Christopher Hare v. National Credit Union Administration ( 2022 )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
CHRISTOPHER HARVEY HARE, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, PH-3443-14-0638-C-1
v.
NATIONAL CREDIT UNION DATE: May 10, 2022
ADMINISTRATION,
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Christopher Harvey Hare, Abingdon, Maryland, pro se.
Scott E. Schwartz, Esquire, Alexandria, Virginia, for the agency.
BEFORE
Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review and the agency has filed a cross
petition for review of the compliance initial decision, which dismissed the
appellant’s petition for enforcement as untimely filed or, in the alternative,
denied the petition on the merits. Generally, we grant petitions such as these only
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings
of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of
statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the
case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appe al or
the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an
abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or
new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the
petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of
the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After
fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that neither party has
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition or cross
petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and the cross
petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify that we do not
apply the doctrine of equitable tolling under these circumstances, we AFFIRM the
compliance initial decision.
BACKGROUND
¶2 The appellant applied, but was not selected, for the CU-0580-13/14
Regional Lending Specialist position under Job Announcement Number RV -14-
DEU-1049051, because the agency found that he failed to provide documentation
demonstrating that he was entitled to veterans’ preference . Hare v. National
Credit Union Administration, MSPB Docket No. PH-3443-14-0638-B-1, Remand
File (RF), Tab 21 at 121-31. Accordingly, the agency did not refer him to the
selecting official for consideration. Id. He filed a Board appeal challenging his
nonselection as violating his veterans’ preference rights. Hare v. National Credit
Union Administration, MSPB Docket No. PH-3443-14-0638-I-1, Initial Appeal
File (IAF), Tab 1. The administrative judge issued an initial decision that
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the appellant failed to
exhaust his administrative remedy with the Department of Labor (DOL). IAF,
3
Tab 12, Initial Decision. The appellant filed a timely petition for review of the
administrative judge’s decision, in which he submitted a July 16, 2014 DOL
determination letter that concluded that his application failed to demonstrate his
entitlement to veterans’ preference. Petition for Review File, Tab 1 at 6. Based
upon the receipt of this letter, the Board reversed the initial decision and
remanded the appeal. Hare v. National Credit Union Administration, MSPB
Docket No. PH-3443-14-0638-I-1, Remand Order (Oct. 8, 2014).
¶3 On remand, after holding a hearing, the administrative judge found that the
appellant demonstrated that the agency violated his veterans’ preference rights
regarding the selection for the Regional Lending Specialist position and thus
ordered the agency to reconstruct the hiring process. RF, Tab 25, Remand Initial
Decision (RID) at 6-9. The administrative judge informed the appellant that the
decision would become final on July 24, 2015, unless he filed a petition for
review. RID at 11. He also informed the appellant that, if he believed that the
agency did not fully comply with the Board’s order , he could ask the Board to
enforce its decision by filing a petition for enforcement and that such a petition
must be filed no later than 30 days after the date of service of the agency’s notice
that it had complied with the initial decision. RID at 10.
¶4 On July 15, 2015, the agency informed the appellant that it had complied
with the Board’s order. Hare v. National Credit Union Administration, MSPB
Docket No. PH-3443-14-0638-C-1, Compliance File (CF), Tab 4 at 43-44.
Despite the administrative judge’s notice regarding how to file a petition for
enforcement, the appellant appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit on August 31, 2015, which the court interpreted as a challenge to the
agency’s reconstruction of the hiring process. See Hare v. National Credit Union
Administration, 633 F. App’x 789, 790-91 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The court dismissed
the petition for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the appellant was required to
challenge the agency’s compliance before the Board prior to appealing to the
Federal Circuit. Id. at 791. The court also noted that the deadline for challenging
4
the agency’s compliance had passed but stated that the Board could consider
whether to accept the appellant’s petition for enforcement “under its equitable
tolling doctrine.” Id.¶5 On February 1, 2016, the appellant filed the instant petition for enforcement
in which he challenges the agency’s review of his application during the
reconstructed hiring process, argues that he was entitled to 5 years of wages, and
asserts that, although his petition was untimely, it should be deemed timely based
upon the doctrine of equitable tolling. CF, Tab 1. The administrative judge
dismissed the petition as untimely filed without good cause shown and without a
showing of entitlement to equitable tolling or, alternatively, with a finding that
the agency complied with the initial decision. CF, Tab 8, Compliance Initial
Decision (CID).
