State v. Chamberlain , 232 N.C. App. 246 ( 2014 )

NO. COA13-886
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 4 February 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Durham County
No. 12 CRS 57142
CHRISTINE RENA CHAMBERLAIN
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 26 March 2013 by
Judge Allen Baddour in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 11 December 2013.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Carolyn McLain, for the State.
Peter Wood for Defendant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Evidence and Procedural History
On 31 December 2011, the district court in Durham County
issued a misdemeanor criminal summons (“First Summons”) asserting
that probable cause was present to believe that Christine Rena
Chamberlain (“Defendant”) committed one count of injury to real
property. According to the summons, Anthony Waraksa (“Waraksa”),
the complainant, alleged that Defendant destroyed “THREE LIGUSTRUM
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TREES” located on his property on 5 April 2011. The case was later
dismissed by the district court due to a “fatal variance.”1
Following dismissal, on 22 July 2012, the district court
issued a second misdemeanor criminal summons (“Second Summons”)
alleging probable cause to believe that Defendant had committed
two counts of injury to real property. According to the Second
Summons, Waraksa alleged that Defendant had destroyed, respective
to the two counts charged, (1) “TREES, LAWN[,] AND FLOWERBEDS” and
(2) “THREE LIGUSTRUM SHRUBS,” both located on his property. This
allegedly occurred between 30 September 2010 and 22 February 2011.
The Second Summons is the origin of the judgment that is now under
review.
After a trial on the Second Summons, the district court found
Defendant not guilty on the first count of injury to real property,
related to destruction of trees, lawn, and flowerbeds, and guilty
on the second count of injury to real property, related to the
destruction of the Ligustrum shrubs. Defendant gave written notice
of appeal to the Durham County Superior Court on 14 November 2012.
1 The court did not provide any more detail on the reason for its
dismissal. However, Defendant asserts in her brief, pursuant to
statements made by her trial counsel in the superior court trial,
that “Waraksa was apparently confused when he took out the first
warrant[ and] gave the wrong date to the magistrate.”
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Beginning 25 March 2013, Defendant was tried before a jury in
superior court on the second count of injury to real property,
regarding the destruction of the shrubs. Defendant made a pre–
trial motion to dismiss that charge on double jeopardy grounds,
arguing that the original dismissal in the district court
constituted an acquittal for the allegedly offending conduct and
that she could not be re-tried for that conduct in superior court.
That motion was denied. The evidence presented at trial tended to
show the following:
Defendant and her husband, James Chamberlain, live next to
Waraksa and his wife, Harriett Sander (“Sander”) in Durham, North
Carolina. They had a friendly relationship until April of 2009,
when Defendant published information communicated to her by
Waraksa in confidence. At that point, Waraksa broke off the
friendship. The following year, in September of 2010, Defendant
installed a berm near the property line between their houses.
Believing that Defendant’s landscaping had encroached upon his
property line, Waraksa “repaired the encroachment” and planted a
line of Ligustrum shrubs on his side of the line. On 11 November
2010, Defendant left Waraksa a note asking him to refrain from
planting “hedge[s]. . . until [the] dispute [was] resolved
regarding the property line.”
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Waraksa testified that property lines in his subdivision “are
set out with embedded iron pipes.” Prior to planting the Ligustrum
shrubs, Waraksa had his property surveyed, and the surveyor
identified the corners of his lot based on those pipes. There was
no testimony that Defendant ever had the property surveyed.
Defendant and her husband nonetheless testified that Waraksa’s
shrubs were planted over the property line, on their property.
On 22 February 2011, Sander observed that the Ligustrum shrubs
had been destroyed and saw Defendant walking away from the shrubs
with “huge scissors.” Later in the trial, Defendant admitted to
cutting the shrubs, knowing they belonged to Waraksa:
[THE STATE:] Okay. It’s your testimony that
you intended to remove the Ligustrum bushes
that had been planted by Mr. Waraksa, is that
right? You intended to remove them; that’s why
you cut them down?
