Danny Williams v. Donald Barrow , 559 F. App'x 979 ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •           Case: 13-11735   Date Filed: 05/05/2014   Page: 1 of 17
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-11735
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 5:11-cv-00431-MTT
    DANNY WILLIAMS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    DONALD BARROW,
    VINOD SACHDEVA,
    WARDEN,
    DR. DEAN C. BROOME,
    LIEUTENANT GAIL OLIPHANT, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    PAUL KING,
    Doctor,
    Defendant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (May 5, 2014)
    Case: 13-11735        Date Filed: 05/05/2014      Page: 2 of 17
    Before CARNES, Chief Judge, PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Danny Williams, a Georgia state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
    dismissal of claims he asserted in a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
    I.
    Danny Williams entered the prison system in 1997. 1 Soon after that, he
    began to experience pain in his shoulder, neck, and back. A 2005 MRI revealed
    that he suffered from various abnormalities that required surgery, which Williams’
    treating physician recommended. Prison officials delayed the surgery, seeking a
    second opinion, which they received from Dr. Paul King in 2008. Dr. King also
    recommended surgery. Williams did not receive the surgery at that time, and his
    condition worsened.
    In November 2009 Williams was transferred to Dooly State Prison (Dooly).
    While there, he told Dr. Vinod Sachdeva and Warden Sheila Oubre of his
    condition and requested surgery. His request was unsuccessful. Sometime that
    following year, Williams told Dr. Sachdeva and Warden Oubre that he was
    experiencing body numbness, poor balance, difficulty standing, an inability to hold
    things in his hands, and inadvertent falling. In June 2010 Williams was sent back
    1
    Because Williams challenges the dismissal of his claims, we accept as true his version
    of events and construe those events in the light most favorable to him. See Belanger v. Salvation
    Army, 
    556 F.3d 1153
    , 1155 (11th Cir. 2009).
    2
    Case: 13-11735     Date Filed: 05/05/2014   Page: 3 of 17
    to Dr. King for an emergency MRI, and prison officials agreed to schedule his
    surgery. Between then and the end of July, which is when he underwent surgery,
    Williams was assigned to “general population” at Dooly, which he alleges was
    inappropriate. He stumbled into people and things, could not go to meals, and
    could not care for himself or perform other basic tasks. Despite his difficulty
    walking, Williams was assigned to an upstairs cell. Williams told Warden Oubre
    about the difficulty posed by his medical conditions but nothing changed.
    Dr. King performed surgery on Williams on July 30, 2010. He ordered
    physical and occupational therapy to facilitate Williams’ rehabilitation, and
    Williams was transferred to Georgia State Prison (GSP) to recover. Upon arrival,
    Dr. Dean Broome, a physician at GSP, told Williams that he would receive
    physical therapy but not occupational therapy. Williams remained at GSP for three
    months and received one or two physical therapy sessions each week. Williams
    told Dr. Broome that his condition was worsening and his pain increasing, but Dr.
    Broome decreased the amount of Williams’ pain medicine, eventually
    discontinuing it. Dr. Broome then transferred Williams back to Dooly even though
    Williams’ physical therapist had ordered an additional six weeks of therapy.
    Upon returning to Dooly, Williams’ repeated requests that Dr. Sachdeva and
    Warden Oubre provide the treatment he claimed to need were denied. Because Dr.
    King, the physician who had performed surgery on Williams, was no longer
    3
    Case: 13-11735      Date Filed: 05/05/2014      Page: 4 of 17
    working with the prison system, Dr. Sachdeva sent Williams to another doctor, Dr.
    Edward Mendoza, at the Augusta State Medical Prison for his post-surgery follow-
    up appointment. Williams alleges that Dr. Mendoza “refused to do anything, on
    several occasions,” despite the fact that Williams had informed him of his
    worsening condition and need for continued therapy. Williams continued to suffer
    from numbness and pain.
