State v. Geter ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
2022-NCSC-137
No. 182PA21
Filed 16 December 2022
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JAQUAN STEPHON GETER
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision
of the Court of Appeals, 276 N.C. App. 377, 2021-NCCOA-98, affirming two
judgments entered on 15 July 2020 by Judge R. Gregory Horne in Superior Court,
Buncombe County, which revoked defendant’s probation. Heard in the Supreme
Court on 24 May 2022 in session in the Old Burke County Courthouse in the City of
Morganton pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-10(a).
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Liliana R. Lopez, Assistant Attorney
General, for the State-appellee.
Jason Christopher Yoder for defendant-appellant.
MORGAN, Justice.
¶1 This Court allowed discretionary review to determine whether the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming a trial court’s judgments revoking defendant’s probation
entered over a year after defendant’s term of probation had expired. Because the trial
court complied with the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3), it possessed the
jurisdiction to revoke defendant’s probation after defendant’s term of probation had
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expired and further did not abuse its discretion in determining that good cause
existed for doing so after defendant’s term of probation had expired. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶2 Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, resisting a
public officer, possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and fleeing to elude arrest on 29
August 2016 and was sentenced by the trial court to a total active term of twenty-two
to forty-five months which was suspended in favor of an eighteen-month term of
supervised probation. While defendant was still on probation, the Asheville Police
Department executed a search warrant on defendant’s residence on 18 January 2017
after conducting a series of controlled purchases of narcotics from defendant using a
confidential informant. Upon executing the warrant, police recovered marijuana,
defendant’s identification card which was situated on top of a digital scale, razor
blades, a black ski mask, a .380 caliber pistol, and over $1,200 in cash. Of the
recovered money, $40.00 had been used in an earlier controlled purchase of narcotics
from defendant. On 23 April 2017, defendant was charged with possession of a
firearm by a felon, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
maintaining a dwelling for the purpose of keeping or selling controlled substances.
On 9 February 2018 and 12 February 2018, defendant’s probation officer served and
filed violation reports for each case of probation which alleged that defendant had
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committed new criminal offenses while on probation and listed the pending charges
which had resulted from the execution of the search warrant. Defendant’s probation
expired on 28 February 2018, more than two weeks after he was served with the
probation violation reports.
¶3 Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence which was seized during the
search of his residence. The trial court granted defendant’s motion on 22 February
2019, determining that the underlying warrant was too general in that it did not
specify which of the two units of the duplex where defendant resided was the focus of
the search. The State dismissed the charges against defendant on 17 March 2019.
Defendant’s pending probation violation reports came on for hearing on 4 April 2019,
at which time the State called the detectives who had executed the search warrant.
Defendant’s probation violation hearing consisted of the detectives’ testimony, by
which all of the items seized during the execution of the warrant—including the
marijuana, firearm, and digital scales—were admitted as evidence that defendant
had committed a new criminal offense while on probation. The trial court, finding
that defendant had committed a new criminal offense while on probation, revoked
defendant’s probation. Defendant appealed the trial court’s judgments to the Court
of Appeals.
¶4 The State conceded, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the trial court had
failed to specify which of the criminal offenses committed by defendant would serve
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as the basis for revocation, and that the trial court had failed to find whether good
cause existed to revoke defendant’s probation after the probationary period had
expired as required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3). State v. Geter (Geter I), No. COA19-
846, 2020 WL 3251033, at *5 (N.C. Ct. App. June 16, 2020) (unpublished). The Court
of Appeals remanded the case for clarification from the trial court as to which
criminal offense the trial court had determined that defendant had committed which
would serve as the basis for revocation, and further remanded for new proceedings
concerning whether good cause existed to revoke defendant’s probation after his term
of probation had expired. Geter I, 2020 WL 3251033, at *5–6.
¶5 On 15 July 2020, the trial court conducted a hearing on whether good cause
existed to revoke defendant’s probation after the expiration of his term and found
that the State had intentionally delayed setting the probation violation report for a
hearing as part of the State’s normal practice to allow a probationer’s pending charges
to be resolved prior to the pending probation violation hearing. The resolution of
defendant’s outstanding charges would have a likely dispositive effect on the alleged
probation violations, according to the trial court. The trial court announced the
following:
[W]hile the [c]ourt recognizes that the [c]ourt can proceed
with regard to a probation violation hearing alleging
pending charges prior to a person’s conviction on those
underlying offenses, the [c]ourt further acknowledges that
in this case the underlying offenses were contested. That a
Motion to Suppress was filed, heard, and granted by this
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[c]ourt.
....
While the State could have proceeded with regard to
probation violation before the new offenses alleged were
adjudicated, the State did not do so. That the State chose
to prosecute the underlying action. Again, the Motion to
Suppress was heard at the jury term. . . .
The [c]ourt would find that this does constitute good
cause in that if the State — if Mr. Geter had been found
not guilty of those offenses, or if for whatever reason the
State had opted to dismiss the charges, that it would have
had a direct impact on the later hearing of the probation
violation.
Again, as reviewed — as shown in the transcript, as
well as the knowledge by this [c]ourt having heard the
Motion to Suppress, and then argument on the Motion to
Suppress, having been granted after probation violation, it
is clear to the [c]ourt that the State waited until disposition
of the underlying offenses alleged before proceeding with
the probation violation. The [c]ourt would find that this
would constitute good cause.
The trial court reduced its finding of good cause to new judgments which revoked
defendant’s probation and announced, “[The] court finds and concludes good cause
exists to revoke defendant’s probation despite the expiration of his probationary
period.” The judgments were entered on 15 July 2020 but related back to the original
probation violation hearing on 4 April 2019.
¶6 Defendant appealed this second set of judgments revoking his probation,
arguing before the Court of Appeals that “the ‘good cause’ found by the trial court
failed as a matter of law” to satisfy N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) according to defendant’s
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interpretation of the opinion of the lower appellate court in State v. Sasek, 271 N.C.
App. 568 (2020). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s second set of
judgments revoking defendant’s probation. State v. Geter (Geter II), 276 N.C. App.
377, 2021-NCCOA-98. The Court of Appeals concluded that Sasek was inapplicable
because the judicial panel in the case vacated the defendant’s probation revocation
judgments not because there was evidence to suggest that any “good cause” that could
be inferred from the record was legally sufficient or insufficient, but specifically
because “there was no evidence in the record to indicate that good cause existed to
justify the untimely revocation.” Id. ¶ 11 (emphasis added). The trial court in Sasek
“erred by not making the required finding that good cause existed,” id. ¶ 12 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Sasek, 271 N.C. App. at 576), unlike the trial court in the instant
case which, upon remand, provided both a written finding of good cause “supported
by the facts in the record” and an oral explanation of the reasoning behind the
findings, id. ¶ 13. Because the state’s jurisprudence and statutory enactments were
devoid of any factors or standard to apply in evaluating a finding of good cause, and
because the trial court had in fact made the good cause finding required by N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1344(f)(3), the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had not abused
its discretion in revoking defendant’s probation despite the “significant and
unadvisable” delay between the expiration of defendant’s probation and the final
probation revocation hearing. Id. ¶ 15. Defendant petitioned this Court for
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discretionary review of the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals in Geter II
which we allowed by order on 10 August 2021.
