State v. Scruggs ( 2014 )


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  • An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
    controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
    with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    NO. COA14-22
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed:    19 August 2014
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    Macon County
    v.
    Nos. 12 CRS 51062, 702006
    ALFRED MICHAEL SCRUGGS
    Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 24 July 2013 by
    Judge Marvin P. Pope in Macon County Superior Court.                     Heard in
    the Court of Appeals 4 August 2014.
    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special                   Deputy    Attorney
    General Neil Dalton, for the State.
    Jon W. Myers for defendant-appellant.
    ERVIN, Judge.
    Defendant     Alfred    Michael     Scruggs    appeals     from    judgments
    sentencing him to active terms of imprisonment based upon his
    convictions for driving while subject to an impairing substance
    and   driving      while   license     revoked.        On     appeal,    Defendant
    contends that the trial court erred by denying his motions to
    dismiss the driving while subject to an impairing substance and
    driving    while    license     revoked    charges     that    had   been   lodged
    -2-
    against him for insufficiency of the evidence.                         After careful
    consideration      of    Defendant’s      challenges      to    the    trial    court’s
    judgments in light of the record and the applicable law, we
    conclude    that        the    trial     court’s     judgments        should    remain
    undisturbed.
    I. Factual Background
    A. Substantive Facts
    At approximately 1:00 a.m. on 18 October 2012, Corporal
    Michael    Langley,      Sr.,    of    the   Macon     County    Sheriff’s       Office
    responded   to     a    report    that    there    had   been    a     motor    vehicle
    accident on West Old Murphy Road in Macon County.                       Upon arriving
    at the scene of the accident, Corporal Langley observed a tan
    Ford Explorer lying in the middle of the road with the driver’s
    side of the vehicle against the pavement.                      As a result of the
    fact that Defendant was still in the vehicle, he had to be
    extricated through the rear window and tailgate area.                           At the
    time of his      removal       from the      wrecked     vehicle, Defendant         was
    “wobbly,”    “unstable,”         and     needed    assistance         from    emergency
    medical personnel.            After Trooper Brandon Padgett of the North
    Carolina State Highway Patrol arrived on the scene, Corporal
    Langley    turned      responsibility        for   investigating        the    accident
    over to him.
    -3-
    At the time that Trooper Padgett located Defendant, he was
    standing in an ambulance completing various documents.                                     After
    determining        that     the    vehicle    that     had    been      involved       in    the
    accident was registered to Defendant, Trooper Padgett returned
    to the location at which Defendant was situated and asked him to
    step    out   of     the    ambulance.         At    the     time      that    he   left    the
    ambulance,      Defendant         was     unsteady     on     his      feet     and    needed
    assistance.        As he assisted Defendant, Trooper Padgett detected
    a “very strong” odor of alcohol about Defendant’s breath and
    person.       When he began interviewing Defendant, Trooper Padgett
    asked    Defendant         to    lean    against    his     patrol      vehicle       so    that
    Defendant      did         not     fall.       According          to    Trooper       Padgett,
    Defendant was “very unsteady,” “[h]is speech was very slurred
    and mumble-ish,” his “eyes were very glassy and droopy,” and he
    “kept his head down.”
    At the time that he spoke with Defendant, Trooper Padgett
    asked    Defendant         what    had     happened.         In     response,       Defendant
    stated that “‘I’m f[-]ed up,’ and ‘I really f[-]ed up,’ and ‘I
    didn’t do anything.’”              After refusing to take a breath test or
    perform any field sobriety tests, Defendant told Trooper Padgett
    to take him to jail.               However, instead of being transported to
    the Macon County Jail, Defendant was                         taken to         the   hospital,
    -4-
    where Officer Padgett heard him tell medical personnel that he
    had consumed “[t]welve beers, no, eight, no, six.”
    B. Procedural History
    On       18    October          2012,    citations         charging     Defendant      with
    driving       while          subject    to    an     impairing       substance,       reckless
    driving, driving while license revoked, and driving a vehicle
    containing         an    open     container         of    an    alcoholic     beverage      were
    issued.       On 8 May 2013, Defendant was found guilty of driving
    while    subject         to     an     impairing         substance    and    driving       while
    license revoked.1              Based upon Defendant’s pleas, Judge Monica H.
    Leslie entered judgments sentencing Defendant to a term of 24
    months imprisonment based upon his conviction for driving while
    subject to an impairing substance and to a consecutive term of
    60 days imprisonment based upon his conviction for driving while
    license revoked.               Defendant noted an appeal from Judge Leslie’s
    judgment to the Macon County Superior Court for a trial de novo.
    On 17 June 2013, the State filed a notice announcing that
    it   intended           to     prove    as    grossly          aggravating       factors    that
    Defendant had been convicted of driving while subject to an
    impairing      substance          on    two   occasions          within    the    seven    years
    prior    to    18       October        2012   and     that      Defendant’s       license    was
    revoked as the result of an impaired driving conviction on 18
    1
    The reckless driving and open container                                    charges    were
    dismissed at the end of the State’s evidence.
