State v. Miller , 371 N.C. 266 ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. 2PA17
    Filed 8 June 2018
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.
    JUAN ANTONIA MILLER
    On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision
    of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 
    795 S.E.2d 374
    (2016), ordering that
    defendant receive a new trial after appeal from a judgment entered on 4 December
    2015 by Judge Eric C. Morgan in Superior Court, Guilford County. Heard in the
    Supreme Court on 7 February 2018.
    Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Derrick C. Mertz and John G. Batherson,
    Special Deputy Attorneys General, for the State-appellant.
    Jason Christopher Yoder for defendant-appellee.
    Southern Coalition for Social Justice, by Ian A. Mance and Ivy A. Johnson, for
    The Beloved Community Center of Greensboro, amicus curiae.
    MARTIN, Chief Justice.
    During a traffic stop, Officer H.B. Harris of the Greensboro Police Department
    found cocaine in defendant’s coat pocket.    Defendant did not move to suppress
    evidence of the cocaine before or at trial, but instead argued for the first time on
    appeal that the seizure of the cocaine resulted from various Fourth Amendment
    violations. We hold that defendant’s Fourth Amendment claims are not reviewable
    STATE V. MILLER
    Opinion of the Court
    on direct appeal, even for plain error, because he completely waived them by not
    moving to suppress evidence of the cocaine before or at trial. We therefore reverse
    the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
    additional proceedings.
    Officer Harris pulled defendant over after a DMV records check indicated that
    the license plate number for the car that he was driving had been revoked due to
    unpaid insurance premiums. At the time of the traffic stop, Derick Sutton, the car’s
    owner, was in the passenger’s seat. After a brief conversation, Officer Harris asked
    Sutton and then defendant to step out of the car. Both men complied.
    The parties dispute exactly what happened next, including whether defendant
    consented to be searched. But they do not dispute that Officer Harris ultimately
    searched defendant. When Officer Harris checked defendant’s coat pocket, he found
    a bag of white powder that was later confirmed to be cocaine and presented as Exhibit
    1 at trial. Officer Harris was wearing a body camera that was recording video footage
    during this traffic stop.
    Defendant did not move in limine to suppress evidence of the cocaine, even
    when the trial court specifically asked if there were pretrial matters to address. Nor
    did defendant object to the State’s use of the cocaine evidence at any point during his
    trial, either when Officer Harris testified about finding cocaine in his pocket or when
    the cocaine itself was introduced as evidence. Defendant argued to the Court of
    -2-
    STATE V. MILLER
    Opinion of the Court
    Appeals that the trial court “plainly erred” by “admitting the cocaine and testimony
    about the cocaine,” and that the seizure of the cocaine resulted from various Fourth
    Amendment violations. Defendant also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective
    for not moving to suppress evidence of the cocaine.
    Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged that “footage from an officer’s
    body camera may not reveal the totality of the circumstances,” State v. Miller, ___
    N.C. App. ___, ___ n.1, 
    795 S.E.2d 374
    , 376 n.1 (2016), it nonetheless considered the
    evidence that was presented at trial, including Officer Harris’ body camera footage,
    and conducted plain error review, see id. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 376-79. The Court of
    Appeals determined that Officer Harris unconstitutionally extended the traffic stop
    and that, even if Officer Harris had not unlawfully extended the stop, defendant’s
    consent to the search of his person was not valid. Id. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 378-79. In
    the course of its analysis, the Court of Appeals made determinations about the
    credibility of Officer Harris’ testimony. See 
    id. The Court
    of Appeals ultimately concluded that the trial court committed plain
    error by admitting evidence of the cocaine. Id. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 376-79. Because
    the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial based on defendant’s Fourth Amendment
    claims, it did not reach defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at ___,
    795 S.E.2d at 379. The State petitioned this Court for discretionary review of two
    issues: whether defendant’s Fourth Amendment claims were susceptible to plain
    -3-
    STATE V. MILLER
    Opinion of the Court
    error review and, if so, whether the Court of Appeals correctly found plain error. We
    allowed review of both issues.
