In re N.T.U. , 234 N.C. App. 722 ( 2014 )

NO. COA14-89
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 1 July 2014
IN THE MATTER OF: Buncombe County
No. 11 JT 259
N.T.U.,
Minor Child.
Appeal by respondent from judgment entered 25 September
2013 by Judge Ward D. Scott in Buncombe County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 June 2014.
Hanna Frost Honeycutt for petitioner-appellee Buncombe
County Department of Social Services.
Amanda Armstrong for guardian ad litem.
Jeffrey L. Miller for respondent-appellant.
DAVIS, Judge.
N.U. (“Respondent”) appeals from the trial court’s
termination of her parental rights as to her son N.T.U.
(“Nathan”).1 On appeal, Respondent argues that (1) the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to terminate her
parental rights as to Nathan; and (2) there was insufficient
1
The pseudonym “Nathan” is used throughout this opinion to
protect the privacy of the minor child and for ease of reading.
N.C.R. App. P. 3.1(b).
-2-
evidence to support either of the trial court’s bases for
terminating her parental rights. After careful review, we
affirm.
Factual Background
Nathan was born to Respondent and Z.R.2 in September of 2010
in Greenville, South Carolina. Nathan lived in South Carolina
with Respondent until 21 September 2011.
On 21 September 2011, the Buncombe County Department of
Social Services (“DSS”) received a Child Protective Services
report alleging that officers of the Asheville Police Department
had arrested Respondent in connection with a bank robbery and
homicide that had occurred in South Carolina earlier that day.
Respondent was apprehended by law enforcement officers at a
motel in Asheville. Nathan, who was one year old at the time,
was with Respondent at the motel. Respondent was taken to the
Buncombe County Jail.
The following day, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging
that Nathan was a neglected and dependent juvenile and obtained
nonsecure custody of Nathan that same day. On 27 September
2011, a seven-day hearing was held on the nonsecure custody
2
Nathan’s father, Z.R., did not appeal from the trial court’s
order terminating his parental rights and, therefore, is not a
party to this appeal.
-3-
order. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order
on 14 October 2011 continuing nonsecure custody with DSS. In
its 14 October 2011 order and in a subsequent order entered 29
November 2011 continuing nonsecure custody with DSS, the trial
court acknowledged that South Carolina was Nathan’s home state
but that the Buncombe County District Court had “temporary
emergency jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act” (“UCCJEA”).
On 1 December 2011, the trial court held an adjudication
hearing and, with the consent of Respondent, adjudicated Nathan
to be a neglected and dependent juvenile. In its order, the
trial court once again found that although South Carolina was
Nathan’s home state, the trial court had temporary emergency
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. The trial court ordered that
Nathan remain in the custody of DSS.
The trial court conducted permanency planning review
hearings during the course of the next year. By order entered
16 October 2012, the court set a permanent plan of guardianship
with a concurrent plan of adoption for Nathan. On 12 April
2013, DSS filed a petition to terminate Respondent’s parental
rights as to Nathan. The termination of parental rights hearing
was held on 24 July and 14 August 2013, and on 25 September
-4-
2013, the trial court entered an order terminating Respondent’s
parental rights on the grounds of neglect and incapacity to
provide proper care and supervision. Respondent filed a timely
notice of appeal.
Analysis
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Respondent first contends the Buncombe County District
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to terminate her
parental rights. We disagree.
“Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the
court to deal with the kind of action in question.” Harris v.
Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 667, 353 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987). The
issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first
time on appeal. In re H.L.A.D., 184 N.C. App. 381, 385, 646
S.E.2d 425, 429 (2007), aff’d per curiam, 362 N.C. 170, 655
S.E.2d 712 (2008). Whether a court possesses jurisdiction is a
question of law reviewable de novo on appeal. In re K.U.-S.G.,
208 N.C. App. 128, 131, 702 S.E.2d 103, 105 (2010).
“In matters arising under the Juvenile Code, the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction is established by statute.” In re
K.J.L., 363 N.C. 343, 345, 677 S.E.2d 835, 837 (2009). The
-5-
jurisdictional statute governing actions to terminate parental
rights is N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101, which provides as follows:
The court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and determine any
petition or motion relating to termination
of parental rights to any juvenile who
resides in, is found in, or is in the legal
or actual custody of a county department of
social services or licensed child-placing
agency in the district at the time of filing
of the petition or motion. The court shall
have jurisdiction to terminate the parental
rights of any parent irrespective of the age
of the parent. Provided, that before
exercising jurisdiction under this Article,
the court shall find that it has
jurisdiction to make a child-custody
determination under the provisions of G.S.
