Azar v. Town of Indian Trail Bd. of Adjustment , 257 N.C. App. 1 ( 2017 )


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  •                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA17-704
    Filed: 19 December 2017
    Union County, No. 17 CVS 45
    CHRIS AZAR, Petitioner,
    v.
    TOWN OF INDIAN TRAIL BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, Respondent.
    Appeal by petitioner from order entered 4 April 2017 by Judge Kevin M.
    Bridges in Union County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 November
    2017.
    Steven D. Starnes for petitioner-appellant.
    Middlebrooks Law PLLC, by James G. Middlebrooks, for respondent-appellees.
    TYSON, Judge.
    Chris Azar (“Appellant”) appeals from the superior court’s order granting the
    Town of Indian Trail Board of Adjustment’s motion to dismiss Appellant’s petition for
    judicial review of the Town of Indian Trail’s denial of a special use permit. We affirm.
    I. Background
    Appellant owns a parcel of real property located within the jurisdictional limits
    of the Town of Indian Trail (the “Town”). Appellant has long intended to build town
    homes upon this property. Around 2003, the Town advised Appellant to petition to
    rezone his property from Light Industrial to Multi-Family, which was allowed.
    AZAR V. TOWN OF INDIAN TRAIL
    Opinion of the Court
    Subsequently, Appellant applied to the Town for and was granted a special use
    permit for a multi-family housing project in 2004.        The special use permit was
    renewed in 2006 and again in 2012.
    In 2016, Appellant requested another renewal of the special use permit. The
    Town’s Board of Adjustment conducted a hearing on 27 October 2016 to decide
    whether to grant Appellant’s renewal request. The Town’s Board of Adjustment
    denied Appellant’s request to renew his special use permit. The Board of Adjustment
    voted on four factors specified in the town zoning ordinance to determine whether
    Appellant’s special use permit request should be granted.
    On the first factor of “Not Materially Endanger the Public Health or Safety[,]”
    “[t]he Board voted 5 to 0 that the proposed [special use permit] request would
    materially endanger the public health or safety.”        On the second factor of “Not
    Substantially Injure the Value of Adjoining or Abutting Property[,]” “[t]he Board
    voted 3 to 2 that the proposed [special use permit] request would substantially injure
    the value of adjoining or abutting property.”
    On the third factor of “Be in Harmony With The Area In Which It Is To Be
    Located[,]” “[t]he Board voted 5 to 0 that the proposed [special use permit] request
    would be in harmony with the area in which it is to be located.” On the fourth factor
    of “Be in General Conformity With The Town of Indian Trail Comprehensive Plan or
    Other Adopted Plans[,]” “[t]he Board voted 5 to 0 that the proposed [special use
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    AZAR V. TOWN OF INDIAN TRAIL
    Opinion of the Court
    permit] request would be in general conformity with the Town of Indian Trail
    Comprehensive Plan or other adopted [plan].”
    Appellant received written notice of the Board of Adjustment’s denial of his
    special use permit request on 15 December 2016. On 5 January 2017, Appellant filed
    a petition for judicial review under writ of certiorari of the decision to deny the special
    use permit. Appellant’s petition named the Board of Adjustment, but not the Town,
    as the respondent to the action. Appellant’s petition stated that he was seeking
    judicial review pursuant to “N.C. G.S. 150B-45[,]” which is the portion of the North
    Carolina Administrative Procedure Act statute providing for judicial review of
    administrative decisions of state agencies. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-1 et seq. (2015).
    The Board of Adjustment moved to dismiss Appellant’s petition pursuant to
    both Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, for
    the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the failure to join a
    necessary party, respectively. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7)
    (2015).   The Board of Adjustment asserted the following bases in its motion to
    dismiss: (1) the superior court lacked jurisdiction to review Appellant’s petition under
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-45, because that statute does not apply to local governmental
    units; (2) Appellant failed to name the Town as the respondent to the action pursuant
    to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393(e) (2015); and (3) Appellant failed to file a proper
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    AZAR V. TOWN OF INDIAN TRAIL
    Opinion of the Court
    petition for writ of certiorari within 30 days of 15 December 2016 pursuant to N.C.
