State v. Johnson , 371 N.C. 870 ( 2018 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 57PA17
Filed 21 December 2018
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
BOBBY JOHNSON
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision
of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 795 S.E.2d 625 (2017), finding no
prejudicial error after appeal from a judgment entered on 6 October 2015 by Judge
Eric L. Levinson in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. On 3 May 2017, the
Supreme Court allowed defendant’s conditional petition for discretionary review as
to an additional issue. Heard in the Supreme Court on 8 January 2018.
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Derrick C. Mertz, Special Deputy
Attorney General, for the State-appellant/appellee.
Marilyn G. Ozer for defendant-appellant/appellee.
BEASLEY, Justice.
The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant’s inculpatory statements to law
enforcement were given under the influence of fear or hope caused by the
interrogating officers’ statements and actions and were therefore involuntarily made.
State v. Johnson, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 795 S.E.2d 625, 639-40 (2017). The
unanimous Court of Appeals panel held that the confession should have been
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Opinion of the Court
suppressed but concluded the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to
the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. Id. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 641. For
the reasons stated below, we uphold the trial court’s conclusion that, under the
totality of the circumstances, defendant’s inculpatory statements were voluntary.
Therefore, we modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Background
In the early morning hours of 2 May 2007, three men robbed a Charlotte motel
where the victim, Anita Jean Rychlik, worked as manager and her husband worked
as a security guard. After pistol whipping and robbing the security guard in the
parking lot, two of the men entered the victim’s room, where the victim was shot once
in the back of her neck and killed. The men escaped, and no one was charged in the
murder until October 2011. DNA evidence collected from beneath the victim’s
fingernails and analyzed in 2009 indicated defendant was the likely contributor.
Defendant voluntarily met with detectives on 24 October 2011 at the police
station, where he was questioned in an interview room for just under five hours before
being placed under arrest and warned of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). After being advised of his rights, defendant
signed a written waiver of those rights and made inculpatory statements. Defendant
was indicted on 7 November 2011 for first-degree murder for the killing of Rychlik.
Defendant was tried before Judge Eric L. Levinson at the 28 September 2015
criminal session of Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. On 6 October 2015, a jury
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found defendant guilty of first-degree murder under the felony murder rule with
armed robbery as the underlying felony. That same day, the trial court sentenced
defendant to life imprisonment without parole.
Defendant made a number of pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress
statements he made to law enforcement while being interrogated on 24 October 2011.
Defendant argued that he was subjected to custodial interrogation before being
informed of his rights as required by Miranda, and that his inculpatory statements
were made in response to improper statements by detectives inducing a hope that his
confession would benefit him. The trial court denied the motion to suppress,
concluding that “[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances during the entirety of
the interview, the statements made by Defendant were voluntary.”
Defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
trial court’s findings of fact “seem[ed] to intentionally downplay the influence of hope
and fear” during his interrogation and were insufficient to support its conclusion that
the Miranda warnings in this case were effective under Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S.
600, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643 (2004). The Court of Appeals panel determined that defendant
was subject to custodial interrogation before being Mirandized and then analyzed
whether the entirety of the interrogation, from the time defendant first should have
been advised of his rights under Miranda until the time defendant made inculpatory
statements, rendered those statements involuntary. Johnson, ___ N.C. App. at ___,
795 S.E.2d at 638-39.
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The Court of Appeals concluded that the detectives used the “question first,
warn later” technique held invalid in Seibert, but that defendant did not make
inculpatory statements prior to being advised of his rights as required by Miranda.
Id. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 637-38. Because of that distinction, the Court of Appeals did
not determine whether the postwarning statement should have been suppressed
under Miranda and Seibert, and instead analyzed the overall voluntariness of the
statements. Id. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 637-38. The Court of Appeals held that the
circumstances under which defendant made inculpatory statements were at least as
coercive as those at issue in State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442, 212 S.E.2d 92 (1975), and
therefore, any statements given were involuntary and inadmissible. Johnson, ___
N.C. App. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 638. Despite its conclusion that the statements should
have been suppressed, the panel determined that admission of defendant’s
statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming
additional evidence of defendant’s guilt, including DNA evidence, eyewitness
testimony, and accomplice testimony. Id. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 640-41. This Court
allowed both the State’s and defendant’s petitions for discretionary review on 3 May
2017.
