In re P.M.N ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-431
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 16 September 2014
IN THE MATTER OF:
P.M.N. Randolph County
A Minor Child No. 10 JA 56
Appeal by Respondent from order entered 22 January 2014 by
Judge Scott C. Etheridge in Randolph County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 August 2014.
Erica Glass for Petitioner-Appellee Randolph County
Department of Social Services.
Rebekah W. Davis for Respondent-Appellant mother.
Administrative Office of the Courts, by Appellate Counsel
Tawanda N. Foster, for guardian ad litem.
DILLON, Judge.
Respondent, mother of the minor child P.M.N. (“Penny”),1
appeals from the district court’s “Permanency Planning Review
Order” awarding guardianship of the child to her foster parents
(hereinafter “Mr. and Mrs. M.”) and granting to Respondent a
1
The parties stipulated to the use of this pseudonym to protect
the child’s privacy.
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minimum of two, two-hour periods of supervised visitation per
month. We affirm.
I. Background
The Randolph County Department of Social Services (“DSS”)
obtained non-secure custody of six-month-old Penny on 5 May
2010, after filing a juvenile petition alleging she was abused,
neglected, and dependent. By consent of the parties, the
district court entered an adjudication of dependency on 19 April
2011, based on the parents’ inability to care for Penny and lack
of an appropriate alternative child care arrangement. In
support of the adjudication, Respondent stipulated that she and
Penny’s father lacked stable housing and had “issues of domestic
violence” in their relationship; that she had violated a safety
plan with DSS by moving with Penny from a safety resource into
an unapproved home; and that she and the father “receive
disability benefits based upon their mental limitations[.]”
At the time it became involved with Penny, DSS was
providing adult protective services (“APS”) to Respondent and
was her disability benefits payee. A psychologist from Carolina
Piedmont Psychological Associates evaluated Respondent in June
2012 and diagnosed her as mildly mentally retarded with a Full
Scale IQ of 62. Respondent had moderate impairments in
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attention, concentration, and functional living skills, which
required “some assistance” to allow her to live independently.
The psychologist found Respondent’s judgment to be “immature and
impaired” and her general intellectual ability to fall within
the first percentile for persons of her age cohort. He also
noted that “three previous evaluations going back to 1997 have
all resulted in similar scores.”
In September 2011, the district court ceased reunification
efforts as to Penny’s father and established a permanent plan of
reunification with Respondent. On 7 March 2012, the court
ceased all reunification efforts and changed Penny’s permanent
plan from reunification with Respondent to adoption.
DSS moved to terminate the parental rights of Respondent
and Penny’s father on 26 March 2012. After a lengthy hearing,
the district court entered an order on 26 September 2013,
finding no grounds for termination as to Respondent. While
acknowledging “the Mother’[s] limitations and cognitive
impairment[,]” the court noted that she had “shown progress and
made efforts.” The court did adjudicate grounds to terminate
the parental rights of Penny’s father but concluded that
termination would not be in the child’s best interests, because
it would foreclose the ability of DSS or Respondent “to obtain
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support or any assistance” from him. The court denied DSS’s
motion, but continued Penny in DSS custody. At the next review
hearing, the court established concurrent permanent plans of
reunification with Respondent or guardianship and ordered DSS to
resume reunification efforts.
Following a subsequent permanency planning hearing held 23
October 2013,2 the district court changed Penny’s permanent plan
to guardianship, finding, inter alia, that Respondent’s “well
documented mental limitations” rendered her “barely able to take
care of herself and . . . unable to adequately provide for the
physical and mental well-being of [Penny,]” who was then four
years old. Despite the “myriad of services . . . provided to
assist [Respondent] in developing [parenting] skills[,]” the
court found that she “has not benefitted, as would be required,
to entrust the care of the minor child to her once again.”
Respondent’s therapist had seen “no progress” by Respondent
since January 2012, and had “greater concerns now than at the
onset of the case in regards to the [Respondent’s] judgment and
decision making.” “Three and one-half years after the child was
2
Effective 1 October 2013, all review hearings after the initial
permanency planning hearing are designated “subsequent
permanency planning hearings” under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
906.1(a) (2013). See 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 129, §§ 25-26, 41
(June 19, 2013).