[DEFENDANT:] Right, yeah, they were on my
property.
[THE STATE:] Right.
[DEFENDANT:] They were planted where I needed
to fix the berm.
[THE STATE:] And you chose to cut them off,
right? Is that what you did; you cut them?
[DEFENDANT:] Yes, with a shovel.
[THE STATE:] You knew . . . Waraksa had planted
those bushes?
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[DEFENDANT:] Well, yes, uh-huh.
Defendant moved to dismiss the charges against her at the
close of the State’s evidence and at the close of all of the
evidence. Those motions were denied. After the presentation of
evidence, the jury found Defendant guilty of injury to real
property. Defendant appeals the judgment entered upon the jury’s
verdict.
Discussion
On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred by (1)
denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy,
(2) denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss at the close of the
State’s evidence and again at the close of all the evidence because
the State did not present sufficient evidence to support the charge
of injury to real property, and (3) failing to “instruct the jury
properly” in response to a question posed during jury
deliberations. We find no error.
I. Double Jeopardy
In her first argument on appeal, Defendant contends that the
trial court erred in denying her pre–trial motion to dismiss on
double jeopardy grounds. In making that argument, Defendant notes
that Waraksa took out two different warrants for injury to real
property based on the exact same damage to the trees. Defendant
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also points out that the district court committed a clerical error
by keeping the incorrect date on the warrant, instead of amending
the warrant to reflect the correct date. As a result, Defendant
alleges that it was a violation of the prohibition against double
jeopardy for the district court to allow the State to proceed with
a second charge. Accordingly, Defendant contends that the superior
court erred in denying her motion to dismiss based upon the first
and second district court trials.2 We disagree.
The doctrine of double jeopardy “provides that no person shall
be subject for the same offen[s]e to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb.” State v. Sparks, 182 N.C. App. 45, 47, 641 S.E.2d
339, 341 (2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause protects against (1) a second
2 We note that there is no substantial evidence in the record
regarding the nature of the fatal variance beyond (a) the fact of
its existence and (b) the district court’s dismissal of the
original charge against Defendant on that basis. The only other
discussion about the variance is counsel’s statement to the
superior court in Defendant’s pre-trial motion to dismiss
regarding Waraksa’s alleged confusion over the date of the offense.
However, “it is axiomatic that the arguments of counsel are not
evidence.” State v. Collins, 345 N.C. 170, 173, 478 S.E.2d 191,
193 (1996). Therefore, the only evidence properly before us in the
record is the handwritten note on the summons stating that the
case was dismissed due to a fatal variance, and we are limited to
that fact. See State v. Gillis, 158 N.C. App. 48, 55, 580 S.E.2d
32, 37-38 (2003) (citation omitted) (“[T]his Court is bound on
appeal by the record on appeal as certified and can judicially
know only what appears in it.”).
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prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple
punishments for the same offense.” State v. Rahaman, 202 N.C. App.
36, 40, 688 S.E.2d 58, 62 (2010) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). “[W]hen the trial court grants a defendant’s motion
to dismiss at the close of evidence, that ruling has the same
effect as a verdict of not guilty.” Id. at 43, 688 S.E.2d at 64;
see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-173 (2013). “However, the 5th
Amendment right to be free from double jeopardy only attaches in
a situation where the motion to dismiss is granted due to
insufficiency of the evidence to support each element of the crime
charged.” Rahaman, 202 N.C. App. at 44, 688 S.E.2d at 64. Double
jeopardy does not preclude a retrial when a charge is dismissed
because there was a fatal variance between the proof and the
allegations in the charge. Id.; State v. Johnson, 9 N.C. App. 253,
175 S.E.2d 711 (1970). We review a trial court’s denial of a motion
to dismiss de novo. State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650
S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007).