Analysis
I. – Standard of Review
We evaluate a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence to determine
“whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether
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the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167-
68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (citing State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140-41, 446
S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994)). If the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by competent
evidence, they “are conclusive on appeal, . . . even if the evidence is conflicting.” State
v. Hammonds, 370 N.C. 158, 161, 804 S.E.2d 438, 441 (2017) (quoting State v.
Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001)). Conclusions of law,
however, “are fully reviewable on appeal” and “must be legally correct, reflecting a
correct application of applicable legal principles to the facts found.” Id. at 161, 804
S.E.2d at 441 (first citing State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577, 422 S.E.2d 730, 737
(1992); then quoting Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 336, 543 S.E.2d at 826).
Determinations regarding the voluntariness of a defendant’s waiver of his
Miranda rights or the voluntariness of incriminating statements made during the
course of interrogation are conclusions of law, which we review de novo. State v.
Knight, 369 N.C. 640, 646, 799 S.E.2d 603, 608 (2017) (citation omitted); State v.
Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 222, 451 S.E.2d 600, 608 (1994) (citation omitted).
II. – Voluntariness and Miranda
At common law a confession obtained through inducements, promises, or
threats of violence lacked the presumption of reliability ordinarily afforded such
statements, and therefore, was not admissible at trial. State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. (1
Dev.) 259, 260 (1827) (per curiam) (declining to allow admission of a confession when
“the defendant ha[d] been influenced by any threat or promise”); cf. Hopt v. Utah, 110
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U.S. 574, 585, 28 L. Ed. 262, 267 (1884) (holding a confession admissible when not
made as a result of inducements, threats, or promises preying on the “fears or hopes
of the accused”). In short, “coerced confessions are inherently untrustworthy.”
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405, 412 (2000) (citations
omitted).
Compliance with Miranda is a threshold requirement for admissibility of such
statements when made as a result of custodial interrogation and does not abrogate
the need for confessions to be obtained in compliance with traditional notions of due
process under both the federal and state constitutions. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617 n.8,
159 L. Ed. 2d at 658 n.8 (plurality opinion) (declining to “assess the actual
voluntariness of the statement” where Miranda warnings were inadequate); New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550, 556 n.5 (1984) (noting that
“failure to provide Miranda warnings in and of itself does not render a confession
involuntary” and suggesting the defendant was “free on remand to argue that his
statement was coerced under traditional due process standards”). “ ‘[T]he mere fact
that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of
compulsion’ as to any subsequent, warned statement.” United States v. Mashburn,
406 F.3d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314, 84 L.
Ed. 2d 222, 235 (1985)). And conversely, compliance with Miranda does not
necessarily raise a presumption of voluntariness. Consequently, even when a
defendant’s Miranda rights are respected, and even when those rights are
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voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived, the confession itself must also be
voluntary under traditional notions of due process. “If, looking to the totality of the
circumstances, the confession is ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice by its maker,’ then ‘he has willed to confess [and] it may be used against him;’
where, however ‘his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.’ ” Hardy, 339 N.C.
at 222, 451 S.E.2d at 608 (alteration in original) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 225-26, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 862 (1973)).
Whether the defendant’s rights under Miranda and its progeny have been
respected is a factor to be considered when assessing the overall voluntariness of a
defendant’s confession. See, e.g., id. at 222, 451 S.E.2d at 608 (listing compliance with
Miranda as a factor to be considered in the voluntariness inquiry). Consequently,
assessing the admissibility of a statement given in response to police questioning
requires an assessment of both compliance with Miranda and the overall
voluntariness of the statement. We agree with the State that the Court of Appeals
erred by compressing these steps to analyze voluntariness alone. Johnson, ___ N.C.
App. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 634. Compliance with Miranda is a factor to be considered
when evaluating voluntariness in light of the totality of the circumstances under
which the statement was given. Whether the State has complied with Miranda
necessarily involves a determination whether the person being interviewed was
subjected to custodial interrogation, which is itself a totality of the circumstances
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analysis. While these two analyses will require the Court to examine interrelated
and overlapping facts, one is not a replacement for the other. Likewise, determining
whether a defendant has voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda does not
abrogate the need to evaluate the voluntariness of the statement itself.