    Gen. Stat. §§ 160A-388(e2)(2) and -393 (2015).
    Appellant filed an amended petition for judicial review under writ of certiorari
    pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393 naming the Town as the respondent on 29
    March 2017. Respondent Town asserts this later filed amended petition does not
    relate back to Appellant’s initial petition.
    On 4 April 2017, the superior court granted the Town’s motion to dismiss, and
    concluded that the “initial petition in this case failed to comply [with] N.C. Gen. Stat.
    § 160A-393, and his petition filed on March 29, 2017, was filed long after the 30-day
    limitation period for appealing such decisions.”          Appellant timely filed notice of
    appeal.
    II. Jurisdiction
    Jurisdiction lies in this Court from a final order of the superior court pursuant
    to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2015).
    III. Standard of Review
    “This Court must conduct a de novo review of the pleadings to determine their
    legal sufficiency and to determine whether the trial court’s ruling on the motion to
    dismiss was correct.” Leary v. N.C. Forest Prods., Inc., 
    157 N.C. App. 396
    , 400, 
    580 S.E.2d 1
    , 4, aff’d per curiam, 
    357 N.C. 567
    , 
    597 S.E.2d 673
    (2003).
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    AZAR V. TOWN OF INDIAN TRAIL
    Opinion of the Court
    Quasi-judicial decisions by a city’s Board of Adjustment are “subject to review
    by the superior court by proceedings in the nature of certiorari pursuant to G.S. 160A-
    393.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-388(e2)(2). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393(e) provides that
    “[t]he respondent named in the petition shall be the city whose decision-making board
    made the decision that is being appealed[.]”
    A party is a “necessary party” to an action when he or she “is so vitally
    interested in the controversy involved in the action that a valid judgment cannot be
    rendered in the action completely and finally determining the controversy without
    his presence as a party.” Booker v. Everhart, 
    294 N.C. 146
    , 156, 
    240 S.E.2d 360
    , 365-
    66 (1978) (citations omitted). Dismissal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule
    12(b)(7) for failure to join a necessary party “is proper only when the defect cannot be
    cured[.]” Howell v. Fisher, 
    49 N.C. App. 488
    , 491, 
    272 S.E.2d 19
    , 22 (1980) (citations
    omitted), disc. review denied, 
    302 N.C. 218
    , 
    277 S.E.2d 69
    (1981).
    IV. Analysis
    A. Dismissal
    The trial court dismissed Appellant’s amended petition for judicial review for
    his failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) and for
    Appellant’s failure to join the Town, as opposed to the Town’s Board of Adjustment,
    as a necessary party in his original petition under Rule 12(b)(7).
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    AZAR V. TOWN OF INDIAN TRAIL
    Opinion of the Court
    The statutes pertinent to Appellant’s petition for review of the Board's
    decision in this case provide as follows:
    Every quasi-judicial decision shall be subject to review by
    the superior court by proceedings in the nature of certiorari
    pursuant to G.S. 160A-393. A petition for review shall be
    filed with the clerk of superior court by the later of 30 days
    after the decision is effective or after a written copy thereof
    is given in accordance with subdivision (1) of this
    subsection. When first-class mail is used to deliver notice,
    three days shall be added to the time to file the petition.
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-388(e2)(2) (emphasis supplied).
    The respondent named in the petition shall be the city whose
    decision-making board made the decision that is being
    appealed, except that if the petitioner is a city that has filed
    a petition pursuant to subdivision (4) of subsection (d) of
    this section, then the respondent shall be the decision-
    making board. If the petitioner is not the applicant before
    the decision-making board whose decision is being
    appealed, the petitioner shall also name that applicant as
    a respondent. Any petitioner may name as a respondent
    any person with an ownership or leasehold interest in the
    property that is the subject of the decision being appealed
    who participated in the hearing, or was an applicant,
    before the decision-making board.
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393(e) (emphasis supplied).
