Joshua Thornbury v. Department of Veterans Affairs ( 2022 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    JOSHUA D. THORNBURY,                            DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                        DE-0752-14-0490-X-1
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: June 29, 2022
    AFFAIRS,
    Agency.
    THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
    Charles A. Shaw, Esquire, Prescott, Arizona, for the appellant.
    Maxine N. Romero, Esquire, Phoenix, Arizona, for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
    Raymond A. Limon, Member
    Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
    ORDER
    ¶1         This case is before the Board on the appellant’s petition for enforcement
    filed on February 25, 2017. Thornbury v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB
    Docket No. DE-0752-14-0490-C-1, Compliance File (CF), Tab 1. As discussed
    1
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.117
    (c).
    2
    below, we find the agency in noncompliance and order it to take appropriate steps
    to comply with the Board’s Final Order.
    DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE ON COMPLIANCE
    ¶2        The final Board order in the underlying removal appeal directed the agency
    to pay the appellant back pay retroactive to June 27, 2014.         Thornbury v.
    Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-14-0490-I-2, Appeal
    File (I-2 AF), Tab 18, Initial Decision at 14. The administrative judge issued a
    compliance initial decision finding the agency noncompliant with the Final Order.
    Thornbury v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-14-
    0490-C-2, Compliance File (C-2 CF), Tab 8, Compliance Initial Decision (CID);
    C-2 CF, Tab 11, Erratum to Compliance Initial Decision (Erratum) .            The
    compliance initial decision became final on March 20, 2018. CID at 6.
    ¶3        The administrative judge informed the agency that, if it decided to take the
    actions ordered in the compliance initial decision, it must submit to the Clerk of
    the Board a narrative statement and evidence establishing compliance.         CID
    at 5-7. In addition, he informed both parties that they could file a petition for
    review of the compliance initial decision if they disagreed with the findings
    therein. CID at 5-7. Neither party filed any submission with the Clerk of the
    Board within the time limit set forth in 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.114
    . As such, pursuant to
    
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.183
    (b)-(c), the administrative judge’s findings of noncompliance
    became final, and the appellant’s petition for enforcement was referred to the
    Board for a final decision on issues of compliance. Thornbury v. Department of
    Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-14-0490-X-1, Compliance Referral
    File (CRF), Tab 1.
    ¶4        On July 12, 2018, and April 12, 2019, the Clerk of the Board issued show
    cause orders directing the agency to provide evidence of compliance and a
    narrative explanation. CRF, Tabs 9, 20. In its responses to the Board’s show
    cause orders, the agency explained that it made a series of pay adjustment errors
    that created overpayments. See, e.g., CRF, Tab 14 at 6-7, Tab 22 at 4-7. The
    3
    agency states that although the removal action was effected on June 27, 2014, see
    Thornbury v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-14-
    0490-I-1, Initial Appeal File, Tab 5, Subtab 4a, at 11-13, it paid the appellant for
    an additional pay period after his removal, see CRF, Tab 22 at 4 (agency
    narrative), 34 (leave and earning statement for pay period (PP) 2014-13). To pay
    off this debt, the agency states that it withheld $372.57 from the appellant’s tax
    refund and $463.88 from the payout of his annual leave and comp time. 
    Id. at 4
    .
    This left a remaining debt of $416.35. 
    Id. at 5
    . The agency mailed the appellant
    a letter on September 6, 2014, notifying him that he owed a debt of $416.35. 
    Id. at 4-5
    .
    ¶5         According to the agency, the Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS)
    did not process the cancellation of the June 27, 2014 removal until January 9,
    2015, even though the agency had promised to reinstate the appellant effective
    December 1, 2014. See I-2 AF, Tab 4 at 20 (letter from agency to the appellant
    dated November 25, 2014, directing the appellant to report for duty on
    December 1, 2014); I-2 AF, Tab 12 at 7 (prehearing submission stating that the
    appellant was reinstated on December 1, 2014); CRF, Tab 22 at 5 (stating that the
    removal was canceled on January 9, 2015). When the removal was canceled on
    January 9, 2015, DFAS restored the appellant’s annual leave balance of
    41.5 hours and comp time balance of 1.0 hours. CRF, Tab 22 at 5. According to
    the agency, this leave restoration created another debt in the amount of $673.47.
    
    Id.
