State v. Mathes ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of
A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e .
NO. COA13-955
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 5 August 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Buncombe County
Nos. 12 CRS 61691–92
ROBERT LEE MATHES, JR.1
Appeal by Defendant from Order and Judgments entered 17
April 2013 by Judge Sharon Tracey Barrett in Buncombe County
Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 January 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Carrie D. Randa, for the State.
Richard J. Costanza for Defendant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
1
The parties’ briefs and the transcript list Defendant’s last
name as “Mathis.” The trial court’s 17 April 2013 order and
judgments, however, list Defendant’s last name as “Mathes.”
While the parties do not address this discrepancy in their
briefs, the indictment indicates that Defendant is known as
“Robert Lee Mathes, Jr., AKA: Robert Lee Mathis, Robert Lee
Mathis, Jr[.]” Pursuant to the custom and practice of this
Court, and for the sake of consistency between the courts, we
use the spelling employed by the trial court in its 17 April
2013 order and judgments.
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Procedural History and Evidence
On 11 October 2012, Defendant Robert Lee Mathes, Jr., was
arrested and charged with driving while impaired, driving while
license revoked, and hit and run causing property damage. On 5
November 2012, Defendant was indicted for habitual impaired
driving in lieu of the original impaired driving charge because
he had three or more convictions for driving while impaired in
the ten years directly preceding the current charge. Defendant
filed a motion to suppress statements and tangible evidence on
15 April 2013, and a hearing on that motion was conducted the
same day. The evidence presented at the hearing tended to show
the following:
Officer Roger Patton of the Black Mountain Police
Department (“BMPD”) responded on 11 October 2012 to a dispatch
concerning a wreck on North Blue Ridge Road in Buncombe County.
The driver of the truck, who was reportedly wearing tan shorts
and a blue jean jacket, left the scene of the accident and was
walking north on North Blue Ridge Road. When Officer Patton
arrived at the scene, he pulled into a retirement complex and
discovered an unoccupied Chevrolet pickup truck blocking both
lanes of North Blue Ridge Road with the front end in a ditch.
The truck had sustained extensive damage. Witnesses at the scene
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indicated that the driver of the truck had gone up the road and
was wearing a plaid jacket and tan shorts.
Officer Patton drove from the parking lot of the retirement
complex onto Old United States Highway 70. Four to five minutes
later and approximately 200 to 250 yards away from the accident,
Officer Patton spotted a person, later identified as Defendant,
walking along the road. Defendant was wearing a plaid jacket and
tan-colored shorts, but no shoes. Officer Patton got out of his
car and told Defendant that he was investigating an accident on
North Blue Ridge Road. When Officer Patton asked Defendant if he
knew anything about the accident, Defendant indicated that he
did not. According to Officer Patton, Defendant looked
intoxicated and appeared to have urinated on himself. His eyes
were bloodshot and glassy, there was a dark stain on his pants,
he smelled of alcohol and urine, and he had slurred speech.
Officer Patton “asked [Defendant] if he would go back to
the scene with me, so I patted him down, . . . just an outer
pat-down Terry frisk of his outer clothing for weapons. Found
none.” (Italics added). During the frisk Officer Patton felt a
set of keys in Defendant’s right front pocket, but did not
remove them. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Officer
Patton to elaborate on the frisk:
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] But you also testified
that you were continuing in your
investigation to determine who was actually
operating the vehicle; right?
[OFFICER PATTON:] Right.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] So you placed him in
handcuffs and then you patted him down?
[OFFICER PATTON:] No, sir. He was patted
down for a Terry frisk [based on] officer
safety prior to being put into cuffs. He was
not put into cuffs until I had determined
that we needed to go back to the scene and
he was going to be going in my car.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] All right. So you
performed a Terry frisk. And what did you
discover from the Terry frisk?
[OFFICER PATTON:] No weapons.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Now, you mentioned this
set of keys in response to the direct
questions. Did you find the set of keys as
part of the Terry frisk?
