In re Appeal of Villas at Peacehaven, LLC , 235 N.C. App. 46 ( 2014 )


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  •                              NO. COA13-1224
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed:    15 July 2014
    IN THE MATTER OF:
    APPEAL OF:
    Villas at Peacehaven, LLC                  From the North Carolina
    from the decisions of the Forsyth          Property Tax Commission
    County Board of Equalization and           No. 10 PTC 011
    Review concerning the valuations
    of certain real property for tax
    year 2009.
    Appeal by taxpayer from final decision entered 16 May 2013
    by the North Carolina Property Tax Commission.                 Heard in the
    Court of Appeals 5 March 2014.
    Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by S.
    Leigh Rodenbough, IV, Robert W. Saunders, and Craig D.
    Schauer, for taxpayer-appellant.
    Assistant County     Attorney      B.   Gordon    Watkins,   III,    for
    Forsyth County.
    McCULLOUGH, Judge.
    Villas at Peacehaven, LLC, (“taxpayer”) appeals from the
    Final Decision of the North Carolina Property Tax Commission
    (the “Commission”) dismissing its appeal from the decision of
    the   Forsyth   County   Board      of   Equalization    and   Review     (the
    “Board”).   For the following reasons, we reverse.
    I. Background
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    This case concerns the revaluation of property in Winston-
    Salem that taxpayer owns and operates as a                            rental      community
    known     as     Villas    at    Peacehaven.            The    property      at    issue    is
    comprised of 121 adjacent tax parcels spanning approximately 25
    acres.         Of the 121 separate tax parcels, 120 are residential
    lots,     each       improved    with    a   detached      single-family          residence.
    The remaining lot is improved with a clubhouse and amenities for
    tenants, including a pool and a tennis court.
    During the revaluation, effective as of 1 January 2009, a
    Forsyth     County       Tax    Assessor     (“the      Assessor”)      determined         the
    aggregate value of all 121 lots to be $16,945,800.1                                Taxpayer
    appealed       the     Assessor’s       valuation    to       the   Board,    which      heard
    taxpayer’s appeal on 10 December 2009 and notified taxpayer in
    writing of its decision to affirm the Assessor’s valuation on 15
    December 2009.          Taxpayer then initiated an appeal of the Board’s
    decision        by    submitting        an   Application        For    Hearing      to     the
    Commission on 12 February 2010.                     The Commission held a final
    pre-hearing conference on 31 August 2012 and filed an Order On
    Final     Pre-hearing          Conference     on    4     September     2012.         On    13
    September 2012, taxpayer’s appeal came on for hearing before the
    1
    The County later stipulated to a reduced value of $16,647,200.
    -3-
    Commission,     sitting       as   the   State    Board    of    Equalization      and
    Review.
    At    the      hearing,     taxpayer      framed   the    issue     as   follows:
    “[W]hether    or    not   separately        platted    lots     with   single-family
    residential homes constructed on them that are held by a common
    owner and have continuously been owned, operated, financed and
    managed as a single, income-producing rental property should be
    assessed as an income-producing property and assessed using the
    direct capitalization approach . . . .”                   Taxpayer then referred
    to the approach as an income approach as a unified whole rather
    than on an individual basis and argued for its use.                          Taxpayer
    further   contended       the      method    of   valuation      employed     by   the
    Assessor, in which the Assessor determined the value of each
    parcel separately on a cost basis using the County’s schedule of
    values and totaled the values assigned to each parcel to reach
    the aggregate value, was             an arbitrary and illegal method of
    valuation that resulted in value far in excess of the true value
    of the property.       In support of its argument, taxpayer relied on
    a South Carolina Supreme Court case and the testimony of two
    witnesses, its managing member, and an appraiser who performed a
    valuation of the property using the income approach.