II. Analysis
¶7 Defendant first takes issue with the application of an abuse of discretion
standard by the Court of Appeals in the lower appellate court’s analysis of the trial
court’s finding of good cause. We agree with defendant that whether a trial court has
the authority to revoke a defendant’s probation after the defendant’s term of
probation has expired is a jurisdictional question. State v. Camp, 299 N.C. 524, 528
(1980) (holding that “jurisdiction was lost by the lapse of time and the court had no
power to enter a revocation judgment” because the trial court had failed to make a
finding required by an earlier version of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)); State v. Bryant, 361
N.C. 100, 103 (2006) (“In the absence of statutorily mandated factual findings, the
trial court’s jurisdiction to revoke probation after expiration of the probationary
period is not preserved.”). “We review issues relating to subject matter jurisdiction de
novo.” State v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264, 266 (2012). Therefore, with regard to the statutory
authority at issue in this case, a trial court’s jurisdiction to revoke a defendant’s
probation after the expiration of that defendant’s probationary term is established
if all of the following apply:
(1) Before the expiration of the period of probation the
State has filed a written violation report with the clerk
indicating its intent to conduct a hearing on one or more
violations of one or more conditions of probation.
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(2) The court finds that the probationer did violate one or
more conditions of probation prior to the expiration of the
period of probation.
(3) The court finds for good cause shown and stated that
the probation should be extended, modified, or revoked.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(1)–(3) (2021). The three enumerated conditions precedent to
the trial court’s jurisdiction to revoke a defendant’s probation after the expiration of
the term of probation are separate and distinct from one another.
Subsection (f)(2) of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344 makes clear that
in order to revoke a defendant’s probation following the
expiration of his probationary term, the trial court must
first make a finding that the defendant did violate a
condition of his probation. After making such a finding,
trial courts are then required by subsection (f)(3) to make
an additional finding of “good cause shown and stated” to
justify the revocation of probation even though the
defendant’s probationary term has expired.
State v. Morgan, 372 N.C. 609, 617 (2019).
¶8 In State v. Rankin, this Court analyzed the provision contained in N.C.G.S. §
15A-805 that a trial court must enter an order compelling the attendance in court of
any incarcerated person so long as the movant produces “good cause shown.” 312 N.C.
592, 597 (1985) (emphasis added). The Rankin defendant had filed a motion to compel
the attendance of five witnesses at his trial for first-degree sexual offense one day
before the trial was calendared to begin. Id. at 595. Without providing the defendant’s
attorney with an opportunity to show the good cause underlying counsel’s request for
the attendance of one of the witnesses, the trial court denied defendant’s motion “on
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the grounds that (1) no affidavits were submitted as to why the witness should be
brought to court; (2) the witness did not testify at the previous trial; and (3) the
witness’s presence was requested at a late date.” Id. at 598. In reversing the trial
court’s decision to deny the Rankin defendant’s motion to compel the attendance of
his proposed witness, this Court explained:
Certainly the statute does not require that affidavits
be submitted to show the “good cause” requirement of the
statute. Neither can we find [a] viable reason why a
witness must have testified in a previous trial in order to
be subject to production as a witness for any other given
trial. We do recognize, however, that a trial judge has the
duty to supervise and control the course and conduct of a
trial, and that in order to discharge that duty he is invested
with broad discretionary powers. Shute v. Fisher, 270 N.C.
247, 154 S.E.2d 75 (1967).
A late filed motion might delay the course of a trial
and invite dilatory tactics by other parties to litigation.
Therefore in [the] instant case it was incumbent on
defendant to show substantial reasons why his motion to
produce and compel the presence of the witness . . . was not
filed until the day before the trial was to commence. Our
examination of this record discloses, however, that
defendant’s motion was denied without permitting him to
show the “good cause” requirement of the statute or to
advance any reasons, if any he had, why the motion was
made at the eve of the trial. For this reason, under the
particular facts of this case, we hold that defendant was
effectively denied his right of compulsory process.
Id. at 598–99.
¶9 The “good cause” discussed by this Court in Rankin contained within it at least
two factors: implicitly, the reason why the attendance of the witness would be
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material to the defendant’s trial strategy, and explicitly, the reason why the
defendant’s motion to compel the attendance of the witness was filed only one day
prior to the start of trial. In superimposing these factors over the otherwise undefined
good cause required to be shown by the statute at issue in Rankin, this Court focused
on “the particular facts of this case,” id. at 599. Similarly, in the present case,
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) “wisely makes no attempt to enumerate” what constitutes
good cause, instead leaving “it to the judge to determine,” Shankle v. Shankle, 289
N.C. 473, 483 (1976). Consistent with our determinations in Rankin and Morgan, the
“good cause” contemplated by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) therefore must be shown by
the State, as the proponent of the “ ‘good cause shown and stated’ to justify the
revocation of probation even though the defendant’s probationary term has expired”
and determined by the trial court, pursuant to its “broad discretionary powers.”
Unfortunately, the dissent fails to appreciate the established soundness of the abuse
of discretion standard which the appellate courts have routinely applied to the review
of trial courts’ “good cause” determinations and would instead prefer a list of
parameters to guide and direct such discretionary matters.
¶ 10 N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) also requires that the good cause to revoke a
defendant’s probation be “stated.” Given the proximity and relation of the word
“stated” to the aforementioned term “shown” within the language of the statute,
[w]e are . . . guided in our decision by the canon of
statutory construction that a statute may not be
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interpreted in a manner which would render any of its
words superfluous. This Court has repeatedly held that a
statute must be considered as a whole and construed, if
possible, so that none of its provisions shall be rendered
useless or redundant. It is presumed that the legislature
intended each portion to be given full effect and did not
intend any provision to be mere surplusage.
Morgan, 372 N.C. at 614 (extraneity omitted). To avoid interpreting the requirement
of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) that good cause be “shown and stated” as imposing a
redundant burden on the State, we hold that the good cause found by the trial court
must be “stated” on the record, either in open court by the trial court, by a party with
the trial court’s endorsement, or within the trial court record.
¶ 11 It is undisputed that written probation violation reports were filed with the
clerk of court against defendant by the State prior to the expiration of defendant’s
term of probation or that the trial court found—as was amply supported by the
evidence—that defendant had in fact violated a condition of his probation by, at the
least, being in possession of a firearm as a felon while on probation. The trial court,
after receiving the “showing” by the State, explicitly found both orally and in writing
that “good cause exists to revoke defendant’s probation despite the expiration of his
probationary period.” The trial court went on to satisfy its statutory requirement by
both finding good cause and “stating” in open court the basis for its finding of good
cause.
¶ 12 The question before this Court, therefore, is whether the “good cause” found by
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the trial court in this case is legally sufficient to justify the trial court’s exercise of its
jurisdiction which is established by the strict adherence of the circumstances of this
case, as described above, to the enumerated conditions of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3).