[OFFICER PATTON:] I felt a set of keys in
his pocket, yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] But you did not take
them out?
[OFFICER PATTON:] No, sir.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] So when you felt them,
they were immediately apparent to you as a
set of keys?
[OFFICER PATTON:] Yes.
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(Italics added). Officer Patton testified on redirect that he
placed Defendant in handcuffs out of concern for officer safety.
When Officer Patton and Defendant returned to the scene of
the accident, two unidentified witnesses told Officer Patton
that Defendant was the person they saw get out of the truck.
Officer Patton then determined that (1) the truck did not belong
to Defendant and (2) Defendant’s driver’s license was revoked.
At that point, Officer Patton placed Defendant under arrest for
driving while impaired and driving while license revoked.
During the arrest Officer Patton again searched Defendant
and, at that point, removed the keys from his pocket. Defendant
indicated that none of the keys would fit in the truck’s
ignition. Nonetheless, Officer Patton entered the truck,
inserted one of the keys, and “turned the switch over and turned
it back off.” Officer Patton did not attempt to start the
engine. Pursuant to BMPD policy, Officer Patton then left the
keys with the vehicle for transportation by the towing company.
Afterward, he took Defendant to the Buncombe County Detention
Facility.
Another police officer, Officer Christopher Staton,
traveled with Officer Patton and Defendant to the facility.
During the ride, Defendant made several comments that the keys
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would fit in any Chevrolet vehicle. Upon arrival, Officer Staton
read Defendant his Miranda rights for the first time. Defendant
waived those rights, declined to submit to a chemical analysis
of his breath, and refused to answer more than three questions
about the incident. Defendant also continued to deny having
driven the truck.
At the suppression hearing, Defendant moved the trial court
to suppress any evidence obtained “as the fruit of the . . .
illegal . . . search of Defendant’s person.” The trial court
orally denied Defendant’s motion and memorialized that denial by
written order entered 17 April 2013. In its written order, the
court also made the following pertinent findings of fact and
conclusions of law:
. . . FINDINGS OF FACT:
. . . .
12. [BMPD] policy required that keys to any
vehicle that requires towing should be left
at the scene of the wreck. As a result
. . . , Officer Patton obtained the keys
from . . . Defendant and tried them in the
vehicle’s ignition. The keys did work in the
ignition. So the keys were left at the
accident scene to be given to the tow truck
driver.
. . . .
. . . CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
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. . . .
3. . . . Officer Patton had reasonable
grounds to conduct an investigatory stop of
. . . Defendant as a pedestrian, to conduct
a protective pat[ ]down for officer safety,
and to transport . . . Defendant from the
road[]side to the wreck scene in his police
vehicle.
4. . . . [Officer Patton] had probable cause
to arrest . . . Defendant and charge[] him
with [d]riving [w]hile [i]mpaired, [d]riving
[w]hile [l]icense [r]evoked and[, h]it and
[r]un [f]ailure to [s]top after a motor
vehicle accident involving property damage.
Defendant’s trial began immediately after the court’s oral
denial of his motion to suppress. At the close of the State’s
case and the close of all of the evidence, Defendant moved to
dismiss the charges against him. The trial court denied that
motion, and Defendant was convicted of driving while impaired,
driving while license revoked, and hit and run causing property
damage. Because Defendant stipulated to having three convictions
of driving while impaired in the previous ten years, he received
a sentence for habitual impaired driving, a class F felony.
Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 23 to 37 months
in prison for habitual impaired driving and 120 days in prison
for hit and run and driving while license revoked. Defendant
gave notice of appeal in open court.
Standards of Review
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Our review of the trial court’s denial of a motion to
suppress is “strictly limited to determining whether the trial
judge’s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent
evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on
appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the
judge’s ultimate conclusions of law.” State v. Cooke, 306 N.C.
132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). “The trial court’s
conclusions of law . . . are fully reviewable on appeal.” State
v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 208, 539 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000).