    In September 2011 Williams was transferred to Washington State Prison. 2
    His wife visited him at that facility on September 24, 2011. Williams claims that
    while she was there, Warden Donald Barrow and Lieutenant Gail Oliphant falsely
    accused him of receiving contraband from her and swallowing it. As a result, his
    wife was removed from his visitation list indefinitely. Williams’ wife contacted
    officials at the Department of Corrections, including Director of Facility
    Operations Randy Tillman, and she and Williams offered to provide sworn
    affidavits about the visitation incident, to have no-contact visits, and to undergo
    strip searches before visits. However, Tillman and Warden Barrow continued to
    deny them visitation.
    Williams filed the lawsuit that led to this appeal in October 2011, asserting
    various claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that five of the defendants,
    Warden Oubre and Drs. King, Sachdeva, Mendoza, and Broome were deliberately
    2
    Washington State Prison is in Washington County, Georgia. It is part of the Georgia
    Department of Corrections.
    4
    Case: 13-11735    Date Filed: 05/05/2014    Page: 5 of 17
    indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also
    contended that he has a “liberty interest in visitation with [his] wife” and that
    Director Tillman, Warden Barrow, and Lieutenant Oliphant interfered with that
    right by removing his wife from his visitation list. Williams generally alleged that
    he had been discriminated against on the basis of race, in violation of the Equal
    Protection Clause. Finally, he claimed that the poor treatment he received at the
    hands of prison officials violated the First Amendment because it was done in
    retaliation for his filing grievances and lawsuits against prison staff. Williams
    asserted that he would have filed more grievances if not for his fear of further
    retaliation.
    The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Williams’ complaint under Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). They argued that the complaint should be
    dismissed because, among other things, it failed to state a claim against any
    defendant, ran afoul of the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA’s) “three-strike”
    provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and because Williams had not exhausted his
    administrative remedies as required by the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
    The magistrate judge recommended that the defendants’ motion to dismiss
    be granted, and the district court agreed for the most part. It determined that
    Williams’ Eighth Amendment claim was precluded as to all defendants except for
    5
    Case: 13-11735       Date Filed: 05/05/2014      Page: 6 of 17
    Dr. Broome because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 3 Williams had
    filed a formal grievance in connection with the treatment he received from Dr.
    Broome, but the court was not convinced that he had ever received a response to
    that grievance. Because of the confusion surrounding that claim, the court
    declined to dismiss it for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and instead
    dismissed it on the ground that Williams had failed to state a claim of deliberate
    indifference against Dr. Broome. The court also dismissed on failure-to-exhaust
    grounds Williams’ due process and retaliation claims against Lieutenant Oliphant,
    Randy Tillman, and Warden Barrow in connection with the removal of Williams’
    wife from his visitation list.
    Williams appeals the district court’s decision, contending that the court
    erred in three main ways. First, he argues that the district court should not have
    dismissed his deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Broome because Williams
    sufficiently alleged the elements of that claim. Second, he argues that the court
    should not have dismissed his deliberate indifference claims against Warden
    Oubre, Dr. Sachdeva, and Dr. Mendoza on failure-to-exhaust grounds because (1)
    he did exhaust his administrative remedies and (2) even if he did not exhaust them,
    any shortcoming on his part should be excused. Finally, Williams argues that the
    3
    The district court had already dismissed several of Williams’ claims when the
    defendants filed the motion to dismiss. Because Williams has not appealed those rulings, we do
    not address them.
    6
    Case: 13-11735       Date Filed: 05/05/2014       Page: 7 of 17
    district court erred by dismissing his due process and retaliation claims against
    Warden Barrow, Lieutenant Oliphant, and Director Tillman because exhaustion
    was complete or should have been excused because of “escalating retaliation” on
    the part of prison officials. 4
    II.