In other instances where this Court has reviewed a trial court’s evaluation of good
cause, we have deferred to the trial court’s intimate view of the circumstances of each
case as the factfinder. In re S.M., 375 N.C. 673, 681 (2020) (holding that a trial court’s
determination of the existence of “extraordinary circumstances” and “good cause”
justifying a continuance in a termination of parental rights matter is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion); State v. Murphy, 321 N.C. 738, 740–41 (1988) (holding that there
was no error in a judgment when the trial court failed to find good cause in a
defendant’s request to sequester potential jurors during a capital murder trial);
Peebles v. Moore, 48 N.C. App. 497, 504 (1980), aff’d as modified, 302 N.C. 351 (1981)
(“What constitutes ‘good cause’ depends on the circumstances in a particular case,
and within the limits of discretion, an inadvertence which is not strictly excusable
may constitute good cause . . . .”). Even in the employment context, where our search
of the state’s jurisprudence has revealed a prevalent use of the phrase “good cause,”
the existence or dearth of good cause is, absent a statutory standard of review, “a
matter for the factfinder . . . to decide.” Intercraft Indus. Corp. v. Morrison, 305 N.C.
373, 377 (1982). Whether the jurisdictional requirements of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3)
are satisfied is a question of law: (1) whether a probation violation report was filed
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prior to the expiration of the defendant’s probation; (2) whether the trial court found
that the defendant violated one or more conditions of his or her probation; and (3)
whether the trial court found good cause “that the probation should be extended,
modified, or revoked.” See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3). But whether good cause exists,
being fact-intensive and dependent on the circumstances which result in the delay of
a probation revocation hearing, is a finding of fact delegated to the discretion of the
trial court.
¶ 13 What constitutes “good cause shown and stated” is a case-by-case, fact-specific
determination which requires a trial court to consider the particular circumstances
which mandate that good cause be shown. In probation violation hearing matters
governed by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) and its requirement of the existence of good
cause in order for the trial court to be authorized to revoke probation after the period
of probation has expired, we also find guidance in this Court’s treatment of
continuance motions which are to be allowed upon “good cause shown.” In Shankle,
this Court examined a situation in which a group of respondents in an estate action
filed a motion to continue the trial after their retained counsel “left the court after
the judge made strong remarks about respondents.” 289 N.C. at 478 (extraneity
omitted). Now without counsel, the respondents in Shankle attempted to represent
themselves after the trial court denied their joint continuance motion without
providing a reason for the denial, which resulted in “obfuscation, judicial frustration,
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and mounting tensions all around.” Id. at 479. This Court reviewed the trial court’s
denial of the continuance motion for an abuse of discretion, while noting that Rule
40(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provided that continuances “may
be granted only for good cause shown and upon such terms and conditions as justice
may require.” Id. at 482 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 40(b)). This Court looked with
favor upon the absence of any factors or definitions of “good cause” within the rule, in
light of the wide array of reasons which may be asserted by a party wishing to obtain
a continuance. This Court explained:
Considering the myriad circumstances which might be
urged as grounds for a continuance[, N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule
40(b)] wisely makes no attempt to enumerate them but
leaves it to the judge to determine, in each case, whether
“good cause” for a continuance has been shown. Thus, a
motion to continue is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial judge, who should determine it as the rights of the
parties require under the circumstances. However, this
discretion is not unlimited, and must not be exercised
absolutely, arbitrarily, or capriciously, but only in
accordance with fixed legal principles.
Further, before ruling on a motion to continue the
judge should hear the evidence pro and con, consider it
judicially and then rule with a view to promoting
substantial justice.
Id. at 482–83 (extraneity omitted). We find this logic to be both compelling and
appropriate for the case at bar. Considering the vast variety of circumstances which
might justify the extension, modification, or revocation of a criminal defendant’s
probation after the expiration of the defendant’s term of probation, N.C.G.S. § 15A-
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1344(f)(3) does not delineate or describe any of them, but merely prescribes that, in
each case, it is up to the trial court to decide whether “good cause” to extend, modify,
or revoke a defendant’s probation after the expiration of the term of probation has
been shown. The trial court’s discretion in this matter “must not be exercised
absolutely, arbitrarily, or capriciously, but only in accordance with fixed legal
principles.” Id. at 483 (quoting 17 C.J.S. Continuances § 5 (1963)). “In reaching its
conclusion the court should consider all the facts in evidence, and not act on its own
mental impression or facts outside the record, although . . . it may take into
consideration facts within its judicial knowledge.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
17 C.J.S. Continuances § 97). Finally, the trial court’s “chief consideration” in
determining whether a defendant’s probation should be revoked despite the
expiration of the term of probation is whether “substantial justice” would be advanced
or offended by the post-expiration revocation. Id. (quoting 17 C.J.S. Continuances §
97). However, despite this Court’s recognition in Shankle that a trial court’s “sound
discretion” to determine good cause from any number of any combination of any series
of circumstances in a variety of cases—including probation violation hearings in
which actions taken after the expiration of probation are dependent upon the
existence of good cause—“is not unlimited, and must not be exercised absolutely,
arbitrarily, or capriciously, but only in accordance with fixed legal principles,”
nonetheless the dissent would prefer to more rigidly define and curtail a trial court’s
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ability to find “good cause” in its discretion.
¶ 14 Applying an abuse of discretion standard to the trial court’s finding that good
cause existed in this case to revoke defendant’s probation over a year after the
expiration of defendant’s term of probation, we do not conclude that the trial court’s
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or offended substantial justice. The record in this
case demonstrates the manner in which both defendant and the State were benefited
by the trial court’s determination of the existence of good cause. The probation officer
filed probation violation reports against defendant on 9 February 2018 and 12
February 2018—two weeks prior to the expiration of his probation, but ten months
after defendant had been criminally charged for the behavior which served as the
basis for the State’s efforts to revoke defendant’s probation. However, on all relevant
dates, criminal charges were pending against defendant for behavior in which he
allegedly engaged while he was on probation. Defendant’s probation expired on 28
February 2018. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence which supported
the criminal charges against him almost a year after his probation had expired. The
motion was heard and granted on 22 February 2019 by the same trial court which
heard both defendant’s probation revocation matter and the hearing on remand to
determine the existence of good cause. The State dismissed the charges against
defendant on 17 March 2019. Less than a month later, the State brought forward the
probation violation reports against defendant for hearing on 4 April 2019. Both the
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State and defendant had the potential benefit of the delay in the occurrence of the
probation violation hearing until after the resolution of defendant’s new criminal
charges as reflected in the trial court’s stated rationale for finding good cause:
[I]f [defendant] had been found not guilty of those offenses,
or if for whatever reason the State had opted to dismiss the
charges, . . . it would have had a direct impact on the later
hearing of the probation violation.
Again, as reviewed — as shown in the transcript, as
well as the knowledge by this [c]ourt having heard the
Motion to Suppress, and then argument on the Motion to
Suppress, having been granted after probation violation, it
is clear to the [c]ourt that the State waited until disposition
of the underlying offenses alleged before proceeding with
the probation violation. The [c]ourt would find that this
would constitute good cause.