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removed,” the court found, Respondent “continues to need[]
supervision during her weekly visitation[,]” is “unable to set
boundaries[,]” and “is often at a loss as to how to proceed”
with Penny, who “has made it very clear to [Respondent] that she
believes her parents to be the foster parents.”
The district court held a subsequent permanency planning
hearing on 4 December 2013 and entered an order ceasing
reunification efforts and granting guardianship of Penny to Mr.
and Mrs. M. on 22 January 2014. Respondent filed timely notice
of appeal from the order.
II. Respondent’s Appeal
“‘Appellate review of a permanency planning order is
limited to whether there is competent evidence in the record to
support the findings and the findings support the conclusions of
law.’” In re R.A.H., 182 N.C. App. 52, 57-58, 641 S.E.2d 404,
408 (2007) (quoting In re J.C.S., 164 N.C. App. 96, 106, 595
S.E.2d 155, 161 (2004)). Findings not specifically challenged
on appeal are presumed to be supported by evidence and are
binding. See Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d
729, 731 (1991).
In selecting an appropriate disposition for a juvenile
adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent, the district court
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“solely considers the best interests of the child.” In re
Pittman, 149 N.C. App. 756, 766, 561 S.E.2d 560, 567 (2002). We
review the district court’s assessment of the child’s best
interests for abuse of discretion. In re D.S.A., 181 N.C. App.
715, 720, 641 S.E.2d 18, 22 (2007). “An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court's ruling is so arbitrary that it
could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re
Robinson, 151 N.C. App. 733, 737, 567 S.E.2d 227, 229 (2002)
(internal marks omitted).
A. Visitation Schedule
Respondent first claims the district court abused its
discretion by awarding her just two hours of supervised
visitation with Penny twice per month. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-905.1, “[a]n order that . . . continues the juvenile’s
placement outside the home shall provide for appropriate
visitation as may be in the best interests of the juvenile
consistent with the juvenile’s health and safety.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-905.1(a) (2013). Where the court establishes a
guardianship, its order “shall specify the minimum frequency and
length of the visits and whether the visits shall be
supervised.” Id. § 7B-905.1(c). The order may also provide for
“additional visitation as agreed upon by the respondent and . .
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. guardian.” Id. Moreover, if the court retains jurisdiction
in the cause, it must inform the parties of their right to file
a motion for review of the visitation plan. Id. § 7B-905.1(d).
Respondent argues that the district court based its
visitation plan upon “logistics and a desire to end the case
rather than Penny’s best interest.” We disagree.
The court received evidence and made findings regarding
Penny’s increasingly adverse reactions to her visits with
Respondent. Supplementing DSS’s written report, the DSS social
worker described Respondent’s most recent visit with Penny,
during which “the minor child was very difficult with the
mother.” Atypically for the child, Penny had rebuffed the
social worker’s attempt to redirect her and had “kicked [the
social worker] as she had been kicking the mother[.]” The
social worker discussed the visit with Penny’s therapist, who
had observed “similar behaviors in [Penny] and believes that
this is her way of expressing her not understanding what’s going
on with . . . these community visits that [Respondent] has been
getting, with [Penny] being brought over to [Respondent’s]
house, and not really understanding what’s going on and why.”
The social worker also noted that Respondent had “told [Penny]
that she would be living at her home with [Respondent] and
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showed [Penny] her bedroom. And that has further confused the
minor child.” In light of these circumstances, DSS recommended
reducing Respondent’s visitation with Penny to “a minimum of
once per month for one hour arranged between [Respondent] and
the legal guardians and supervised by the legal guardians.”
Penny’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and Mr. and Mrs. M. concurred
in this recommendation.
The social worker did remind the court that DSS would no
longer facilitate Respondent’s visitation if a guardianship was
established. Because Mr. and Mrs. M. “both work outside of the
home” and “have two other children [who] are actively engaged in
community activities[,]” the social worker referred to the
difficulty “[l]ogistically for them scheduling visits[.]”
However, when asked whether this difficulty was “the reason for
the recommendation to go from a minimum of four times a month to
once a month[,]” Gillespie responded, “No, that is not the only
reason. That is just one piece of it.”