    “We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under
    Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, accepting the allegations in the complaint
    as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
    Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP, 
    634 F.3d 1352
    , 1359
    (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations
    must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the
    assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in
    fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 555, 
    127 S. Ct. 1955
    , 1965
    (2007) (citation omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, therefore, a plaintiff
    must plead “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 
    Id. at 570,
    127 S.Ct. at
    1974. Because Williams is proceeding pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally.
    See Boxer X v. Harris, 
    437 F.3d 1107
    , 1110 (11th Cir. 2006).
    4
    Williams has abandoned any challenge to the dismissal of his retaliation claim against
    Warden Oubre by failing to brief it on appeal. See Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root
    Servs., Inc., 
    572 F.3d 1271
    , 1283 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that parties abandon arguments by
    failing to properly brief them).
    7
    Case: 13-11735    Date Filed: 05/05/2014    Page: 8 of 17
    We also review de novo the dismissal of a lawsuit for failure to exhaust
    administrative remedies under the PLRA. Parzyck v. Prison Health Servs., Inc.,
    
    627 F.3d 1215
    , 1217 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010). The defendant bears the burden of
    proving that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Turner v.
    Burnside, 
    541 F.3d 1077
    , 1082 (11th Cir. 2008).
    III.
    Williams’ Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Broome requires him to
    show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. See Estelle v. Gamble, 
    429 U.S. 97
    , 104, 
    97 S. Ct. 285
    , 291 (1976). “To prevail on a deliberate indifference to
    medical need claim [a plaintiff] must show: (1) a serious medical need; (2) the
    defendants’ deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that
    indifference and the plaintiff’s injury.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 
    588 F.3d 1291
    ,
    1306–07 (11th Cir. 2009). Only the second prong of that test is at issue here.
    Under it, Williams must prove that Dr. Broome disregarded a serious risk of harm
    he was subjectively aware of by conduct that was more than gross negligence. See
    Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 
    601 F.3d 1152
    , 1158 (11th Cir. 2010).
    In seeking a reversal of the district court’s determination that he failed to
    state a claim of deliberate indifference against Dr. Broome, he makes several
    allegations which he believes support his contention. First, Williams asserts that
    Dr. King ordered physical and occupational therapy after Williams’ surgery –– a
    8
    Case: 13-11735       Date Filed: 05/05/2014      Page: 9 of 17
    fact that Dr. Broome knew based on Williams’ medical records –– but that Dr.
    Broome ordered only physical therapy. 5 Williams next points to the fact that,
    although he advised Dr. Broome of his “worsening condition and increased pain,”
    Dr. Broome decreased his pain medication and then discontinued it completely.
    And finally, Williams argues that Dr. Broome’s actions –– and inaction –– caused
    him to suffer severe pain and further disability.
    Accepting all of these assertions and arguments as true, we agree with the
    district court that Williams failed to state a claim of deliberate indifference to a
    serious medical need against Dr. Broome. Williams received pain medication and
    physical therapy once or twice a week during the roughly three months that he was
    treated by Dr. Broome. Although Dr. Broome knew that Dr. King had prescribed
    both physical therapy and occupational therapy, Williams does not allege that Dr.
    Broome knew that ordering only physical therapy amounted to a “risk of serious
    harm.” 
    Id. at 1158
    (quotation marks omitted). Similarly, while Dr. Broome
    decreased and eventually discontinued Williams’ pain medication despite his
    complaints that his pain was worsening, there is no indication, and Williams does
    not allege, that Dr. Broome knew Williams would be subjected to a “substantial
    risk of serious harm” if his request for more pain medication was not granted.
    5
    Williams alleges that Dr. Broome also deprived him of needed physical therapy when
    he released him from medical care and sent him back to Dooly after Williams’ physical therapist
    had ordered six more weeks of rehabilitation.
    9
    Case: 13-11735     Date Filed: 05/05/2014   Page: 10 of 17
    
    Mann, 588 F.3d at 1307
    (quotation marks omitted). While “prison officials may
    violate the Eighth Amendment by failing to treat an inmate’s pain,” that failure
    must rise to the level of deliberate indifference, such as where the pain treatment
    “was so cursory as to amount to no care at all.” McElligott v. Foley, 
    182 F.3d 1248
    , 1257 (11th Cir. 1999). That standard is not met here.