    This Court adopted plain error review in State v. Odom, 
    307 N.C. 655
    , 
    300 S.E.2d 375
    (1983). As a general rule, “plain error review is available in criminal
    appeals for challenges to jury instructions and evidentiary issues.” Dogwood Dev. &
    Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak Transp. Co., 
    362 N.C. 191
    , 196, 
    657 S.E.2d 361
    , 364 (2008)
    (citations omitted) (first citing 
    Odom, 307 N.C. at 660
    , 300 S.E.2d at 378; and then
    citing State v. Cummings, 
    352 N.C. 600
    , 613, 
    536 S.E.2d 36
    , 47 (2000), cert. denied,
    
    532 U.S. 997
    , 
    121 S. Ct. 1660
    (2001)). Even after adopting plain error review,
    however, we have continued to indicate that the failure to move to suppress evidence
    when required by statute constitutes a waiver of those claims on appeal. See, e.g.,
    State v. Hucks, 
    332 N.C. 650
    , 652-53, 
    422 S.E.2d 711
    , 713 (1992); State v. Maccia, 
    311 N.C. 222
    , 227-28, 
    316 S.E.2d 241
    , 244 (1984). But we have not squarely addressed
    whether plain error review is available when a defendant has not moved to suppress.
    See, e.g., State v. Walters, 
    357 N.C. 68
    , 85, 
    588 S.E.2d 344
    , 354, cert. denied, 
    540 U.S. 971
    , 
    124 S. Ct. 442
    (2003). This issue is therefore one of first impression for this
    Court.
    For guidance, we first turn to the statutory framework that governs the
    suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence in our trial courts. N.C.G.S. § 15A-
    974(a)(1) states that, “[u]pon timely motion, evidence must be suppressed if . . . [i]ts
    exclusion is required by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of
    -4-
    STATE V. MILLER
    Opinion of the Court
    the State of North Carolina.” And N.C.G.S. § 15A-979(d) specifies that “[a] motion to
    suppress evidence made pursuant to this Article is the exclusive method of
    challenging the admissibility of evidence” on constitutional grounds.       (Emphasis
    added.) A defendant generally “may move to suppress evidence only prior to trial,”
    N.C.G.S. § 15A-975(a) (2017), subject to a few, narrow exceptions that permit a
    defendant to move during trial, see 
    id. § 15A-975(b),
    (c) (2017).
    In other words, the governing statutory framework requires a defendant to
    move to suppress at some point during the proceedings of his criminal trial. Whether
    he moves to suppress before trial or instead moves to suppress during trial because
    an exception to the pretrial motion requirement applies, a defendant cannot move to
    suppress for the first time after trial. By raising his Fourth Amendment arguments
    for the first time on appeal, however, that is effectively what defendant has done here.
    When a defendant files a motion to suppress before or at trial in a manner that is
    consistent with N.C.G.S. § 15A-975, that motion gives rise to a suppression hearing
    and hence to an evidentiary record pertaining to that defendant’s suppression
    arguments. But when a defendant, such as defendant here, does not file a motion to
    suppress at the trial court stage, the evidentiary record pertaining to his suppression
    arguments has not been fully developed, and may not have been developed at all.
    To find plain error, an appellate court must determine that an error occurred
    at trial. See, e.g., State v. Towe, 
    366 N.C. 56
    , 62, 
    732 S.E.2d 564
    , 568 (2012). The
    defendant, additionally, must demonstrate that the error was “fundamental”—
    -5-
    STATE V. MILLER
    Opinion of the Court
    meaning that the error “had a probable impact on the jury’s finding that the
    defendant was guilty” and “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public
    reputation of judicial proceedings.” State v. Grice, 
    367 N.C. 753
    , 764, 
    767 S.E.2d 312
    ,
    320-21 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Lawrence, 
    365 N.C. 506
    , 518-19, 
    723 S.E.2d 326
    , 334-35 (2012)), cert. denied, 576 U.S. ___, 
    135 S. Ct. 2846
    (2015). But
    here, considering the incomplete record and the nature of defendant’s claims, our
    appellate courts cannot conduct appellate review to determine whether the Fourth
    Amendment required suppression. Defendant asked the Court of Appeals to review
    the length of an officer’s stop to determine whether the officer unnecessarily
    prolonged it, and to review whether defendant voluntarily consented to a search that
    resulted in the discovery of incriminating evidence.           Fact-intensive Fourth
    Amendment claims like these require an evidentiary record developed at a
    suppression hearing. Without a fully developed record, an appellate court simply
    lacks the information necessary to assess the merits of a defendant’s plain error
    arguments.