       It does not appear that the agency explained these payroll errors to the
    appellant.   See I-2 AF, Tab 4 at 22 (appellant’s declaration, dated March 12,
    2015, averring that as of that date he had not been contacted by the agency or
    DFAS about his reinstatement with status quo relief). Instead, the agency mailed
    the appellant a letter, dated January 24, 2015, notifying him that he owed a debt
    of $673.47 due to “Time and Attendance change(s).” I-2 AF, Tab 4 at 30 (letter
    from DFAS to appellant, dated Jan. 24, 2015); 35 (debt worksheet dated
    4
    January, 10, 2015, showing debts based on overpayments of $649.89 for “ PA LSL
    ANNUAL” and $23.58 for “PS FPAY COMP”).
    ¶6           On January 10, 2015, the agency paid the appellant the net amount of
    $309.00 for PP 2014-26. CRF, Tab 14 at 12-13 (earnings and leave statement);
    CRF, Tab 22 at 5, 46-47. This was not back pay, but rather pay for time worked
    after the appellant was reinstated on December 1, 2014. Specifically, this was
    pay for the week of December 29, 2014, through January 2, 2015. CRF, Tab 22
    at 5.
    ¶7           On January 30, 2015, the agency paid the appellant the net amount of
    $11,035.36 in back pay. I-2 AF, Tab 4 at 28 (leave and earnings statement). The
    back pay included 1,040 hours from July 12, 2014, through December 27, 2014.
    CRF, Tab 14 at 11, 13; CRF, Tab 22 at 5 (paragraph i), 47-48. The back pay
    included 32 hours of holiday pay and 1 hour of comp time, although the agency
    did not explain how these hours were determined. 
    Id.
     The agency deducted the
    outstanding debts of $416.35 and $673.47, giving the appellant an “adjusted”
    gross back pay of $15,721.28, which was further reduced to a net of $11,035.36
    based on various deductions. 
    Id.
    ¶8           Subsequently, the agency states that DFAS discovered more errors.
    Specifically, DFAS determined that the appellant was not paid for a full 80 hours
    for PP 2014-13 and PP 2014-14. CRF, Tab 22 at 6 (paragraph p). The agency
    states that DFAS “paid out the missing $1,089.82 retro funds,” 
    id.,
     but there is no
    evidence of such a payment or of interest on such a payment. The appellant avers
    that he did not receive any payments after January 2015. CRF, Tab 18 at 61 .
    ¶9           On April 18, 2015, the agency states that it processed a retroactive
    within-grade increase (WIGI) effective on June 29, 2014, and which increased the
    appellant’s salary from $32,683 to $34,074 on that date.       CRF, Tab 22 at 6
    (paragraphs l and r), 52-53. According to the agency, it issued the appellant a
    payment for this adjustment in the amount of $546.72 ($470.81 after deductions)
    on April 18, 2015. CRF, Tab 22 at 52-53. The agency states that this retroactive
    5
    action was in error. CRF, Tab 22 at 6 (paragraph r). “This created a debt of
    $546.72 which was collected from the retro funds.” 
    Id.
     The appellant avers that
    he did not receive the April 18, 2015 payment. CRF, Tab 18 at 61.
    ¶10         Pursuant to 
    5 U.S.C. § 1204
    (a)(2), the Board has jurisdiction to consider an
    appellant’s claim of agency noncompliance with a Board order. Kerr v. National
    Endowment for the Arts, 
    726 F.2d 730
    , 733 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency bears
    the burden of proving that it has complied. 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.183
    (d). See Spates v.
    United States Postal Service, 
    70 M.S.P.R. 438
    , 441 (1996).              An agency’s
    assertions of compliance must include a clear explanation of its compliance
    actions supported by understandable documentary evidence.                Vaughan v.
    Department of Agriculture, 
    116 M.S.P.R. 319
    , ¶ 5 (2011).
    The Agency Must Reimburse the Appellant for $552.44 Tax Refund Offset
    ¶11         On February 18, 2017, the agency sent the appellant a letter notifying him
    that he had a “delinquent debt” of $478.58. CRF, Tab 18 at 64. This letter, as
    with the previous letters, did not clearly explain the source of the debt. Instead, it
    warned that “[i]f we do not hear from you, we will report your debt to the U.S.
    Department of the Treasury for the Treasury Offset Program (TOP)” and that the
    appellant would be responsible for “any and all fees associated with the offset
    program.”   
    Id.
          On March 7, 2018, the Department of Treasury notified the
    appellant that it had offset a debt of $552.44 from his tax refund. 