    -5-
    October 2012.         The charges against Defendant came on for hearing
    before the trial court and a jury at the 22 July 2013 criminal
    session of the Macon County Superior Court.                  On 24 July 2013,
    the jury returned verdicts convicting Defendant of driving while
    subject    to    an   impairing   substance    and   driving      while   license
    revoked and finding that Defendant “ha[d] two convictions for
    impaired driving which occurred within seven (7) years before
    the date of this offense” and that “Defendant drove at the time
    of the current offense, while [his] drivers license was revoked
    under   [N.C.     Gen.    Stat.   §]   20-28   and   the    revocation    was   an
    impaired    driving      revocation    under    [N.C.      Gen.   Stat.   §]    20-
    28.2(a).”       At the conclusion of the ensuing sentencing hearing,
    the trial court determined that Defendant should be sentenced as
    an aggravated Level I offender in the case in which he had been
    convicted of driving while subject to an impairing substance and
    entered judgments sentencing Defendant to a term of 36 months
    imprisonment based upon his conviction for driving while subject
    to am impairing substance and to a consecutive term of 120 days
    imprisonment based upon his conviction for driving while license
    revoked.    Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial
    court’s judgments.
    II. Substantive Legal Analysis
    -6-
    In his brief, Defendant argues that the trial court erred
    by denying his motions to dismiss the driving while subject to
    an impairing substance and driving while license revoked charges
    that   had     been   lodged   against   him   for   insufficiency   of   the
    evidence.      More specifically, Defendant contends that the record
    evidence did not suffice to support a determination that he was
    operating a motor vehicle on the night of 18 October 2012.                We
    do not find Defendant’s argument persuasive.
    “‘Upon defendant’s motion for dismissal, the question for
    the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each
    essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense
    included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator
    of such offense.       If so, the motion is properly denied.’”          State
    v. Fritsch, 
    351 N.C. 373
    , 378, 
    526 S.E.2d 451
    , 455 (quoting
    State v. Barnes, 
    334 N.C. 67
    , 75, 
    430 S.E.2d 914
    , 918 (1993)),
    cert. denied, 
    531 U.S. 890
    , 
    121 S. Ct. 213
    , 
    148 L. Ed. 2d 150
    (2000).        “In making its determination, the trial court must
    consider       all    evidence    admitted,      whether    competent      or
    incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State, giving
    the    State    the    benefit   of   every    reasonable   inference     and
    resolving any contradictions in its favor.”             State v. Rose, 
    339 N.C. 172
    , 192, 
    451 S.E.2d 211
    , 223 (1994), cert. denied, 
    515 U.S. 1135
    , 
    115 S. Ct. 2565
    , 
    132 L. Ed. 2d 818
     (1995).
    -7-
    “The essential elements of [driving while subject to an
    impairing substance] are:     (1) Defendant was driving a vehicle;
    (2) upon any highway, any street, or any public vehicular area
    within this State; (3) while under the influence of an impairing
    substance.”    State v. Mark, 
    154 N.C. App. 341
    , 345, 
    571 S.E.2d 867
    , 870 (2002), aff’d, 
    357 N.C. 242
    , 
    580 S.E.2d 693
     (2003) (per
    curiam) (citing 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1
    ).              “To convict a
    defendant . . . of driving while his license is revoked the
    State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the defendant’s
    operation of a motor vehicle (2) on a public highway (3) while
    his operator’s license is revoked.”           State v. Richardson, 
    96 N.C. App. 270
    , 271, 
    385 S.E.2d 194
    , 195 (1989) (citing State v.
    Atwood, 
    290 N.C. 266
    , 271, 
    225 S.E.2d 543
    , 545 (1976)).                 The
    State   must   also   prove   that     the   defendant   had   actual    or
    constructive knowledge of the revocation of his license.          
    Id.
    In reliance upon our decision in State v. Ray, 54 N.C. App,
    473, 475, 
    283 S.E.2d 823
    , 825 (1981) (holding that evidence that
    the defendant was observed “‘halfway [in] the front seat’” of a
    vehicle did not suffice to support a determination that the
    defendant had been driving the vehicle), Defendant claims that
    his mere presence in the wrecked vehicle, which is all that he
    conceded that the record showed, did not suffice to support a
    determination that he had been driving.          We also noted in Ray,
    -8-
    however, that, even though “other circumstantial evidence . . .
    would have bolstered the State’s case,” none was offered.                            
    Id.
    The additional circumstantial evidence lacking in Ray is clearly
    present here.
    The record developed at trial in this case demonstrated
    that (1) Defendant was found alone in the vehicle; (2) Defendant
    could       not   extricate       himself    from    the   vehicle,       allowing    a
    reasonable        juror     to     conclude       that,    if    Defendant      needed
    assistance to exit the vehicle, any other occupants would have
    needed such assistance as well; (3) Defendant made remarks, such
    as     “I    really      f[-]ed    up,”     which    could      be   viewed    as    an
    incriminating admission that Defendant knew that he had done
    something that he should have refrained from doing; and (4) the
    vehicle was registered in Defendant’s name.                     In view of the fact
    that the evidence contained in this record showed considerably
    more    than      that    Defendant    had    been    discovered     in    a   wrecked
    vehicle, we have no hesitation in concluding that the record
    provided ample justification for a decision that Defendant was
    driving the Ford Explorer involved in the accident on the night
    in question.             As a result, the trial court did not err by
    denying Defendant’s dismissal motions.
    III. Conclusion
    -9-
    Thus,       for   the   reasons    set   forth   above,    Defendant’s
    challenges to the trial court’s judgments lack merit.                   As a
    result,   the    trial   court’s   judgments   should,   and   hereby    do,
    remain undisturbed.
    NO ERROR.
    Judges ROBERT C. HUNTER and STEPHENS concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-22

Filed Date: 8/19/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014