III. – Compliance with Miranda in light of Seibert
“Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction
on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’ ” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S.
492, 495, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714, 719 (1977) (per curiam). There is no question that
defendant was read the Miranda warnings when he was formally placed under arrest
and that he signed a form acknowledging his waiver of those rights. The parties
disagree, however, as to whether those warnings, when given, were sufficient to
comply with Miranda in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 600, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 643. Defendant relies on Seibert to argue
that the officers’ use of the “question first, warn later” method of interrogation
violated Miranda. The State argues that there is no evidence that officers
intentionally used the “question first, warn later” technique at issue in Seibert, and
therefore, this case is distinguishable and should be analyzed instead under the
rationale of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1985). We do not find
the reasoning of Elstad distinguishable from Seibert in this way. Rather, the two
cases stand for the same proposition: Miranda warnings must be given in a manner
that meaningfully apprises the interviewee of his choice to give an admissible
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statement or stop talking before he is taken into custody and questioned.
In Seibert, the officer testified that he purposefully did not place the defendant
under arrest until after he had questioned her for some time and she had fully
confessed. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604-07, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 650-51. By doing so, he was
able to secure a confession without apprising the defendant of her constitutional
rights as required by Miranda. Id. at 604-07, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 651. He then gave the
obligatory warnings, confronted her with her prewarning statements, and repeated
the questions to confirm what had already been said. Id. at 605, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 650-
51. According to the Court, the manifest purpose of this interrogation technique was
to obtain “a confession the suspect would not make if he understood his rights at the
outset,” thereby intentionally circumventing Miranda and undermining the purposes
it sought to serve—combatting interrogation tactics designed to trick, pressure, or
coerce a suspect into incriminating himself without knowing or understanding he had
the right not to do so. Id. at 613, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 655. The Court explained that the
practice of administering Miranda warnings in the midst of coordinated and
continuing interrogation undermines the defendant’s ability to knowingly and
intelligently waive the right to remain silent by placing him in a state of confusion as
to why his rights are being discussed after he has been interrogated. Id. at 613-14,
159 L. Ed. 2d at 656. Doing so is “likely to mislead and ‘depriv[e] a defendant of
knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the
consequences of abandoning them.’ ” Id. at 613-14, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 656 (alteration in
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original) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424, 89 L. Ed. 410, 422 (1986)).
The prewarning statement at issue in Elstad, on the other hand, was not made
in a station house interrogation but rather in the defendant’s home where officers
had come to execute an arrest warrant. Id. at 300-01, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 226-27. The
officers allowed the defendant to get dressed before placing him under arrest and
taking him to the sheriff’s department for interrogation, where the defendant was
read the Miranda warnings before being questioned. Id. at 300-01, 84 L. Ed. 2d at
226-27. The defendant’s initial statements were made in casual conversation with
an officer in the defendant’s own home, while his subsequent statements were made
after being transported to the police station in a patrol car and placed in an
interrogation room for questioning. The Court concluded that, under such
circumstances, “a subsequent administration of Miranda warnings . . . should suffice
to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement,” id. at
314, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 235; those “conditions” being his lack of information essential to
understanding the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.
Consequently, under both Elstad and Seibert, the question for a reviewing court
remains whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the warnings so given could
function effectively to apprise the suspect that he had a real choice to either give an
admissible statement or stop talking.
The Court of Appeals here “agree[d] that the detectives in the present case
used the same objectionable technique considered in Seibert,” but held that because
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defendant “did not confess until after he was given his Miranda warnings,” the court
needed only to determine whether his statements were involuntary. Johnson, ___
N.C. App. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 637-38. This was error. When a defendant asserts
that his or her Miranda rights have been violated as a result of successive rounds of
custodial interrogation, some portion of which was unwarned, the question for the
court is whether the warnings effectively apprised him of his rights and whether he
made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent.