“This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to
dismiss de novo.” State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650
S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). “Upon [the] defendant’s motion for
dismissal, the question for the [appellate c]ourt is whether
there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of
the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein,
and (2) of [the] defendant’s being the perpetrator of such
offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.” State v.
Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890, 148 L. Ed. 2d 150 (2000).
Discussion
On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motions to suppress and dismiss. Defendant contends
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that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because Officer Patton did not have the authority to (1) perform
a pat down when he first encountered Defendant or (2) seize
Defendant’s keys during the arrest. Defendant argues that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the
State did not present substantial evidence that he was the
operator or driver of the truck. We find no prejudicial error.
I. Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
The Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend.
IV. This prohibition applies to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Article I, Section 20
of the North Carolina Constitution similarly
prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures. There are generally two types of
“seizures” under the Fourth Amendment: (1)
arrests and (2) investigatory stops. [In
order to be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, an a]rrest[] require[s] that the
arresting officer have “probable cause,”
whereas investigatory stops do not.
State v. Thorpe, __ N.C. App. __, __, 754 S.E.2d 213, 220–21
(2014) (certain citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
A. The First Search
Defendant does not dispute the trial court’s findings of
fact. Therefore, they are binding on appeal. State v. Taylor,
178 N.C. App. 395, 401, 632 S.E.2d 218, 223 (2006). Furthermore,
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Defendant states outright that he “does not contest Officer
Patton’s right to stop [him].” Instead, Defendant argues that
Officer Patton did not have authority for the first search. We
agree.
Under the standard first laid out in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, . . . 20 L. Ed.
2d 889 (1968), officers temporarily
detaining someone for investigatory purposes
only require reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. . . . The officer’s
reasonable suspicion must be based on
specific and articulable facts, as well as
the rational inferences from those facts, as
viewed through the eyes of a reasonable,
cautious officer, guided by the officer’s
experience and training. In reviewing the
validity of a Terry stop, the [c]ourt must
consider the totality of the circumstances.
Thorpe, __ N.C. App. at __, 754 S.E.2d at 221 (certain
citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
“[T]he characteristics of the investigatory stop, including its
length, the methods used, and any search performed, should be
the least intrusive means reasonably available to effectuate the
purpose of the stop.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
[W]hen a police officer observes unusual
behavior which leads him to conclude, in
light of his experience, that criminal
activity may be occurring and that the
person may be armed and dangerous, the
officer is permitted [under Terry] to
conduct a pat-down search to determine
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whether the person is carrying a
weapon. . . .
The purpose of the officer’s frisk or
pat[ ]down is for the officer’s safety; as
such, the pat[ ]down is limited to the
person’s outer clothing and to the search
for weapons that may be used against the
officer. If during a limited weapons search,
contraband or evidence of a crime is of
necessity exposed, the officer is not
required by the Fourth Amendment to
disregard such contraband or evidence of
crime. Evidence of contraband, plainly felt
during a pat[ ]down or frisk, may be
admissible, provided the officer had
probable cause to believe that the item was
in fact contraband.
Under the “plain feel” doctrine if a police
officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer
clothing and feels an object whose contour
or mass makes its identity immediately
apparent, there has been no invasion of the
suspect’s privacy beyond that already
authorized by the officer’s search for
weapons.
State v. Robinson, 189 N.C. App. 454, 458–59, 658 S.E.2d 501,
504–05 (2008) (citations, certain internal quotation marks,
brackets, and ellipsis omitted). An officer’s conclusion that a
suspect may be armed and dangerous is sufficient to justify a
protective pat-down frisk when it is based on reasonable
suspicion. State v. Carrouthers, 200 N.C. App. 415, 419, 683
S.E.2d 781, 784 (2009) (citation omitted).