    When a defendant does not move to suppress, moreover, the State does not get
    the opportunity to develop a record pertaining to the defendant’s Fourth Amendment
    claims. Developing a record is one of the main purposes of a suppression hearing. At
    a suppression hearing, both the defendant and the State can proffer testimony and
    any other admissible evidence that they deem relevant to the trial court’s suppression
    determination. In this case, though, the trial court did not conduct a suppression
    -6-
    STATE V. MILLER
    Opinion of the Court
    hearing because defendant never moved to suppress evidence of the cocaine. And
    because no suppression hearing took place, we do not know whether the State would
    have produced additional evidence at a suppression hearing, or, if the State had done
    so, what that evidence would have been. Cf. Cardinale v. Louisiana, 
    394 U.S. 437
    ,
    439, 
    89 S. Ct. 1161
    , 1163 (1969) (“Questions not raised below are those on which the
    record is very likely to be inadequate, since it certainly was not compiled with those
    questions in mind.”). To allow plain error review in a case like this one, therefore,
    “would ‘penalize the [g]overnment for failing to introduce evidence on probable cause
    for arrest [or other matters bearing on the Fourth Amendment claim] when
    defendant’s failure to raise an objection before or during trial seemed to make such a
    showing unnecessary.’ ” 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.7(e), at 584
    (5th ed. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Meadows, 
    523 F.2d 365
    , 368 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
    424 U.S. 970
    , 
    96 S. Ct. 1469
    (1976)).
    The Court of Appeals’ decision in this case illustrates the problem with
    conducting plain error review on an incomplete record.           Relying primarily on
    Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, 
    135 S. Ct. 1609
    (2015), the Court of Appeals
    held that Officer Harris unconstitutionally prolonged the traffic stop in question
    beyond the time needed to complete the stop’s mission. See Miller, ___ N.C. App. at
    ___, 795 S.E.2d at 377-79. The Court of Appeals reviewed Officer Harris’ body camera
    footage and then determined that Officer Harris did not have reasonable suspicion to
    extend the stop when he asked defendant and Sutton to get out of Sutton’s car. See
    -7-
    STATE V. MILLER
    Opinion of the Court
    id. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 378. To have reasonable suspicion, “an officer . . . must
    ‘reasonably . . . conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
    afoot,’ ” State v. Bullock, 
    370 N.C. 256
    , 258, 
    805 S.E.2d 671
    , 674 (2017) (ellipsis in
    original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 30, 
    88 S. Ct. 1868
    , 1884 (1968)), based on
    “specific and articulable facts” and “rational inferences from those facts,” 
    id. (quoting Terry,
    392 U.S. at 
    21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880
    ). But Officer Harris never testified at a
    suppression hearing in this case. As a result, he never gave testimony for the purpose
    of establishing that, among other things, he had reasonable suspicion to extend the
    stop. He may have observed something during the traffic stop that was not captured
    in his body camera footage and that he did not testify about during the guilt/innocence
    phase of the trial. If he had testified, his testimony may have provided a basis—
    assuming for the sake of argument that he did not have one otherwise—for
    constitutionally extending the traffic stop.       We just do not know, because no
    suppression hearing occurred.
    If the Court of Appeals or this Court were to conduct plain error review of a
    suppression issue on an undeveloped record when resolution of that issue required a
    developed record, moreover, a defendant could unfairly use plain error review to his
    tactical advantage. For instance, a defendant might determine that his chances of
    winning a motion to suppress before or at trial are minimal because he thinks that,
    once all of the facts come out, he will likely lose. But if we were to allow plain error
    review when no motion to suppress is filed and hence no record is created, that same
    -8-
    STATE V. MILLER
    Opinion of the Court
    defendant might wait to raise a Fourth Amendment issue until appeal and take
    advantage of the undeveloped record—a record in which some or all of the important
    facts may never have been adduced—to claim plain error.          Cf. United States v.
