 minutes prior to his order, but the administrative judge found
that, because he was on the agency premises and performing work from his
2
The CSRS and FERS Handbook is a public document, of which we take administrative
notice. See Azdell v. Office of Personnel Management, 88 M.S.P.R. 319, 323 (2001).
5
previous shift, the supervisor had the necessary authority. I-2 ID at 9; HT at 312
(testimony of the deciding official).
¶7 The appellant has provided no basis for disturbing the administrative
judge’s findings that he was subject to random drug testing and that agency
officials had the authority to order him to provide a sample to conduct such
testing. We also have considered the appellant’s claims of unusual circumstances
surrounding the request for a sample. PFR File, Tab 1 at 18-19, 22-23, 26-27.
However, we find that these claims, as well as his previous claims, do not provide
a basis for disturbing the initial decision. See Broughton v. Department of Health
& Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (finding that mere disagreement
with the administrative judge’s well-reasoned findings provides no basis for
disturbing the initial decision).
¶8 Next, the appellant asserts, as he did below, that he should not have been
required to obey the agency’s order to provide a urine sample because doing so
would have been dangerous. PFR File, Tab 1 at 22-24. He alleged that, as an
African American, he feared being confronted late at night by a large group of
Caucasian officers, and he was nervous about certain accusations if he provided a
urine sample to a Caucasian female employee. Id. Absent unusual
circumstances, such as when obedience would cause him irreparable harm or
place him in a clearly dangerous situation or when the instructions are clearly
unlawful, an employee must first comply with an instruction and then, if he
disagrees with them, register his complaint or grievance later. Pedeleose v.
Department of Defense, 110 M.S.P.R. 508, ¶¶ 16, 18, aff’d, 343 F. App’x 605(Fed. Cir. 2009); Larson v. Department of the Army, 91 M.S.P.R. 511, ¶ 21
(2002). We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant has not shown
that he was entitled to disregard the instructions because he did not establish that
compliance with the instructions would have caused him irreparable harm or
6
placed him in a clearly dangerous situation. 3 See Larson, 91 M.S.P.R. 511, ¶ 21
(holding that an appellant’s subjective and unsupported apprehension of danger
does not justify his refusal to perform his duties); I-2 ID at 10-11.
The administrative judge properly sustained the AWOL charge.
¶9 The appellant also challenges the administrative judge’s decision to sustain
the AWOL charge because he left the agency premises after being sick and to
avoid a dangerous situation and thus argues that he should have been placed in a
sick leave status. PFR File, Tab 1 at 30-31. To prove an AWOL charge, an
agency must show that the employee was absent without authorization and, if the
employee requested leave, that the request was properly denied. Savage v.
Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 28 n.5 (2015) (clarifying that, if an
employee requested leave, the agency must show that the request was properly
denied to sustain an AWOL charge), overruled in part by Pridgen v. Office of
Management & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-25. Here, the appellant’s
supervisor testified that, despite any mistaken notation to the contrary, he did not
place the appellant on sick leave on the day in question and did not authorize his
absence. HT at 123-25 (testimony of the appellant’s supervisor). Thus, we agree
that the appellant was absent and this absence was not authorized. I-2 ID at 13.
¶10 An AWOL charge will not be sustained, however, if an employee presents
administratively acceptable evidence showing that he was incapacitated for duty
during the relevant time period, and he has sufficient sick leave to cover the
period of absence. Valenzuela v. Department of the Army, 107 M.S.P.R. 549, ¶ 9
(2007). We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant did not present
3
To the extent that the appellant’s challenges regarding the circumstances surrounding
the collection of the sample constitute a claim of harmful error, we find that he has
failed to establish this claim because he has not shown how such circumstances would
have caused the agency to reach a different conclusion than the one it would have
reached absent the alleged error. See Forte v. Department of the Navy, 123 M.S.P.R.
124, ¶ 19 (2016) (finding that a specimen collector’s alleged failure to have the
appellant sign a vial containing his urine sample before leaving the testing room did not
constitute harmful error).
7
any such documentation, and thus his absence could not be excused on this basis.
I-2 ID at 13. Further, we do not find persuasive the appellant’s argument that he
was absent because of a perceived danger. See Proctor v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, 27 M.S.P.R. 163, 168-69 (1985) (finding that, when an
employee failed to show danger of death or serious injury, the employee’s AWOL
and refusal to return to work warranted an adverse action). Accordingly, we find
that the administrative judge properly sustained the AWOL charge. I -2 ID at 13.
We agree that the appellant has not shown that the deciding official was biased,
that he engaged in ex parte communications, or that he committed a due process
violation by considering the appellant’s lack of remorse.
¶11 In support of his claim that the deciding official was biased, the appellant
asserts that the deciding official led a conspiracy to set him up to be subjected to
a nonrandom drug test. PFR File, Tab 1 at 24-25. We disagree with the
appellant’s general characterization, which is not supported by the record. We
also find that the deciding official’s involvement in ordering the drug testing did
not constitute an intolerably high risk of unfairness to the appellant and thus find
no due process violation in this respect. See Holton v. Department of the Navy,
123 M.S.P.R. 688, ¶ 31 (2016) (finding that the fact that the deciding official was
also the official that had granted permission for the agency to perform the
appellant’s drug testing did not constitute a due process violation), aff’d,
884 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
¶12 The appellant next argues that the deciding official engaged in improper
ex parte communications with the proposing official. PFR File, Tab 1 at 27-28.