    Neither of Dr. Broome’s decisions amount to deliberate indifference of
    Williams’ medical needs. Instead, they are “classic example[s] of a matter for
    medical judgment and therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability
    under the Eighth Amendment.” Adams v. Poag, 
    61 F.3d 1537
    , 1545 (11th Cir.
    1995) (quotation marks omitted). See also 
    Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107
    , S.Ct. at 293
    (“A medical decision not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does not represent
    cruel and unusual punishment.”); Harris v. Thigpen, 
    941 F.2d 1495
    , 1505 (11th
    Cir. 1991) (“[A] simple difference in medical opinion between the prison’s
    medical staff and the inmate as to the latter’s diagnosis or course of treatment
    [does not] support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment.”). The district court
    properly dismissed Williams’ deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Broome.
    IV.
    Williams’ other claims were all dismissed on the basis of his failure to
    exhaust administrative remedies. These claims can be broken down into two
    categories –– the deliberate indifference claims against Warden Oubre, Dr.
    10
    Case: 13-11735       Date Filed: 05/05/2014      Page: 11 of 17
    Sachdeva, and Dr. Mendoza, which are related to Williams’ medical treatment, and
    the due process and retaliation claims against Warden Barrow, Lieutenant
    Oliphant, and Director Tillman for removing Williams’ wife from his visitation
    list.
    The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought” by a prisoner “until
    such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.
    § 1997e(a). We have interpreted this provision to “mandate[] strict exhaustion” no
    matter “the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues.”
    Johnson v. Meadows, 
    418 F.3d 1152
    , 1155 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks
    omitted). To exhaust administrative remedies, a prisoner must complete the
    administrative review process according to the rules set forth in the prison
    grievance process itself. Jones v. Bock, 
    549 U.S. 199
    , 218, 
    127 S. Ct. 910
    , 922
    (2007). In other words, the PLRA’s exhaustion provision requires compliance
    with prison grievance procedures. 
    Id., 127 S.Ct.
    at 922–23.
    A.
    Williams’ deliberate indifference claims against Warden Oubre, Dr.
    Sachdeva, and Dr. Mendoza relate to the medical treatment he received at two
    different locations, Dooly and Augusta State Medical Prison.6 The district court
    6
    Williams alleged in his complaint that he was treated by Dr. Mendoza only at Augusta
    State Medical Prison. He now contends that he saw Dr. Mendoza not only at Dooly but also at
    GSP. Because Williams did not mention Dr. Mendoza’s alleged treatment of him at GSP in his
    11
    Case: 13-11735       Date Filed: 05/05/2014       Page: 12 of 17
    determined that Williams failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to the
    claims against Warden Oubre and Dr. Sachdeva because he filed only one
    grievance while at Dooly, and that grievance related to prison staff keeping the
    lights on in sleeping areas after dark. The court dismissed his claim against Dr.
    Mendoza on exhaustion grounds because Williams did not file a grievance related
    to his treatment at Augusta State Medical Prison and did not mention Dr. Mendoza
    in the grievance he filed while at Dooly.
    Williams now contends that another grievance, Grievance 66065, which he
    filed while housed at a different prison, encompassed his mistreatment at the hands
    of Warden Oubre, Dr. Sachdeva, and Dr. Mendoza. Williams filed Grievance
    66065 on September 12, 2010 (or October 13, 2010)7 while at GSP. The district
    court found that that grievance pertained only to Dr. Broome, who was Williams’
    treating physician at GSP. We agree.