Whether a defendant made prewarning inculpatory statements may be a factor that
affects that analysis, but it does not change the nature of the question to be asked.
While defendant has argued vigorously on appeal that his Miranda rights were
violated by the officers’ use of the “question first” technique, he did not make that
argument to the trial court. He did not assert to the trial court that his postwarning
statements suffered from the same constitutional infirmity as any prewarning
statements, because there were no such inadmissible prewarning statements upon
which he could base such an argument. Rather, he argued that the totality of his
interaction with officers was involuntary because of the substance of his unwarned
conversations with officers that morning. Although his motion to suppress includes
an assertion that the officers “initially . . . did not ascertain that he knowingly and
voluntarily waived his rights to remain silent,” he did not argue that the waiver of
his rights under Miranda in the afternoon was not voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent, nor that he did not understand his right to remain silent at the time he
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was Mirandized; only that officers should have obtained the waiver earlier in the
day.1 In fact, he conceded to the trial court that “the technical requirements of
Miranda may have been met,” but contended that his statement should have been
suppressed nonetheless because it was involuntary.
The trial court found as fact that the waiver forms introduced into evidence by
the State “accurately reflect[ed] the required Miranda warnings.” This
determination is supported by competent evidence in the record and has not been
challenged by defendant. Consequently, it is binding on appeal. Having made an
appropriate waiver of his rights under Miranda, the finding supports the trial court’s
conclusion that “[t]he requirements of Miranda were satisfied.” We therefore proceed
to defendant’s claim that his statements were involuntary.
IV. - Voluntariness
Although defendant does not argue that his postwarning statements failed to
comply with Miranda, he does argue that they were involuntarily procured as a result
of the statements made by officers during the first “round” of interrogation before he
was Mirandized. Defendant contends that the officers’ statements improperly
1 Because defendant did not seek to suppress any statements made to officers during
the first several hours of his interrogation, before he was formally arrested and Mirandized,
and in light of defendant’s concession that “the technical requirements of Miranda may have
been met,” we do not find it necessary to determine whether he was “in custody” for purposes
of Miranda before he was formally arrested. This position, taken at the hearing on the motion
to suppress, appears to conflict with the motion itself which stated that “[u]se of Defendant’s
statement would be in violation of Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights . . . under
case law of the United States Supreme Court, Miranda v. Arizona, and its progeny.”
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induced hope that his confession would benefit him. His motion to suppress cites
State v. Pruitt for the proposition that “a confession obtained by the slightest emotions
of hope or fear ought to be rejected.” 286 N.C. at 455, 212 S.E.2d at 101. The State
argues that both defendant’s and the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Pruitt is misplaced
because, in the State’s view, the “per se” voluntariness analysis in that case and its
predecessors has been circumscribed by our more recent decisions that favor a totality
of the circumstances analysis of the voluntariness of a confession. The Court of
Appeals quoted Pruitt extensively and ultimately determined that “the circumstances
in the present case were at least as coercive as those in Pruitt” and therefore held
“that Defendant’s inculpatory statements ‘were made under the influence of fear or
hope, or both, growing out of the language and acts of those who held him in
custody.’ ” Johnson, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 639-40 (quoting Pruitt, 286
N.C. at 458, 212 S.E.2d at 103). We hold that the trial court’s conclusion that
defendant’s inculpatory statements were voluntarily made was adequately supported
by its findings of fact and that those findings are supported by competent evidence in
the record. We therefore modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
We assess the voluntariness of a confession by determining whether, under the
“totality of the circumstances, the confession is ‘the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker,’ ” in which case it is admissible against him, or
conversely, whether “ ‘his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-
determination critically impaired,’ ” in which case “ ‘the use of his confession offends
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due process.’ ” Hardy, 339 N.C. at 222, 451 S.E.2d at 608 (quoting Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 862 (1973)). In addition to
considering whether the defendant’s rights under Miranda have been heeded, when
conducting this review of the totality of the circumstances, the Court should also
consider: (1) circumstances under which the interrogation was conducted, for