Penny’s co-GAL testified that the GAL recommended reducing
Respondent’s visitation with Penny to one hour per month because
of “the angst that the child is clearly exhibiting” as a result
of the visits, not issues of scheduling convenience. “Given the
escalation in [Penny’s] behavior currently[,]” the co-GAL
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explained, “I think [Penny] needs some time to work with the
therapist to be able to resolve some of the conflict that she’s
dealing with.”
Mr. M. explained that he and his wife “feel that [] once a
month visitation at this point would be reasonable . . . mostly
due to the fact that we want to make sure that [Penny] is very
clear as to what her situation is and not confuse the situation
in her mind.” Mr. M. specifically noted concern about “comments
by [Respondent] in regards to [Penny] returning home or sleeping
in [her] bed or residence[.]” Mr. M. also expressed a
reluctance to allow “someone other than ourselves to supervise
the visits.”
In its order, the district court expressly concluded that
“[t]he best interest of the minor child will be served by” the
following visitation plan:
Supervised visitation between the Mother and
the minor child shall occur a minimum of two
hours twice per month. The legal guardians
may allow individuals other than themselves
to supervise visits between the Mother and
the minor child in the community if the
legal guardians believe such identified
individuals to be appropriate . . . . It
should be noted that it is the Court’s
preference that visitation by the Mother be
expanded as the minor child becomes older.
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The court did not foreclose additional community visits or
visits of a duration longer than the prescribed two-hour
minimum. Indeed, the order contemplates expanding Respondent’s
visitation in the future. The court further found that
Respondent was “aware that the matter may be brought before the
Court for review [at] anytime by the filing of a motion for
review” by a party. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(n)(4)
(2013). Because the order plainly reflects the court’s proper
exercise of discretion based on its assessment of Penny’s best
interests, Respondent’s assignment of error is overruled.
Respondent also contends that the court abdicated its fact-
finding duty under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1 by adopting
“verbatim” the version of facts contained in the written reports
submitted by DSS and the GAL. She characterizes the court’s
order as “resembl[ing] a rubber stamp of the opinion of DSS.”
Citing our decision in In re J.S., 165 N.C. App. 509, 598 S.E.2d
658 (2004), Respondent suggests that the court’s findings do not
evince a proper exercise of discretion.
The purpose of a permanency planning hearing is to
establish “the best plan of care to achieve a safe, permanent
home for the juvenile within a reasonable period of time.” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(g) (2013). Following the hearing, “[t]he
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court may maintain the juvenile’s placement . . . or order a
different placement, appoint a guardian of the person for the
juvenile pursuant to G.S. 7B-600, or order any disposition
authorized by G.S. 7B-903[.]” Id. § 7B-906.1(i). The court
must consider the seven criteria set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-906.1(d) and “make written findings regarding those that are
relevant[.]” If the court elects not to place the juvenile with
a parent, it must also enter findings as to any of the six
“relevant” factors in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(e).
Although she refers to the district court’s duty to make
findings under the statutes, Respondent does not contend that
the court failed to address any particular criterion set forth
therein. Respondent instead argues, based on In re J.S., that
the court improperly delegated its fact-finding responsibility
by relying so heavily on the written report submitted by DSS.
We disagree.
In In re J.S., this Court reviewed “a cursory two page”
permanency planning review order in which the district court
merely “incorporated [by reference] a court report from DSS and
a mental health report on the oldest boy as a finding of fact.”
165 N.C. App. at 511, 598 S.E.2d at 660. While affirming that
“it is permissible for trial courts to consider all written
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reports and materials submitted” at a dispositional hearing, we
also stated that a “court should not broadly incorporate these
written reports from outside sources as its findings of fact.”
Id. Because the court’s few findings were “not sufficiently
specific to allow this Court to review its decision and . . .
also fail[ed] to comply with the statutory requirements” for a
permanency planning review order, we remanded for additional
findings. Id. at 513, 598 S.E.2d at 661.
Unlike the “cursory two page order” at issue in In re J.S.,
the order sub judice includes forty paragraphs of detailed,
single-spaced findings of fact covering almost eight full pages.