-12-
When Officer Patton first encountered Defendant, Defendant
was walking barefoot along Highway 70 near North Blue Ridge
Road, wearing a plaid jacket and tan shorts. Officer Patton did
not observe anything resembling a weapon on Defendant’s person
or testify that he noticed any circumstances suggesting that
Defendant was armed and dangerous. He did not state that
Defendant was walking along a particularly dangerous part of
Highway 70 or that Defendant had acted in a way to suggest that
he was armed. He did not describe any movements that Defendant
made which might have indicated Defendant was reaching for
something on his person and, thereby, creating reasonable
concern that Defendant was reaching for a weapon. Indeed, it
appears from the transcript that Defendant was entirely
cooperative, if not sober. The only rationale that Officer
Patton provided for his decision to frisk Defendant is the
following: “I asked [Defendant] if he would go back to the scene
with me, so I patted him down, done [sic] just an outer pat-down
Terry frisk of his outer clothing for weapons.” (Emphasis and
italics added). This explanation does not even suggest, much
less establish, the kind of unusual behavior sufficient to
justify a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and
dangerous.
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A suspect’s decision to accede to an officer’s request to
return to the scene of the crime does not, in and of itself,
justify a Terry frisk. See State v. Rhyne, 124 N.C. App. 84, 91,
478 S.E.2d 789, 792–93 (1996) (holding that the officer did not
have reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry frisk of the
defendant when the officer received an anonymous tip that
several men were dealing drugs in a breezeway and the defendant,
who was sitting in the breezeway, complied with the officer’s
request for identification, but refused the search). It does not
indicate that the suspect is armed and dangerous or that the
officer’s safety is in jeopardy. See id. If anything, such
behavior implies that the suspect is compliant and, thus, not
dangerous. See id. (noting that the defendant did not flee when
approached by the officer and, “[o]ther than being nervous, [the
defendant] exhibited no other behavior that would indicate that
he was engaged in criminal activity”). In addition, an officer’s
plain statement that he conducted a pat down solely for the
purpose of ensuring that no weapons were present does not, in
and of itself, establish reasonable suspicion that the suspect
was armed and dangerous. There must be some external facts
giving rise to a reasonable concern for the presence of a
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weapon, none of which were present here.2 See id.; cf. State v.
Beveridge, 112 N.C. App. 688, 696, 436 S.E.2d 912, 916 (1993)
(holding that the officer was not justified in continuing a
search of the defendant after concluding that the defendant was
not armed because it was “unrelated to the sole justification
for the search . . . the protection of the police officer and
others nearby”) (citation omitted), affirmed per curiam, 336
N.C. 601, 444 S.E.2d 223 (1994).
Nonetheless, this initial search did not yield any evidence
other than the fact that Defendant had keys in his pocket. As
many innocent people carry keys in their pockets, this fact did
not help the State’s case at trial. Officer Patton had already
decided to take Defendant back with him to the crime scene, and
Defendant did not make any additional statements directly
related to the first search. Therefore, the trial court’s error
2
The only case law cited by the State for the contrary assertion
is authority from the Fourth Circuit, which is not controlling,
where the court concluded that the officer had authority for a
Terry stop and frisk when he was investigating a theft that had
just occurred, the suspects matched the description of the
individuals involved in the crime, and the “suspects behaved
nervously and in a threatening manner upon being approached and
addressed.” United States v. Swann, 149 F.3d 271, 274 (1998).
Even though this case is not binding on this Court, we note that
it is entirely distinguishable given the fact that the defendant
in that case acted in a “threatening manner” upon being
approached. Id.-15-
in failing to suppress this evidence was not prejudicial and
does not warrant reversal.
B. The Second Search
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by
concluding that the seizure of his keys, following the second
search, was appropriate under BMPD’s towing policy. In response,
the State contends that the seizure of the keys was instead
appropriate in conjunction with a valid search incident to
arrest. We agree.
i. BMPD’s Towing Policy
Officer Patton testified that he seized the keys during the
arrest of Defendant. At the suppression hearing, the prosecution
argued that this seizure was proper because Officer Patton
“needed to leave those keys with the tow truck to make sure that
those were the keys in order for the tow truck driver to be able
to get it on the tow truck.” In its order, the trial court made
only one finding of fact related to the seizure of Defendant’s
keys, determining that Officer Patton obtained them “[a]s a
result of” the BMPD policy requiring “that keys to any vehicle
that requires towing should be left at the scene of the wreck.”
