State v. Scruggs ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-22
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 19 August 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
Macon County
v.
Nos. 12 CRS 51062, 702006
ALFRED MICHAEL SCRUGGS
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 24 July 2013 by
Judge Marvin P. Pope in Macon County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 4 August 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Neil Dalton, for the State.
Jon W. Myers for defendant-appellant.
ERVIN, Judge.
Defendant Alfred Michael Scruggs appeals from judgments
sentencing him to active terms of imprisonment based upon his
convictions for driving while subject to an impairing substance
and driving while license revoked. On appeal, Defendant
contends that the trial court erred by denying his motions to
dismiss the driving while subject to an impairing substance and
driving while license revoked charges that had been lodged
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against him for insufficiency of the evidence. After careful
consideration of Defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s
judgments in light of the record and the applicable law, we
conclude that the trial court’s judgments should remain
undisturbed.
I. Factual Background
A. Substantive Facts
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on 18 October 2012, Corporal
Michael Langley, Sr., of the Macon County Sheriff’s Office
responded to a report that there had been a motor vehicle
accident on West Old Murphy Road in Macon County. Upon arriving
at the scene of the accident, Corporal Langley observed a tan
Ford Explorer lying in the middle of the road with the driver’s
side of the vehicle against the pavement. As a result of the
fact that Defendant was still in the vehicle, he had to be
extricated through the rear window and tailgate area. At the
time of his removal from the wrecked vehicle, Defendant was
“wobbly,” “unstable,” and needed assistance from emergency
medical personnel. After Trooper Brandon Padgett of the North
Carolina State Highway Patrol arrived on the scene, Corporal
Langley turned responsibility for investigating the accident
over to him.
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At the time that Trooper Padgett located Defendant, he was
standing in an ambulance completing various documents. After
determining that the vehicle that had been involved in the
accident was registered to Defendant, Trooper Padgett returned
to the location at which Defendant was situated and asked him to
step out of the ambulance. At the time that he left the
ambulance, Defendant was unsteady on his feet and needed
assistance. As he assisted Defendant, Trooper Padgett detected
a “very strong” odor of alcohol about Defendant’s breath and
person. When he began interviewing Defendant, Trooper Padgett
asked Defendant to lean against his patrol vehicle so that
Defendant did not fall. According to Trooper Padgett,
Defendant was “very unsteady,” “[h]is speech was very slurred
and mumble-ish,” his “eyes were very glassy and droopy,” and he
“kept his head down.”
At the time that he spoke with Defendant, Trooper Padgett
asked Defendant what had happened. In response, Defendant
stated that “‘I’m f[-]ed up,’ and ‘I really f[-]ed up,’ and ‘I
didn’t do anything.’” After refusing to take a breath test or
perform any field sobriety tests, Defendant told Trooper Padgett
to take him to jail. However, instead of being transported to
the Macon County Jail, Defendant was taken to the hospital,
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where Officer Padgett heard him tell medical personnel that he
had consumed “[t]welve beers, no, eight, no, six.”
B. Procedural History
On 18 October 2012, citations charging Defendant with
driving while subject to an impairing substance, reckless
driving, driving while license revoked, and driving a vehicle
containing an open container of an alcoholic beverage were
issued. On 8 May 2013, Defendant was found guilty of driving
while subject to an impairing substance and driving while
license revoked.1 Based upon Defendant’s pleas, Judge Monica H.
Leslie entered judgments sentencing Defendant to a term of 24
months imprisonment based upon his conviction for driving while
subject to an impairing substance and to a consecutive term of
60 days imprisonment based upon his conviction for driving while
license revoked. Defendant noted an appeal from Judge Leslie’s
judgment to the Macon County Superior Court for a trial de novo.
On 17 June 2013, the State filed a notice announcing that
it intended to prove as grossly aggravating factors that
Defendant had been convicted of driving while subject to an
impairing substance on two occasions within the seven years
prior to 18 October 2012 and that Defendant’s license was
revoked as the result of an impaired driving conviction on 18
1
The reckless driving and open container charges were
dismissed at the end of the State’s evidence.