    Id. at 63
    . The
    appellant seeks reimbursement for this amount.        CRF, Tab 18 at 32, Tab 23
    at 14-16.
    ¶12         In the show cause order issued by the Clerk of the Board on April 12, 2019,
    the agency was directed to explain “whether the agency created a debt that was
    deducted from the appellant’s tax refund, whether that debt was legitimate, a nd if
    not, whether the debt has been canceled and the appellant reimbursed. ” CRF,
    Tab 20 at 2.      In response to the order, the agency denied that the offset was
    related to a debt that it created and instead suggested that the $552.44 might have
    6
    been collected on behalf of a different agency or as a court-ordered garnishment.
    CRF, Tab 22 at 8. This assertion is in direct conflict with the evidence provided
    by the appellant.    The Department of the Treasury’s offset notice explicitly
    states—under the heading “Who Do I Owe?”—that it applied the offset to the
    debt that the appellant owed to the agency, which it identifies as “Prescott VAMC
    649.” CRF, Tab 18 at 63. We find, based on the agency’s notice to the appellant
    that it would collect the debt through the Treasury Offset Program, 
    id. at 64
    , and
    the subsequent notice from the Department of Treasury that the debt had, indeed,
    been collected through that program and sent to the agency, 
    id. at 63
    , that the
    agency collected an unsubstantiated debt of $552.44 from the appellant’s tax
    refund. Accordingly, the agency must reimburse the appellant in the amount of
    $552.44, plus applicable interest.
    The Agency Must Effectuate the Appellant’s Within-Grade Increase
    ¶13        The record evidence supports a finding that the appellant should have
    received a WIGI, effective on November 2, 2014, increasing his salary from
    General Schedule (GS) 5, step 2, to GS-5, step 3, i.e., from $32,683 to $33,738.
    CRF, Tab 22 at 5 (paragraph j), 49-50. The appellant’s prior WIGI, from GS-5,
    step 1, to GS-5, step 2, occurred on October 20, 2013. CRF, Tab 14 at 12 (leave
    and earnings statement showing salary of $32,683 and last WIGI on October 20,
    2013). Therefore, he was entitled to a WIGI from GS-5, step 2, to GS-5, step 3,
    52 weeks later, on October 20, 2014. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 5335
    (a)(1) (providing that a
    GS employee, subject to certain conditions, shall receive an increase from step 2
    to step 3 after 52 weeks). Because October 20, 2014 fell within the middle of
    PP 2014-21, it should have taken effect on the first day of PP 2014 -22, i.e.,
    November 2, 2014.      See 
    5 C.F.R. § 531.412
    (a) (stating that a WIGI shall be
    effective on the first day of the first pay period following completion of the
    required waiting period and in compliance with the conditions of eligibility ). The
    agency’s evidence, however, shows that it processed the appellant’s pay at GS-5,
    7
    step 2 for PP 2014-22 through PP 2014-26.             See CRF, Tab 22 at 42-46.
    Therefore, the appellant is entitled to the difference between step 2 and step 3 pay
    for those five pay periods, i.e., PP 2014-22, PP 2014-23, PP 2014-24,
    PP 2014-25, and PP 2014-26, along with applicable interest. 2
    The Agency Owes Back Pay for January 5, 2015
    ¶14        The appellant asserts that the agency erred by ending the back pay period on
    January 2, 2015, given that the notice of his second removal was not served on
    him by that date and he did not receive a copy until one was provided by his
    attorney on January 9, 2015. See I-2 AF, Tab 4 at 25 (declaration of appellant),
    64 (postmark indicating that the agency mailed its removal decision to the
    appellant’s attorney on January 5, 2015). The appellant states that he continued
    to report for duty until Monday, January 5, 2015, “when he was told by an agency
    employee not to return to work the following day.” I-2, AF, Tab 1 at 5.
    ¶15        In its response to the petition for enforcement, the agency stated that the
    appellant was on “constructive notice” from the notice of proposed removal that
    he “could be removed,” and that on January 2, 2015, “the agency effectuated his
    removal and Appellant was told the removal was effectuated.” CF, Tab 4 at 4.
    However, constructive notice, or notice of a proposed action, is not sufficient
    under the applicable regulations. The agency was required to “deliver the notice
    of decision to the employee on or before the effective date of the action.”