    Grievance 66065 could not have pertained to Dr. Mendoza because Williams
    filed the grievance before he was ever seen by Dr. Mendoza. Williams’ grievance
    complaint alleged that he was not seen by Dr. Mendoza until, at the earliest, when
    he returned to Dooly in November 2010. But Williams filed Grievance 66065 in
    October 2010 at the latest. So Williams could not have exhausted through
    complaint or in his administrative grievances, we decline to consider it. See Access Now, Inc. v.
    Sw. Airlines Co., 
    385 F.3d 1324
    , 1331 (11th Cir. 2004).
    7
    The exact date on which he filed this grievance is disputed. The form itself contains
    both of these dates. Because the date on which it was filed does not affect the outcome of this
    case, we need not resolve that factual dispute.
    12
    Case: 13-11735     Date Filed: 05/05/2014   Page: 13 of 17
    Grievance 66065 his administrative remedies for any claim he may have against
    Dr. Mendoza. Nor does that grievance describe any conduct of Warden Oubre and
    Dr. Sachdeva. While a prisoner is not required to name each defendant in a
    grievance in order to properly exhaust a claim, Jones, 549 U.S at 
    219, 127 S. Ct. at 923
    , he is required to “provide as much relevant information as he reasonably can
    in the administrative grievance process,” Brown v. Sikes, 
    212 F.3d 1205
    , 1207
    (11th Cir. 2000). Williams’ Grievance 66065 provided very little in the way of
    details. It does not include any dates. It does not provide any names, asserting
    only that “staff” denied him the treatment he needed. And it does not indicate that
    the mistreatment by “staff” occurred anywhere other than GSP, where he was
    housed at that time (and which was not the same the prison in which Warden
    Oubre and Dr. Sachdeva worked). Indeed, most of the allegations relate to his
    allegedly inadequate rehabilitation while he was under Dr. Broome’s care. For
    these reasons, the district court did not err in determining that Grievance 66065
    pertained only to Dr. Broome.
    Even if the grievance did describe the conduct of Warden Oubre and Dr.
    Sachdeva, it was not timely filed. See 
    Johnson, 418 F.3d at 1159
    (“Prisoners must
    timely meet the deadlines or the good cause standard of Georgia’s administrative
    grievance procedures before filing a federal claim.”). The Georgia Department of
    Corrections’ grievance procedure requires an inmate to file his informal grievance
    13
    Case: 13-11735       Date Filed: 05/05/2014      Page: 14 of 17
    within ten days “from the date the [inmate] knew, or should have known, of the
    facts giving rise to the grievance.” Appellee’s Ex. 8, 15. Williams’ grievance
    could not have been timely as to Warden Oubre and Dr. Sachdeva because he was
    last housed at Dooly, where Warden Oubre and Dr. Sachdeva worked, in July
    2010, but he did not file Grievance 66065 until September 12, 2010 at the earliest.
    As a result, Williams failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for these claims,
    and the dismissal of them was proper. 8 See 
    Jones, 549 U.S. at 218
    , 127 S.Ct. at
    922.
    B.
    Williams’ remaining claims are against Warden Barrow, Lieutenant
    Oliphant, and Director Tillman and stem from the mistreatment he allegedly
    received at Washington State Prison, including most notably the removal of his
    wife from his visitation list. Williams filed several grievances related to these
    claims, but the district court found that exhaustion was not complete at the time
    that he filed this lawsuit.
    8
    Williams contends that his health problems provided him with “good cause” for failing
    to file a timely grievance. To file an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective grievance,
    however, a prisoner must request a good-cause waiver. See Bryant v. Rich, 
    530 F.3d 1368
    ,
    1378–79 (11th Cir. 2008); 
    Johnson, 418 F.3d at 1159
    (noting that prisoners must timely meet the
    deadlines “or the good cause standard” of Georgia’s grievance procedure to properly exhaust
    their claim). As Williams points out in his brief, Georgia’s grievance procedure allows the
    Department of Corrections’ “grievance coordinator” to waive the untimeliness of a complaint for
    “good cause.” But Williams does not assert that he ever sought or received such a waiver.