    Chavez–Valencia, 
    116 F.3d 127
    , 132 (5th Cir.) (“If, at trial, the government assumes
    that a defendant will not seek to suppress certain evidence, the government may
    justifiably conclude that it need not introduce the quality or quantity of evidence
    needed otherwise to prevail.”), cert. denied, 
    522 U.S. 926
    , 
    118 S. Ct. 325
    (1997).
    And the State would not have a good way of defending against this tactic. On
    the one hand, the State could try to present evidence at trial in an attempt to prove
    the legality of a search or seizure even when the defendant did not move to suppress
    evidence derived from the search or seizure.         But if the evidence pertinent to
    suppression were not relevant to the question of the defendant’s guilt, then the State
    could be thwarted by rules that prohibit the admission of evidence not relevant to
    issues at trial. See, e.g., N.C. R. Evid. 402. And even if the State were permitted to
    introduce the full range of evidence that pertained to suppression, it would have to
    expend prosecutorial resources presenting evidence not directly relevant to a
    defendant’s guilt—evidence that supported only the legality of a search or seizure
    that the defendant may or may not later challenge on appeal. On the other hand, if
    the State chose not to present evidence supporting an unchallenged search or seizure,
    it could risk reversal on an undeveloped record under the plain error standard. Cf.
    Wainwright v. Sykes, 
    433 U.S. 72
    , 86-91, 
    97 S. Ct. 2497
    , 2506-09 (1977) (using a
    -9-
    STATE V. MILLER
    Opinion of the Court
    similar rationale to explain why the lack of a contemporaneous objection required
    under state law creates a procedural bar to federal habeas review). If a defendant
    must move to suppress to keep from forfeiting even plain error review, however, the
    incentive for a defendant to underhandedly put the State in this position disappears.
    Defendant fails to distinguish between cases like his, on the one hand, and
    cases in which a defendant has moved to suppress and both sides have fully litigated
    the suppression issue at the trial court stage, on the other. When a case falls into the
    latter category but the suppression issue is not preserved for some other reason, our
    appellate courts may still conduct plain error review. For example, in State v. Grice,
    the defendant moved to suppress evidence of marijuana plants, and the trial court
    held a suppression hearing on whether the plants had been obtained through an
    illegal search or seizure. 
    See 367 N.C. at 754-55
    , 
    764, 767 S.E.2d at 314-315
    , 320.
    We conducted plain error review, rather than harmless error review, only because
    the defendant did not renew his objection to the introduction of the evidence at trial.
    
    Id. at 755,
    764, 767 S.E.2d at 315
    , 320.
    Similarly, in State v. Bullock, the defendant moved to suppress evidence of
    heroin found in the car that he was driving, and his Fourth Amendment claim was
    fully litigated at the trial court stage. 
    See 370 N.C. at 256-57
    , 805 S.E.2d at 673. So
    there was a complete record on the suppression issue for our appellate courts to
    review. See 
    id. at 258-61,
    805 S.E.2d at 674-76. We thus reviewed video footage from
    the dash cam of the officer who had stopped the defendant, along with suppression
    -10-
    STATE V. MILLER
    Opinion of the Court
    hearing testimony from that same officer, to determine whether the trial court’s
    findings of fact were supported by competent evidence. See 
    id. at 260-61,
    805 S.E.2d
    at 675-76. In a few instances, we also used facts that we independently gleaned from
    our review of that video footage in our legal analysis to clarify and supplement the
    trial court’s findings of fact. See 
    id. at 261-63,
    805 S.E.2d at 676-77. In other words,
    we used video footage for limited purposes after a suppression hearing had occurred
    and a full evidentiary record had been compiled. That is very different from using
    video footage to substitute for a suppression hearing and an evidentiary record, and
    making determinations about witness credibility in the process, which is what the
    Court of Appeals did here.
    In sum, because defendant did not file a motion to suppress evidence of the
    cocaine in question, he deprived our appellate courts of the record needed to conduct
    plain error review. By doing so, he completely waived appellate review of his Fourth
    Amendment claims. Because we hold that the Court of Appeals should not have
    conducted plain error review in the first place, we do not need to address (and, based
    on our analysis, it would not be possible for us to address) the other issue before us—
    namely, whether the Court of Appeals reached the right conclusion in its plain error
    analysis. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this
    case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant’s ineffective assistance of
    counsel claim.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    -11-