The fact that the State’s dismissal of defendant’s underlying charges did not have a
“direct impact on the later hearing of the probation violation” is a product of
hindsight, not the trial court’s weighing of “the rights of the parties.” Shankle, 289
N.C. at 483 (quoting 17 C.J.S. Continuances § 5). After all, the State dismissed the
charges against defendant after it was discovered that the evidence was collected as
the result of a search warrant which did not specify which of the two duplex units
where defendant resided was the subject of the search, not after the evidence against
defendant was presented to a jury. Meanwhile, the State was afforded the
opportunity to await the outcome of defendant’s trial on the new criminal charges
and the potential effect on the probation violation allegations, in the event that
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defendant was found guilty of the underlying charges.
¶ 15 Defendant further asserts that the Court of Appeals violated the principle of
stare decisis and this Court’s holding in In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373 (1989), by
“fail[ing] to apply two key holdings from its own prior published and binding
precedent in State v. Sasek.” We disagree. The lower appellate court properly
concluded that Sasek did not apply in the current case because, even if the trial court
had made the required finding of good cause in Sasek, and the record had contained
evidence to support an inferred existence of good cause in that case, the issue of the
sufficiency of any good cause which may have existed was not before the Court of
Appeals in Sasek; therefore, any comment on the issue by the Court of Appeals would
constitute dicta and would also, in any event, remain discretionary in its application
before this Court. Furthermore, defendant’s citation to Sasek is ineffectual in light of
his argument that Sasek stands for the proposition that any “reasonable efforts”
undertaken by the State to hold the revocation hearing earlier or before the
expiration of his term of probation is a factor to consider in determining whether
there is “good cause shown and stated” to revoke his probation after the term had
expired. In Sasek, the Court of Appeals recalled its observation in Morgan that a
probation revocation judgment should only be remanded, as opposed to vacated, when
“the record contain[s] sufficient evidence to permit the necessary finding of
‘reasonable efforts’ by the State to have conducted the probation revocation hearing
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earlier.” Sasek, 271 N.C. App. at 575 (alteration in original) (quoting Morgan, 372
N.C. at 618). The lower appellate court’s citation to, and discussion of, this statement
from Morgan in the Court of Appeals’ Sasek opinion is misplaced and misleading
within the context of reviewing the good cause requirement of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f).
In the present case, the dissent has also succumbed to this miscalculated reliance on
the concept of “reasonable efforts,” while erroneously and curiously claiming that the
statute requires a demonstration of both reasonable efforts and good cause, when
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f) doesn’t mention “reasonable efforts.” The Court in Morgan, in
referencing the “reasonable efforts” undertaken by the State to conduct the revocation
hearing earlier, referred to this Court’s decision in Bryant. Morgan, 372 N.C. at 618
(citing Bryant, 361 N.C. at 104). Bryant, in turn, analyzed the version of N.C.G.S. §
15A-1344(f) which was existent at the time, and which explicitly required a trial court
to find “that the State has made reasonable effort to notify the probationer and to
conduct the hearing earlier.” 361 N.C. at 102 (emphasis omitted) (quoting N.C.G.S. §
15A-1344(f)(2) (2005)). However, the Legislature unequivocally eliminated the trial
court’s necessity to consider the State’s reasonable efforts to conduct the hearing at
an earlier time with the passage of Session Law 2008-129, which replaced the one
“reasonable effort” finding earlier required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(2) with two
findings which presently must be determined by a trial court: N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1344(f)(2) requires a finding that the “probationer did violate one or more conditions
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Opinion of the Court
of probation prior to the expiration of the period of probation” and N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1344(f)(3) requires a finding of “good cause shown and stated that the probation
should be extended, modified, or revoked.” 2008 N.C. Sess. Law 129, § 4; N.C.G.S. §
15A-1344(f) (2021). Therefore, Morgan does not stand for the proposition, as argued
by defendant, that the reasonable efforts undertaken by the State to hold the
probation revocation hearing at an earlier date must be shown to, or found by, the
trial court as a prerequisite to the trial court exercising its jurisdiction in extending,
modifying, or revoking a defendant’s probation after the term of probation has
expired.
III. Conclusion
¶ 16 The trial court complied with the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f) and
therefore possessed the jurisdiction to revoke defendant’s probation after his term of
probation had expired. Specifically, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3), the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that good cause existed for the
revocation of defendant’s probation after his term of probation had expired. We
therefore affirm the Court of Appeals decision for the reasons stated herein, and the
trial court’s judgments revoking defendant’s probation are given full force and effect.
AFFIRMED.
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Earls, J., dissenting
Justice EARLS dissenting.
¶ 17 The majority here holds that because the trial court “complied with N.C.G.S. §
15A-1344(f)(3),” it has jurisdiction to revoke defendant’s probation 399 days after it
expired and did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause for the delay. Because
I disagree on both points and conclude that the majority’s decision provides
inadequate guidance to trial courts, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 18 Though trial courts are rightfully afforded a high degree of discretion in
making certain fact-intensive determinations, that discretion must be exercised
within clear and consistent boundaries in order to safeguard fundamental
constitutional principles of due process. These boundaries are particularly important
in criminal law, in which a trial court’s discretionary rulings—like those involving
the revocation of probation and institution of a term of active incarceration—can
directly and severely impact basic personal liberties. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 781 (1973) (observing that “the loss of liberty entailed [in probation
revocation] is a serious deprivation” thus requiring the protections of due process).
¶ 19 Below, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is “no specific set of factors that
must be considered in evaluating whether ‘good cause’ exists [for post-expiration
probation revocation] under [N.C.G.S.] 15A-1344(f)(3).” State v. Geter, 267 N.C. App.
377, 2021-NCCOA-98, # 14. In my view, that ruling untethers the trial court’s
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discretion from “fixed legal principles,” thereby running afoul of constitutional
protections against statutory vagueness and inviting inconsistent applications of the
law. Shankle v. Shankle, 289 N.C. 473, 483 (1976). Further, it is the proper role of
appellate courts to provide lower courts with certain minimum guidance regarding
the contours of these constitutional guardrails. While the majority observes that
there are some general limits on a trial court’s discretion, it does not state those limits
with sufficient specificity to avoid unconstitutional vagueness and inconsistency in
future determinations of “good cause” for probation revocation under N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1344(f)(3).
¶ 20 Although the relevant statute plainly gives trial courts significant discretion
in making this determination, the legislature could not have given trial courts the
kind of virtually unreviewable discretion to trial courts the majority confers here, nor
did it intend to do so. Such discretion will lead to unpredictable application of the
“good cause” standard across the state; as a result, defendants will have little notice
of what constitutes “good cause” to warrant revocation of probation after their
probationary period has expired and no real idea how any given trial court will treat
their case.