example the location, the presence or absence of restraints, and the suspect’s
opportunity to communicate with family or an attorney; (2) treatment of the suspect,
for example the duration of the session or consecutive sessions, availability of food
and drink, opportunity to take breaks or use restroom facilities, and the use of actual
physical violence or psychologically strenuous interrogation tactics; (3) appearance
and demeanor of the officers, for example whether they were uniformed, whether
weapons were displayed, and whether they used raised voices or made shows of
violence; (4) statements made by the officers, including threats or promises or
attempts to coerce a confession through trickery or deception; and (5) characteristics
of the defendant himself, including his age, mental condition, familiarity with the
criminal justice system, and demeanor during questioning.2 None of these factors
2 See, e.g., State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 458, 573 S.E.2d 870, 881 (2002) (citing,
inter alia, State v. Hyde, 352 N.C. 37, 45, 530 S.E.2d 281, 288 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1114, 148 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2001)) (listing factors, including “whether defendant was in custody,
whether her Miranda rights were violated, whether she was held incommunicado, whether
there were threats of violence, whether promises were made to obtain the confession, the age
and mental condition of defendant, and whether defendant had been deprived of food,” as
well as the “defendant’s familiarity with the criminal justice system, length of interrogation,
and amount of time without sleep”); Hardy, 339 N.C. at 221-22, 451 S.E.2d at 607-08 (listing
same factors and additionally considering the environment and duration of the interview;
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standing alone will necessarily be dispositive, State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 458,
573 S.E.2d 870, 881 (2002) (citing State v. Barlow, 330 N.C. 133, 141, 409 S.E.2d 906,
911 (1991)), and the court is certainly free to look to a host of other facts and
circumstances surrounding the act of confessing to determine whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, the defendant was truly capable of making, and did in
fact make, a free and rational decision to confess his guilt.
In this case the trial court’s findings of fact indicate that defendant came to the
police department headquarters on his own without police escort, was not shackled
or handcuffed,3 and retained possession of his personal cell phone while inside the
interview room. Defendant was placed in an interview room with two plainclothes
police officers on the second floor of a secure law enforcement facility. At one point,
his cell phone rang and it appears from the record that officers would have allowed
him to answer had he chosen to do so. Officers made no threats of physical violence
but did interrogate defendant rigorously and raised their voices. Defendant was told,
demeanor and characteristics of the interviewee; officers’ civilian dress, lack of weapons, and
demeanor; and subjective belief of the defendant, including whether he asked to leave,
requested an attorney, felt he was free to leave, and believed what officers were telling him);
State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 573-74, 304 S.E.2d 134, 147-48 (1983) (finding the defendant’s
statement voluntary even though officers fabricated evidence because the defendant: was
not in custody; was Mirandized; was not threatened, touched, or intimidated; was driven by
officers to his chosen destination at the conclusion of the first interview; and had extensive
experience with interrogation), overruled on other grounds as stated in State v. Abbott, 320
N.C. 475, 481, 358 S.E.2d 365, 369 (1987).
3 The Court of Appeals recited as fact that defendant was made to shackle himself to
the floor of the interrogation room after he was placed under arrest, four and one-half hours
after questioning began. Defendant has not challenged the trial court’s finding that he was
not shackled or handcuffed and that finding is therefore binding on appeal.
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contradictorily and repeatedly, that officers both could not promise him anything and
that the district attorney would “work with him” and would “go easier on him” if he
cooperated and gave them truthful information. After a lengthy interrogation,
officers asked whether defendant believed he would be able to go home that day and
defendant responded, “No.” The following conversation ensued:
Officer 1: Then you’re under arrest for murder.
Officer 2: If you don’t believe you can get up and
walk out of here, then I have no choice.
You just told me you believe you’re
going to jail.
Officer 1: Did you just say that, yes or no?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
Officer 1: Then I’m going to have to place you
under arrest and then I’ve got some
stuff to do before I continue. Because to
be voluntary, you’ve got to believe you
can walk out of here.
....
Officer 1: If you feel like you can leave, then we’re
good. But if not, then we’ll have to do
something different. Do you think you
can get up and walk out of here any
time?
Defendant: Not at any time, only after you free me
to go.
Officer 2: That’s different, Bobby. Do you think
you can walk out of here right now?
Defendant: Yes.