    B. Failure to Name the Town in the Original Petition
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393(e) plainly requires the Town, and not the Town’s
    Board of Adjustment, to be named as the respondent in the petition for judicial
    review. 
    Id. Appellant originally
    named “The Town of Indian Trail Board of
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    AZAR V. TOWN OF INDIAN TRAIL
    Opinion of the Court
    Adjustment” as the respondent in his original petition. Defendant subsequently
    named “Town of Indian Trail” as the respondent in his amended petition.
    It is undisputed Appellant filed his original petition on 5 January 2017, within
    30 days of the Board’s provision of written notice to him of its denial of his special-
    use permit on 15 December 2016. Appellant did not seek to amend his petition to
    name the Town as respondent, and not the Town’s Board of Adjustment, until 29
    March 2017, after the Board of Adjustment’s motion to dismiss was filed, and nearly
    three and a half months after Appellant received written notice of the Board’s
    decision.
    Appellant cites MYC Klepper/Brandon Knolls L.L.C. v. The Board of Adjust.
    for City of Asheville and argues the Town has been properly joined as a party to the
    suit, in order to reverse the superior court’s dismissal. 
    238 N.C. App. 432
    , 
    767 S.E.2d 668
    (2014). In MYC Klepper, the petitioner was a billboard sign owner, who had filed
    a petition for writ of certiorari, seeking review of the Asheville Board of Adjustment's
    decision to uphold a notice of violation regarding a billboard sign the petitioner
    owned. 
    Id. at 433-35,
    767 S.E.2d at 669-71. The petitioner named the “Board of
    Adjustment for the City of Asheville,” not the “City of Asheville,” as is required by
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393(e). 
    Id. at 436,
    767 S.E.2d at 671; see N.C. Gen. Stat. §
    160A-393(e) (“The respondent named in the petition shall be the city whose decision-
    making board made the decision that is being appealed[.]”).
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    AZAR V. TOWN OF INDIAN TRAIL
    Opinion of the Court
    On appeal, this Court stated that the “defect” to name the City amounted to a
    failure to join a necessary party. 
    Id. “[T]he City
    was on notice of this action and
    participated in the defense thereof[,]” and “the City's participation in the proceedings
    cured the defect in the petition[.]” 
    Id. at 437,
    767 S.E.2d at 671. The Court held, in
    part, “[b]ecause the City's participation in the proceedings cured the defect in the
    petition, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying the Board’s motion to
    dismiss the petition.” 
    Id. Unlike the
    City of Asheville in MYC Klepper, the Town has not participated in
    the hearings of this action to waive Appellant’s failure to join them as a necessary
    party. See 
    Id. There has
    not been a hearing in the superior court to review the Town’s
    zoning decision, only a hearing on the Board of Adjustment’s motion to dismiss, which
    the Town did not participate in. Although the Town filed a motion for an extension
    of time to respond to Appellant’s initial petition, this action does not waive the defense
    of failure to join a necessary party. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b) (“Obtaining
    an extension of time within which to answer or otherwise plead shall not constitute
    a waiver of any defense herein set forth.”)
    C. Relation Back
    Under the present facts, Appellant must show the amended petition naming
    the Town relates back to the filing of his initial petition, in order for his amended
    petition not to be barred under the 30-day period for filing petitions for judicial review
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    AZAR V. TOWN OF INDIAN TRAIL
    Opinion of the Court
    of quasi-judicial zoning decisions. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393(e).      Appellant
    argues the amended petition should relate back to his original petition under Rule 15
    of our Rules of Civil Procedure, and be deemed timely filed. We disagree. The relation
    back rule “does not apply to the naming of a new party-defendant to the action.”
    Crossman v. Moore, 
    341 N.C. 185
    , 187, 
    459 S.E.2d 715
    , 717 (1995).
    In this case, Appellant named the Board of Adjustment for the Town of Indian
    Trail as respondent instead of naming the Town, as is required by N.C. Gen. Stat. §
    160A-393(e). The real party-in-interest in this case is the Town, not the Board of
    Adjustment. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393(e). The question becomes whether the
    defect in the original petition of naming the Board as the respondent, instead of the
    Town, was sufficient to bar Appellant’s petition and support the Town’s motion to
    dismiss, or whether the defect was merely technical in nature and subject to remedy
    under the relation back rule.