¶ 21 It is the function of appellate courts to interpret broad legislation that is
susceptible to multiple meanings and provide guidance for trial courts tasked with
applying statutes in the first instance. See, e.g., State v. Starr, 365 N.C. 314, 319
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Earls, J., dissenting
(2011) (“We pause to provide guidance to trial court judges” regarding how to
“exercise [their] discretion” in order “to ensure compliance with N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1233(a).”); In re J.F., 237 N.C. App. 218, 227 (2014) (“We briefly address this
jurisdictional issue to provide guidance to trial courts faced with similar situations in
the future.”). Here, the text and purpose of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) demonstrate
that there are limits to a trial court’s discretion under these circumstances. Trial
courts must make express findings of fact demonstrating that there is “good cause”
to revoke probation. “Good cause” is not just whatever a trial court thinks reasonable
on a given day; “good cause” necessarily incorporates an assessment of whether the
State made reasonable efforts to hold the revocation hearing before the probationary
period ended. Moreover, while delaying a probation revocation hearing to allow for
the disposition of underlying charges may sometimes be “good cause” for a delay, that
is true only when the outcome of those charges has some impact on a trial court’s
“good cause” determination. The State may not require defendants to wait years for
their revocation hearings under the guise that the disposition of their new charges
will be relevant, then proceed with revocation even though those charges have been
dismissed. Under these circumstances, the delay is without purpose and cannot
constitute “good cause.” Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I. Background
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2022-NCSC-137
Earls, J., dissenting
¶ 22 Jaquan Stephon Geter began serving eighteen months of supervised probation
on 29 August 2016. During his probation, the State charged Mr. Geter with new
criminal offenses after a SWAT-team illegally searched Mr. Geter’s home and found
drug paraphernalia, a pistol with ammunition, and cash, $40 of which had been used
to purchase contraband pursuant to the investigation. On 22 February 2019, a trial
court determined the evidence the SWAT-team obtained during the search had to be
suppressed because they obtained it pursuant to an illegal warrant. The State
subsequently dismissed these charges against Mr. Geter.
¶ 23 The State had no obligation to wait until those new charges were disposed
before seeking to revoke Mr. Geter’s probation. See, e.g., State v. Crompton, 380 N.C.
220, 2022-NCSC-14, ¶ 11 (noting that the trial court “found that the defendant had
violated the condition of his probation to ‘commit no criminal offense’ ” based on its
determination that he committed new offenses and charges were pending). Although
the State was aware of these new charges—as well as other violations of his
probation, such as Mr. Geter’s failure to complete his assigned community service
hours and his GED—the State did not file probation violation reports immediately.
Instead, the State waited 387 days after the alleged criminal conduct to file violation
reports and an additional 399 days after Mr. Geter’s probation expired to hold his
revocation hearing. In total, 806 days elapsed between the alleged criminal conduct
and Mr. Geter’s probation revocation.
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2022-NCSC-137
Earls, J., dissenting
¶ 24 Mr. Geter’s probation hearing occurred over a year later on 4 April 2019. At
that hearing, the State presented the illegally obtained evidence to support
revocation. The trial court revoked Mr. Geter’s probation but failed to make a finding
of “good cause” for revoking his probation after the expiration of the probationary
period. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s revocation
because (1) the trial court had failed to make a finding of “good cause,” and (2) it was
ambiguous whether the court impermissibly revoked Mr. Geter’s probation for a class
three misdemeanor. State v. Geter (Geter I), No. COA19-846, 2020 WL 3251033 (N.C.
Ct. App. June 16, 2020).
¶ 25 At his second revocation hearing on 15 July 2020, Mr. Geter argued that
because the State could have held the revocation hearing prior to the disposition of
the underlying drug charges, the State did not have “good cause” to revoke his
probation after the probationary period had expired. The State, although
acknowledging that it did have the ability to hold revocation hearings prior to
disposition, emphasized that it delays proceedings in “every single case” involving
allegations of new criminal conduct. Otherwise, the State argued, “we would be
having hearings all the time.” Additionally, the State noted that Buncombe County
only holds one criminal session per week and probation hearings once every two
weeks and that “99 percent of the time, if the underlaying evidence is suppressed or
charges dismissed, the [S]tate does not pursue the revocation.” The State contended
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Earls, J., dissenting
that it “allowed the probation matter to be continued to afford Mr. Geter an
opportunity to have his trial.” After hearing these arguments, the trial court found
that “it is clear to the [c]ourt that the State waited until disposition of the underlying
offenses alleged before proceeding with the probation violation. The [c]ourt would find
that this would constitute good cause.”
¶ 26 Mr. Geter again appealed, arguing that the trial court erred because (1) “the
record did not contain evidence the State made reasonable efforts to hold the hearing
prior to expiration of probation” and (2) the idea that waiting for underlying criminal
offenses to be resolved is “good cause” was expressly rejected by the Court of Appeals
in” State v. Sasek, 271 N.C. App. 568 (2020). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s revocation order, concluding that “review of caselaw and our General Statutes
has revealed no specific set of factors that must be considered in evaluating whether
‘good cause’ exists under N.C.[G.S.] § 15A-1344(f)(3).” State v. Geter (Geter II), 276
N.C. App. 377, 2021-NCCOA-98, ¶ 14. According to the Court of Appeals, Sasek was
inapplicable to Mr. Geter’s case because the trial court in his case did make a finding
of “good cause.” Id. ¶ 12. This Court allowed Mr. Geter’s petition for discretionary
review on 10 August 2021.
II. Standard of Review
¶ 27 “[A]n ‘ultimate finding is a conclusion of law or at least a determination of a
mixed question of law and fact’ and should ‘be distinguished from the findings of
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Earls, J., dissenting
primary, evidentiary, or circumstantial facts.’ ” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 76 (2019)
(quoting Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481, 491 (1937)). In contrast to abuse
of discretion review, appellate courts reviewing ultimate findings ask whether the
trial court’s “evidentiary facts reasonably support the trial court’s ultimate finding.”
State v. Fuller, 376 N.C. 862, 2021-NCSC-20, ¶ 8 (concluding that a determination of
whether a defendant “is a danger to the community” should be reviewed as an
“ultimate finding”). But when there is no “rational connection between the basic facts
. . . and the ultimate fact,” State v. White, 300 N.C. 494, 504 (1980) (cleaned up), or
the evidentiary findings do not “adequately address” the legal conclusions, In re
N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 78, the ultimate fact is not binding on appeal.
III. Analysis
¶ 28 Statutory interpretation begins with the text. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)
enumerates three prerequisites that must be present before a trial court can revoke
a defendant’s probation after expiration of the probationary period. The statute
provides that a court
may extend, modify, or revoke probation after the
expiration of the period of probation if all of the following
apply:
(1) Before the expiration of the period of probation
the State has filed a written violation report with the
clerk indicating its intent to conduct a hearing on
one or more violations of one or more conditions of
probation.
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Earls, J., dissenting
(2) The court finds that the probationer did violate
one or more conditions of probation prior to the
expiration of the period of probation.
(3) The court finds for good cause shown and stated
that the probation should be extended, modified, or
revoked.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f) (2021). As the majority notes, this version of the statute omits
language appearing in a prior version providing that revocation was permitted if the
“State has made reasonable effort to notify the probationer and to conduct the hearing
earlier.” Act of July 28, 2008, S.L. 2008-129, § 4, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws 499, 503. That
version of the statute read:
(f) Revocation after Period of Probation. — The court may
revoke probation after the expiration of the period of
probation if:
(1) Before the expiration of the period of probation
the State has filed a written motion with the clerk
indicating its intent to conduct a revocation hearing;
and
(2) The court finds that the State has made
reasonable effort to notify the probationer and to
conduct the hearing earlier.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f) (2007). Notably, the commentary to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344 did
not change when the statute was revised: It provides that “probation can be revoked
. . . if a violation occurred during the period and if the court was unable to bring the
probationer before it in order to revoke at that time.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344 Official
Commentary.
