State v. Saldierna ( 2018 )


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  •                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. 271PA15-2
    Filed 17 August 2018
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.
    FELIX RICARDO SALDIERNA
    On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision
    of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 
    803 S.E.2d 33
    (2017), reversing an order
    denying defendant’s motion to suppress entered on 20 February 2014 by Judge
    Forrest Donald Bridges, vacating a judgment entered on 4 June 2014 by Judge Jesse
    B. Caldwell, both in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, and remanding the case
    for further proceedings after the Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded the
    Court of Appeals’ prior decision in this case, State v. Saldierna, 
    242 N.C. App. 347
    ,
    
    775 S.E.2d 326
    (2015). Heard in the Supreme Court on 14 May 2018 in session in the
    Old Burke County Courthouse in the City of Morganton pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-
    10(a).
    Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Kimberly N. Callahan, Assistant
    Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
    Goodman Carr, PLLC, by W. Rob Heroy, for defendant-appellee.
    ERVIN, Justice.
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    The issue before the Court in this case is whether the trial court’s order
    denying defendant’s suppression motion contained sufficient findings of fact to
    support its conclusion that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his juvenile
    rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101 before making certain incriminating
    statements. After careful consideration of defendant’s challenge to the denial of his
    suppression motion in light of the record and the applicable law, we hold that the
    trial court’s order contained sufficient findings to support this conclusion and reverse
    the decision of the Court of Appeals to the contrary.
    From 26 November 2012 to 3 January 2013, defendant Felix Ricardo Saldierna
    and seven other individuals were involved in a series of breakings and enterings that
    occurred in the Charlotte area. After coming home from work on 17 December 2012,
    Cheryl Brewer1 discovered that someone had entered her residence through a broken
    window, scrawled “Merry Chritmas” [sic] across a wall, and stolen a 32-inch television
    and a lock box. On 18 December, a 42-inch television, an Xbox game system, and
    jewelry were stolen from the residence of William Nunez.                Another individual
    suspected in the commission of these crimes told investigating officers that defendant
    had been involved in the underlying break-ins. In January 2013, warrants for arrest
    charging defendant with felonious breaking or entering and conspiracy to commit
    1 The name of the victim set out in the text of this opinion is derived from the factual
    basis statement provided by the prosecutor at the time that defendant entered his negotiated
    guilty plea. The indictment returned against defendant in the relevant cases named the
    alleged victim as Cheryl Drew.
    -2-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    breaking or entering were issued. Based upon the issuance of these warrants for
    arrest, defendant was taken into custody at his home in Fort Mill, South Carolina.
    After having been placed under arrest, defendant was transported to the York
    County Justice Center, where he was interviewed by Detective Aimee Kelly of the
    Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department.         At the beginning of this interview,
    Detective Kelly informed defendant that she was required to inform him of his rights.
    Defendant responded to Detective Kelly’s statement by telling her that “my English
    is good, but like when you say something like that much it’s kind of confusing.” After
    stating that he was sixteen years old, defendant informed Detective Kelly that he was
    taking courses intended for both freshman and sophomore high school students.
    When Detective Kelly asked defendant if he could read, defendant responded in the
    affirmative before adding that he could read English “kind of, a little bit,” and that
    he could read Spanish. At that point, Detective Kelly told defendant that she would
    provide him with a copy of a juvenile rights waiver form in both English and Spanish
    so that he would be able to read along with her while she informed him of his rights.
    At the conclusion of this portion of their discussion, Detective Kelly and defendant
    had the following exchange:
    [Kelly]: You understand I’m a police officer, right?
    [Defendant]: Yes ma[‘]am[.]
    [Kelly]: Ok, and that I would like to talk to you about this.
    And this officer has also explained to me and I understand
    that I have the right to remain silent, that means that I
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    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    don’t have to say anything or answer any questions.
    Should be right there number 1 right on there. Do you
    understand that?
    [Defendant]: [unintelligible] questions?
    [Kelly]: Yes, that is your right? So do you understand that?
    If you understand that, put your initials right there
    showing that you understand that. On this sheet. On this
    one. You can put it on both. Anything I say can be used
    against me. Do you understand that?
    [Defendant]: Yes ma[‘]am.
    [Kelly]: I have the right to have a parent[,] guardian or
    custodian here with me now during questioning. Parent
    means my mother, father, stepmother, or stepfather.
    Guardian means the person responsible for taking care of
    me. Custodian means the person in charge of me where I
    am living. Do you understand that? Do you want to read
    that?
    [Defendant]: Yeah.
    [Kelly]: Do you understand that?
    [Defendant]: [no response]
    [Kelly]: I have the right to talk to a lawyer and to have a
    lawyer here with me now to advise and help during
    questioning. Do you understand that?
    [Defendant]: [unintelligible]
    [Kelly]: If I want to have a lawyer with me during
    questioning one will be provided to me at no cost before any
    questioning. Do you understand that?
    [Defendant]: Yes ma[‘]am.
    -4-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    [Kelly]: Ok. Now I want to talk to you about some stuff
    that’s happened in Charlotte. And um, I will tell you this.
    There’s been some friends of yours that have already been
    questioned about these items and these issues. And
    they’ve been locked up. And that’s what I want to talk to
    you about. Do you want to help me out and to help me
    understand what’s been going on with some of these cases
    and talk to me about this now here?
    [Defendant]: Uh
    [Kelly]: Are you willing to talk to me is what I’m asking.
    [Defendant]: Yes ma[‘]am.