50A-201, 50A-203, or 50A-204. The court
shall have jurisdiction to terminate the
parental rights of any parent irrespective
of the state of residence of the parent.
Provided, that before exercising
jurisdiction under this Article regarding
the parental rights of a nonresident parent,
the court shall find that it has
jurisdiction to make a child-custody
determination under the provisions of G.S.
50A-201 or G.S. 50A-203, without regard to
G.S. 50A-204 and that process was served on
the nonresident parent pursuant to G.S. 7B-
1106. . . .
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101 (2013) (emphasis added).
The above-referenced statutes listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1101 are all provisions of the UCCJEA, which defines a
“child-custody determination” as “a judgment, decree, or other
order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical
-6-
custody, or visitation with respect to a child.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 50A-102(3) (2013). The jurisdictional requirements of
the UCCJEA apply to proceedings for the termination of parental
rights. In re N.R.M., 165 N.C. App. 294, 298, 598 S.E.2d 147,
149 (2004). Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101, the trial
court must have jurisdiction to make a child-custody
determination under the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201
or N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-203 in order to terminate the parental
rights of a nonresident parent. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101;
K.U.-S.G., 208 N.C. App. at 132, 702 S.E.2d at 106.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-203 pertains only to the modification
of a custody order previously entered by another state. In the
present case, no other state has ever entered a custody order as
to Nathan and, therefore, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-203 does not
apply here. Accordingly, we must determine whether the trial
court had jurisdiction to terminate Respondent’s rights pursuant
to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in G.S.
50A-204, a court of this State has
jurisdiction to make an initial child-
custody determination only if:
(1) This State is the home state of the
child on the date of the commencement
of the proceeding, or was the home
-7-
state of the child within six months
before the commencement of the
proceeding, and the child is absent
from this State but a parent or person
acting as a parent continues to live in
this State;
(2) A court of another state does not
have jurisdiction under subdivision
(1), or a court of the home state of
the child has declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that this
State is the more appropriate forum
under G.S. 50A-207 or G.S. 50A-208,
and:
a. The child and the child's
parents, or the child and at
least one parent or a person
acting as a parent, have a
significant connection with
this State other than mere
physical presence; and
b. Substantial evidence is
available in this State
concerning the child's care,
protection, training, and
personal relationships;
(3) All courts having jurisdiction
under subdivision (1) or (2) have
declined to exercise jurisdiction on
the ground that a court of this State
is the more appropriate forum to
determine the custody of the child
under G.S. 50A-207 or G.S. 50A-208; or
(4) No court of any other state would
have jurisdiction under the criteria
specified in subdivision (1), (2), or
(3).
(b) Subsection (a) is the exclusive
-8-
jurisdictional basis for making a child-
custody determination by a court of this
State.
(c) Physical presence of, or personal
jurisdiction over, a party or a child is not
necessary or sufficient to make a child-
custody determination.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201 (2013).
Respondent contends that the trial court could not have
properly exercised jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201 because it never actually
possessed any jurisdiction over the custody of Nathan. We
disagree.
The trial court noted that it was exercising temporary
emergency jurisdiction over Nathan pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
50A-204(a) when it first entered the initial nonsecure custody
orders. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-204 allows a North Carolina court
to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction “if the child is
present in this State and the child has been abandoned or it is
necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child
. . . is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-204(a) (2013).
Respondent argues that the trial court acted without proper
temporary emergency jurisdiction because it failed to make
findings that Nathan was abandoned or that it was necessary to
-9-
exercise jurisdiction to protect Nathan from mistreatment or
abuse. However, we have previously held that the statutory
bases for jurisdiction set forth in the UCCJEA do not require a
trial court to make specific findings of fact regarding
jurisdiction and that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-204 “states only
that certain circumstances must exist, not that the court [must]
specifically make findings to that effect . . . .” In re
E.X.J., 191 N.C. App. 34, 40, 662 S.E.2d 24, 27-28 (2008)
(citation and quotation marks omitted), aff’d per curiam, 363
N.C. 9, 672 S.E.2d 19 (2009).