The unwarned portion of the interrogation lasted about five hours. When
defendant was formally arrested, officers Mirandized him and secured a written
waiver of his rights. Questioning continued for another four hours. During the
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unwarned portion of the interrogation defendant was given coffee and cigarettes and
was offered food. He had access to the restroom if needed and was offered a
wastebasket when he began to feel ill. Defendant was, at times, left alone in the
interview room. There was no guard or police officer stationed at the door. Defendant
was in his mid-thirties, had obtained his GED, and was articulate, intelligent,
literate, and knowledgeable about the criminal justice system and its processes. As
the trial court found, defendant at times appeared eager to assist the officers in their
investigation and offered to help, offered to wear a wire, and offered to do whatever
else he could to help with the investigation.
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that, “[b]ased on the totality of the
circumstances during the entirety of the interview, the statements made by
Defendant were voluntary,” and that “[t]he confession was not obtained as a result of
hope or fear instilled by the detectives.” Defendant argues that the trial court’s
findings of fact failed to disclose material circumstances regarding the giving of his
confession and therefore do not support the trial court’s conclusion of law. Defendant
has challenged five of the trial court’s findings of fact:
5 The Defendant was not told he was under arrest[.]
19[ ] The Defendant was emotional at times[.]
20 The Defendant cried at times[.]
21 The defendant expressed concern with his ability to
“keep food down[.]”
26[ ] While there were no specific promises or threats
made by law enforcement, the detectives conducting
the interview did represent to the Defendant that
the District Attorney “might look favorably” at the
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Defendant if he made a confession[.]
Defendant asserts that finding of fact 5 is “at best an incomplete finding,” as
he was told he would be arrested if he did not state that he was there voluntarily.
While we agree that a more detailed finding may have preserved for the record a more
nuanced understanding of the exchanges that took place between defendant and the
interviewing officers, there is competent evidence in the record to support the finding
as written. Consequently, the finding is conclusive on appeal.
Defendant similarly asserts that findings of fact 19, 20 and 21 “downplay” the
actual circumstances of the encounter. Again, while it may be true that a more
detailed set of findings would have more thoroughly described defendant’s physical
and emotional state, the findings as written are not erroneous. Instead, these
findings are supported by the evidence in the record and it is not the duty of this
Court to reweigh the evidence presented to the trial court. Consequently, we are also
bound by these findings.
Finally, defendant challenges finding of fact 26 as inaccurate. Defendant
argues that detectives threatened him when they told him that they had sufficient
evidence to convict him of capital murder and that he would “wear” the whole charge
himself unless he provided them the names of his accomplices. However, we have
held that informing a defendant of the charge he is facing does not constitute a threat.
See State v. Richardson, 316 N.C. 594, 602, 342 S.E.2d 823, 829-30 (1986). We find
sufficient evidence in the record to support finding of fact 26 as written, and we are
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consequently bound by it for purposes of appellate review.
In addition to challenging several of the trial court’s findings of fact, defendant
also argues that his statements were involuntary as a result of statements made by
officers before he was Mirandized that “improperly induced hope that his confession
would benefit him.” Defendant’s arguments incorporate the division of the
interrogation into “rounds” as in the United State Supreme Court’s analysis in
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 658, and defendant asks that this Court
evaluate the voluntariness of the statement he gave after receiving the Miranda
warnings in the second “round” of questioning through the lens of the statements by
officers in the first “round.” To do as defendant asks is unnecessary given the trial
court’s totality of the circumstances analysis which requires that the entire encounter
be evaluated to determine whether defendant freely and voluntarily chose to make a
confession. The question is not simply whether the officers made a promise or made
a threat, no matter when such statements were made during the encounter, but
whether any such statements made by the officers resulted in defendant’s will being
overborne such that his capacity for self-determination was so impaired that the
giving of his confession cannot be thought to be voluntary.
Defendant did not argue to the trial court that officers made specific promises
to him or threatened him. He simply argued that their statements “improperly
induced hope that his confession would benefit him.” We note that the presiding
judge watched the entirety of the interrogation interview and concluded that
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STATE V. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
defendant’s statements were voluntarily made. The trial court had the benefit of
observing the testifying witnesses and heard extensive arguments from counsel. The
trial court’s findings of fact are supported by sufficient competent evidence and
support the conclusion that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant was
not coerced or induced through hope or fear into giving his confession and that his
confession was in fact voluntarily given.