    [Kelly]: Ok. So I am 14 years or more. Let me see that pen.
    And I understand my rights as they’ve been explained by
    [D]etective Kelly. I do wish to answer questions now
    without a lawyer, parent, guardian or custodian here with
    me? My decision to answer questions now is made freely
    and is my own choice. No one has threatened me in any
    way or has promised me any special treatment because I
    have decided to answer questions now. I am signing my
    name below. Do you understand this? Initial, sign, date
    and time.
    [Kelly]: It is 1/9/13. It is 12:10PM.
    [Defendant]: Um, Can I call my mom?
    [Kelly]: Call your mom now?
    [Defendant]: She’s on her um. I think she is on her lunch
    now.
    [Kelly]: You want to call her now before we talk?
    [Kelly] [to other officers]: He wants to call his mom.
    ....
    -5-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    [Other Officer]:   [S]tep back outside and we’ll let you
    call your mom outside. . . .
    ....
    9:50: [Defendant] [can be heard on phone. Call is not
    intelligible.]
    ....
    [Kelly]: 12:20: Alright Felix, so, let’s talk about this thing
    going on. Like I said a lot of your friends have been locked
    up and everybody’s talking. They’re telling me about
    what’s going on and what you’ve been up to. I’m not saying
    you’re the ringleader of this here thing and some kind of
    mastermind right but I think you’ve gone along with these
    guys and gotten yourself into a little bit of trouble here.
    This is not something that’s going to end your life. You
    know what I’m saying. This is not a huge deal. I know you
    guys were going into houses when nobody was home. You
    weren’t looking to hurt anybody or anything like that. I
    just want to hear your side of the story. We can start off.
    I’m going to ask you questions I know the answer to. A lot
    of these questions are to tell if you’re being truthful to me.
    At that point, Detective Kelly interviewed defendant for approximately fifty-four
    minutes concerning the extent of his involvement in the commission of the crimes
    that Detective Kelly was investigating.         During the course of the ensuing
    interrogation, defendant confessed to having been involved in the break-ins that had
    occurred at the residences of Ms. Brewer and Mr. Nunez.
    On 22 January 2013, the Mecklenburg County grand jury returned bills of
    indictment charging defendant with two counts of conspiracy to commit felonious
    breaking, entering, and larceny and two counts of felonious breaking or entering. On
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    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    9 October 2013, defendant filed a motion seeking to have his confession and all of the
    evidence that the State had obtained as a result of the statements that defendant
    made to Detective Kelly suppressed on the grounds that his confession had been
    obtained as the result of violations of N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101 and his federal
    constitutional right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law. According
    to defendant, “[b]y asking to speak to his mother prior to questioning, [d]efendant
    invoked his rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101.” In addition, defendant alleged that, in
    light of his “indicat[ion] that he was not ready to be questioned without her,” “[t]he
    interview should have ceased at that moment and not continued until [d]efendant’s
    mother was present, or should have simply ceased.”
    On 31 January 2014, defendant’s suppression motion came on for hearing
    before Judge Forrest Donald Bridges in the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. At
    the suppression hearing, Detective Kelly testified that, while defendant “spoke
    English clearly and understood what [she] was saying,” “[he] said he wasn’t very good
    at reading English.” Although Detective Kelly acknowledged that defendant might
    have claimed to have had “some issues understanding English,” she stated that
    defendant “seemed to very clearly understand what [she] was asking him” and that
    she had had no trouble understanding defendant at any point during the interview.
    Detective Kelly “found [defendant’s English] to be fine” and believed “that he
    understood [his juvenile] rights.” According to Detective Kelly, defendant followed
    -7-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    along and initialed the relevant portions of the juvenile rights waiver form while she
    read his juvenile rights to him.
    In addition, Detective Kelly asserted at the suppression hearing that
    defendant “never said he wanted his mother [at the interview].” On the other hand,
    Detective Kelly did not ask defendant “whether or not he was ready to proceed” after
    he requested to be allowed to speak with his mother. In fact, defendant had signed
    the juvenile rights waiver form before asking the investigating officers to give him an
    opportunity to call his mother.       Detective Kelly had an “understanding” that
    defendant had called his mother “to let her know where he was and that he was
    arrested.”
    On 20 February 2014, the trial court entered an order denying defendant’s
    suppression motion in which the court found as a fact:
    1.     That Defendant was in custody.
    2.    That Defendant was advised of his juvenile rights
    pursuant to North Carolina General Statute § 7B-2101.
    3.     That Detective Kelly of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
    Police Department advised Defendant of his juvenile
    rights.
    4.     That Defendant was advised of his juvenile rights in
    three manners. Defendant was advised of his juvenile
    rights in spoken English, in written English, and in written
    Spanish.
    5.    That Defendant indicated that he understood his
    juvenile rights as given to him by Detective Kelly.
    -8-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    6.     That Defendant indicated he understood his rights
    after being given and reviewing a form enumerating those
    rights in Spanish.
    7.     That Defendant indicated that he understood that
    he had the right to remain silent. Defendant understood
    that to mean that he did not have to say anything or
    answer any questions. Defendant initialed next to this
    right at number 1 on the English rights form provided to
    him by Detective Kelly to signify his understanding.
    8.     That Defendant indicated he understood that
    anything he said could be used against him. Defendant
    initialed next to this right at number 2 on the English
    rights form provided to him by Detective Kelly to signify
    his understanding.
