State v. Wilson ( 2015 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA15-536
Filed: 20 October 2015
Guilford County, Nos. 13CRS076515-16, 76518, 76522, 76524, 76526, 76528-30,
76532-33, 76538
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
MICHAEL CAIN WILSON
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 2 December 2014 by Judge
Lindsay R. Davis in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
12 October 2015.
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph L.
Hyde, for the State.
William D. Spence, for Defendant-Appellant.
DILLON, Judge.
Defendant entered a guilty plea to seven counts of first degree rape of a child
under thirteen years of age, two counts of sexual offense by a parent, two counts of
statutory rape of a child between thirteen and fifteen years of age, and one count of
intentional child abuse inflicting serious injury. Three of the seven counts of first
degree rape occurred between January 1991 and January 1994 and were therefore
governed by the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”). The trial court consolidated the three
STATE V. WILSON
Opinion of the Court
FSA offenses for judgment and sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment as
prescribed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-1.1(a)(2) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1995).1 The
court consolidated the remaining offenses and sentenced Defendant as a prior record
level (“PRL”) I to a consecutive prison term of 240 months to 297 months under the
applicable version of structured sentencing. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17(c), (e)
(1997). Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.
Counsel appointed to represent Defendant is unable to identify any issue with
sufficient merit to support a meaningful argument for relief on appeal and asks that
this Court conduct its own review of the record for possible prejudicial error. Counsel
shows to the satisfaction of this Court that he has complied with the requirements of
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), and State
v. Kinch, 314 N.C. 99, 331 S.E.2d 665 (1985), by advising Defendant of his right to
file written arguments with this Court and providing him with the documents
necessary to do so. Defendant has not filed any written arguments on his own behalf
with this Court, and a reasonable time for him to do so has expired. In accordance
with Anders, we have fully examined the record to determine whether any issues of
arguable merit appear therefrom. We are unable to find any possible prejudicial error
and conclude that the appeal is wholly frivolous.
1 State v. Ballew, 113 N.C. App. 674, 682, 440 S.E.2d 565, 571 (1994) (“First-degree rape is a
class B felony which carries a mandatory life sentence.”), aff'd per curiam, 339 N.C. 733, 453 S.E.2d
865 (1995).
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STATE V. WILSON
Opinion of the Court
The State has moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Defendant has
no cognizable ground for direct appeal under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(a1)-(a2), (e)
(2013), and this Court’s decision in State v. Hamby, 129 N.C. App. 366, 369, 499
S.E.2d 195, 196 (1998). We agree with the State that Defendant has no viable claim
within his limited appeal of right from a guilty plea under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1444. Defendant received a mandatory sentence under the FSA; he was sentenced
as a PRL I and within the presumptive range of structured sentencing for his
remaining offenses and he neither preserved the right to appeal the denial of a motion
to suppress nor moved to withdraw his guilty plea. See State v. Pimental, 153 N.C.
App. 69, 73, 568 S.E.2d 867, 870 (2002). Accordingly, we allow the State’s motion and
dismiss Defendant’s appeal. See Hamby, 129 N.C. App. at 369, 499 S.E.2d at 196
(“[I]f during plea negotiations the defendant essentially stipulated to matters that
moot the issues he could have raised under [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444](a2), his
appeal should be dismissed.”).
DISMISSED.
Chief Judge McGEE and Judge HUNTER, JR., concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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