    
    5 C.F.R. § 752.404
    (g)(2). Cf. Loui v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 
    25 F.3d 1011
    , 1014 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that, for purposes of determining when the
    time period for appeal begins in cases in which the stated effective date in a
    removal notice is earlier than the date of delivery of the removal notice, the date
    2
    We note that the agency states that it retroactively processed the WIGI effective
    November 16, 2014, and made a correction payment to the appellant in the amount of
    $153.27 on March 21, 2015. See CRF, Tab 22 at 5 (paragraph j), 49-50. However, the
    agency has not provided proof of this payment, and the appellant avers that he did not
    receive it. CRF, Tab 18 at 61.
    8
    of delivery must be considered to be the effective date). The agency has provided
    no evidence that the removal decision was served on the appellant on or before
    January 2, 2015.
    ¶16        Subsequently, the parties agreed that the appellant would be paid for
    January 5, 2015. CF, Tab 7 at 6-7. The agency states that it “processed” payment
    in the amount of $129.36. CRF, Tab 22 at 6 (paragraph q). The only evidence of
    this payment, however, is a DFAS remedy ticket that has a handwritten notation
    that it was paid on March 12, 2018. CRF, Tab 14 at 25. Moreover, it appears
    that the $129.36 may have been applied to various debts created by agency
    processing errors. See CRF, Tab 22 at 6-7. The agency states that the appellant
    was ultimately paid $49.36 during PP 2018-04.         See CRF, Tab 14 at 18, 25,
    Tab 22 at 58. In a sworn declaration, however, the appellant avers that he did not
    receive any payments from the agency after January 2015. CRF, Tab 18 at 21, 61
    (declaration at ¶ 3). He asserts that he is owed $130.64 for January 5, 2015,
    based on his hourly rate of $16.33 for this time period multiplied by 8 hours.
    CRF, Tab 23 at 12. Given the absence of any explanation of how the agency
    computed the pay for January 5, 2015, and its lack of proof of payment, we find
    that the agency owes the appellant payment for January 5, 2015, in the amount of
    $130.64, plus applicable interest.
    The Agency Owes the Appellant Additional Holiday Pay
    ¶17        An appellant’s entitlement to holiday back pay is computed using the same
    principles applied to overtime back pay. 3       See Blanchard v. Department of
    Justice, 
    40 M.S.P.R. 513
    , 516 (1989).       Overtime back pay may be computed
    based on either pre-removal overtime history or average overtime hours worked
    by similarly-situated employees during the removal period.          Johnson v. U.S.
    Postal Service, 
    71 M.S.P.R. 303
    , 306 (1996). Here, the agency’s methodology is
    3
    We note that the appellant has not contested the agency’s computation of his overtime
    back pay.
    9
    not clear. The January 24, 2015 (PP 2015-01) back pay included 32 hours of
    holiday pay in the amount of $501.12, i.e., $15.66 per hour. See I-2 AF, Tab 4
    at 28; CRF, Tab 14 at 11, 13, 23; CRF, Tab 23 at 21. The appellant’s pay for his
    last week of work, PP 2014-26, did not include holiday pay for January 1, 2015.
    See CRF, Tab 14 at 12-13, Tab 22 at 46-47.
    ¶18         The agency states that it later learned that the appellant should have been
    paid for Labor Day 2014, Veterans Day 2014, and New Year’s Day 201 5, and that
    he was not paid for those three holidays because the agency’s “corrected
    timecards” did not show that the appellant worked on those holidays.            CRF,
    Tab 22 at 7.    The agency indicates that if the appellant were paid for these
    holidays, he would be owed $379.92, plus interest in the amount of $55.27 (based
    on payment during PP 2018-08).
    ¶19         The appellant states that he should be paid at the rate of $16.33 per hour for
    all three holidays because he received a WIGI from GS-5, step 2, to GS-5, step 3,
    effective June 29, 2014. CRF, Tab 23 at 9. As discussed above, however, the
    evidence shows that the appellant’s WIGI should have been effective on
    November 2, 2014, and that the June 29, 2014 date was an error by the agency.
    See CRF, Tab 22 at 6 (paragraphs l and r). We conclude that the appellant is
    owed holiday pay at the $15.66 rate for Labor Day 2014, and Veterans Day 2014,
    for a total of $250.56, and at the $16.33 rate for New Year’s Day 2015, for a total
    of $130.64. Thus, the agency owes the appellant $381.20 for holiday p ay, plus
    applicable interest.