See In re C.M., 183 N.C. App. 207, 213, 644 S.E.2d 588, 593
(2007) (“In this case, the trial court considered the written
reports, incorporated the written reports, and made findings
based upon the reports.”); In re J.W., K.W., 173 N.C. App. 450,
455-56, 619 S.E.2d 534, 539-40 (2005). Rather than merely
reciting allegations or broadly incorporating other sources, the
district court made specific, affirmative findings regarding
Respondent’s history of abusive relationships, her hiding of
these from DSS, her inability to recognize situations that were
unsafe to herself or her child, and her persistent inability to
benefit from services and apply learned information to new
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situations. The court also made findings regarding Penny’s
three and one-half years in foster care and her bond with Mr.
and Mrs. M., her escalating misbehavior during and after visits
with Respondent, and her difficulties coping with and
understanding “the current situation regarding the Mother and
foster parents.” We thus find In re J.S. to be easily
distinguishable.
For purposes of appellate review, it is immaterial that
many of the district court’s findings of fact are copied from
the DSS or GAL reports. See In re R.A.H., 182 N.C. App. at 60,
641 S.E.2d at 409. “The standard of review that applies to an
assignment challenging a dispositional finding is whether the
finding is supported by competent evidence.” In re C.M., 183
N.C. App. at 212, 644 S.E.2d at 593. Inasmuch as “[s]uch
reports constitute competent evidence,” the court is free to
“rel[y] upon them in reaching its finding of fact.” In re
R.A.H., 182 N.C. App. at 60, 641 S.E.2d at 409. Moreover,
Respondent’s assertion that the court merely “rubber stamped”
the DSS report ignores the fact that the court awarded
Respondent substantially more visitation than was unanimously
recommended by DSS, the GAL, and Mr. and Mrs. M. Cf. In re
K.S., 183 N.C. App. 315, 323-24, 646 S.E.2d 541, 545-46 (2007)
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(“[C]ontrary to respondent’s contentions, the trial court did
not adopt lock-stock-and-barrel DSS’s summary and
recommendations. Indeed, the trial court declined to follow
DSS’s recommendation[.]”).
Respondent further notes that many of the court’s findings
concern events that occurred during the course of the case,
rather than “current” information. She then faults the court
for failing to incorporate any findings from its 26 September
2013 order denying DSS’s motion to terminate her parental
rights. Neither of these objections has merit. It is entirely
proper, if not imperative, for the court to consider the history
of the case when determining the appropriate disposition for a
juvenile. Furthermore, we find no indication that the court
disregarded its 26 September 2013 order in its account of the
case history. The findings describe Respondent’s active
participation in parenting classes, a domestic violence support
group, and individual therapy, as well as her consistent
visitation with Penny. They credit Respondent’s “progress in
caring for herself,” including her transition from APS payee
services to managing her own finances in October 2012. However,
the court found that Respondent’s “judgment and ability to
benefit from supports has waxed and waned over the time that the
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minor child has been in the custody of RCDSS, since May 3,
2010[,]” but that she “has not benefitted, as would be required,
to entrust the care of the minor child to her once again.”
Respondent also suggests that the district court should
have ordered additional “community visits during which
[Respondent] was the parent instead of visits during which [Mr.
or Mrs. M.] remained the parent in charge” and should have
required that Respondent be included in Penny’s therapy.
However, the court heard no evidence that Penny’s best interests
demanded these activities. To the contrary, the evidence
indicated that Penny was struggling with the uncertainty created
by three and one-half years in foster care and by the ambiguity
of her relationships with Respondent and Mr. and Mrs. M. The
terms of Respondent’s visitation reflect the court’s thoughtful
balancing of her rights as a parent with Penny’s need for a
“safe, permanent home within a reasonable amount of time.” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-100(5) (2013). Accordingly, we find no abuse of
discretion.
B. Waiver of Review Hearings
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Respondent next claims the district court erred by waiving
further review hearings in this cause pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-906.1(n).3 Subsection (n) provides:
[T]he court may waive the holding of
hearings required by this section . . . if
the court finds by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence each of the following:
(1) The juvenile has resided in the
placement for a period of at least one year.