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    At the close of taxpayer’s evidence, the County moved to
    dismiss taxpayer’s appeal on the ground that taxpayer failed to
    carry its burden of production.           Upon considering both sides’
    arguments, the Commission granted the County’s motion in open
    court.   A Final Decision was later entered on 16 May 2013.
    Taxpayer filed Notice of Appeal and Exceptions from the
    Final Decision on 13 June 2013.
    II. Standard of Review
    This   Court’s   standard   of   review    of   a   decision   by   the
    Commission is governed by statute.        When reviewing a decision of
    the Commission:
    the   court   shall   decide    all   relevant
    questions of law, interpret constitutional
    and statutory provisions, and determine the
    meaning and applicability of the terms of
    any Commission action. The court may affirm
    or reverse the decision of the Commission,
    declare the same null and void, or remand
    the case for further proceedings; or it may
    reverse or modify the decision if the
    substantial rights of the appellants have
    been prejudiced because the Commission's
    findings,    inferences,     conclusions    or
    decisions are:
    (1)   In    violation         of    constitutional
    provisions; or
    (2)   In excess of statutory authority           or
    jurisdiction of the Commission; or
    (3)   Made upon unlawful proceedings; or
    -5-
    (4)   Affected by other errors of law; or
    (5)   Unsupported by competent, material and
    substantial evidence in view of the
    entire record as submitted; or
    (6)   Arbitrary or capricious.
    
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-345.2
    (b) (2013).     “In making the foregoing
    determinations, the court shall review the whole record or such
    portions thereof as may be cited by any party and due account
    shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”            
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-345.2
    (c).
    The “whole record” test does not allow the
    reviewing      court     to       replace     the
    [Commission's]    judgment    as    between   two
    reasonably conflicting views, even though
    the court could justifiably have reached a
    different result had the matter been before
    it de novo.     On the other hand, the “whole
    record”   rule     requires    the    court,   in
    determining the substantiality of evidence
    supporting the [Commission's] decision, to
    take into account whatever in the record
    fairly detracts from the weight of the
    [Commission's] evidence. Under the whole
    evidence rule, the court may not consider
    the   evidence    which   in    and   of   itself
    justifies the [Commission's] result, without
    taking into account contradictory evidence
    or    evidence     from     which     conflicting
    inferences could be drawn.
    In re Parkdale Mills, _ N.C. App. _, _, 
    741 S.E.2d 416
    , 419
    (2013) (citation omitted).
    III. Discussion
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    “It is . . . a sound and a fundamental principle of law in
    this State that ad valorem tax assessments are presumed to be
    correct.”    In re Appeal of Amp, Inc., 
    287 N.C. 547
    , 562, 
    215 S.E.2d 752
    , 761 (1975).      Yet, “the presumption is only one of
    fact and is therefore rebuttable.”          Id. at 563, 
    215 S.E.2d at 762
    .
    [I]n order for the taxpayer to rebut the
    presumption   he  must   produce  competent,
    material and substantial evidence that tends
    to show that: (1) [e]ither the county tax
    supervisor used an arbitrary method of
    valuation; or (2) the county tax supervisor
    used an illegal method of valuation; AND (3)
    the assessment substantially exceeded the
    true value in money of the property. Simply
    stated, it is not enough for the taxpayer to
    show that the means adopted by the tax
    supervisor were wrong, he must also show
    that the result arrived at is substantially
    greater than the true value in money of the
    property assessed, i.e., that the valuation
    was unreasonably high.
    
    Id.
        (quotation   marks   and    citations   omitted)     (emphasis   in
    original).      “In   attempting     to    rebut   the    presumption   of
    correctness, the burden upon the aggrieved taxpayer ‘is one of
    production and not persuasion.’”         In re Blue Ridge Mall LLC, 
    214 N.C. App. 263
    , 267, 
    713 S.E.2d 779
    , 782 (2011) (quoting In re
    IBM Credit Corp., 
    186 N.C. App. 223
    , 226, 
    650 S.E.2d 828
    , 830
    (2007), aff'd. per curiam, 
    362 N.C. 228
    , 
    657 S.E.2d 355
     (2008)).
