Keith v. Freeport Sulphur Co ( 1999 )


Menu:
  • IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _______________ No. 99-30118 Summary Calendar _______________ FLOYD ALBERT KEITH, Plaintiff, VERSUS FREEPORT SULPHUR COMPANY, et al., Defendants, CRESCENT TECHNOLOGY, INC.; TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendants- Third Party-Plaintiffs- Appellants, VERSUS PARADIGM INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant- Third Party Defendant- Appellee, TCB INDUSTRIES, INC., Third Party Defendant- Appellee. _________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana (96-CV-3803-B) _________________________ August 10, 1999 Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, and indemnity should there be a judgment Circuit Judges. against” defendants. (Emphasis added.) Because Crescent and Travelers claim PER CURIAM:* already to have already incurred defense costs, their indemnification claims were In the flurry of litigation following not mooted by the failure of Keith’s case. Floyd Keith’s fall from a sulphur platform off the coast of Louisiana, defendant Therefore, the dismissal of Crescent and Crescent Technology, Inc. (“Crescent”), Traveler’s summary judgment motion and Travelers Property Casualty Company against Paradigm and TCB (Lexington (“Travelers”) joined indemnity claims having been dismissed from this appeal) is against Lexington Insurance Company REVERSED, and this matter is (“Lexington”), Paradigm Insurance REMANDED for further appropriate Company (“Paradigm”), and TCB proceedings.1 We intimate no view as to Industries, Inc. (”TCB”). Finding Keith’s what action the district court should take underlying negligence action meritless, the on remand. district court granted summary judgment in favor of all of Keith’s defendants and dismissed Crescent and Travelers's motion for summary judgment against Lexington, Paradigm, and TCB as “moot.” Crescent and Travelers appeal. They aver that they have “incurred substantial costs in the defense of the principal action prior to the lower court’s dismissal of [Keith’s] principal demand.” In its order of April 7, 1998, the district court apparently overlooked this, characterizing the summary judgment motion it dismissed as one “for defense * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except 1 under the limited circumstances set forth in TCB's motion to file reply brief is 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. GRANTED. 2

Document Info

Docket Number: 99-30118

Filed Date: 8/12/1999

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2014