As such, we conclude that the trial court properly entered
the initial nonsecure custody orders pursuant to its temporary
emergency jurisdiction because the particular circumstances in
this case supported emergency jurisdiction. When the trial
court entered its 14 October 2011 order continuing nonsecure
custody with DSS, Nathan was present in the State and — due to
his mother’s arrest and subsequent incarceration — left without
supervision or any provision for his care. See N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 50A-102(1) (defining “abandoned” as “left without provision
for reasonable and necessary care or supervision”). Indeed, the
juvenile petition alleged, and the trial court found, that DSS
needed to assume custody of Nathan at that time because
-10-
Respondent would be unable to provide care for him and the
individual she recommended as a kinship placement had pending
criminal charges, including sexual offenses against a child.
Thus, we believe the trial court correctly treated Nathan as
having been abandoned and that its initial assertion of
jurisdiction was proper under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-204.
Therefore, having determined that the trial court properly
exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction over the custody of
Nathan initially, the sole remaining question is whether the
trial court had jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201 at
the time it terminated Respondent’s parental rights. Neither
before nor after the trial court’s entry of the nonsecure
custody orders have there been any custody proceedings
instituted, or custody orders entered, in any state other than
North Carolina. Nathan has lived in North Carolina with his
foster parents since September 2011. Therefore, guided by our
decision in E.X.J., 191 N.C. App. 34, 662 S.E.2d 24, we conclude
that North Carolina became Nathan’s home state such that the
trial court possessed jurisdiction to terminate Respondent’s
parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201(a).
In E.X.J., we held that the trial court properly exercised
temporary emergency jurisdiction over the juveniles at issue in
-11-
that case in initially placing them with the Rutherford County
Department of Social Services (“the Department”) because the
respondent-mother had traveled from Alabama to North Carolina
with the children and then left them with the Department because
she felt she was unable to care for them. Id. at 39-40, 662
S.E.2d at 27. After the Department obtained custody, the
children remained in North Carolina with a parent (or a person
acting as a parent) for at least six months before the
Department filed the petition to terminate parental rights and
no custody orders were entered in any other state during that
time. Id. at 43, 662 S.E.2d at 29. Consequently, this Court
concluded that North Carolina had become the juveniles’ home
state for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201 and that
jurisdiction therefore existed to terminate parental rights.
Id.; see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-102(7) (defining “home state” as
“the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person
acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months
immediately before the commencement of a child-custody
proceeding”).
The same is true in the present case. Nathan has resided
in North Carolina with persons acting as parents (his foster
parents) since September 2011. No custody proceedings have been
-12-
instituted or custody orders entered in another state during
this time — or, indeed, at any time. Accordingly, when DSS
filed the petition seeking termination of Respondent’s parental
rights on 12 April 2013, North Carolina had become Nathan’s home
state and the trial court had jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 50-201(a) to enter its order terminating Respondent’s parental
rights.
II. Grounds for Termination of Parental Rights
Having determined that the trial court had subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of whether Respondent’s
parental rights should be terminated, we now turn to the
question of whether the trial court properly terminated those
rights. In order to terminate a parent’s parental rights, a
trial court must find — based on clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence — that one or more of the statutory grounds for
termination exist. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a) (2013); In re
Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1997). We review
a court’s order terminating parental rights to determine whether
the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence and whether the conclusions of law are
supported by the findings of fact. In re Shepard, 162 N.C. App.
215, 221, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6, disc. review denied, 358 N.C. 543,
-13-
599 S.E.2d 42 (2004). We review the trial court’s conclusions
of law de novo. In re S.N., 194 N.C. App. 142, 146, 669 S.E.2d
55, 59 (2008), aff’d per curiam, 363 N.C. 368, 677 S.E.2d 455(2009).
