Dupree v. Ultramar Diamond ( 2003 )


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  •                                                       United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    May 30, 2003
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                     Clerk
    _______________________
    Summary Calendar
    No. 02-21227
    _______________________
    DWYN LLORENCE DUPREE; ET AL.,
    Plaintiffs,
    DWYN LLORENCE DUPREE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    ULTRAMAR DIAMOND SHAMROCK CORP.; SAM TIOLETTE; SANDRA CONTRERAS;
    UDS SERVICES, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division
    H-02-CV-1424
    _________________________________________________________________
    Before JONES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Pro se appellant Dwyn Llorence Dupree brought claims
    against Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corp.; Sam Tiolette; Sandra
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Contreras; UDS Services, Inc.1 (collectively “UDS”) under the
    Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Title VII of the
    Civil Rights Act of 1990.    UDS filed a motion to compel arbitration
    pursuant to a signed arbitration agreement between UDS and Dupree.
    Dupree did not challenge the motion to compel arbitration (in fact
    he agreed to arbitration).    The arbitrator found in favor of UDS on
    all of Dupree’s claims.      Following the arbitration, but prior to
    UDS’s filing a motion to confirm the arbitration award, Dupree
    filed a motion for a jury trial and his request for trial de novo.
    The district court denied Dupree’s motions on October 23, 2002.
    That same day, UDS filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award.
    Dupree did not file an opposition to UDS’s motion and the district
    court entered an order confirming the arbitration award on November
    13, 2002. On appeal, Dupree challenges the district court’s denial
    of his motion for jury trial and his motion for trial de novo.
    Finding no error, we affirm.
    Dupree makes three arguments as to why the district court
    erred in denying his motion for jury trial and trial de novo: (1)
    arbitration of his Title VII and ADA claims violates his right to
    1
    Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corporation is a misnomer for UDS
    Services, Inc.    Contreras was never properly served with the
    complaint. Tiolette was served with the complaint and testified at
    the arbitration. Tiolette never answered the complaint. Dupree’s
    complaint, however, even most liberally construed, has not sought
    any relief against Tiolette. Perez v. United States, 
    312 F.3d 191
    ,
    194-95 (5th Cir. 2002) (construing a pro se plaintiff's pleadings
    liberally).
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    a jury trial, (2) he is entitled a new trial under 
    28 U.S.C. § 657
    (2000), and (3) the arbitrator was wrong in finding in favor of UDS
    and the award was tainted by misconduct.                    Each of these arguments
    is without merit.
    As    a   condition     of     his    employment      with     UDS,     Dupree
    executed an arbitration agreement with UDS that covers his Title
    VII   and     ADA    claims.         This    court    has     previously         held   that
    arbitration         provisions       between       employers       and     employees     are
    enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act.                           Miller v. Pub.
    Storage      Mgmt.,       Inc.,   
    121 F.3d 215
    ,    218     (5th    Cir.      1997).
    Furthermore, we have held that claims under Title VII and the ADA
    are arbitrable.           
    Id.
     (ADA claims); Rojas v. TK Communications,
    Inc.,   
    87 F.3d 745
    ,   747    (5th    Cir.    1996)       (Title    VII    claims).
    Additionally, when parties resolve a dispute pursuant to a valid
    arbitration agreement, they waive their right to a judicial forum
    and a jury trial.          Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 
    294 F.3d 702
    ,
    711 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
    123 S. Ct. 871
     (2003).
    Furthermore, Dupree’s argument that he is entitled to a
    trial de novo under 
    28 U.S.C. § 657
     is meritless.                            Section 657
    applies      only    to    arbitrations       conducted      as     part    of    a   court-
    administrated alternative dispute resolution program authorized
    under Chapter 44 of Title 28 (
    28 U.S.C. §§ 651-657
    ). 
    28 U.S.C. § 657
     (2000). It does not apply to arbitrations conducted, like that
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    in the instant case, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.                         
    28 U.S.C. § 651
    (e) (2000).
    Finally,     Dupree     challenges        the     fairness      of        the
    arbitration proceeding.         “Because a party who has not agreed to
    arbitrate normally has a right to seek a court's decision on the
    merits of his or her dispute with another person, the party's
    agreement     to    arbitrate     that       matter   under     the   FAA        is    a
    relinquishment of much of that right's practical value.”                    Williams
    v. CIGNA Fin. Advisors Inc., 
    197 F.3d 752
    , 757 (5th Cir. 1999).                        A
    party can still ask a court to review the arbitrator's decision,
    but the court will set aside that decision only in the very unusual
    circumstances where an award is procured by fraud, undue means, or
    corruption, or is in manifest disregard of the law.                   
    Id.
         Dupree
    claims that the arbitrator’s decision is flawed for all of these
    reasons.    Dupree’s arguments are based solely upon allegation and
    conjecture.        There is nothing in the record to support any of
    Dupree’s claims.       Thus, finding no error in the district court’s
    decision we AFFIRM.
    AFFIRMED.
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