(2) The placement is stable and continuation
of the placement is in the juvenile's best
interests.
(3) Neither the juvenile's best interests
nor the rights of any party require that
review hearings be held every six months.
(4) All parties are aware that the matter
may be brought before the court for review
at any time by the filing of a motion for
review or on the court's own motion.
(5) The court order has designated the
relative or other suitable person as the
juvenile's permanent custodian or guardian
of the person.
Id.
We find no error here. Paragraph 40(a)-(e) of the order
includes all of the necessary findings required by N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-906.1(n)(1)-(5). The district court explicitly made
3
Subsection 7B-906.1(n) differs only slightly from former N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-906(b) (2011), which was repealed effective 1
October 2013. See 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 129, §§ 25, 41.
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these findings “[b]y clear, cogent, and convincing evidence,” as
prescribed by subsection (n). Of these findings, Respondent
challenges only the determination that Penny’s best interests
did not “require that review hearings be held every six
months[.]” See id. § 7B-906.1(n)(3). Given the lengthy history
of this case, the stability of Penny’s placement with Mr. and
Mrs. M., and the minor child’s obvious need for permanence, we
find ample support for the finding that Penny’s best interests
no longer required regular review hearings. Nor does Respondent
assert that her rights as a parent required additional hearings,
inasmuch as she retained the right to file motions for review.
We thus find no basis for Respondent’s claim that the court
should have conducted “at least one more review.”
C. Guardianship
Respondent next claims that the district court abused its
discretion in awarding guardianship of Penny to Mr. and Mrs. M.
Respondent repeats her prior assertion that the court failed to
make independent findings of fact when it copied language from
the report filed by DSS. She also asserts that the court failed
to consider her “growth and progress” in avoiding abusive
relationships, managing her finances, and improving her
parenting skills. Respondent notes she “was never given a
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chance to care for Penny” during “a trial placement or even
overnight visits.”
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-600(a) (2013), the
district court may “appoint a guardian at any time during the
juvenile proceedings . . . when it finds such appointment to be
in the juvenile’s best interests.” In re E.C., 174 N.C. App.
517, 520, 621 S.E.2d 647, 650-51 (2005). Appointment of a
guardian at a permanency planning review hearing is explicitly
authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(j).4 The court has
broad discretion to determine a juvenile’s best interests, In re
D.S.A., 181 N.C. App. 715, 720, 641 S.E.2d 18, 22 (2007), and an
authorized disposition based thereon “will not be disturbed
absent clear evidence that the decision was manifestly
unsupported by reason.” In re N.B., 167 N.C. App. 305, 311, 605
S.E.2d 488, 492 (2004).
Initially, we note that Respondent appeared to consent to
the guardianship at the conclusion of the hearing. In urging
the court to grant her visitation beyond the one hour per month
recommended by DSS, her counsel stated as follows:
[Respondent] understands that guardianship
is coming. I mean we’re not – we’re beyond
4
Subsection 7B-906.1(j) is identical to former N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-907(f), which was repealed effective 1 October 2013. See
2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 129, §§ 25, 41.
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contesting that. It’s something actually
that we attempted to discuss before we went
through six days in a termination hearing.
I’m just asking for the Court to put in
place enough structure that will provide
[Respondent] the opportunity to stay
involved with her child.
(emphasis added).
Assuming, arguendo, that Respondent did not waive this
issue or invite the alleged error, we find no abuse of
discretion. As noted above, the fact that the court’s findings
of fact quote from the DSS report does not undermine their
validity. See In re R.A.H., 182 N.C. App. at 60, 641 S.E.2d at
409. The findings describe Respondent’s persistent struggles
with life skills, judgment, and decision-making. They further
underscore the stability and success of Penny’s foster placement
as well as the bond Penny developed with Mr. and Mrs. M. after
three and one-half years in their care. The court expressly
found and concluded that Penny’s best interests would be served
by her continued placement with Mr. and Mrs. M. and by their
appointment as her guardians. Both DSS and the GAL agreed with
the court’s assessment.