Here, the trial court made the following pertinent findings
of fact:
16. On September 21, 2013 [sic], the
Buncombe County Department of Social
Services (“Department”) received a Child
Protective Services report alleging that
respondent mother was being arrested for
serious criminal charges, that the minor
child was with her, that her proposed
kinship placement was inappropriate and that
the minor child would not have a caretaker
after the respondent mother’s arrest.
17. SW Jennie Wells initiated the
investigation. SW Jennie Wells went to the
Sleep Inn Hotel in Asheville, North
Carolina. SW Wells found respondent mother,
her friend, her brother and the minor child
to be present along with law enforcement
officers.
18. Respondent mother had diapers and some
clothes for the minor child.
19. Respondent mother admitted that she was
present when her brother shot and killed a
man named Sean. The minor child was with a
relative during the time Sean was killed by
respondent mother’s brother.
20. After the killing, respondent mother
separated from her brother and reunited with
the minor child.
-14-
21. Respondent mother received a text
message from her brother telling her to “lay
low.”
22. Respondent mother later rejoined her
brother, along with her friend and the minor
child, and left town. Respondent mother,
her brother, friend and the minor child
traveled in the same car and stayed at
various hotels in an attempt to evade law
enforcement.
23. While on the run from law enforcement,
respondent mother’s brother robbed a bank
and respondent mother, her friend and the
minor child waited in the car while the
robbery occurred.
24. Respondent mother did not contact law
enforcement at any point in time to report
the killing or bank robbery.
25. Respondent mother knew she would be
arrested.
26. Respondent mother advised that a
relative named [T.D.] was on his way to pick
up the child. [T.D.] had charges pending
for indecent liberties and lewd act on a
child. [T.D.] was respondent mother’s first
choice for placement of the minor child.
Placement with [T.D.] was not approved by
the Department for placement [sic] due to
his criminal history.
27. Respondent mother did not provide any
other options for placement of the minor
child.
28. Respondent mother was arrested for
murder and robbery charges and was taken to
jail. Respondent mother’s brother and
friend were also arrested.
-15-
29. The Department sought and obtained non-
secure custody of the minor child and the
non-secure custody order was entered on
September 22, 2011. The minor child has
remained in the continuous custody of the
Department since that time.
30. Although respondent mother was
initially jailed at the Buncombe County Jail
for a period of time, respondent mother was
ultimately housed at the Pickens County Jail
in South Carolina.
31. In October of 2011, SW Sumner mailed
respondent mother a copy of her case plan,
which required respondent mother to provide
viable options for kinship placement and to
abide by certain conditions for visitation
if she was released from jail.
32. On November 14, 2011, SW Sumner met
with respondent mother in the Pickens County
Jail. The respondent mother reported that
she had received letters from the social
worker, copies of the case plan and the
visitation plan. SW Sumner provided
respondent mother with an update on the
minor child, reviewed the case plan with
respondent mother and reviewed the
visitation plan with respondent mother. At
that meeting, respondent mother did not
provide any prospective kinship providers.
33. In December of 2011, the minor child
was adjudicated a neglected and dependent
child, as defined by N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-101(15)
and (9).
34. In July of 2012, respondent mother’s
attorney provided the names of prospective
placements for the minor child, [M.U.] and
[T.U.]. Later, SW Sumner was informed that
family friend, [J.M.], may also be an option
for placement.
-16-
35. A request for a home study on [M.U.]
was sent to South Carolina through ICPC.
The home study was approved by South
Carolina. However, subsequent to the
approval of his home study, [M.U.] was
arrested and incarcerated. Additionally,
Child Protective Services became involved
with his family. The Court in the
underlying juvenile action did not approve
[M.U.] for placement of the minor child.
36. A request for a home study on [T.U.]
was sent to South Carolina through ICPC.
The home study was approved by South
Carolina. After the home study of [T.U.]
was approved, the Department had a difficult
time getting [T.U.] to visit with the minor
child so that she could establish a
relationship with him. [T.U.] demonstrated
that she was not interested in placement
with the minor child as she failed to avail
herself of opportunities to visit with the
minor child even though the Department
offered to go to South Carolina so she could
visit. [T.U.] physically disciplined a
cousin in front of the social worker in a
visitation room at DSS. The Court in the
underlying juvenile action did not approve
[T.U.] for placement of the minor child.