    9.     That Defendant indicated he understood that he had
    the right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian there
    with him during questioning. Defendant understood the
    word parent meant his mother, father, stepmother, or
    stepfather. Defendant understood the word guardian
    meant the person responsible for taking care of him.
    Defendant understood the word custodian meant the
    person in charge of him where he was living. Defendant
    initialed next to this right at number 3 on the English
    rights form provided to him by Detective Kelly to signify
    his understanding.
    10.    That Defendant indicated he understood that he had
    the right to have a lawyer and that he had the right to have
    a lawyer there with him at the time to advise and help him
    during questioning. Defendant initialed next to this right
    at number 4 on the English rights form provided to him by
    Detective Kelly to signify his understanding.
    11.   That Defendant indicated he understood that if he
    wanted a lawyer there with him during questioning, a
    lawyer would be provided to him at no cost prior to
    questioning. Defendant initialed next to this right at
    -9-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    number 5 on the English rights form provided to him by
    Detective Kelly to signify his understanding.
    12.    That Defendant initialed a space below the
    enumerated rights on the English rights form that stated
    the following: “I am 14 years old or more and I understand
    my rights as explained by Detective Kelly. I DO wi[s]h to
    answer questions now, WITHOUT a lawyer, parent,
    guardian, or custodian here with me. My decision to
    answer questions now is made freely and is my own choice.
    No one has threatened me in any way or promised me
    special treatment. Because I have decided to answer
    questions now, I am signing my name below.”
    13.   That Defendant’s signature appears on the English
    rights form below the initialed portions of the form.
    Defendant’s signature appears next to the date, 1-9-13, and
    the time, 12:10. Detective Kelly signed her name as a
    witness below Defendant’s signature.
    14.   That after being informed of his rights, informing
    Detective Kelly he wished to waive those rights, and
    signing the rights form, Defendant communicated to
    Detective Kelly that he wished to contact his mother by
    phone. Defendant was given permission to do so.
    15.   That Defendant attempted to call his mother, but
    was unable to speak to her.
    16.   That Defendant indicated that his mother was on
    her lunch break at the time he tried to contact her.
    17.    That Defendant did not at that time or any other
    time indicate that he changed his mind regarding his
    desire to speak to Detective Kelly. That Defendant did not
    at that time or any other time indicate that he revoked his
    waiver.
    18.   That Defendant only asked to speak to his mother.
    -10-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    19.    That Defendant did not make his interview
    conditional on having his mother present or conditional on
    speaking to his mother.
    20.   That Defendant did not ask to have his mother
    present at the interview site.
    21.   That, upon review of the totality of the
    circumstances, the Court finds that Defendant’s request to
    speak to his mother was at best an ambiguous request to
    speak to his mother.
    22.   That at no time did Defendant make an
    unambiguous request to have his mother present during
    questioning.
    23.   That Defendant never indicated that his mother was
    on the way or could be present during questioning.
    24.   That Defendant made no request for a delay of
    questioning.
    Based upon these findings of fact, the trial court concluded as a matter of law:
    1.     That the State carried its burden by a
    preponderance of the evidence that Defendant knowingly,
    willingly, and understandingly waived his juvenile rights.
    2.     That the interview process in this case was
    consistent with the interrogation procedures as set forth in
    North Carolina General Statute § 7B-2101.
    3.    That none of Defendant’s State or Federal rights
    were violated during the interview conducted of Defendant.
    4.     That statements made by Defendant were not
    gathered as a result of any State or Federal rights
    violation.
    -11-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    In light of these findings and conclusions, the trial court denied defendant’s
    suppression motion.
    On 4 June 2014, defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to two counts of
    felonious breaking or entering and two counts of conspiracy to commit breaking or
    entering while reserving the right to seek appellate review of the denial of his
    suppression motion.2 Based upon defendant’s plea, Judge Caldwell consolidated
    defendant’s convictions for judgment and entered a judgment sentencing defendant
    to a term of six to seventeen months imprisonment, with this sentence being
    suspended and defendant placed on supervised probation for a period of thirty-six
    months on the condition that defendant serve a forty-five day active sentence, for
    which he received forty-five days’ credit for time spent in pretrial confinement; pay
    the costs; comply with the usual terms and conditions of probation; and have no
    contact with the victim.3 Defendant noted an appeal from Judge Caldwell’s judgment
    to the Court of Appeals.
    2 The plea agreement between defendant and the State provided that, in return for
    defendant’s guilty pleas, the State would voluntarily dismiss one additional count of felonious
    breaking or entering, one count of conspiracy to break or enter, and three counts of felonious
    larceny and that defendant would receive a sentence of six to seventeen months
    imprisonment, with this sentence to be suspended and with defendant to be on supervised
    probation for a period of thirty-six months, with the terms and conditions of defendant’s
    probation including a requirement that he serve a forty-five day split sentence, subject to
    credit for time served in pretrial confinement, and that he be subject to intensive probation
    for a period of one year.
    3The final page of Judge Caldwell’s judgment was omitted from the record on appeal.
    Having obtained a copy of that page from the office of the Clerk of Superior Court,
    Mecklenburg County, we have added it to the record on appeal upon our own motion pursuant
    to N.C.R. App. P. 9(b)(5)b.
