The Guiding Light Missionary Baptist Ass'n ( 2015 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-750
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 3 February 2015
THE GUIDING LIGHT MISSIONARY
BAPTIST ASSOCIATION, INC.
Plaintiff,
v. Rowan County
No. 12 CVS 270
MT. ZION BAPTIST CHURCH, BOYDEN
QUARTERS,
Defendants.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 4 June 2013 and
judgment entered 1 April 2014 by Judge Mark E. Klass in Rowan
County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20
November 2014.
Nancy R. Gaines for plaintiff-appellant.
Kluttz Reamer Hayes Randolph Adkins & Carter, LLP, by
Richard R. Reamer, for defendant-appellee.
STEELMAN, Judge.
The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s claim
against Barr at summary judgment because there was a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Barr’s actions were
justified. Where, on appeal, plaintiff failed to argue the
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issue of whether it was entitled to recover punitive damages
from Barr, any appeal of that claim is deemed abandoned, and is
dismissed.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The Guiding Light Missionary Baptist Association, Inc.
(plaintiff) is an incorporated religious organization made up of
individual member churches. Mt. Zion Baptist Church, Boyden
Quarters (Mt. Zion) was a member of plaintiff. In 2003,
plaintiff decided to build a Convention Center, and in 2005
acquired financing for the project. Mt. Zion, as a member of
plaintiff, committed to pay $550.00 per month towards debt
incurred in the construction of the Convention Center. In July
2010, Corey Barr (Barr) became Pastor of Mt. Zion Church. Up to
that time, Mt. Zion had paid all of the monthly installments
towards the Convention Center debt, without missing a payment.
In February of 2011, Mt. Zion removed itself from plaintiff
and stopped paying the monthly installments towards the debt for
plaintiff’s Convention Center. Plaintiff brought this action
against Mt. Zion, seeking monetary damages for breach of
contract, and against Barr, seeking monetary damages for
tortious interference with a contract and punitive damages.
Plaintiff’s complaint also sought a temporary restraining order
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and preliminary injunction against Barr. On 4 April 2013,
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking
dismissal of the claims against Mt. Zion and Barr, and also for
summary judgment on Mt. Zion’s counterclaim. On 4 June 2013,
the trial court entered its summary judgment order, dismissing
plaintiff’s claims with respect to Barr, but denied summary
judgment with respect to the claims between plaintiff and Mt.
Zion. Plaintiff initially attempted to appeal this order on 19
June 2013. On 1 November 2013, this Court dismissed that appeal
as interlocutory, since there were unresolved claims between
plaintiff and Mt. Zion. Those claims were tried before Judge
Klass and a jury at the 24 March 2014 session of Superior Court
for Rowan County. On 1 April 2014, the trial court entered
judgment based upon the jury verdict awarding damages of $13,200
to plaintiff against Mt. Zion for breach of contract. The
judgment also awarded $3,000 to Mt. Zion on its counterclaim
against plaintiff.
Plaintiff appeals the final judgment of 1 April 2014, and
all interlocutory orders entered in this matter, including the
summary judgment order of 4 June 2013.
II. Summary Judgment
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In its only argument on appeal, plaintiff contends that the
trial court erred in dismissing its claims against Barr for
tortious interference with a contract and punitive damages. We
agree in part.
A. Standard of Review
“Our standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment
is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the record
shows that ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.’” In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572,
576 (2008)(quoting Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 524, 649 S.E.2d
382, 385 (2007)); see also N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the lack
of triable issues of fact. Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280
N.C. 513, 518, 186 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1972). On appeal from
summary judgment, "[w]e review the record in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party." Bradley v. Hidden Valley
Transp., Inc., 148 N.C. App. 163, 165, 557 S.E.2d 610, 612
(2001) (citation omitted), aff'd per curiam, 355 N.C. 485, 562
S.E.2d 422 (2002). Summary judgment is improperly granted where
there is a genuine issue of material fact.
B. Claim for Tortious Interference with a Contract
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Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment as to the tortious interference with a contract
claim against Barr, contending that there are genuine issues of
material fact regarding the elements of that claim.
The elements of a claim for tortious interference with a
contract are: (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third
party, which confers upon plaintiff a contractual right against
a third party; (2) defendant knows of the contract; (3)
defendant intentionally induces the third party not to perform
the contract; (4) and in doing so acts without justification;
and (5) resulting in actual damage to plaintiff. Holroyd v.
Montgomery Cty., 167 N.C. App. 539, 546, 606 S.E.2d 353, 358
(2004), disc. review denied and cert. denied, 359 N.C. 631, 613
S.E.2d 690 (2005).
"[A] third party who induces one party to terminate or fail
to renew a contract with another may be held liable for
malicious interference with the party's contractual rights if
the third party acts without justification." Fitzgerald v.
Wolf, 40 N.C. App. 197, 199, 252 S.E.2d 523, 524 (1979). For
Barr to be liable for tortious interference with the contract
between plaintiff and Mt. Zion, his interference must have been
"without justification." The justification for an actor's
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conduct depends upon "the circumstances surrounding
the interference, the actor's motive or conduct, the interests
sought to be advanced, the social interest in protecting the
freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of
the other party." Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Hooks, 322 N.C.
216, 221, 367 S.E.2d 647, 650, reh'g denied, 322 N.C. 486, 370
S.E.2d 227 (1988). Finally, "a person is justified in inducing
the termination of a contract of a third party if he does so for
a reason reasonably related to a legitimate business
interest." Fitzgerald, 40 N.C. App. at 200, 252 S.E.2d at 524.
The only issue in the instant case concerns the fourth
element of the tortious interference claim; specifically whether
Barr had justification for his actions resulting in Mt. Zion
stopping payments to plaintiff towards the Convention Center
debt. Plaintiff contends that Barr had no justification for his
actions resulting in Mt. Zion’s stopping the payments to
plaintiff. Affidavits before the trial court at the summary
judgment hearing tend to show that Barr expressed
dissatisfaction with plaintiff’s financial practices. While
plaintiff contends that Barr acted solely out of malice towards
plaintiff, Barr contends that his actions were justified by
plaintiff violating its own bylaws and constitution regarding
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financial matters. Barr also contends that he was doing what
was in the best interest of Mt. Zion, which was his role as
pastor of the church. The question of whether Barr was
justified in his actions that resulted in Mt. Zion breaching the
contract with plaintiff is a genuine issue of material fact.
The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s claim for
tortious interference with a contract against Barr. The trial
court’s order of 4 June 2013 is reversed as to this claim, and
this matter is remanded to the trial court for a jury trial.
C. Punitive Damages Claim
On appeal, plaintiff has failed to present any argument
that the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Barr on plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages was improper.
Any appeal of this issue is deemed abandoned, and is dismissed.
N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).
III. Final Judgment
Although plaintiff has raised arguments concerning the
summary judgment order of 4 June 2013, plaintiff makes no
arguments with respect to the final judgment of 1 April 2014.
We deem such arguments abandoned, and dismiss them. N.C. R.
App. P. 28(b)(6).
REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.
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Judges GEER and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).