37. A home study was completed on family
friend, [J.M.]. The home study was not
approved as [J.M.] was convicted of a crime
related to crack cocaine, had insufficient
housing, along with other reasons. [J.M.]
failed to pursue placement of the minor
child after SW Sumner’s visit. The Court in
the underlying juvenile action did not
approve [J.M.’s] home for placement of the
minor child.
38. Respondent mother has not provided any
other possible kinship placement options for
-17-
the minor child.
39. In September of 2012, respondent mother
began writing the minor child. She has sent
more than ten letters to the child and/or
foster parents.
40. The minor child is not old enough to
read the letters from respondent mother.
41. Respondent mother’s date of release
from incarceration is unknown.
42. Respondent mother’s trial dates for
robbery and murder are unknown.
43. The minor child was taken into custody
when he was one year old and he is now
almost three years old.
44. The minor child has spent almost 2/3 of
his life outside of the care of respondent
mother.
45. The actions of respondent mother
invited state intervention.
46. Respondent mother has not completed any
services to improve the conditions which
caused the minor child to be removed from
her care.
47. There is no evidence that respondent
mother understands the gravity of her past
conduct and how her past conduct placed the
minor child at risk of harm.
48. Respondent mother’s incarceration has
rendered her unable and unavailable to
parent the juvenile.
The trial court ultimately found as fact and concluded as a
matter of law that:
-18-
57. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1),
the respondent mother has neglected the
minor child, as specified above. There is a
high likelihood of a repetition of the
neglect if the minor child was returned to
the care and control of the respondent
mother as the respondent mother has failed
to correct those conditions that led to the
removal of the minor child from her care and
has failed to show any understanding of the
gravity of her past conduct or the danger
she placed the minor child in due to her
past conduct, including running from law
enforcement with her brother and the minor
child after witnessing her brother kill a
man and waiting in the car with the minor
child while her brother committed a bank
robbery. The respondent mother has not
completed any services.
58. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. 7B-1111(a)(6), the
respondent mother is incapable of providing
for the proper care and supervision of the
minor child, such that the minor child is a
dependent child within the meaning of G.S.
7B-101, and there is a reasonable
probability that such incapacity will
continue for the foreseeable future. The
respondent mother’s incapability is the
result of incarceration. The respondent
mother has no appropriate, alternative child
care arrangements for the juvenile.
Respondent challenges all or portions of findings 27, 32,
34-37, 46-47, and 57-58 as unsupported by the evidence. She
also contends that these findings were insufficient to support
the trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed to terminate
her parental rights.
-19-
In termination of parental rights proceedings, the trial
court’s “finding of any one of the . . . enumerated grounds is
sufficient to support a termination.” In re J.M.W., 179 N.C.
App. 788, 791, 635 S.E.2d 916, 918-19 (2006) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). Thus, on appeal, if we determine that
any one of the statutory grounds enumerated in § 7B-1111(a) is
supported by findings of fact based on competent evidence, we
need not address the remaining grounds. In re D.H.H., 208 N.C.
App. 549, 552, 703 S.E.2d 803, 805-06 (2010).
It is well settled that findings of fact made by the trial
court in a termination of parental rights proceeding are binding
“where there is some evidence to support those findings, even
though the evidence might sustain findings to the contrary.” In
re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110-11, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252-53
(1984). Findings of fact are also binding if they are not
challenged on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408
S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). Moreover, if such findings sufficiently
support one ground for termination, this Court need not address
a respondent’s challenges to findings of fact that support
alternate grounds for termination. See In re J.L.H., ___ N.C.
App. ___, ___, n. 3, 741 S.E.2d 333, 335, n. 3 (2012) (noting
that although respondent challenged additional findings of fact,
-20-
this Court was not required to address those arguments because
“they [were] not relevant” to the particular ground that
supported the trial court’s termination of parental rights).
In the present case, the trial court concluded that
Respondent’s parental rights were subject to termination under
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6), which permits the termination
of rights if
the parent is incapable of providing for the
proper care and supervision of the juvenile,
such that the juvenile is a dependent
juvenile within the meaning of G.S. 7B-101,
and that there is a reasonable probability
that such incapability will continue for the
foreseeable future. Incapability under this
subdivision may be the result of substance
abuse, mental retardation, mental illness,
organic brain syndrome, or any other cause
or condition that renders the parent unable
or unavailable to parent the juvenile and
the parent lacks an appropriate alternative
child care arrangement.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6).