    Because he did not, we cannot excuse his failure to file the grievance on time.
    14
    Case: 13-11735     Date Filed: 05/05/2014    Page: 15 of 17
    This Court has stated that “[t]he plain language of [§ 1997e(a)] makes
    exhaustion a precondition to filing an action in federal court.” Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of
    Corrs., 
    254 F.3d 1276
    , 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (alteration in original). It is also clear
    that, for exhaustion purposes, the facts that count are those in existence at the time
    the plaintiff files his lawsuit. See Harris v. Garner, 
    216 F.3d 970
    , 974 (11th Cir.
    2000) (concluding that a plaintiff’s status as a prisoner for purposes of § 1997e(e)’s
    limitation on suits “brought by a prisoner” is determined as of the time suit is
    filed). Section 1997e(a) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought . . . by a
    prisoner . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42
    U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added). And the word “brought” in this context
    “refer[s] to the filing or commencement of a lawsuit, not to its continuation.”
    
    Harris, 216 F.3d at 974
    ; see also Miller v. Tanner, 
    196 F.3d 1190
    , 1193 (11th Cir.
    1999) (interpreting § 1997e(a) to mean that a state inmate must comply with state
    grievance procedures “before filing a federal lawsuit under section 1983”)
    (emphasis added).
    Williams did file several grievances related to the claims he now raises, but
    he did not exhaust the grievance process as to those claims before filing this
    lawsuit. Williams filed Grievance 98947, which related to his wife’s visitation
    15
    Case: 13-11735       Date Filed: 05/05/2014       Page: 16 of 17
    rights, on September 28, 2011. 9 He later administratively appealed the denial of
    that grievance, but that appeal was not denied until November 16, 2011, which was
    after Williams had filed his complaint in the district court. Thus, Williams had not
    exhausted the administrative process with respect to that claim before filing the
    lawsuit raising it. Williams also filed a grievance related to his retaliation claim.
    However, that grievance was denied because it did not comply with the
    Department of Corrections’ requirement that each grievance contain only a single
    issue. Williams did not administratively appeal that denial. As a result, he failed
    to exhaust administrative remedies for that claim as well.
    Williams attempts to avoid the consequences of his failure to exhaust his
    administrative remedies by arguing that he was afraid to file additional grievances
    or appeals because of “the escalating retaliation” on the part of prison staff. In
    other words, Williams contends that the Department of Corrections’ administrative
    remedies were not truly “available” within the meaning of § 1997e(a). We have
    held that a prison official’s “serious threats of substantial retaliation against an
    inmate” for lodging a grievance can “make the administrative remedy
    ‘unavailable,’ and thus lift the exhaustion requirement” if two conditions are met:
    (1) the threat must actually deter the inmate from filing a grievance “or pursuing a
    9
    Williams filed another grievance dealing with the same issue, Grievance 99215, just
    four days later. Because the allegations in the second grievance were substantively similar to
    those in the earlier grievance, and because the earlier grievance was still pending, the second
    grievance was denied.
    16
    Case: 13-11735     Date Filed: 05/05/2014   Page: 17 of 17
    particular part of the process”; and (2) the threat must be “one that would deter a
    reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and fortitude from lodging a grievance or
    pursuing the part of the grievance process that the inmate failed to exhaust.”
    
    Turner, 541 F.3d at 1085
    . But Williams’ conclusory allegation that he failed to
    exhaust his remedies because of “escalating retaliation” does not come close to
    satisfying the Turner standard. He has not identified any actual threats of
    retaliation that deterred him from pursuing his grievance that would deter an
    “inmate of ordinary firmness” from pursuing a remedy. 
    Id. In fact,
    Williams did
    administratively exhaust Grievance 98947; he just failed to do so before filing this
    lawsuit.
    For all of these reasons, the district court did not err in dismissing Williams’
    complaint.
    AFFIRMED.
    17