    -12-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    In seeking relief from the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that his request
    to call his mother during his conversation with Detective Kelly had constituted “an
    unambiguous invocation of his right to have a parent present during a custodial
    interrogation” and that, in the alternative, even if his request for the presence of his
    mother had been ambiguous, “[Detective] Kelly was required to make further
    inquiries to clarify whether he actually meant that he was invoking his right to end
    the interrogation until his mother was present.” State v. Saldierna, 
    242 N.C. App. 347
    , 353, 
    775 S.E.2d 326
    , 330 (2015) (Saldierna I). In addition, defendant contended
    that the trial court had failed to “appropriately consider his juvenile status in
    determining that his waiver of rights was knowing and voluntary.” 
    Id. at 354,
    775
    S.E.2d at 331.
    In holding that the trial court had erred by denying defendant’s suppression
    motion, the Court of Appeals determined “that[, while] the findings of fact regarding
    the ambiguous nature of [defendant’s] statement, ‘Can I call my mom[,]’ are
    supported by competent evidence,” the “ambiguous [nature of that] statement
    required [Detective] Kelly to clarify whether [defendant] was invoking his right to
    have a parent present during the interview.” 
    Id. at 360,
    775 S.E.2d at 334. As a
    result, the Court of Appeals held “that the trial court erred in concluding that
    [Detective] Kelly complied with the provisions of section 7B-2101” and “reverse[d] the
    trial court’s order, vacate[d] the judgments entered upon [defendant’s] guilty pleas,
    and remand[ed] to the trial court with instructions to grant the motion to suppress.”
    -13-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    
    Id. at 360,
    775 S.E.2d at 334.         This Court granted the State’s petition seeking
    discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’ decision, reversed that decision, and
    remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant’s remaining
    challenge to the trial court’s suppression order. State v. Saldierna, 
    369 N.C. 401
    , 409,
    
    794 S.E.2d 474
    , 479 (2016).4
    In overturning the Court of Appeals’ decision in Saldierna I, this Court
    concluded that defendant’s statement, “Um, [c]an I call my mom?”, did not constitute
    “a clear and unambiguous invocation of his right to have his parent or guardian
    present during questioning.” 
    Id. at 408,
    794 S.E.2d at 479 (citing Davis v. United
    States, 
    512 U.S. 452
    , 459, 
    114 S. Ct. 2350
    , 2355, 
    129 L. Ed. 2d 362
    , 371 (1994) (holding
    that invocation of the right to counsel “requires, at a minimum, some statement that
    can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an
    attorney”)).   “Although defendant asked to call his mother, he never gave any
    indication that he wanted to have her present for his interrogation, nor did he
    condition his interview on first speaking with her.” 
    Id. at 408,
    794 S.E.2d at 479. As
    a result, we determined that the Court of Appeals had erred by holding that the
    ambiguous nature of defendant’s request to be allowed to call his mother required
    4  Justice Beasley dissented from the Court’s decision to reverse the Court of Appeals
    based upon her belief that the record established that defendant had unambiguously invoked
    his right to the presence of a parent and that investigating officers had an obligation to obtain
    clarification of any ambiguous statement that defendant may have made regarding the extent
    to which he desired the presence of a parent prior to being interrogated by Detective Kelly.
    
    Saldierna, 369 N.C. at 409
    , 794 S.E.2d at 479-80 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
    -14-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    Detective Kelly to make further inquiry into the extent to which defendant intended
    to invoke his right to have his mother present before any custodial interrogation could
    commence. 
    Id. at 409,
    794 S.E.2d at 479.
    On remand before the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that the trial court
    had erred by denying his suppression motion on the grounds that his confession had
    been obtained as the result of a violation of both his statutory and constitutional
    rights as a juvenile. According to defendant, the United States Supreme Court held
    in J.D.B. v. North Carolina “that reviewing courts must take into account the
    juvenile’s age and maturity when determining the admissibility of a confession, and
    not to evaluate the confession as if the juvenile were an adult,” citing J.D.B., 
    564 U.S. 261
    , 272, 
    131 S. Ct. 2394
    , 2403, 
    180 L. Ed. 2d 310
    , 323-24 (2011). Defendant argued
    “that the Davis test should not be applied to the context of a juvenile interrogation”
    because “Davis involved an adult,” because “the [United States] Supreme Court did
    not announce that the rule applied equally to juvenile confessions,” and because “the
    [United States] Supreme Court has made clear . . . that juvenile confessions should
    be evaluated differently than adult confessions,” citing, inter alia, In re Gault, 
    387 U.S. 1
    , 
    87 S. Ct. 1428
    , 
    18 L. Ed. 257
    (1967), and J.D.B., 
    564 U.S. 261
    , 
    131 S. Ct. 2394
    ,
    
    180 L. Ed. 2d 310
    .
    In addition, defendant argued that, in light of the totality-of-the-circumstances
    approach outlined in J.D.B., the trial court had erred by failing to consider that
    defendant “was in custody and outnumbered by three law enforcement officers”; had
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    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    “stated to the detective plainly, ‘[c]an I call my mom now?’ ”; was sixteen years old
    and had only completed the eighth grade as of the date of the interrogation; “indicated
    to [Detective Kelly] that his native language was Spanish, that he could not write in
    English, and he may have stated he had difficulty understanding” Detective Kelly;
    provided “unclear” responses to questions that Detective Kelly posed during the
    interrogation; and expressed a desire to call his mother. According to defendant, an
    analysis of the totality of the circumstances surrounding defendant’s interrogation
    established that the trial court had erred by finding that defendant had knowingly
    and voluntarily waived his statutory and constitutional rights.