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2022-NCSC-137
Earls, J., dissenting
¶ 29 This case raises two important questions regarding how to interpret this
provision of the JRA. First, does N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) require the trial court to
enter any evidentiary findings in support of its ultimate determination that good
cause exists? Second, does N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) require the State to have made
“reasonable effort . . . to conduct the hearing earlier” prior to seeking post-expiration
revocation, as the previous version of the statute required? See N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1344(f)(2) (2007). The majority answers no to both of these questions. I disagree.
¶ 30 In my view, the “shown and stated” language of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3)
requires both that the State meet its burden that “good cause” exists and that the
trial court state the reasons for which “good cause” exists, rather than simply making
an express finding. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) (2021). Furthermore, although the
legislature omitted the “reasonable effort” language in the current statute, trial
courts must still consider “reasonable effort” by the State to hold the revocation
hearing earlier in determining if “good cause” to revoke exists. The “good cause”
language subsumes “reasonable effort” and grants trial courts greater, but not
boundless, discretion to consider other factors. This interpretation closely follows the
text of the statute and the legislative intent of the Justice Reinvestment Act, which
was to limit the ability of trial courts to revoke probation after expiration and to
restrict spending on incarceration so that the state could instead invest those
resources in community programs to decrease crime.
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2022-NCSC-137
Earls, J., dissenting
A. The “shown and stated” language of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) requires
trial courts to include findings illustrating why “good cause” exists to
revoke probation after expiration.
¶ 31 The majority holds that the trial court’s “good cause” determination is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. This ignores the nature of the good cause inquiry and the
statutory text. The JRA provides that trial courts may revoke probation after the
probationary period has expired if “[t]he court finds for good cause shown and stated”
that it is appropriate to do so. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3). There are two potential
readings of the “shown and stated” language. The first gives meaning to all language
in § 15A-1344(f)(3). Revoking probation after expiration requires (1) “[t]he court
finds” that the State “show[ed],” and thus met their burden, that “good cause” exists;
and (2) the court “state[s]” the reasons supporting its determination that “good cause”
exists. This reading gives full effect to the statute.
¶ 32 The second reading, which the majority adopts only requires the trial court to
find “good cause” without explaining why good cause exists. This reading renders the
prefatory language “[t]he court finds” duplicative with the subsequent “shown and
stated” language. To read “[t]he court finds” and “shown and stated” as identical
conflicts with the principle that statutes “should not be interpreted in a manner
which would render any of its words superfluous.” Coffey, 336 N.C. at 417. Instead,
the State must show that good cause exists by meeting its burden of demonstrating
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2022-NCSC-137
Earls, J., dissenting
good cause at the revocation hearing and the trial court must state its explanation by
entering findings in support of its ultimate finding that “good cause” exists to revoke
after expiration. The statute requires evidentiary findings in support of the ultimate
findings of “good cause.” Thus, the legislature intended the “shown and stated”
language to require trial courts to not only find “good cause” but also to state the
reasons why “good cause” exists for revocation.
¶ 33 This Court has previously held that trial courts must make an express finding
that “good cause” exists to revoke probation after expiration. State v. Morgan, 372
N.C. 609, 613 (2019). A trial court order does not satisfy this requirement simply
because evidence exists in the record from which a court may infer “good cause.” Id.
at 616. Instead, we explained that the language of § 15A-1344(f) clearly mandates
that the trial court find both that “the probationer did violate one or more conditions
of probation” and that there is “good cause shown and stated.” Id. at 614 (quoting
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f) (2017)).
¶ 34 Further, requiring specific findings of fact in “good cause” determinations
aligns with the broader purpose of the JRA. The primary goal of the JRA is to “reduce
. . . [state] spending on corrections and . . . reinvest the savings in community-based
programs” to decrease crime. State v. Moore, 370 N.C. 338, 343 (2017) (quoting James
M. Markham, The North Carolina Justice Reinvestment Act 1 (2012)). Probation
revocations account for the largest percentage of North Carolina prison admissions
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Earls, J., dissenting
each year. See N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Fiscal Year 2019–2020 Annual Statistical
Report 11, https://files.nc.gov/ncdps/FY-2019-20-Annual-Statistical-Report.pdf. An
interpretation of the act that would allow trial courts to revoke probation whenever
they deem fit would be in tension with the JRA’s goals. By contrast, interpreting the
JRA to require evidentiary findings to support a good cause determination ensures
that courts allow post-expiration revocations only in circumstances where they are
truly warranted. Interpreting § 15A-1344(f)(3) in this way also ensures an adequate
record for appellate review. By contrast, in concluding that a trial court may simply
state that “good cause” exists to revoke, the majority introduces a standard that is
virtually unreviewable and enables the State to potentially abuse calendaring of
revocation hearings at the expense of defendants. The “shown and stated” language
in the statute requires trial courts to illustrate why good cause exists, imposing a
necessary guardrail protecting against unnecessary revocations after expiration of
the probationary period.
B. Trial courts must consider whether the State made “reasonable effort”
to conduct the hearing prior to revocation in order to determine if
“good cause” exists for post-expiration revocation.
¶ 35 Concluding that trial courts must include findings illustrating why “good
cause” exists calls for this Court to give meaning to “good cause.” Establishing factors
grounded in the interpretation and legislative intent of § 15A-1344(f) will enable trial
courts to apply the statute uniformly in a way that provides defendants notice as to
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Earls, J., dissenting
what constitutes “good cause.” The statute does require the State to show and the
trial court to state that the State made “reasonable effort” to hold the hearing earlier.
Finally, because the legislature did broaden the statutory language from “reasonable
effort” to “good cause,” trial courts are also free to consider other relevant factors or
scenarios. “Good cause” subsumes, but is not limited to, a “reasonable effort” analysis.
¶ 36 When a trial court fails to make an express finding of “good cause,” a reviewing
court will vacate an order revoking probation unless the record includes sufficient
evidence that may enable a court to conclude “good cause” exists on remand. Morgan,
372 N.C. at 618. And the Court of Appeals concluded in Sasek that “the record [must]
contain[ ] sufficient evidence to permit the necessary findings of ‘reasonable efforts’
by the State to have conducted the probation revocation hearing earlier” to warrant
remand. 271 N.C. App. at 575 (quoting Morgan, 372 N.C. at 618). Although Sasek is
not binding on this Court, Sasek interpreted the latter version of the statute—the one
at issue here—and we did not allow further review of that case. At a minimum, Sasek
indicates that as of 2020, the Court of Appeals believed that the new version of the
JRA incorporated its predecessor’s requirement that the State undertake “reasonable
effort” for a good cause determination to be warranted.
¶ 37 Creating factor tests to guide trial courts in applying the law is often necessary
to give effect to criminal statutes in a manner that comports with the rights of
criminal defendants and avoids vagueness. In North Carolina, a statute is void for
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2022-NCSC-137
Earls, J., dissenting
vagueness where “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application.” In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 531 (1969). Additionally,
the language of the statute must provide a defendant with sufficient notice as to what
criminal conduct the statute seeks to punish. State v. Elam, 302 N.C. 157, 162 (1981).