Specifically, the trial court concluded that (1) Respondent
was incapable of providing care for Nathan because of her
incarceration; and (2) Respondent had “no appropriate,
alternative child care arrangements for [Nathan].” We believe
that the evidence presented at the hearing and the findings of
fact based on that evidence support the trial court’s conclusion
that Respondent is incapable of providing for the care and
-21-
supervision of Nathan, that this incapacity will continue for
the foreseeable future, and that Respondent failed to provide
any viable alternative child care arrangements.
The unchallenged findings show that Respondent has been
continuously incarcerated since September 2011 awaiting trial on
charges stemming from two separate incidents — a homicide and a
bank robbery. During that time and due to her incarceration,
Respondent has been personally incapable of providing proper
care and supervision of her child, and nothing in the record
indicates that she will be released from incarceration in the
foreseeable future. Respondent argues that her inability to
care for Nathan during her incarceration is an insufficient
basis for termination of her parental rights because (1) the
trial court did not make a specific finding as to the expected
duration of her incarceration; and (2) Respondent’s
incarceration could, in theory, end at any time. We are not
persuaded.
We note that “[i]ncarceration, standing alone, is neither a
sword nor a shield in a termination of parental rights
decision.” In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 10, 618 S.E.2d 241,
247 (2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted), aff’d per
curiam, 360 N.C. 360, 625 S.E.2d 779 (2006). As such, while a
-22-
parent’s imprisonment is relevant to the trial court’s
determination of whether a statutory ground for termination
exists, it is not determinative. See id.Termination of parental rights based upon N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a)(6) does not require that the parent’s incapability be
permanent or that its duration be precisely known. Instead,
this ground for termination merely requires that “there is a
reasonable probability that such incapability will continue for
the foreseeable future.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6)
(emphasis added). Given that (1) Respondent has been held on
charges relating to homicide and bank robbery since September
2011 and has not yet received a trial date; and (2) no evidence
was presented giving rise to any expectation of her release from
incarceration in the foreseeable future, we cannot conclude that
the trial court erred in determining that there is a reasonable
probability that Respondent’s incapability would continue for
the foreseeable future.
Respondent next challenges the trial court’s determination
that she lacked appropriate alternative child care arrangements
for Nathan. The record indicates that Respondent provided DSS
with three possible placements for Nathan: her sister, T.U.; her
brother, M.U.; and her friend, J.M. DSS had concerns regarding
-23-
placing Nathan with T.U. after witnessing T.U. physically
discipline another child in the DSS visitation room. While a
home study was approved for T.U. and T.U. sought placement of
Nathan with her, she was not ultimately approved for placement
by the trial court based — at least in part — on the ground that
she “demonstrated that she was not interested” in Nathan’s
placement with her by declining opportunities to get to know
Nathan through visitation. M.U. was initially approved for
placement, but the trial court ultimately determined that he was
not an appropriate alternative caregiver because he was
incarcerated following his approval by DSS, requiring the Child
Protective Services division in South Carolina to become
involved with his own children. Finally, Respondent’s friend,
J.M., was not approved for placement because of a prior crack
cocaine conviction and DSS’s concerns regarding her housing. As
such, Respondent’s three proposed caretakers for Nathan were
deemed unsuitable, supporting the trial court’s determination
that Respondent lacked appropriate alternative child care
arrangements.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating
Respondent’s parental rights. Because we conclude that the
trial court did not err in terminating Respondent’s parental
-24-
rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6), it is
unnecessary to address her arguments regarding neglect — the
other ground for termination found by the trial court. P.L.P.,
173 N.C. App. at 8, 618 S.E.2d at 246 (“[W]here the trial court
finds multiple grounds on which to base a termination of
parental rights, and an appellate court determines there is at
least one ground to support a conclusion that parental rights
should be terminated, it is unnecessary to address the remaining
grounds.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s
order terminating Respondent’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Judges CALABRIA and STROUD concur.