    The State, on the other hand, argued before the Court of Appeals that
    defendant had knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived his juvenile rights
    when he was advised of those rights in spoken English, written English, and written
    Spanish; had acknowledged that he understood those rights; and had expressed, both
    verbally and in writing, his willingness to waive those rights. “[A]s [ ] evidence of his
    understanding and intention to proceed with the interview,” the State pointed to the
    fact that defendant had “signed each paragraph of the Rights Waiver Form” and had
    gone “on to answer Detective Kelly’s questions for nearly an hour without ever once
    indicating . . . . he did not understand the rights read to him or that he was at all
    unclear about the choice he made to answer questions.” Although “age is to be
    considered by the trial judge,” the State asserted that defendant’s juvenile status and
    grade level did not preclude him from understanding and waiving his juvenile rights.
    -16-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    Moreover, the State claimed that “[t]here is no evidence of mistreatment or coercion”
    during the interrogation. In spite of the fact that it involved the interrogation of an
    adult rather than a juvenile, the State contended that the United States Supreme
    Court’s decision in Davis remains applicable in determining whether defendant had
    validly waived his juvenile rights. Finally, the State argued that defendant’s reliance
    upon J.D.B. was misplaced given that J.D.B. involved the issue of a juvenile’s age as
    “relevant to the determination of whether the child was considered to have been ‘in
    custody’ for Miranda purposes” and given that the United States Supreme Court had
    stated in J.D.B. that “a child’s age will [not] be determinative, or even a significant
    factor in every case,” quoting 
    J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 277
    , 131 S. Ct. at 2406, 
    180 L. Ed. 2d
    at 326.
    In holding that the trial court had erred by denying defendant’s suppression
    motion, the Court of Appeals concluded on remand that defendant did not “knowingly,
    willingly, and understandingly waive[ ] his rights under section 7B-2101 of the North
    Carolina General Statutes and under the constitutions of North Carolina and the
    United States.” State v. Saldierna, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 
    803 S.E.2d 33
    , 35 (2017)
    (Saldierna II). In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals explained that,
    “[w]hether a waiver is knowingly and intelligently made depends on the specific facts
    and circumstances of each case, including the background, experience, and conduct
    of the accused.” Id. at ___, 803 S.E.2d at 36 (quoting State v. Simpson, 
    314 N.C. 359
    ,
    367, 
    334 S.E.2d 53
    , 59 (1985)). According to the Court of Appeals, “[t]he totality of
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    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    the circumstances must be carefully scrutinized when determining if a youthful
    defendant has legitimately waived his Miranda rights,” id. at ___, 803 S.E.2d at 40
    (quoting State v. Reid, 
    335 N.C. 647
    , 663, 
    440 S.E.2d 776
    , 785 (1994) (emphasis
    added)), given that juveniles possess “unique vulnerabilities,” in that “(1) they are
    less likely than adults to understand their rights; and (2) they are distinctly
    susceptible to police interrogation techniques,” id. at ___, 803 S.E.2d at 42 (emphasis
    omitted) (quoting Cara A. Gardner, Failing to Serve and Protect: A Proposal for an
    Amendment to a Juvenile’s Right to a Parent, Guardian, or Custodian During a Police
    Interrogation After State v. Oglesby, 
    86 N.C. L
    . Rev. 1685, 1698 (2008)).
    The Court of Appeals stated that, “despite the trial court’s many findings of
    fact that defendant ‘indicated he understood’ Detective Kelly’s questions and
    statements regarding his rights, the evidence as recorded contemporaneously during
    the questioning and as noted in testimony from the hearing, does not support those
    findings.” Id. at ___, 803 S.E.2d at 41. In addition, the Court of Appeals stated that
    “the findings do not reflect the scrutiny that a trial court is required to give in juvenile
    cases.” Id. at ___, 803 S.E.2d at 41. Among other things, the Court of Appeals noted
    that “no response [was] recorded that [defendant] ‘understood’ ” that Detective Kelly
    had asked defendant to initial, sign, and date the English version of the juvenile
    rights waiver form. Id. at ___, 803 S.E.2d at 41. For that reason, the Court of Appeals
    held that the finding of fact “ ‘[t]hat [d]efendant was advised of his juvenile rights . . .
    in written Spanish,’ is not supported by competent documentary evidence in the
    -18-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    record” and that “the evidence does not support the trial court’s ultimate conclusion
    that defendant executed a valid waiver.” Id. at ___, 803 S.E.2d at 41 (alterations in
    original). As a result, the Court of Appeals determined that “the totality of the
    circumstances set forth in this record ultimately do not fully support the trial court’s
    conclusions of law, namely, ‘[t]hat the State carried its burden by a preponderance of
    the evidence that [d]efendant knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived his
    juvenile rights.’ ” Id. at ___, 803 S.E.2d at 43 (alterations in original). This Court
    granted the State’s petition for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’ remand
    decision in Saldierna II on 1 November 2017.
    In seeking to persuade us to reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision, the State
    claims that the Court of Appeals failed to properly apply the applicable standard of
    appellate review. According to the State, the Court of Appeals should have focused
    upon determining “whether the unchallenged findings of fact supported the trial
    court’s conclusion of law that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his
    juvenile rights.” The State further contends that, even if the trial court’s findings
    had been challenged by defendant as lacking in sufficient evidentiary support, they
    would nevertheless be “conclusive on appeal” because they were “supported by
    competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting,” quoting State v. Eason, 
    336 N.C. 730
    , 745, 
    445 S.E.2d 917
    , 926 (1994), cert. denied, 
    513 U.S. 1096
    , 
    115 S. Ct. 764
    ,
    
    130 L. Ed. 2d 661
    (1995). In the State’s view, the audio recording of defendant’s
    interview with Detective Kelly “demonstrates that defendant had the ability to
    -19-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    understand Detective Kelly as she read him his juvenile rights.” In addition, the
    State notes that, in instances in which defendant failed to provide an audible
    response to Detective Kelly’s inquiries concerning the extent to which defendant
    understood specific juvenile rights, defendant placed his initials by the relevant
    paragraph on the juvenile rights waiver form.            Finally, the State asserts that
    Detective Kelly’s suppression hearing testimony sufficed to support the trial court’s
    findings to the effect that defendant understood Detective Kelly as she read his
    juvenile rights to him.
    Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the State failed to meet its burden
    of demonstrating that he knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived his
    statutory and constitutional rights.    According to defendant, this Court should
    consider defendant’s youth, his request to call his mother, the number of officers
    present during the interrogation, and the misleading statements made to defendant
    by investigating officers in determining that the trial court had erred by denying
    defendant’s suppression motion. In spite of the fact that defendant had initialed the
    juvenile rights waiver form, defendant argues that the fact that his responses to
    Detective Kelly’s questions regarding the extent to which he understood his rights
    were unclear indicates that he had not understood the questions that Detective Kelly
    had posed to him. In addition, defendant notes that the trial court failed to make any
    findings of fact concerning defendant’s “experience, education, background, . . .
    intelligence,” and “capacity to understand the warnings given [to] him” as required
    -20-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    by the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis enunciated in Fare v. Michael C.,
    quoting Fare, 
    442 U.S. 707
    , 725, 
    99 S. Ct. 2560
    , 2571, 
    61 L. Ed. 2d 197
    , 212 (1979).
    In light of these deficiencies in the trial court’s findings of fact and the fact that, in
    the Court of Appeals’ view, the relevant findings were actually mixed findings of fact
    and conclusions of law, defendant contends that the Court of Appeals appropriately
    examined the evidence anew, citing, inter alia, Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business
    Systems, Inc., 
    319 N.C. 534
    , 548, 
    356 S.E.2d 578
    , 586-87 (1987), and had not
    committed any error of law in the course of overturning the trial court’s suppression
    order.
    “The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress is
    whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether
    the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” State v. Biber, 
    365 N.C. 162
    , 167-
    68, 
    712 S.E.2d 874
    , 878 (2011) (citation omitted). The trial court’s findings of fact
    “are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is
    conflicting.” 
    Eason, 336 N.C. at 745
    , 445 S.E.2d at 926. “The conclusions of law made
    by the trial court from such findings, however, are fully reviewable on appeal.” State
    v. McCollum, 
    334 N.C. 208
    , 237, 
    433 S.E.2d 144
    , 160 (1993) (citation omitted), cert.
    denied, 
    512 U.S. 1254
    , 
    114 S. Ct. 2784
    , 
    129 L. Ed. 2d 895
    (1994), post-conviction relief
    granted, State v. McCollum, No. 83 CRS 15506-07, 
    2014 WL 4345428
    (N.C. Super.
    Ct. Robeson County Sept. 2, 2014) (order vacating defendant’s convictions and the
    trial court’s judgment, and mandating defendant’s immediate release from custody).
    -21-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    “[A]n appellate court accords great deference to the trial court . . . because it is
    entrusted with the duty to hear testimony, weigh and resolve any conflicts in the
    evidence, find the facts, and, then based upon those findings, render a legal decision,
    in the first instance, as to whether or not a constitutional violation of some kind has
    occurred.” State v. Cooke, 
    306 N.C. 132
    , 134, 
    291 S.E.2d 618
    , 619-20 (1982).
    N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a) states that
    (a)       [a]ny juvenile in custody must be advised
    prior to questioning:
    (1)     That the juvenile has a right to remain silent;
    (2)     That any statement the juvenile does make
    can be and may be used against the juvenile;
    (3)     That the juvenile has a right to have a parent,
    guardian, or custodian present during
    questioning; and
    (4)     That the juvenile has a right to consult with
    an attorney and that one will be appointed for
    the juvenile if the juvenile is not represented
    and wants representation.
    N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a) (2015).5 The relevant statutory language is clearly intended
    to codify the rights afforded to a juvenile subjected to custodial interrogation
    5 At the time that the interrogation at issue in this case occurred, N.C.G.S. § 7B-
    2101(b) provided that, “[w]hen the juvenile is less than 14 years of age, no in-custody
    admission or confession resulting from interrogation may be admitted into evidence unless
    the confession or admission was made in the presence of the juvenile’s parent, guardian,
    custodian, or attorney.” For offenses committed on or after 1 December 2015, the General
    Assembly amended N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(b) by raising the age at which the presence of the
    juvenile’s parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney is required from less than fourteen to less
    than sixteen. Act of May 26, 2015, ch. 58, secs. 1.1, 4. 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 126, 126, 130.
    -22-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    pursuant to Miranda in addition to affording a juvenile the State statutory right to
    have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during the interrogation process. See
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 444, 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 1612, 
    16 L. Ed. 2d 694
    , 706-07
    (1966) (holding that, “[p]rior to any questioning, [a] person [subjected to custodial
    interrogation] must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
    statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right
    to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed,” although “[t]he
    defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
    voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently”). “If the juvenile indicates in any manner
    and at any stage of questioning pursuant to this section that the juvenile does not
    wish to be questioned further, the officer shall cease questioning.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-
    2101(c). “Before admitting into evidence any statement resulting from custodial
    interrogation, the court shall find that the juvenile knowingly, willingly, and
    understandingly waived the juvenile’s rights.” 