    [If]   the  taxpayer  rebuts  the   initial
    presumption, the burden shifts back to the
    -7-
    County which must then demonstrate that its
    methods produce true values.     The critical
    inquiry in such instances is whether the
    County's   appraisal   methodology   “is   the
    proper   means  or   methodology   given   the
    characteristics   of   the    property   under
    appraisal to produce a true value or fair
    market value.” To determine the appropriate
    appraisal   methodology    under   the   given
    circumstances, the Commission must “‘hear
    the evidence of both sides, to determine its
    weight and sufficiency and the credibility
    of witnesses, to draw inferences, and to
    appraise   conflicting   and    circumstantial
    evidence, all in order to determine whether
    the Department met its burden.’”
    In re Parkdale Mills, _ N.C. App. at             _, 741 S.E.2d at 420
    (citations omitted).
    In the present case, the Commission granted the County’s
    motion to dismiss taxpayers’ appeal “for failure of [taxpayer]
    to   rebut   the   initial   presumption   of   correctness   as   to   the
    county’s tax assessments . . . .”          Specifically, the Commission
    found the following:
    15. In this appeal, Appellant argued that
    Forsyth   County   overvalued   the    units
    because it used an arbitrary method to
    value the property by not estimating a
    value for all of the parcels taken as a
    whole.    When granting Forsyth County's
    motion to dismiss at the conclusion of
    Appellant's   evidence,    the   Commission
    determines that Forsyth County did not
    use an arbitrary method to value the
    subject   individual   parcels    when   our
    Supreme Court has noted that "[a]n act is
    arbitrary   when   it   is   done    without
    adequate determining principle."       In re
    -8-
    Hous. Auth. Of City of Salisbury, Project
    NC 16-2, 
    235 N.C. 463
    , 468, 
    70 S.E.2d 500
    , 503 (1952). When Appellant did not
    provide    competent,    material,    and
    substantial evidence as to the individual
    values of all the parcels, then there was
    no evidence tending to show that the
    Forsyth County Assessor used an arbitrary
    method regarding his values for the
    subject parcels when his values were
    determined during the revaluation process
    and were not substantially higher than
    the values called for by the statutory
    formula.
    The Commission then issued the following pertinent conclusions:
    3. Since Appellant failed to rebut the
    presumptive   validity  of   the  County’s
    individual assessments of the subject
    residential parcels, then the burden did
    not shift back to the County and no
    further analysis is necessary as to the
    County’s appraisal methodology (i.e. the
    county is not required to demonstrate that
    its method produce[d] true values).
    4. For that reason, the Commission granted
    Forsyth County’s motion to dismiss this
    appeal at the conclusion of Appellant’s
    evidence; by ruling that Appellant failed
    to rebut the presumptive validity of the
    County’s individual assessments of the
    subject   residential    parcels.      When
    granting   Forsyth   County’s   motion   to
    dismiss, no further analysis was necessary
    as to the County’s appraisal methodology
    (i.e. the Commission was not required to
    “hear the evidence of both sides, to
    determine its weight and sufficiency and
    the credibility of witnesses, to draw
    inference, and to appraise conflicting and
    circumstantial evidence, all in order to
    determine whether the County met its
    burden.”)
    -9-
    Now   on    appeal,    taxpayer     argues   the     Commission       erred   in
    dismissing its appeal because it presented sufficient evidence
    to rebut the presumption of correctness.                  We agree.
    North Carolina’s uniform appraisal standards provide the
    following:
    All property, real and personal, shall as
    far as practicable be appraised or valued at
    its true value in money. When used in this
    Subchapter, the words “true value” shall be
    interpreted as meaning market value, that
    is, the price estimated in terms of money at
    which   the  property   would  change  hands
    between a willing and financially able buyer
    and a willing seller, neither being under
    any compulsion to buy or to sell and both
    having reasonable knowledge of all the uses
    to which the property is adapted and for
    which it is capable of being used.