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October 2012. The charges against Defendant came on for hearing
before the trial court and a jury at the 22 July 2013 criminal
session of the Macon County Superior Court. On 24 July 2013,
the jury returned verdicts convicting Defendant of driving while
subject to an impairing substance and driving while license
revoked and finding that Defendant “ha[d] two convictions for
impaired driving which occurred within seven (7) years before
the date of this offense” and that “Defendant drove at the time
of the current offense, while [his] drivers license was revoked
under [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 20-28 and the revocation was an
impaired driving revocation under [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 20-
28.2(a).” At the conclusion of the ensuing sentencing hearing,
the trial court determined that Defendant should be sentenced as
an aggravated Level I offender in the case in which he had been
convicted of driving while subject to an impairing substance and
entered judgments sentencing Defendant to a term of 36 months
imprisonment based upon his conviction for driving while subject
to am impairing substance and to a consecutive term of 120 days
imprisonment based upon his conviction for driving while license
revoked. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial
court’s judgments.
II. Substantive Legal Analysis
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In his brief, Defendant argues that the trial court erred
by denying his motions to dismiss the driving while subject to
an impairing substance and driving while license revoked charges
that had been lodged against him for insufficiency of the
evidence. More specifically, Defendant contends that the record
evidence did not suffice to support a determination that he was
operating a motor vehicle on the night of 18 October 2012. We
do not find Defendant’s argument persuasive.
“‘Upon defendant’s motion for dismissal, the question for
the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each
essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense
included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator
of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.’” State
v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (quoting
State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914, 918 (1993)),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890, 121 S. Ct. 213, 148 L. Ed. 2d 150(2000). “In making its determination, the trial court must
consider all evidence admitted, whether competent or
incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State, giving
the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and
resolving any contradictions in its favor.” State v. Rose, 339
N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994), cert. denied, 515
U.S. 1135, 115 S. Ct. 2565, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995).
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“The essential elements of [driving while subject to an
impairing substance] are: (1) Defendant was driving a vehicle;
(2) upon any highway, any street, or any public vehicular area
within this State; (3) while under the influence of an impairing
substance.” State v. Mark, 154 N.C. App. 341, 345, 571 S.E.2d
867, 870 (2002), aff’d, 357 N.C. 242, 580 S.E.2d 693 (2003) (per
curiam) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1). “To convict a
defendant . . . of driving while his license is revoked the
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the defendant’s
operation of a motor vehicle (2) on a public highway (3) while
his operator’s license is revoked.” State v. Richardson, 96
N.C. App. 270, 271, 385 S.E.2d 194, 195 (1989) (citing State v.
Atwood, 290 N.C. 266, 271, 225 S.E.2d 543, 545 (1976)). The
State must also prove that the defendant had actual or
constructive knowledge of the revocation of his license. Id.In reliance upon our decision in State v. Ray, 54 N.C. App,
473, 475, 283 S.E.2d 823, 825 (1981) (holding that evidence that
the defendant was observed “‘halfway [in] the front seat’” of a
vehicle did not suffice to support a determination that the
defendant had been driving the vehicle), Defendant claims that
his mere presence in the wrecked vehicle, which is all that he
conceded that the record showed, did not suffice to support a
determination that he had been driving. We also noted in Ray,
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however, that, even though “other circumstantial evidence . . .
would have bolstered the State’s case,” none was offered. Id.The additional circumstantial evidence lacking in Ray is clearly
present here.
The record developed at trial in this case demonstrated
that (1) Defendant was found alone in the vehicle; (2) Defendant
could not extricate himself from the vehicle, allowing a
reasonable juror to conclude that, if Defendant needed
assistance to exit the vehicle, any other occupants would have
needed such assistance as well; (3) Defendant made remarks, such
as “I really f[-]ed up,” which could be viewed as an
incriminating admission that Defendant knew that he had done
something that he should have refrained from doing; and (4) the
vehicle was registered in Defendant’s name. In view of the fact
that the evidence contained in this record showed considerably
more than that Defendant had been discovered in a wrecked
vehicle, we have no hesitation in concluding that the record
provided ample justification for a decision that Defendant was
driving the Ford Explorer involved in the accident on the night
in question. As a result, the trial court did not err by
denying Defendant’s dismissal motions.
III. Conclusion
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Thus, for the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s
challenges to the trial court’s judgments lack merit. As a
result, the trial court’s judgments should, and hereby do,
remain undisturbed.
NO ERROR.
Judges ROBERT C. HUNTER and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).