In Johnson, the indictment alleged that
the defendant committed the crime of breaking
and entering “a certain storehouse, shop,
warehouse, dwelling house and building
occupied by one Lloyd R. Montgomery, 648
Swannanoa River Road, Asheville, N.C.” The
evidence at trial tended to show that the
defendant broke into “438 Swannanoa River Road
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in Asheville which was occupied by one Elvira
L. Montgomery, who was engaged in business
under the name of ‘Cat and Fiddle
Restaurant.’” The trial court granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss due to a fatal
variance between the indictment and the
evidence presented at trial. The State retried
[the] defendant for the offense of breaking
and entering, but upon an indictment that
corresponded to the evidence. The defendant
then appealed and asserted that his right to
be free from double jeopardy had been
violated. Our Supreme Court held that “a
judgment of dismissal for whatever reason
entered after a trial on the first indictment
would not sustain a plea of former jeopardy
when [the] defendant was brought to trial on
the charge contained in the second
indictment.”
Rahaman, 202 N.C. App. at 44–45, 688 S.E.2d at 64–65 (citation
omitted).
In this case, the two summonses pertain generally to the same
facts, but the First Summons lists the date of offense as
“04/05/2011” while the Second Summons lists the date of offense as
“9/30/2010 through 02/22/2011.” Pursuant to the record properly
before us, the district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss
due to a fatal variance between the First Summons and the proof at
trial, not due to insufficiency of the evidence.3 Therefore, the
3 Defendant admits that the district court dismissed the charge
for a fatal variance. Defendant also admits that the only evidence
of record shows the variance was between the date of offense in
the First Summons and the Second Summons.
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State was permitted to retry Defendant because the Second Summons
corrected the dates of the offense. Accordingly, we hold that the
superior court did not violate the double jeopardy provisions of
the state and federal constitutions and did not err by denying
Defendant’s motion to dismiss. See also State v. Fraley, __ N.C.
App. __, 749 S.E.2d 111 (unpublished opinion), available at 2013
N.C. App. LEXIS 806 (“Double jeopardy does not preclude a retrial
when a charge is dismissed because there was a fatal variance
between the proof and the allegations in the charge.”).4
II. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Second, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying
her motion to dismiss due to insufficiency of the evidence,
alleging that the State failed to present substantial evidence of
every element of the crime charged.
The test to be applied in ruling on a defendant’s motion to
dismiss is whether the State has produced substantial evidence of
each and every element of the offense charged, or a lesser-included
offense, and substantial evidence that the defendant committed the
offense. State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117
(1980). “If substantial evidence exists supporting [the]
4 While unpublished decisions are not binding upon this court, the
facts in Fraley are similar to those here, and we find the Court’s
reasoning to be especially persuasive.
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defendant’s guilt, the jury should be allowed to decide if the
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Fowler,
353 N.C. 599, 621, 548 S.E.2d 684, 700 (2001), cert. denied, 535
U.S. 939, 152 L. Ed. 2d 230 (2002).
Substantial evidence is defined as “evidence from which a
rational finder of fact could find the fact to be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Davis, 130 N.C. App. 675, 678, 505
S.E.2d 138, 141 (1998). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the
trial court must consider all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State. Id. at 679, 505 S.E.2d at 141. “Any
contradictions or discrepancies arising from the evidence are
properly left for the jury to resolve and do not warrant
dismissal.” State v. King, 343 N.C. 29, 36, 468 S.E.2d 232, 237
(1996). The trial court’s decision as to whether there is
substantial evidence is a “question of law,” and, on appeal, we
review it de novo. State v. Bumgarner, 147 N.C. App. 409, 412, 556
S.E.2d 324, 327 (2001).
Defendant was charged with violating N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
127, which provides as follows:
Willful and wanton injury to real property.
If any person shall willfully and wantonly
damage, injure or destroy any real property
whatsoever, either of a public or private
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nature, [she] shall be guilty of a Class 1
misdemeanor.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-127 (2013). Defendant does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence to prove that she was the perpetrator
of the crimes. Rather, she argues that the State presented
insufficient evidence as to her mental state. We disagree.