This the Fourth Amendment does not permit.
Whatever the practical application of BMPD’s towing policy,
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it had no bearing on the validity of Officer’s Patton’s search
of Defendant’s person or the seizure of Defendant’s keys from
his pocket. While that policy might have served to justify a
search of the truck and seizure of keys located in the truck
under the inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment, it
did not provide authority for Officer Patton’s decision to
search Defendant’s person and seize the keys in his pocket. Cf.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000,
1007–08 (1976) (holding that the police officers did not violate
the Fourth Amendment by performing a search of the defendant’s
lawfully impounded car on grounds that “[i]t would be
unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain the car
in their custody for such a length of time, had no right, even
for their own protection, to search it”); see generally State v.
Phifer, 39 N.C. App. 278, 288, 250 S.E.2d 309, 315, affirmed,
297 N.C. 216, 254 S.E.2d 586 (1979) (“[I]n order for an
inventorying process not to violate the Fourth Amendment
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
State must show that the automobile was lawfully impounded,
there being a demonstrable need for its impoundment; that the
driver was not arrested as a subterfuge for searching the
vehicle; that the inventory was reasonably related to its
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purpose which is the protection of the owner from loss, and the
police or other custodian from unjust claims; that the inventory
itself was reasonable and not exploratory in character; [and]
that the inventory was actually conducted under circumstances
indicative of a true protective examination of the contents of
vehicle.”) (emphasis added). To the extent BMPD’s towing policy
could be applicable in this case, it would be limited to a
search of Defendant’s truck, not his person. See Opperman, 428
U.S. at 369, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1007–08. Accordingly, we hold that
the trial court erred by determining that seizure of the keys
from Defendant’s person was justified under BMPD’s towing
policy.
ii. The State’s New Argument
Despite the prosecutor’s misguided argument at the
suppression hearing and the trial court’s obviously flawed
order, the State now argues that seizure of the keys was
appropriate in conjunction with a search incident to Defendant’s
arrest. In response, Defendant asserts that “this Court should
reject [that] theor[y] of admissibility” on grounds that the
State did not raise it during the suppression hearing, citing
case law that the parties are not permitted to raise a new legal
theory for the first time on appeal. We disagree.
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Well-settled case law in this State makes it clear that
“[a] correct decision of a lower court [on a motion to suppress]
will not be disturbed on review simply because an insufficient
or superfluous reason is assigned.” State v. Austin, 320 N.C.
276, 290, 357 S.E.2d 641, 650 (1987) (emphasis added). Whether
the trial court’s reasoning for denying the defendant’s motion
is correct or — as is obviously the case here — incorrect, “we
are not required on this basis alone to determine that the
ruling was erroneous.” Id. (citation omitted). “The [only
relevant] question for review is whether the ruling of the trial
court was correct and not whether the reason given therefor is
sound or tenable. The crucial inquiry for [the appellate c]ourt
is admissibility and whether the ultimate ruling was supported
by the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted; emphasis added); see
also State v. Bone, 354 N.C. 1, 8, 550 S.E.2d 482, 486 (2001)
(“We additionally conclude that further grounds, not articulated
by the trial court, also justify the seizure.”). Therefore, the
State’s inexplicable failure to raise the search incident to
arrest doctrine at the hearing is not sufficient reason for this
Court to decline to consider the possibility that the trial
court’s order might be correct under some other doctrine. We
hold that it is.