Finally, Respondent claims the district court awarded
guardianship to Mr. and Mrs. M. without properly verifying that
they “understand[] the legal significance of the appointment and
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will have adequate resources to care appropriately for the
juvenile[,]” under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-600(c) and 7B-906.1(j).
We have previously held these provisions do not “require that
the court make any specific findings in order to make the
verification.” In re J.E., 182 N.C. App. 612, 616-17, 643
S.E.2d 70, 73 (2007). We conclude that the court’s findings
were sufficient.
The order includes the following language addressing the
verification requirement:
The Court has verified that [Mr. and Mrs.
M.] understand the legal significance of the
appointment of guardianship regarding the
minor child. The[y] have adequate resources
to care appropriately for the minor child.
[Mrs. M.] is employed and receives
compensation for her employment, and though
at this time [Mr. M.] has been laid off from
his previous employment, he receives
unemployment compensation.
Respondent challenges these findings as unsupported by the
evidence and otherwise inadequate. Specifically, she argues the
evidence did not show that Mr. and Mrs. M. understood their
obligation to honor any future expansion of visitation ordered
by the court. Respondent characterizes the court’s assessment
of the guardians’ financial resources as “perfunctory[.]”
Competent evidence supports the challenged findings. Mr.
M. testified that he and Mrs. M. had served as Penny’s foster
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parents since 3 May 2010, that they understood the guardianship
arrangement recommended by DSS, and that they wished to have
guardianship of the child. In addition to expressing his
understanding of and willingness to comply with the visitation
schedule recommended by DSS, Mr. M. testified as follows
regarding Respondent’s ongoing right to visitation:
Q. Are you willing to continue to make that
type of visitation available between [Penny]
and her mother, visitation that would be
well beyond a simple hour a month?
A. Well, if it were consistent with the
court order at the – anywhere from – if they
were as to an hour or two to four hours,
we’d be willing to provide access for those
visits.
(emphasis added). While Mr. M. balked at the suggestion of
“having someone other than ourselves supervise the visits[,]”
particularly a person the guardians had never met, he agreed to
“possibly increasing visitation if that was something that was
left available.” In its report to the court, DSS noted that it
had discussed the legal guardianship with Mr. and Mrs. M.,
including the issue of “continued visitation . . . should the
court accept the Department’s recommendation regarding
Guardianship.” The DSS social worker testified that Mr. and
Mrs. M. had generally “gone above and beyond what the minimum of
the court order has said in regards to visits.”
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Insofar as Respondent suggests the court erroneously found
that Mr. and Mrs. M. were aware of her right to file a motion
seeking additional visitation, we note the following exchange
between the court and their counsel:
THE COURT: My understanding is is once I've
deemed them guardians, if that's what I
choose to do, then the only hearing that
gets done after that is if someone files a
motion to have them removed for acting
inconsistent with their responsibilities as
guardian.
[COUNSEL FOR MR. AND MRS. M.]: Right, and
certainly i[f] visitation is an issue, they
can bring that issue forward as well as the
mother.
Though Respondent also posits several hypothetical scenarios in
her brief to this Court, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-600 and 7B-
906.1(j) do not require the court to review every possible
future contingency with the guardians to ensure their
understanding of the legal ramifications thereof.
The district court properly verified that Mr. and Mrs. M.
had adequate resources to care for Penny. The court’s findings
about the guardians’ income accurately reflect the testimony of
Mr. M., who also affirmed that he and his wife had “the
financial means to care for [Penny.]” The court was also aware
that Mr. and Mrs. M. had cared for Penny since May 2010, and had
previously been recommended as an adoptive placement by DSS and
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the GAL. Cf. In re J.E., 182 N.C. App. at 617, 643 S.E.2d at 73
(allowing verification based on pre-existing evidence such as a
DSS home study). The GAL reported to the court that Mr. and
Mrs. M. had “properly attended to” any issues that arose with
Penny during the placement. The evidence and the court’s
findings were sufficient to satisfy N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-600(c)
and 7B-906.1(j).
III. Conclusion
The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
Respondent two hours of supervised visitation twice per month,
awarding guardianship to Mr. and Mrs. M., and waiving future
review hearings. The court made sufficient findings of fact
supported by competent evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the
order.
Affirmed.
Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).