¶6 The appellant has filed a petition for review, and the agency has filed a
response in opposition to the appellant’s petition and a cross petition for review. 2
Compliance Petition for Review (CPFR) File, Tabs 1-2, 4.
DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
The appellant’s petition for enforcement is untimely.
¶7 Pursuant to the Board’s regulations, an employee must file a petition for
enforcement within 30 days after the date of service of the agency’s notice that it
has complied with the Board’s decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a). The agency
sent the appellant notice of its compliance on July 15, 2015. CF, Tab 4 at 43-44.
Thus, the appellant’s petition for enforcement was due no later than August 16,
2015. 3 See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a). The appellant did not file his petition for
2
The appellant has submitted evidence for the first time on review, including an
August 15, 2015 complaint of retaliation, a September 2015 motion to amend his
Federal Circuit brief with title 5 of the United States Code attached, and the January 21,
2016 Federal Circuit decision. CPFR File, Tab 1. This evidence is not new, and thus,
we have not considered it. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d).
3
The administrative judge stated that, because the appellant received the agency’s
notice of compliance, dated July 15, 2015, on July 17, 2015, the filing deadline should
5
enforcement until February 1, 2016. CF, Tab 1. Accordingly, his petition for
enforcement was 171 days late. 4
¶8 Nevertheless, in certain limited circumstances, the Board has found that a
petition was timely when the appellant timely filed it in an incorrect forum. See
generally Godesky v. Department of Health & Human Services, 101 M.S.P.R.
280, ¶ 6 (2006) (finding that the appellant timely filed his Board appeal from an
arbitrator’s decision when he mistakenly filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission). However, the appellant did not appeal to the Federal
Circuit until August 31, 2015, which was after the July 24, 2015 deadline for
filing a petition for review as well as the August 16, 2015 deadline for filing a
petition for enforcement. CID at 10-11; CF, Tab 1 at 33-37. Accordingly, we
find no basis for finding that the appellant’s petition was timely based upon his
mistaken appeal to the Federal Circuit.
We do not apply the doctrine of equitable tolling. 5
¶9 The appellant asserted below and on review that his petition for
enforcement is timely based upon the doctrine of equitable tolling. CF, Tab 1
at 4; CPFR File, Tab 1 at 11. We are mindful of the Federal Circuit’s statement
in its decision regarding the possibility of applying the doctrine of equitable
be calculated from July 17, 2015. CID at 5-6; CF, Tab 1, Tab 4 at 43-44. However,
pursuant to the Board’s regulations, the filing deadline for a petition for enforcement is
calculated from the date of service of the agency’s notice of compliance, 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.182(a), and thus, the filing deadline is calculated from July 15, 2015, the date
that the agency sent the notice of its compliance to the app ellant via commercial carrier.
Any error in this respect is harmless because the petition for en forcement was untimely
based upon either date. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281,
282 (1984).
4
To the extent that the appellant asserts that he intended to file a petition for review,
even if we considered his filing as a petition for review, such a petition would be
untimely by over 6 months. RID at 11; CF, Tab 1; CPFR File, Tab 1 at 4; see 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.114(e).
5
We clarify the initial decision to the extent that the administrative judge analyzed
equitable tolling and good cause for the appellant’s delay together. CID at 4-7.
Instead, as discussed, we find that the doctrine of equitable tolling is inapplicable .
6
tolling. Hare, 633 F. App’x at 791. However, as discussed below, we find that
this doctrine does not apply to compliance cases, such as this one.