    Appellant filed his amended petition naming the Town as the respondent on
    29 March 2017, two and a half months late, and well outside the 30-day limitations
    period for filing petitions for judicial review of zoning decisions of towns. N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 160A-388(e2)(2). 
    Id. Here, the
    Board is a different party from the Town.           According to our
    precedents, Appellant’s amended petition does not relate back to his original filing.
    Piland v. Hertford Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs., 
    141 N.C. App. 293
    , 301-02, 
    539 S.E.2d 669
    ,
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    AZAR V. TOWN OF INDIAN TRAIL
    Opinion of the Court
    674 (2000). In Piland, a factually similar case to MYC Klepper, the Hertford County
    Board of Commissioners argued the trial court had erred in denying its motion to
    dismiss pursuant to N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (2), (4), (6) and (7). 
    Id. at 294-95,
    539 S.E.2d at 670. The Commissioners contended that the plaintiffs had
    failed to join the proper defendant, Hertford County, and that plaintiffs attempt to
    amend their complaint to name Hertford County was barred by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
    54.1 (1996), the two-month statute of limitations for challenging zoning decisions of
    a county. 
    Id. at 295,
    539 S.E.2d at 671.
    This Court recognized “the plaintiffs’ attempt to amend the summons and
    complaint in the instant case by changing the name of the party-defendant to
    Hertford County in place of the Board of Commissioners effectively seeks to add a
    new party-defendant rather than merely correct a misnomer, and the relation-back
    rule therefore cannot apply[.]” 
    Id. at 301-02,
    539 S.E.2d at 674. The Court held “the
    plaintiffs’ suit against the county was time-barred under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54.1,
    and the trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. 
    Id. at 302,
    539 S.E.2d at 674; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15(c).
    Appellant failed to join the Town as respondent in his initial petition, as is
    statutorily required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393(e), and he filed the amended
    petition outside the 30-day limitations period provided by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-
    388(e2)(2). Appellant’s amended petition does not relate to his initial petition because
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    AZAR V. TOWN OF INDIAN TRAIL
    Opinion of the Court
    it attempted to add the Town as a new party, outside the 30-day limitations period.
    See id.; see also 
    Crossman, 341 N.C. at 187
    , 459 S.E.2d at 717 (holding that relation
    back rule “does not apply to the naming of a new party-defendant to the action”).
    The Town has not waived Defendant’s failure to name them as the respondent
    in his initial petition by participating in the hearing on the Board of Adjustment’s
    motion to dismiss. See MYC Klepper, 238 N.C. App. at 
    437, 767 S.E.2d at 671
    (holding
    City of Asheville waived failure to be joined as a necessary party by participating in
    proceedings before superior court). As this defect in Appellant’s initial petition was
    not and could not be cured by his amended petition under the relation back doctrine,
    the superior court properly granted the Board’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7).
    See 
    Howell, 49 N.C. App. at 488
    , 491, 
    272 S.E.2d 19
    , 22 (holding dismissal for failure
    to join a necessary party is proper when the “defect cannot be cured.”)
    D. Misnaming of Judicial Review Statute
    The Town also based its motion to dismiss upon Appellant’s improperly seeking
    judicial review pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-45, under the Administrative
    Procedure Act, and not under the proper statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393(e).
    Based upon our resolution of the issue that Appellant failed to correctly name or join
    the Town in his initial petition, it is unnecessary to, and we do not address the parties’
    remaining arguments concerning Appellant’s original petition being brought under
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-45 instead of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-393(e).
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    AZAR V. TOWN OF INDIAN TRAIL
    Opinion of the Court
    V. Conclusion
    Appellant has failed to show any reversible error in the superior court’s order.
    The superior court’s grant of the Board’s motion to dismiss for failure to join a
    necessary party is affirmed It is so ordered.
    AFFIRMED.
    Judge CALABRIA concurs.
    Judge DAVIS concurs in the result only.
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