V. – Conclusion
We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in condensing the Miranda and
voluntariness inquiries into one. We also hold that defendant did not preserve the
argument that officers employed the “question first, warn later” technique to obtain
his confession in violation of Miranda and Seibert. The trial court’s conclusion that
the requirements of Miranda were met is adequately supported by its findings of fact,
as is its conclusion that defendant’s statements to officers were voluntarily made. We
therefore modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.
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Justice HUDSON concurring in result.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. Here the Court of Appeals
determined that although defendant’s constitutional rights were violated by the trial
court’s failure to suppress his inculpatory statements, this error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. State v.
Johnson, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 795 S.E.2d 625, 640-41 (2017); see also State v. Autry,
321 N.C. 392, 400, 364 S.E.2d 341, 346 (1988) (“Significantly, this Court has held that
the presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt may render error of constitutional
dimension harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (citing State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151,
164, 293 S.E.2d 569, 578, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1080, 103 S. Ct. 503, 74 L. Ed. 2d 642
(1982))). Specifically, the Court of Appeals stated:
[W]e hold that the overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s
guilt of first-degree murder, based upon the evidence that
Anita was murdered in the course of a robbery in which
Defendant played an essential part, renders this error
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Both Josh and Tony, whose testimony Defendant did
not move to suppress, identified Defendant as the third
man involved in the robbery and shooting, and both stated
Defendant was wearing a mask that covered his face. They
both testified that Defendant and Tony entered the motel
while Josh remained outside, and both claimed Defendant
was carrying a gun. Brandy testified that there were two
younger men without their faces covered, and an older,
larger man whose face was covered by a mask. Brandy
testified it was the older, larger man who held the gun, and
who entered the motel with one of the younger men. Most
importantly, Defendant’s DNA was recovered from under
Anita’s fingernails. Although Defendant’s admission of
participation in the crime, which we have held was
STATE V. JOHNSON
Hudson, J., concurring in result
involuntary, clearly prejudiced Defendant, in light of the
overwhelming evidence presented pointing to Defendant as
one of the three men involved in the robbery and murder,
we hold the prejudice to Defendant was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. We reach this holding on these
particular facts, and because the jury was instructed on
acting in concert and felony murder based upon killing in
the course of a robbery. The State did not have to prove
that Defendant shot Anita, only that he was one of the
three men involved in the robberies and murder. The
evidence that Defendant was one of the three men involved
was overwhelming, and the State has shown beyond a
reasonable doubt that Defendant would have been
convicted even had his motion to suppress his inculpatory
statements been granted.
Johnson, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 640-41 (footnote omitted). In my opinion,
the Court of Appeals properly concluded that there was overwhelming evidence of
defendant’s guilt of felony murder, particularly in light of the evidence of defendant’s
DNA recovered from under the victim’s fingernails.
Accordingly, this Court’s analysis and determination regarding defendant’s
constitutional rights is unnecessary, in my view. See James v. Bartlett, 359 N.C. 260,
266, 607 S.E.2d 638, 642 (2005) (“However, appellate courts must ‘avoid
constitutional questions, even if properly presented, where a case may be resolved on
other grounds.’ ” (quoting Anderson v. Assimos, 356 N.C. 415, 416, 572 S.E.2d 101,
102 (2002) (per curiam))); see, e.g., State v. Powell, 340 N.C. 674, 686, 459 S.E.2d 219,
224 (1995) (“Assuming arguendo that the trial court erred by admitting the
statements defendant made after [the police officer] destroyed the [Miranda] waiver
form, we hold that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (citing N.C.G.S.
-2-
STATE V. JOHNSON
Hudson, J., concurring in result
§ 15A-1443(b) (1988))), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1060, 116 S. Ct. 739, 133 L. Ed. 2d 688
(1996). Because I conclude that any error by the trial court was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, I would affirm the Court of Appeals on that basis alone. Therefore,
I respectfully concur in the result.
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