    
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-283
         (2013).         Thus,    this   Court      has
    recognized        that    “[a]n     important    factor     in     determining       the
    property's market value is its highest and best use.”                           In re
    Appeal of Belk-Broome Co., 
    119 N.C. App. 470
    , 473, 
    458 S.E.2d 921
    , 923 (1995), aff’d per curiam, 
    342 N.C. 890
    , 
    467 S.E.2d 242
    (1996).
    At the hearing before the Commission, taxpayer first called
    its    managing     member,       Mr.   Barry   Siegal,    to     testify.     Siegal
    testified concerning the nature of the property and how it was
    purchased and developed with the intent that it be a rental
    complex.       Siegal further testified about how the property was
    -10-
    managed as a rental complex with taxpayer responsible for the
    maintenance        of    the   interior     and   exterior   of    the     residences,
    common areas, and amenities.
    Following         Siegal’s     testimony,     taxpayer      called    Mr.    Dick
    Foster, who the County stipulated was an expert in appraisal, as
    a   witness.        Foster     testified     that   he    determined       the    income
    approach was the most appropriate valuation approach to employ
    in this case.             Foster testified        that this determination was
    based on the use of property as a rental complex, which Foster
    found    to   be    the    highest    and    best   use   given    the     history    of
    taxpayer’s economic success with the property.                      Foster further
    stated that “[he] thought the income approach was basically the
    best way to go because it was an investment-grade property, and
    the value of it is dictated about [sic] how much income you
    bring in.”     After explaining why he believed the income approach
    was the most appropriate valuation approach, Foster described
    how he employed the income approach to calculate the value of
    the property.           Foster then testified that his application of the
    income    approach         produced    a    value    of    $10,905,000       for     the
    property.
    Despite the testimony elicited by taxpayer supporting use
    of the income approach, the County contends taxpayer did not
    -11-
    produce     sufficient    evidence   that    the    method   employed     by   the
    Assessor     was    arbitrary   or   illegal.         Yet,   this      Court   has
    explained that:
    [a]n illegal appraisal method is one which
    will not result in “true value” as that term
    is used in [N.C.G.S.] § [105–]283.     Since
    [a]n illegal appraisal method is one which
    will not result in true value as that term
    is used in [N.C.G.S. § 105–283], it follows
    that such method is also arbitrary.
    In re Blue Ridge Mall LLC, 214 N.C. App. at 269, 
    713 S.E.2d at 784
     (quotation marks and citations omitted).
    Keeping in mind the burden on the aggrieved taxpayer is one
    of production and not persuasion, see Id. at 267, 
    713 S.E.2d at 782
    ,   we   hold    the   taxpayer   produced      competent,    material,     and
    substantial        evidence   tending   to    show    that      the    Assessor’s
    valuation was arbitrary or illegal and substantially exceeded
    the true value of the property.
    Although we determine taxpayer rebutted the presumption of
    correctness, we take no position on the proper valuation method
    in this case and explicitly decline taxpayer’s invitation to
    provide guidance to the Commission.                 We determine only that
    taxpayer produced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption
    of correctness afforded ad valorem tax assessments.                   Because the
    Commission held otherwise and dismissed taxpayer’s appeal, we
    reverse the Commission’s Final Decision and remand the case for
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    the Commission to determine the appropriate valuation method.
    Whether it is necessary for the Commission to hear evidence
    beyond that already elicited from taxpayer’s witnesses during
    direct- and cross-examinations is for the Commission to decide.
    We simply hold taxpayer produced sufficient evidence to require
    the   Commission    to      address   the    valuation     issue    raised   by
    taxpayer.
    III. Conclusion
    For   the   reasons    discussed      above,   we   reverse   the   Final
    Decision of the Commission and remand for further proceedings.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Judges HUNTER, Robert C. and GEER concur.