¶ 38 The Court of Appeals’ ruling potentially conflicts with the foundational
constitutional principles of due process and equal protection by approving statutory
vagueness. If there is “no specific set of factors that must be considered” within a trial
court’s “good cause” determination, then trial courts enjoy functionally unbridled
discretion to make this determination “on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at
109.
¶ 39 Indeed, the circumstances here illustrate the potential for inconsistent or
arbitrary applications of the “good cause” requirement absent further guidance. The
State conceded at the revocation hearing that it made no effort to hold the hearing
earlier, instead opting to “wait and see” what happened to the underlying charges. At
first glance, this explanation seems reasonable enough: a conviction on the
underlying charges would likely support the State’s case for probation revocation,
while a dismissal or acquittal of these charges would weigh against probation
revocation. The trial court acknowledged this approach when it stated that “it is clear
to the [c]ourt that the State waited until disposition of the underlying offenses alleged
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Earls, J., dissenting
before proceeding with the probation violation.” The trial court likewise relied upon
this “wait and see” approach in its “good cause” determination: It found “that this
does constitute good cause in that . . . if for whatever reason the State had opted to
dismiss the charges, that it would have had a direct impact on the later hearing of the
probation violation.” (Emphasis added).
¶ 40 But this finding is squarely contradicted by what actually happened here: The
State did dismiss the underlying charges against Mr. Geter, but the dismissal had no
impact on the later hearing of the probation violation. That is, despite the dismissal
of the underlying charges that supposedly influenced the State to “wait and see,” the
State nevertheless forged ahead with seeking the post-expiration revocation of
Geter’s probation. Under this “heads I win, tails you lose” framework approved by the
majority opinion today, the mere fact of pending underlying charges against a
defendant could always constitute “good cause,” regardless of the outcome of those
charges. This result is prohibited by the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)
itself, which enumerates the “good cause” determination required by subsection (f)(3)
as a separate and distinct prerequisite from the mere fact “that the probationer did
violate one or more conditions of probation prior to the expiration of the period of
probation” required by subsection (f)(2). Finally, if, as the majority opinion observes,
the State “likely felt confident that the same evidence, deemed excluded at
defendant’s criminal trial, could very well satisfy the trial court that defendant had
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committed new criminal offenses while on probation under a less demanding
standard,” then the State would have absolutely no reason to delay defendant’s
probation revocation hearing until after the underlying charges were resolved; it
could have presented that evidence to the trial court independently of the trial on the
underlying charges. Instead, Geter’s probation revocation hearing was delayed until
399 days after his probation expired, constituting a “significant and unadvisable
[delay] in the administration of justice.” Geter, 2021-NCCOA-98, # 15.
¶ 41 These inconsistencies illustrate why, contrary to the ruling of the Court of
Appeals below, there must be some “specific set of factors that must be considered in
evaluating whether ‘good cause’ exists under [N.C.G.S.] § 15A-1344(f)(3). The
responsibility for establishing those factors falls on the shoulders of this Court. While
the majority opinion generally acknowledges that a trial court’s discretion in this
matter must not be exercised arbitrarily but only in accordance with fixed legal
principles, it stops short of addressing the Court of Appeals’ sweeping ruling and
providing the necessary, more specific guidance about what “fixed legal principles” a
trial court must consider. In my view, the high stakes of post-expiration probation
revocation and the language of N.C.G.S. § 15A1344(f)(3) require this Court to do so.
Indeed, “where a statute is ambiguous or unclear in its meaning, resort must be had
to judicial construction to ascertain the legislative will, and the courts will interpret
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Earls, J., dissenting
the language to give effect to the legislative intent.” In re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239
(1978).
¶ 42 As Mr. Geter correctly notes, this Court has established multifactor tests to
give meaning to criminal statutes on numerous occasions, thus avoiding vagueness
and providing defendants with sufficient notice. Such instances include State v.
Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 368 (1976), where we adopted factors to determine if a defendant
should be shackled at trial; State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 339 (2002), which
announced voluntary confession factors; and State v. Spivey, 357 N.C. 114, 118 (2003),
which established speedy trial factors. By creating factors that trial courts may
consider in determining “good cause,” we can ensure uniform and clear applications
of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) consistent with all constitutional requirements.
¶ 43 Specifically, the statutory text, structure, purpose, and context, as well as
foundational constitutional principles dictate that a trial court engaging in a “good
cause” determination under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) consider within its discretion:
(1) the State and the court’s ability or inability to hold the probation revocation
hearing in a timely manner; (2) the length of the delay between the alleged act
warranting probation revocation and the subsequent hearing; and (3) the efforts
made by the State or the court to conduct an earlier probation hearing. In my view,
requiring consideration of these factors would properly honor the statutory text,
purpose, and constitutional limitations while still affording the trial court broad and
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necessary discretion in making this fact-intensive determination. Indeed, in addition
to criminal defendants and the State, trial courts themselves could also benefit from
this guidance by gaining statutory and constitutional landmarks to orient their
discretionary ruling. Without providing this guidance, and without establishing any
“specific set of factors that must be considered,” this Court allows trial court
discretion to functionally undermine the statute’s purpose and foundational
constitutional principles.
¶ 44 Establishing a “good cause” requirement that does not mandate finding
substantive content such as “reasonable effort” effectively invalidates § 15A-1344(f)
for vagueness. Adopting the majority’s position that “good cause” must simply be
written and neither illustrated nor explained by finding that the State made
“reasonable effort” to hold the revocation hearing earlier grants trial courts
unreviewable discretion and does not put probationers on notice as to what
establishes “good cause.” Trial courts’ application of the statute may vary widely,
effectively preventing defendants from anticipating what may constitute “good cause”
and from building arguments that “good cause” does not exist. Recognizing that the
current version of the Justice Reinvestment Act incorporates the “reasonable effort”
framework into its “good cause” requirement establishes workable guidelines for trial
courts and clarifies the statutory requirements of § 15A-1344(f).
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Earls, J., dissenting
¶ 45 Interpreting “good cause” as subsuming “reasonable effort” aligns with the
official commentary to § 15A-1344. The exact language states: “probation can be
revoked . . . if a violation occurred during the period and if the court was unable to
bring the probationer before it in order to revoke at that time.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344
Official Commentary. Because the legislature preserved the commentary, we must
construe it as applicable to the “good cause” requirement. See Wing v. Goldman Sachs
Tr. Co., N.A., 382 N.C. 288, 2022-NCSC-104, ¶ 54 (“When the legislature explicitly
instructs the revisor of statutes to print the commentary with the statute, such
reliance appears particularly appropriate.” (citation omitted)). The clear language of
this guidance implies that the trial court should find the State could not bring in the
defendant prior to revocation.
¶ 46 The “reasonable effort” factor analysis also makes sense of the Court of Appeals
ruling in Sasek. Although the opinion is not binding on this Court, is important
because the Court of Appeals concluded that, in order for a reviewing court to remand,
it must hold “sufficient” evidence exists in the record “to permit the necessary
findings of ‘reasonable efforts’ by the State to have conducted the probation
revocation hearing earlier.” Sasek, 271 N.C. App. at 575 (quoting Morgan, 372 N.C.
at 618). Moreover, Sasek suggests that the crucial question in determining “good
cause” is whether the State made reasonable effort to conduct the hearing earlier. If
appellate courts review the record for “reasonable effort” in deciding whether to
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vacate or remand, trial courts should be required to establish such findings in their
order to support “good cause.”