    The Agency Must Compensate the Appellant for his Annual Leave
    ¶20         The   appellant   has   consistently   alleged   that   he   did   not   receive
    reimbursement for 97.5 hours of annual leave. See, e.g., I-2 AF, Tab 4 at 10, 28;
    CF, Tab 1 at 5, 39; CRF, Tab 18 at 6 n.2, 12-13. At the hearing on April 15,
    2015, an agency human resources representative testified that if the then-ongoing
    audits at the agency showed that the appellant had not been compensated for his
    10
    accrued leave, he would be. I-2 AF Tab 18 at 5. She stated that the agency
    planned to remedy these issues within 30-60 days of the hearing. 
    Id.
    ¶21         Initially, the agency stated that the appellant was paid $1,511.90 for
    97.5 hours on April 10, 2015. CRF, Tab 14 at 11, 15. The agency later provided
    a leave and earning statement that listed a sum of $1,511.90 for annual leave and
    $23.58 for 1 hour of comp time. CRF, Tab 22 at 51-52. According to the agency,
    the payment of $23.58 created yet another debt because it had already paid the
    appellant for comp time in its January 24, 2015 payment. CRF, Tab 22 at 5-6
    (paragraph k). The agency mailed the appellant a letter notifying him of this debt
    on April 18, 2015. 
    Id. at 6
    . In any event, the agency’s evidence shows that the
    appellant actually received a net payment of “$.00” on April 10, 2015. 
    Id. at 51
    .
    This is consistent with the appellant’s declaration that he did not receive any
    payments from the agency after January 2015. CRF, Tab 18 at 21, 61 (declaration
    at ¶ 3).
    ¶22         The appellant states that he accrued 192 hours of leave between his date of
    hire on October 21, 2012, and January 2, 2015, and that the agency previously
    agreed to pay him for those hours following an audit. CRF, Tab 23 at 10-12.
    There is nothing in the record to substantiate the claim that the appellant accrued
    192, rather than 97.5, hours of annual leave. Furthermore, whatever the agency
    promised in the settlement agreement appears to have been contingent on its
    audit. See CF, Tab 7 at 7. There is no audit report in the record that supports
    192 hours.   We therefore conclude that the agency owes the appellant for
    97.5 hours of annual leave, plus applicable interest. The agency’s computation of
    the appellant’s compensation for annual leave should take into account that the
    appellant was due a WIGI to GS-5, step 3, effective PP 2014-22.
    The Agency Must Reimburse the Appellant for his FEHB Withholdings
    ¶23         The agency states that it refunded the appellant’s withholdings for the
    Federal Employees’ Health Benefits (FEHB) program in the amount of $2,664.74
    11
    on April 16, 2015. CRF, Tab 22 at 6 (paragraph m) . The agency’s evidence
    shows payment of $2,664.74 on May 2, 2015, during PP 2015-08. CRF, Tab 14
    at 17, Tab 22 at 53-54. The appellant responds that “[i]f, in fact, these premiums
    were refunded, they were not paid to [the appellant], and [the agency] has offered
    no proof or evidence that they were ever ‘refunded’ or ‘paid’ to [the appellant].”
    CRF, Tab 23 at 14. The appellant includes a declaration in which he avers, under
    penalty of perjury, that he never received a check or electronic funds transfer for
    his unreimbursed FEHB premiums. 
    Id. at 19-20
     (declaration, paragraphs 2 & 3).
    In light of the appellant’s declaration, and in the absence of any proof of payment
    by the agency, we conclude that the agency still owes the appellant $2,664.74 for
    his unreimbursed FEHB premiums, with applicable interest.
    The Agency Owes Interest on Back Pay
    ¶24        The Back Pay Act provides that back pay “shall be payable with interest”
    and states that the interest shall be computed at the overpayment rate set forth in
    the Internal Revenue Code at 
    26 U.S.C. § 6621
    (a)(1). 
    5 U.S.C. § 5596
    (b)(2). In
    a hearing before the administrative judge on April 15, 2015, an agency human
    resources representative testified that “the agency agrees that it did not pay the
    appellant the required interest on his back pay.”     I -2 AF Tab 18 at 5.     The
    administrative judge, in his compliance initial decision, found that it was
    undisputed that the agency had not paid the interest due. Erratum at 1-2. After
    the case was forwarded to the Board, the Clerk issued two orders directing the
    agency to show cause that it had properly calculated and paid interest on back
    pay. CRF, Tab 9, Tab 20.