¶10 In certain instances, the Board considers whether to apply the doctrine of
equitable tolling to a statutory deadline under which the filing period is
suspended for equitable reasons. For instance, the Board has considered
equitable tolling in individual right of action (IRA) appeals and Veterans
Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA) appeals to determine whether a
case should be considered timely filed. See, e.g., Heimberger v. Department of
Commerce, 121 M.S.P.R. 10, ¶¶ 9-12 (2014) (considering the doctrine of
equitable tolling and finding that the appellant did not show a sufficient basis to
toll the filing deadline of her IRA appeal pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3)(A));
Gingery v. Office of Personnel Management, 119 M.S.P.R. 43, ¶¶ 17-18 (2012)
(finding that the application of equitable tolling to waive the 60-day period for
filing a written complaint with DOL was not appropriate); Alegre v. Department
of the Navy, 118 M.S.P.R. 424, ¶ 17 (2012) (remanding a VEOA appeal to
consider whether equitable tolling would render the appeal timely when the
appellant had not filed his Board appeal within the statutory 15-day deadline after
receiving notification from DOL). The Board considers whether to apply
equitable tolling in these situations because the statutory basis for the deadlines
in these appeals does not provide for waiving the time limit for good
cause. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3)(A), 3330a(a)(2)(A), (d)(1)(B); Heimberger,
121 M.S.P.R. 10, ¶ 9; Alegre, 118 M.S.P.R. 424, ¶ 17; 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5(b).
Furthermore, these circumstances are limited to situations such as when an
employee has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into
allowing the filing deadline to pass or when an appellant has actively pursued his
judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period . Irwin
v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990).
¶11 When, as here, the Board is considering the appellant’s petition for
enforcement in a VEOA appeal, as opposed to the VEOA appeal itself, the Board
7
may apply its own regulations, as set forth in chapter II, subchapter A, part 1201
of title 5, to address procedural matters. See generally Marshall v. Department of
Health & Human Services, 587 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Under these
regulations, instead of considering equitable tolling, the Board considers whether
the appellant’s petition was timely filed or whether there was good cause for the
delay. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶12 Further, even if we considered the applicability of the doctrine of equitable
tolling, we would find it inapplicable here. The administrative judge informed
the appellant of the appropriate deadline for filing a petition for enforcement and
there is no evidence that the agency or the administrative judge induced or tricked
the appellant regarding the filing deadline. RID at 10. Accordingly, even if we
did consider the doctrine of equitable tolling, we would find no basis for waiving
the deadline in this case.
The appellant has not shown good cause for the delay in filing his petition for
enforcement.
¶13 If an appellant files his petition for enforcement more than 30 days after the
date of service of the agency’s notice that it has complied with the Board’s
decision, he must submit a statement and evidence showing good cause for the
delay and request an extension of time for filing the petition. Vargo v. U.S.
Postal Service, 78 M.S.P.R. 66, 71 (1998); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a); see Gallegos
v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 844 F.3d 1340, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(affirming the Board’s finding that the appellant did not establish good cause for
the untimely filing of his petition for enforcement of a settlement agreement). To
establish good cause for the untimely filing, the appellant must show that he
exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular circumstances
of the case. Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980).
To determine if an appellant has shown good cause, the Board will consider the
following: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasonableness of his excuse and
his showing of due diligence; (3) whether he is proceeding pro se; and
8
(4) whether he has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond
his control that affected his ability to comply with the time limits or of
unavoidable casualty or misfortune that similarly shows a causal relationship to
his inability to timely file his petition for review. Gaetos v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 201, ¶ 5 (2014); Moorman v. Department of the
Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60, 62-63 (1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table).
¶14 As the administrative judge properly found, the delay in this case was
lengthy. CID at 5-6. Specifically, the appellant’s petition for enforcement was
171 days late and he did not request an extension of time to file his petition.
5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a); CF, Tab 1, Tab 4 at 43-44. Accordingly, this factor
weighs heavily against finding good cause for the delay. See, e.g., Dean v. U.S.
Postal Service, 100 M.S.P.R. 556, ¶ 5 (2005) (finding that a delay of 6 months is
not minimal).
¶15 The appellant attempts to excuse his delay by arguing that he did not
receive the agency’s notice of compliance until July 17, 2015 , at which point he
attempted to contact DOL to seek advice. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 5. He asserts that,
because DOL did not contact him until after July 24, 2015, he only had minimal
time to comply with the deadline for filing a petition for enforcement . Id. at 11.