¶ 47 “Good cause” must encompass, but is not limited to, the “reasonable effort”
analysis. The previous version requires that the court “finds that the State has made
reasonable effort to notify the probationer and to conduct the hearing earlier.” Act of
July 28, 2008 § 4. Although the majority and the State are correct that the legislature
omitted the “reasonable effort” language in the updated statute, this omission cannot
grant trial courts unlimited discretion because the legislature also added the “good
cause” requirement. Replacing the “reasonable effort” language with “good cause”
does widen what trial courts may consider in determining “good cause,” but it is still
a limit on when trial courts can revoke after expiration. The legislature intended the
statute and the Justice Reinvestment Act to limit the possibility of revocation after
expiration, limit the activation of sentences, and thus limit state spending on
incarceration. “Good cause” should be read in accordance with this intent as requiring
the State to show and for the trial court to state a finding that the State made
“reasonable effort” to bring the probationer in earlier.
C. Remand is necessary to determine if delaying Mr. Geter’s probation
revocation hearing until after the disposition of his underlying criminal
charges constitutes “good cause.”
¶ 48 Interpreting “good cause” as subsuming “reasonable effort” but leaving room
for additional considerations in a trial court’s determination enables defendants to
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still have the option of acquiescing or delaying their probation revocation hearing
until the disposition of their underlying charges. However, the disposition of those
charges should affect the outcome of the probationary hearing. If a Court finds “good
cause” shown and stated because the State and the defendant both agreed to wait
until the disposition of the underlying charges, that disposition must affect the trial
court’s exercise of discretion. Otherwise, there is no true “good cause” for delaying the
hearing.
¶ 49 Although waiting to proceed with a revocation until after the disposition of
underlying charges would ideally limit the number of total revocations, a blanket
policy, like that of Buncombe County’s, has the potential to harm defendants, such as
Mr. Geter, whose underlying charges have been dismissed or acquitted and yet are
still the subject of revocation hearings. Simply put, trial courts cannot allow for the
delay of probation revocation hearings until after the disposition of underlying
charges only to revoke probation despite the dismissal or acquittal of those charges
and still rule within the limiting parameters of the “good cause” requirement and the
Justice Reinvestment Act.
¶ 50 Our precedents provide some context regarding what constitutes sufficient
evidence of “reasonable effort” by the State sufficient for remand to be appropriate.
In Morgan, this Court was “unable to say from our review of the record that no
evidence exists that would allow the trial court on remand to make a finding of ‘good
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Earls, J., dissenting
cause shown and stated.’ ” Morgan, 372 N.C. at 618. Evidence to support our holding
included a notice of revocation hearing with a scheduled date before the expiration
period and remarks from the defendant’s counsel addressing the defendant’s
significant mental health issues and inability to comply with terms of probation or
appear in court. Id. at 611. Bryant suggests that neither a “failed scheduling effort
alone” nor a defendant’s medical condition causing difficulty in scheduling is
sufficient “to support a finding of reasonable efforts.” Bryant, 361 N.C. at 104. Finally,
the Court of Appeals holding in Sasek suggests that when the record shows there was
a hearing initially scheduled prior to expiration but does not explain why it did not
take place, the matter does not warrant remand. Sasek, 271 N.C. App. at 576.
¶ 51 Buncombe County’s blanket policy of delaying probation revocation hearings
until after the disposition of underlying charges alone cannot constitute “good cause.”
The policy does not demonstrate that the State made “reasonable effort” to hold the
hearing earlier. In fact, it supports the notion that the State purposefully wanted to
delay the proceeding simply because it was inconvenient to the State to hold it earlier.
In the trial transcript, the State noted that it is typical practice to wait until the
disposition of underlying charges because if they “tried to hold hearings before
probation expired, ‘we would be having hearings all the time.’ ” The State’s inability
to accommodate probation hearings adequately and fairly in a timely manner cannot,
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Earls, J., dissenting
on its own, be held against defendants facing the possibility of revocation after the
expiration of the probationary period.
¶ 52 However, in Mr. Geter’s case, there is enough evidence in the record that the
State made “reasonable effort” to conduct the hearing earlier to warrant remand for
the trial court to determine if “good cause” exists. Unlike in Bryant and Sasek, the
State’s testimony suggests Mr. Geter acquiesced or potentially agreed for the
“probation matter to be continued to afford [him] an opportunity to have his trial.”
Additionally, there was significant restraint on the State’s ability to hold Mr. Geter’s
revocation hearing earlier, which explains the failed scheduling efforts and further
delays: Buncombe County only holds one criminal session per week and probation
hearings only once every two weeks. In tandem with Mr. Geter’s agreement to delay
the revocation hearing, the State’s calendaring restrictions support a remand;
however, the latter would be likely insufficient alone. See Bryant, 361 N.C. at 104
(holding a “failed scheduling effort alone” does not constitute sufficient evidence to
warrant remand).
¶ 53 On remand, this case warrants serious consideration of two facts to determine
if “good cause” existed to revoke Mr. Geter’s probation. First, despite the State’s
statements that “99 percent of the time, if the underlying evidence is suppressed or
charges dismissed, the [S]tate does not pursue the revocation,” the State still
pursued, and the trial court granted, the revocation of Mr. Geter’s probation. The
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Earls, J., dissenting
delay to allow Mr. Geter the “opportunity to have his trial” had zero impact on his
revocation hearing and should not constitute “good cause.” Second, Mr. Geter had
violated other conditions of his parole, such as completing required community
service hours and his GED, for which the State could have pursued modification or
extension of his probation, yet the State instead pursued revocation on the basis of
criminal conduct. The State had every opportunity to extend, modify, or revoke Mr.
Geter’s probation prior to expiration, yet decided to wait 806 days total to do so.
¶ 54 Ultimately, if the State, with a defendant’s agreement, waits to proceed with
revocation until after disposition of underlying charges, the disposition should have
an impact on the trial court’s determination of “good cause.” Asking defendants to
wait until well after their probationary period expires and then revoking their
probation regardless of the fact that their underlying charges have been dismissed or
acquitted is “significant and unadvisable in the administration of justice.” Geter II, ¶
15.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 55 Requiring trial courts to make express findings of fact that demonstrate why
“good cause” exists to revoke probation after expiration will limit such instances of
extreme delay. This requirement is consistent with the text of § 15A-1344(f) and the
purposes of the Justice Reinvestment Act. The majority errs by failing to enforce the
statutory guardrails, such as requiring trial courts to illustrate why “good cause”
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Earls, J., dissenting
exists, and to consider the factor of “reasonable effort” by the State to conduct the
hearing earlier, which impose a crucial limit on the ability of trial courts to revoke
probation after expiration of the probationary period. Because there is evidence in
the record of this case to suggest “reasonable effort” by the State exists, this matter
should be remanded.
Justice HUDSON joins in this dissenting opinion.