Section 14-127 requires, as an essential element of the
offense, a showing that the person charged with violating the
statute “willfully” and “wantonly” caused the damage to real
property. The words “willful” and “wanton” have substantially the
same meaning when used in reference to the requisite state of mind
for a violation of a criminal statute. State v. Williams, 284 N.C.
67, 72–73, 199 S.E.2d 409, 412 (1973). “[Willful] as used in
criminal statutes means the wrongful doing of an act without
justification or excuse, or the commission of an act purposely and
deliberately in violation of law.” State v. Arnold, 264 N.C. 348,
349, 141 S.E.2d 473, 475 (1965). “Willfulness” is a state of mind
which is seldom capable of direct proof, but which must be inferred
from the circumstances of the particular case. Id.
Despite Defendant’s assertion to the contrary, there need not
be an intent to break the law in order for an act to be “willful.”
State v. Coal Co., 210 N.C. 742, 754–55, 188 S.E. 412, 420 (1936).
Thus, it does not matter whether Defendant knew for certain if the
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Ligustrum shrubs were on her property or Waraksa’s property when
she cut them down.
The word [“willful”], used in a statute
creating a criminal [offense], means something
more than an intention to do a thing. It
implies the doing the act purposely and
deliberately, indicating a purpose to do it,
without authority — careless whether [she] has
the right or not — in violation of law, and it
is this which makes the criminal intent,
without which one cannot be brought within the
meaning of a criminal statute.
In re Adoption of Hoose, 243 N.C. 589, 594, 91 S.E.2d 555, 558
(1956) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the State presented testimony by Waraksa that
the Ligustrum shrubs were on his property. The State also presented
evidence that Defendant acknowledged that the property line was in
dispute through a signed letter in which she asked Waraksa to stop
planting hedges until the property-line dispute was resolved.
Defendant’s testimony and her signed letter indicate that she did
not know whether the Ligustrum shrubs were on her property or
Waraksa’s. Accordingly, it was for the jury to determine whether
the shrubs were planted on Waraksa’s property or Defendant’s and
whether Defendant was legally justified in cutting them down. While
Defendant presented some evidence to contradict Waraksa’s
testimony regarding the location of the shrubs in relation to the
property line, “[i]t is elementary that the jury may believe all,
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none, or only part of a witness’[s] testimony[.]” State v. Miller,
26 N.C. App. 440, 443, 216 S.E.2d 160, 162, affirmed, 289 N.C. 1,
220 S.E.2d 572 (1975). Here, the jury opted to believe Waraksa’s
testimony that the shrubs were planted on his property. Therefore,
the evidence produced by the State, even though it was contested,
provided sufficient evidence for the finding that Defendant had
cut down the shrubs on Waraksa’s property without justification.
Accordingly, we hold that the superior court did not err in denying
Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
III. Jury Instructions
Lastly, Defendant contends that the trial court committed
reversible error by failing to directly answer the jury’s question:
“Is [D]efendant [j]ustified in cutting down property she knew was
not hers if she truly believed [that the bushes] were on her
property[?]” Defendant contends a proper instruction would have
been:
For you to find[ D]efendant guilty of injury
to real property, you must find that she
willfully damaged trees, lawn[,] and
flowerbeds, the real property of[] Waraksa.
[“]Willful” is defined as “the wrongful doing
of an act without justification or excuse, or
the commission of an act purposely and
deliberately in violation of [the] law.
[“]Willfully” means “something more than an
intention to commit the offense.”
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Defendant contends that the superior court’s failure to give this
instruction “affected [the jury’s] verdict.” Defendant argues that
the trial court’s decision not to answer this question amounted to
a failure to instruct on willfulness and, thus, that the jury might
not have properly considered Defendant’s state of mind. Therefore,
Defendant reasons, the State was improperly required to prove only
that Defendant damaged the shrubs.