He further argues that he decided to appeal to the Federal Circuit because the
filing deadline there was longer than the Board’s deadlines. Id. He also asserts
that the agency’s “late compliance” with the initial decision left him with only a
few days to file a petition for review. Id. at 6.
¶16 Even assuming that the appellant did not receive the agency’s notice of
compliance until July 17, 2015, and that he did not receive DOL’s advice until
July 24, 2015, he still had several days to file a petition for enforcement or to
request an extension. Thus, these excuses are not persuasive and do not justify
the fact that he did not file a petition for review or request an extension of time,
should he have wished to do so. Furthermore, we agree with the administrative
judge that the initial decision ordered the agency to reconstruct the hiring process
9
within 30 days of its issuance on June 19, 2015, and that, because the agency
submitted its compliance letter prior to the July 20, 2015 due date on July 15,
2015, it was not late in complying with the order. CID at 10; CF, Tab 4 at 43 -44;
see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a). Consequently, to the extent any late compliance by
the agency could possibly have confused the appellant, there was no such issue in
this case. Furthermore, to the extent that the appellant attempts to justify his late
filing because he appealed instead to the Federal Circuit, we find that this is
inconsistent with the clearly delineated instructions in the initial decision for
challenging compliance, and thus we do not find that this is a reasonable excuse.
CID at 10.
¶17 We also agree with the administrative judge that the appellant has shown no
unavoidable casualty or misfortune that prevented him from filing on time. CID
at 7. Moreover, although we recognize that the appellant is pro se, we find that,
because the initial decision clearly informed him about the relevant deadlines, he
should have known when to file his petition. Brame v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 98 M.S.P.R. 224, ¶ 5 (2005) (stating that, although the appellant’s pro se
status was a factor weighing in her favor, it was insufficient to excuse her
untimeliness). Thus, we find that the appellant failed to establish good cause for
the untimely filing of his petition for enforcement.
The appellant has not otherwise demonstrated a reason for disturbing the initial
decision.
¶18 Next, we find that the appellant has not shown that the administrative judge
was biased. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 5. In making a claim of bias or prejudice
against an administrative judge, a party must overcome the presumption of
honesty and integrity that accompanies administrative adjudicators. Montgomery
v. Department of Health & Human Services, 123 M.S.P.R. 216, ¶ 13 n.4 (2016).
The appellant’s general allegations do not rise to this level. We also find that,
although the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s failure to process his
appeal in 120 days, any such delay does not provide a reason for disturbing the
10
initial decision because it did not prejudice his substantive rights. 6 CPFR File,
Tab 1 at 5; see Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282
(1984).
The agency’s cross petition for review provides no reason for disturbing the
initial decision.
¶19 Finally, the agency, in its cross petition for review, opposes the
administrative judge’s prior finding that it was obligated to permit the appellant
to supplement his application after the vacancy closing date. CPFR File, Tab 4;
RID at 9. This argument does not provide a basis for disturbing our finding that
the appellant’s petition for enforcement was untimely, and thus it is not necessary
to address it.
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
6
We agree with the administrative judge that, even if the appellant’s petition for
enforcement was timely, it would otherwise have been denied. Contrary to the
appellant’s arguments, the administrative judge was not required to compare his
application to that of other applicants or to allow him to prove his finance
qualifications, and we agree that the agency did not improperly overlook or exclude his
experiences. CID at 10; CPFR File, Tab 1 at 5-7; see Miller v. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, 121 M.S.P.R. 88, ¶ 9 (2014) (finding that the agency properly
considered the totality of the appellant’s experiences in determining that he was not
qualified for a position), aff’d, 818 F. 3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The appellant has not
otherwise provided a reason for disturbing the administrative judge’s finding that his
petition for enforcement would have been denied. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service,
74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s
findings when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and
made reasoned conclusions on issues of credibility).
7
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
11
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of partic ular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
12
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
13
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 8 The court of appeals must receive your
8
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the Pr esident on
14
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
15
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.