    ¶25        In its first response, the agency stated:
    As noted in the CFO’s memorandum, the calculation of the interest
    and interest on interest had to be broken into three separate
    calculations because of erroneous SF-50’s that had been submitted
    and then corrected at different points in time. This document was one
    of three calculations made to resolve the settlement payments. One
    was paid by [Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT)] to the bank in March
    12
    of 2018, the remaining two portions were issued as a check from
    DFAS and mailed to the address on the settlement agreement
    documents.
    CRF, Tab 14 at 7.
    ¶26          The agency states that it processed interest on the $15,721.28 gross back
    pay that it paid on January 24, 2015, and computed the amount of interest at
    $99.52, as well as interest on that interest in the amount of $11.32 , for a total of
    $110.84. CRF, Tab 14 at 21-22, Tab 22 at 6. The interest rate was 3 percent.
    CRF, Tab 22 at 60. The agency states that it also processed the third amount of
    interest, which it computed to be in the amount of $144.38. CRF, Tab 14 at 25;
    CRF, Tab 22 at 6 (paragraph t). While the agency’s first response stated that the
    interest payments were made by EFT and then by two separate checks mailed to
    the appellant, CRF, Tab 14 at 7, the second response indicates that the agency
    made one payment of the total of $255.22 in interest ($110.84 + $144.28) on
    March 3, 2018, during pay period 2018-04. CRF, Tab 22 at 57-58.
    ¶27         In any event, the appellant states that he did not receive this payment, and
    the agency has not provided any proof of payment. CRF, Tab 23 at 16, 19-20.
    Citing concern about further delay, the appellant states that he “prefers to accept
    the agency’s computation of $255.22 and add a rough estimate of $100.00 more,
    for total back pay interest to be awarded in the amount of $355.22. ” CRF, Tab 23
    at 16-17. We find that the agency owes the appellant $255.22 in interest, plus
    interest on that interest and on the additional payments discussed herein. With
    respect to the appellant’s proposal of limiting additional interest to $100, we note
    that the parties are free to come to an agreement on the additional interest owed
    so that compliance can be expedited.       In the absence of such an agreement,
    however, we do not have a basis to award the appellant the specific amount of
    $100.00.
    13
    ORDER
    ¶28         Accordingly, the agency is ORDERED, within 30 calendar days, to pay the
    appellant $552.44 to reimburse him for the offset from his tax refund; $130.64 as
    back pay for January 5, 2015; $381.21 for holiday pay; $2,664.74 for
    unreimbursed FEHB premiums; and $255.22 for back pay interest; for a total
    amount of $3,984.25.      In addition, the agency must pay the appellant the
    difference between GS-5, step 2 pay and GS-5, step 3 pay for Pay
    Periods 2014-22 through 2014-26.          The agency also must compensate the
    appellant for 97.5 hours of annual leave, taking into account that the appellant
    was due a WIGI to GS-5, step 3, effective PP 2014-22. The agency must pay the
    appellant applicable interest on all of these payments. The agency must submit a
    narrative explanation and documentary evidence of its interest calculations, as
    well as documentary evidence of a check or electronic payment made to the
    appellant.
    ¶29         If satisfactory evidence of compliance is not received, the Board will
    impose sanctions, pursuant to 
    5 U.S.C. § 1204
    (a)(2) and (e)(2)(A) and 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.183
    , against Shannon Wasielewski, Chief Financial Officer, Northern
    Arizona VA Health Care Systems, as the responsible agency official.
    NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT
    Following the agency’s submission of evidence, you may respond no later
    than 21 calendar days after the date shown on the agency’s certificate of
    service.     The   response    may   be   filed   electronically   through   https://e-
    appeal.mspb.gov/, by facsimile to (202) 653-7130, or by mail to:
    Clerk of the Board
    Merit Systems Protection Board
    1615 M Street NW
    Washington, DC 20419
    14
    Any response must be served on the agency and proof of such service
    provided to the Board. If you do not respond, the Board may assume you are
    satisfied and dismiss the petition for enforcement as moot. 4
    FOR THE BOARD:                                      /s/ for
    Jennifer Everling
    Acting Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.
    4
    When the Board issues a final decision or order in this compliance matter, the
    appellant may file a motion for attorney fees with the Board’s Denver Field Office. See
    
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.203
    (c).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: DE-0752-14-0490-X-1

Filed Date: 6/29/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/22/2023