To the contrary, the proposing official emailed the deciding official and others
stating that, if the appellant reports to work, he is to remain in the front lobby or
computer area until otherwise authorized to proceed. I-2 ID at 16. We find that
this email does not contain any new, let alone material, information.
Furthermore, the appellant has not identified any communication that included
new and material evidence, and thus we agree with the administrative judge that
8
the deciding official did not engage in improper ex parte communication.
Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
¶13 The appellant asserts that the deciding official violated his right to due
process because he considered the lack of remorse as expressed in the response to
the proposal without notification that he would consider this factor. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 28; HT at 255 (testimony of the deciding official); IAF, Tab 13 at 33-34,
37-48. Put another way, the appellant argues that he was not notified that “if he
showed remorse or if he stayed silent, his chances of removal would be
mitigated.” RAF, Tab 20 at 26 n.4. We find no violation of due process.
Principles of due process require that a deciding official consid er an employee’s
response to a proposal notice, but they do not prevent him from rejecting those
arguments in rendering a decision. An employee is not entitled to know in
advance the weight that the deciding official will attach to his arguments, as it
would be impossible for the deciding official to know in advance what the
employee would argue. See Grimes v. Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 36,
¶¶ 12-13 (2014). We find that, in determining the penalty, the deciding official
properly considered the appellant’s lack of remorse in his response. 4 See Alberto
v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 98 M.S.P.R. 50, ¶ 10 (2004) (considering that
the appellant lacked the potential for rehabilitation given his lack o f remorse for
his misconduct as demonstrated by his written reply in which he essentially
attempted to blame his accusers for his actions).
The removal penalty is reasonable.
¶14 The appellant argues that the administrative judge should have mitigated the
penalty because he had 18 years of service, the deciding official did not consider
4
Although the appellant has not presented any such arguments, we have considered
whether the appellant has shown harmful error based upon the deciding official’s
aforementioned actions, but we find no evidence of such error. See Stone, 179 F.3d
at 1377-78; Ronso v. Department of the Navy, 122 M.S.P.R. 391, ¶ 16 (2015).
9
the unusual circumstances surrounding the case, random urine tests only recently
began at the facility and an employee had never before refused a test , and, as an
African-American male, he feared for his safety when, around midnight, he was
asked to provide the sample to a Caucasian female surrounded by many Caucasian
guards. PFR File, Tab 1 at 29-32. When, as here, all of the agency’s charges
have been sustained, the Board will review an agency-imposed penalty only to
determine if the agency considered all of the relevant factors and exercised
management discretion within tolerable limits of reasonableness. Portner v.
Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 10 (2013), overruled on other
grounds by Singh v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 17. The
administrative judge sustained the penalty because she found, as the deciding
official did, that, despite the appellant’s 18 years of service and good work
record, considering the fact that the deciding official lost confidence in him, the
seriousness of his misconduct, the nature of his position, and his evident lack of
potential for rehabilitation, the deciding official did not err in imposing the
penalty of removal. I-2 ID at 26. We agree that the penalty is reasonable under
the circumstances. See Howarth v. U.S. Postal Service, 77 M.S.P.R. 1, 7-8 (1997)
(sustaining the appellant’s removal for refusing to undergo alcohol testing).
The appellant has not otherwise provided a reason for disturbing the initial
decision.
¶15 In addition, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge erred by
asking leading questions of agency witnesses, did not consider his hearing
exhibits, was biased when she gave greater weight to certain agency
documentation, and should have imposed an adverse evidentiary inference against
the agency for failing to preserve a copy of its video surveillance from the day in
question. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13, 20-21, 30, 32. Even assuming that the
administrative judge improperly asked leading questions, the appellant has n ot
explained how any error in this respect would have affected the outcome of this
appeal, and thus this argument does not provide a basis for disturbing the initial
10
decision. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282
(1984). Additionally, the appellant’s general allegation of bias is not sufficient to
rebut the presumption of the administrative judge’s honesty and integrity. See
Vaughn v. Department of the Treasury, 119 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 19 (2013); Oliver v.
Department of Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R. 382, 389 (1980). Further, we agree
with the administrative judge that the agency had no reason to anticipate t he
appellant’s request for the video in question. I-2 ID at 17-18. Thus, we find no
reason to draw an adverse evidentiary inference against the agency. Cf.
Kirkendall v. Department of the Army, 573 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(finding that the Board should have drawn adverse inferences against the agency
based upon its negligent destruction of relevant documents) .
¶16 Lastly, we have considered the appellant’s argument that the administrative
judge erred in not considering the exhibits that he requested to present after the
hearing, stating that they “tell a totally different tale of what happened .”
PFR File, Tab 1 at 32. At the hearing, the administrative judge denied the
appellant’s motion to submit additional exhibits because she found no good cause
for the appellant’s untimely filing of the exhibits. HT at 493-94, 502-04 (rulings
of the administrative judge). An administrative judge has broad discretion to
refuse to consider any motion or other pleading that is not filed in a timely
fashion. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.43(c). Furthermore, the appellant has not described
how the disallowed exhibits would affect the result of the appeal. Accordingly,
he has not shown that the administrative judge abused her broad discretion in
excluding evidence or that any such error prejudiced his substantive rights.
Vaughn, 119 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 14.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
5
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
12
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
13
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via com mercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
14
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court a t the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscour ts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
6
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
15
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.