    Id. § 7B-2101(d)
    (2017). The State
    “bears the burden of demonstrating that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently
    made, and an express written waiver, while strong proof of the validity of the waiver,
    is not inevitably sufficient to establish a valid waiver.” 
    Simpson, 314 N.C. at 367
    ,
    334 S.E.2d at 59 (citations omitted); see also State v. Thibodeaux, 
    341 N.C. 53
    , 58,
    However, given that defendant was sixteen years old at the time of the interrogation at issue
    in this case, neither version of N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(b) would have barred the admission of
    defendant’s incriminating statements concerning his involvement in the unlawful break-ins
    at the residence of Ms. Brewer and Mr. Nunez.
    -23-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    
    459 S.E.2d 501
    , 505 (1995) (explaining that “[t]he State has the burden of showing by
    a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent
    waiver of his rights and that his statement was voluntary”). “Whether a waiver is
    knowingly and intelligently made depends on the specific facts and circumstances of
    each case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”
    
    Simpson, 314 N.C. at 367
    , 334 S.E.2d at 59 (citations omitted). As a result, “the court
    [is required to look] at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement”
    in order to determine whether the State has adequately established that a waiver
    was knowingly and intelligently made. 
    Thibodeaux, 341 N.C. at 58
    , 459 S.E.2d at
    505.
    “This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether
    there was been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved.” 
    Fare, 442 U.S. at 725
    , 99 S. Ct. at 
    2572, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 212
    . “The totality approach permits—
    indeed, it mandates—inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the
    interrogation,” including “evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education,
    background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the
    warnings given him, the nature of his . . . rights, and the consequences of waiving
    those rights.” Id. at 
    725, 99 S. Ct. at 2572
    , 61 L. Ed. 2d at 212 (citing North Carolina
    v. Butler, 
    441 U.S. 369
    , 
    99 S. Ct. 1755
    , 
    60 L. Ed. 2d 286
    (1979)). In applying the
    totality-of-the-circumstances test in cases involving the custodial interrogation of
    juveniles, we have noted that “the record must be carefully scrutinized, with
    -24-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    particular attention to both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
    interrogation.” State v. Fincher, 
    309 N.C. 1
    , 19, 
    305 S.E.2d 685
    , 697 (1983) (quoting
    State v. Spence, 
    36 N.C. App. 627
    , 629, 
    244 S.E.2d 442
    , 443, disc. rev. denied, 
    295 N.C. 556
    , 
    248 S.E.2d 734
    (1978)). However, a defendant’s juvenile status “does not compel
    a determination that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda
    rights.” 
    Id. at 19,
    305 S.E.2d at 696-97 (citation omitted). Instead, the juvenile’s age
    is a factor to consider along with “the characteristics of the accused and the details of
    the interrogation.” 
    Id. at 19,
    305 S.E.2d at 697 (quoting 
    Spence, 309 N.C. at 629
    , 244
    S.E.2d at 443).
    A careful review of the record satisfies us that the trial court’s findings of fact
    have adequate evidentiary support and that those findings support the trial court’s
    conclusion that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his juvenile rights. In
    reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals failed to focus upon the
    sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of fact that the trial court actually
    made and to give proper deference to those findings. 
    Cooke, 306 N.C. at 134
    , 291
    S.E.2d at 619-20. Although the Court of Appeals concluded that “the evidence does
    not support the trial court’s findings of fact . . . that defendant ‘understood’ Detective
    Kelly’s questions and statements regarding his rights,” Saldierna II, ___ N.C. App.
    at ___, 803 S.E.2d at 41, the record contains ample support for the trial court’s
    determination that defendant understood his juvenile rights, with this determination
    resting upon the existence of evidence tending to show that Detective Kelly advised
    -25-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    defendant of his juvenile rights in spoken English, written Spanish, and written
    English;6 that defendant initialed each of the rights enumerated on the juvenile
    rights waiver form that Detective Kelly reviewed with him and signed the juvenile
    rights waiver form in such a manner as to indicate that he had decided to waive his
    juvenile rights and to speak with Detective Kelly without the presence of a parent,
    guardian, custodian, or attorney; that defendant answered affirmatively when
    questioned about the extent to which he understood his rights; and that defendant
    “understood what [Detective Kelly] was saying.” As a result, we hold that the Court
    of Appeals erred in determining that the record did not support the trial court’s
    findings to the effect that defendant understood his juvenile rights.
    Admittedly, the record does contain evidence that would have supported a
    different determination concerning the issue of whether defendant understood the
    juvenile rights that were available to him. For example, the record does reflect that
    some of defendant’s responses to Detective Kelly’s inquiries concerning the extent to
    which he understood certain of his rights were “unintelligible” and that English was
    not defendant’s primary language.         However, given the evidence recited above,
    including Detective Kelly’s suppression hearing testimony that defendant “seemed to
    very clearly understand what [she] was asking him” and that his English was “fine,”
    6 In spite of the fact that the record does not contain the Spanish language version of
    the juvenile rights waiver form, the trial court’s determination that defendant was informed
    of his juvenile rights in written form using the Spanish language is amply supported by
    Detective Kelly’s suppression hearing testimony.