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iii. Search Incident to Arrest
“An officer may conduct a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest. A search is considered incident to arrest even if
conducted prior to formal arrest if probable cause to arrest
exists prior to the search and the evidence seized is not
necessary to establish that probable cause.” State v. Chadwick,
149 N.C. App. 200, 205, 560 S.E.2d 207, 211 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, 355 N.C.
752, 565 S.E.2d 672 (2002). A warrantless arrest by a police
officer is lawful if the officer has “probable cause to believe
[the suspect] has committed a felony.” Id. at 204, 560 S.E.2d at
210 (citations omitted). If the police officer has probable
cause to believe that the suspect has committed a misdemeanor, a
warrantless arrest is generally unlawful unless the misdemeanor
is committed in the officer’s presence or some other exception
applies. See State v. McCloud, 276 N.C. 518, 526, 173 S.E.2d
753, 759 (1970). Section 15A-401 of the North Carolina General
Statutes describes those exceptions as follows:
(2) Offense Out of Presence of Officer. — An
officer may arrest without a warrant any
person who the officer has probable cause to
believe:
a. Has committed a felony; or
b. Has committed a misdemeanor, and:
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1. Will not be apprehended unless
immediately arrested, or
2. May cause physical injury to himself
or others, or damage to property unless
immediately arrested; or
c. Has committed a misdemeanor under G.S.
14-72.1, 14-134.3, 20-138.1, or 20-138.2; or
d. Has committed a misdemeanor under G.S.
14-33(a), 14-33(c)(1), 14-33(c)(2), or 14-34
when the offense was committed by a person
with whom the alleged victim has a personal
relationship as defined by G.S. 50B-1; or
e. Has committed a misdemeanor under G.S.
50B-4.1(a); or
f. Has violated a pretrial release order
entered under G.S. 15A-534 or G.S. 15A-
534.1(a)(2).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-401(b)(2) (2013).
In this case, Officer Patton stated at the hearing that he
arrested Defendant “for [driving while impaired and] driving
while license revoked.” Later that day Defendant was charged
with operating a vehicle in a public vehicular area: “[w]hile
subject to an impairing substance” under section 20-138.1,
“[w]hile the defendant’s drivers license was revoked” under
section 20-28, and in violation of section 20-166(c) for failing
to stop. Each of these crimes is punishable as a misdemeanor
and, on that basis, would not generally be sufficient to justify
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an arrest when committed outside the officer’s presence, as
here. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-28, -138.1, -166 (2013). Because
section 15A-401(b)(2)(c) provides an exception to this rule for
suspected violations of section 20-138.1, however, Defendant’s
arrest for driving while impaired was lawful as long as Officer
Patton had probable cause to believe that Defendant was, in
fact, driving while impaired. We hold that he did.
Officer Patton responded to a dispatch that an individual
wearing a blue jean jacket and tan shorts had been involved in
an accident. Witnesses at the scene informed Officer Patton that
the driver was wearing a plaid jacket with tan shorts and
directed Officer Patton up the road, where he discovered
Defendant. Defendant was wearing a plaid shirt and tan shorts,
looked intoxicated, had bloodshot and glassy eyes, exhibited
slurred speech, smelled of alcohol, and had a urine stain on his
pants. When Officer Patton brought Defendant back to the scene
of the accident, witnesses unequivocally identified Defendant as
the man who was driving the truck when it wrecked. At that
point, Officer Patton certainly had probable cause to believe
that Defendant had been driving the truck and had been doing so
while subject to an impairing substance in violation of section
20-138.1. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 138.1. Therefore it was lawful
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for Officer Patton to arrest Defendant and, incident to that
lawful arrest, to conduct a search of Defendant’s person.
Despite the State’s complete failure to make this point at
the hearing and the trial court’s improper reliance on the
State’s misguided towing argument, the trial court reached the
right result — the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we will not disturb the court’s order on appeal.
Defendant’s argument is overruled.
II. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Lastly, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss because each of the charged
offenses required proof that Defendant was operating or driving
the truck and the State did not present substantial evidence
that this occurred. We disagree.
None of the bystanders from the scene of the accident
offered testimony at trial. Nonetheless, Officer Patton
testified that the keys lawfully seized from Defendant fit into
the truck’s ignition and turned. This testimony, alone, is
sufficient to constitute substantial evidence that Defendant was
the driver of the truck. Accordingly, Defendant’s final argument
is overruled, and we hold that the trial court properly denied
Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
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NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Judges STEELMAN and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).