The State argues, and Defendant concedes, that — because
Defendant did not object to the trial court’s original charge,
request a different charge at the charge conference, or request
any additional charge when the jury expressed confusion — Defendant
did not properly preserve this argument for appeal. We agree.
In matters concerning jury instructions, a party’s failure to
object at trial limits our review to an examination for plain
error. State v. King, 342 N.C. 357, 364, 464 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1995)
(citing State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E.2d 375 (1983)); see
also N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(2). Plain error is “error so fundamental
that it tilted the scales and caused the jury to reach its verdict
convicting the defendant.” State v. Bagley, 321 N.C. 201, 211, 362
S.E.2d 244, 250 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 99 L. Ed. 2d
912 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In deciding
whether a defect in the jury instruction constitutes ‘plain error’,
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[sic] the appellate court must examine the entire record and
determine if the instructional error had a probable impact on the
jury’s finding of guilt.” Odom, 307 N.C. at 661, 300 S.E.2d at
378-79. “[A] charge must be construed as a whole in the same
connected way in which it was given. When thus considered, if it
fairly and correctly presents the law, it will afford no ground
for reversing the judgment, even if an isolated expression should
be found technically inaccurate.” State v. Tomblin, 276 N.C. 273,
276, 171 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, Defendant’s proposed jury instructions are
substantially similar to those actually given by the superior
court. Indeed, the court initially explained the term “willful” as
follows:
THE COURT: . . .
[D]efendant has been charged with willful and
wanton damage to, injury to, or destruction of
real property. For you to find[ D]efendant
guilty of this offense, the State must prove
two things beyond a reasonable doubt.
First, that [D]efendant damaged, injured, or
destroyed Ligustrum shrubs of Anthony Waraksa.
Lugustrum [sic] shrubs are real property.
And second, that[] [D]efendant did this
willfully and wantonly; that is,
intentionally and without justification or
excuse, and without regard for the
consequences or the rights of others.
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If you find from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged
date, [D]efendant willfully and wantonly
damaged, injury, [sic] or destroyed Ligustrum
shrubs, it would be your duty to return a
verdict of guilty. If you do not so find or
have a reasonable doubt as to one or both of
these things, it would be your duty to return
a verdict of not guilty.
In addition, the jurors had written copies of the instructions
quoted above, and the judge offered to re–read the instructions to
the jurors if necessary:
THE COURT: . . .
I’m happy to re-read them, if they want. But
since they all have copies of the
instructions, I don’t want to insult their
intelligence — I won’t say that, but something
like that. And I’ll ask them to return to the
jury room to continue deliberating. But if for
any reason they, any one of them wants the
Court to orally re[-]give the instructions,
I’ll be happy to do so, and they can just send
out another note. I mean I have found in the
past from time to time there is a juror who
does not read well and prefers to hear
something orally. So I want to make sure they
understand they have that option and that
right, whether or not they’ll exercise it.
“[T]his Court has consistently held that a trial court is not
required to repeat verbatim a . . . specific instruction that is
correct and supported by the evidence, but that it is sufficient
if the court gives the instruction in substantial conformity with
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the request.” State v. Brown, 335 N.C. 477, 490, 439 S.E.2d 589,
597 (1994).
Here, the instruction given clearly sets forth that
“willfulness” is a necessary element of injury to real property.
To find Defendant guilty of injury to real property, the State had
to prove the Defendant had a “willful” state of mind when she
damaged the shrubs. If the jury had a reasonable doubt as to the
willfulness of Defendant’s actions, the jury’s duty was to find
Defendant not guilty of injury to real property. This is, in
substance, the concept Defendant claims the trial court should
have reiterated to the jury. Because the trial court gave
instructions in substantial conformity with those that Defendant
argues for on appeal, Defendant’s argument is overruled. The trial
court did not err — much less plainly err — in declining to directly
answer the jury’s question. Accordingly, we find
NO ERROR.
Judges STEELMAN and DAVIS concur.