    -26-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    the record concerning the extent to which defendant was able to understand the
    English language in general and Detective Kelly’s questions in particular was, at
    most, in conflict. According to well-established North Carolina law, resolution of such
    evidentiary conflicts is a matter for the trial court, which has the opportunity to see
    and hear the witnesses, rather than an appellate court, which is necessarily limited
    to consideration of a cold record even in cases involving audio recordings and
    videographic evidence.
    In addition, the trial court’s findings support its conclusion of law that
    “[d]efendant knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived his juvenile rights.”
    Among other things, the record contains defendant’s express written waiver of his
    juvenile rights which, while not determinative, is “strong proof of the validity of the
    waiver.” 
    Simpson, 314 N.C. at 367
    , 334 S.E.2d at 59. In addition to the express
    written waiver, the record contains evidence tending to show, and the trial court
    found, that defendant was advised of his rights in both written English and Spanish
    and in spoken English.     Moreover, the transcript of defendant’s interview with
    Detective Kelly indicates that, in all but two instances, defendant verbally affirmed
    that he understood his rights and that he was willing to answer Detective Kelly’s
    questions. Aside from the fact that defendant’s suggestion that the inaudibility of
    certain of defendant’s responses demonstrated that he did not understand his rights
    conflicts with Detective Kelly’s suppression hearing testimony to the contrary and
    the fact that the record contains no evidence tending to show that defendant ever
    -27-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    expressed a lack of willingness to speak with Detective Kelly, sought to invoke his
    rights, or was unable to adequately communicate with the investigating officers, this
    aspect of defendant’s argument represents, in essence, an attempt to persuade us to
    reweigh the evidence and reach a different result with respect to a factual issue other
    than that deemed appropriate by the trial court. Similarly, the Court of Appeals’
    determinations that defendant’s request to call his mother “shows enough
    uncertainty, enough anxiety on [defendant’s] behalf, so as to call into question
    whether, under all the circumstances present in this case, the waiver was
    (unequivocally) valid” and that defendant’s “last ditch effort to call his mother (for
    help), after his prior attempt to call her had been unsuccessful,[7] was a strong
    indication that he did not want to waive his rights at all,” Saldierna II, ___ N.C. App.
    at ___, 803 S.E.2d at 42, are inconsistent with the trial court’s findings of fact
    concerning the circumstances surrounding defendant’s attempt to call his mother,
    which we have already found to have adequate record support. Finally, the record
    contains no allegations of coercive police conduct or the use of improper interrogation
    techniques.8 As a result, we hold that the trial court did not err by concluding that
    7 A number of statements that were made by investigating officers during Detective
    Kelly’s interview with defendant suggest that defendant had made an earlier, unsuccessful
    attempt to reach his mother before the phone call reflected in the interview transcript.
    8 Both defendant and the Court of Appeals appear to assert that Detective Kelly’s
    statement to defendant that “[t]his is not something that’s going to end your life” and “is not
    a huge deal” constituted a deceptive statement that should be weighed in favor of a finding
    that defendant had not voluntarily waived his juvenile rights. We are acutely aware that the
    incurrence of a felony conviction can have significant, and lasting, effects upon a juvenile’s
    -28-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Opinion of the Court
    defendant had knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived his juvenile rights
    and that the Court of Appeals’ decision to the contrary should be reversed.9
    REVERSED.
    prospects. However, we are not persuaded that the statement in question constitutes official
    misconduct sufficient to compel a conclusion that defendant’s will was overborne at the time
    that he decided to waive his juvenile rights and speak with Detective Kelly and believe that
    it simply reflects Detective Kelly’s opinion that defendant was not suspected of having
    committed other, more serious criminal offenses.
    9 A considerable amount of defendant’s argument to this Court focuses upon policy,
    rather than legal or evidentiary, considerations. Although defendant points to a substantial
    body of research that suggests that juveniles are unable to understand the language typically
    used in informing them of their rights, the approach that defendant advocates in reliance
    upon this information lacks support in the precedent of the United States Supreme Court or
    of this Court. On the contrary, as we have already noted, the United States Supreme Court
    has explicitly held that the totality-of-the-circumstances test for determining the validity of
    waivers of a defendant’s Miranda rights is equally applicable to adults and juveniles, see
    
    Fare, 442 U.S. at 725
    , 99 S. Ct. at 
    2572, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 212
    , with a juvenile’s age being a
    relevant, but not determinative, factor in the required analysis. Nothing in the record that
    has been presented for our consideration tends to show that the trial court failed to properly
    incorporate evidence concerning defendant’s age or his linguistic and educational status into
    the required totality-of-the-circumstances evaluation.
    -29-
    STATE V. SALDIERNA
    Beasley, J., dissenting
    Justice BEASLEY dissenting.
    In Saldierna I, I dissented because defendant’s statement, “Um, [c]an I call my
    mom?”, was an unambiguous invocation of his right to have a parent present during
    questioning. See State v. Saldierna (Saldierna I), 
    369 N.C. 401
    , 409, 
    794 S.E.2d 474
    ,
    479 (2016) (Beasley, J., dissenting).       Upon this unambiguous invocation, law
    enforcement should have immediately ceased questioning and not resumed until
    defendant’s mother was present or he reinitiated the conversation. See 
    id. at 412,
    794 S.E.2d at 481 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 
    451 U.S. 477
    , 484-85, 
    68 L. Ed. 2d 378
    ,
    386 (1981)). Defendant did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his
    right to have his mother present—rather, he unambiguously invoked that right.
    Thus, for the reasons stated in my dissent to Saldierna I, I respectfully dissent.
    -1-