Garren v. Watts ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-1085
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 5 August 2014
JAMES HOWARD GARREN, JR.,
Plaintiff
v. Buncombe County
No. 11 CVS 6276
BECKY L. WATTS a/k/a SUNNY
WILLIAMS and husband, NEIL
WILLIAMS, ANTHONY GARREN, and
KIM GARREN,
Defendants
Appeal by defendants Becky L. Watts a/k/a Sunny Williams
and Neil Williams from order entered 3 June 2013 by Judge Mark
E. Powell in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court
of Appeals 6 February 2014.
Burt Langley, P.C., by Katherine Langley, for defendant-
appellants Becky L. Watts a/k/a Sunny Williams and Neil
Williams.
Adams Hendon Carson Crow & Saenger, P.A., by Matthew S.
Roberson and George W. Saenger, for plaintiff-appellee and
defendant-appellees Anthony Garren and Kim Garren.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Becky L. Watts a/k/a Sunny Williams (“Watts”) and her
husband Neil Williams (collectively “defendants”) appeal from
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the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of
James Howard Garren, Jr. (“plaintiff”), Anthony Garren
(“Anthony”), and Kim Garren (“Kim”) (collectively, “the
Garrens”). We affirm.
On 5 March 2009, Winifred Garren (“Winifred”) executed a
quitclaim deed (“the quitclaim deed” or “the deed”) to her
daughter, Watts.1 The deed was a preprinted form with blank
spaces for the completion of all required information. The deed
indicated that it was prepared by Watts. The portion of the
quitclaim deed intended to include the legal description of the
property being transferred was left blank. However, in the
section between Winifred’s signature and the notary
certification on the deed, Watts wrote “Parcel
#960704498200000.” The deed was recorded on 14 May 2009 at the
Buncombe County Register of Deeds.
On 29 April 2010, Winifred executed an “Affidavit of
Correction” (“the affidavit”) pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47-
36.1 (2013), which added a legal metes and bounds description of
the property intended to be conveyed in the quitclaim deed. The
affidavit was recorded on 26 May 2010.
1
Watts later legally changed her name to Sunny Williams.
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On 3 November 2010, Winifred died. Plaintiff, who was
Winifred’s son, believed that she had executed a will in 2009,
but he was unable to locate that document or any other will
after her death. However, plaintiff discovered that both the
deed and the affidavit had been recorded in the Buncombe County
Registry.
On 16 December 2011, plaintiff initiated an action against
defendants, Anthony, and Kim. Anthony and Kim were the children
of Winifred’s third child, who was deceased. In his complaint,
plaintiff sought to have the quitclaim deed declared void, to
have plaintiff and Watts declared one-third owners of Winifred’s
property, and to have Anthony and Kim declared one-sixth owners
of the property.
Anthony and Kim filed an answer to plaintiff’s complaint
which admitted all of plaintiff’s allegations and requested that
they be aligned with plaintiff against the remaining defendants.
On 17 May 2013, the Garrens jointly filed a motion for summary
judgment.
After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of the Garrens on 3 June 2013. The trial court’s order
concluded that the description of the land conveyed in the deed
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was insufficient such that the quitclaim deed was void ab
initio. Defendants appeal.
Defendants argue that the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment in favor of the Garrens and declaring the
quitclaim deed void. Specifically, defendants contend that the
deed had a sufficient description of the property conveyed. We
disagree.
“Our standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment
is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the record
shows that ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.’” In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572,
576 (2008) (quoting Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 524, 649
S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007)). This Court has previously explained
that
[a] description of land is void unless it is
sufficient to identify the land or refers to
something extrinsic by which the land may be
identified with certainty. When the
description itself, including the references
to extrinsic things, describes with
certainty the property, parol evidence is
admissible to fit the description to the
land.
Maurice v. Motel Corp., 38 N.C. App. 588, 590, 248 S.E.2d 430,
432 (1978). Moreover,
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[t]o resolve cases in which a deed contains
an ambiguous description, the courts have
formulated various rules of construction and
techniques to locate the boundaries of deeds
whose descriptions are less than ideal. The
most common rule of construction used by the
courts is to gather the intention of the
parties from the four corners of the
instrument. The courts seek to sustain a
deed if possible on the assumption that the
parties intended to convey and receive land
or they would never have been involved in
the first place.
Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Wetherington, 127 N.C. App. 457, 462,
490 S.E.2d 593, 597 (1997) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
In the instant case, the quitclaim deed stated, in relevant
part:
The Grantor, Winifred M. Garren, city of 102
Justice Ridge Rd. Candler, County of
Buncombe, State of North Carolina, for the
consideration of _________ CONVEY and QUIT
CLAIM to Becky L. Watts of 11006 Kingfisher
Dr., City of Charlotte, County of
Mecklenburg, State of North Carolina, all
interest in the following described real
estate situated in the county of Buncombe,
in the state of North Carolina, to wit:
The deed is then blank until Winifred’s signature. Below
Winifred’s signature and prior to the notary certification
section, Watts included the following: “Parcel#
960704498200000.”
Defendants contend that two pieces of information on the
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quitclaim deed identify the property sufficiently to satisfy the
description element of a deed. First, defendants argue that
Winifred’s address listed on the deed, “102 Justice Ridge Rd.
Candler,” constitutes evidence of the property intended to be
conveyed. However, that address only appears as part of the
identification of Winifred as grantor. There is nothing in the
remainder of the deed which would support an inference that
Winifred intended to convey that particular piece of property.
The second piece of evidence cited by defendants is the
handwritten “Parcel # 960704498200000” which appears in the
lower portion of the deed. Defendants contend that this number
constitutes a tax parcel identification number (“PIN”) which
could be used to establish the boundaries of the property by
reference to the Buncombe County tax map. Defendants cite
Fisher v. Town of Nags Head, ___ N.C. App. ___, 725 S.E.2d 99(2012) and GMAC Mortg., LLC v. Miller, 216 N.C. App. 416, 716
S.E.2d 876, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 2250, 2011 WL 4920645 (2011)
(unpublished), in support of their contention that a tax PIN,
standing alone, constitutes a legally valid description of a
property.
However, neither Fisher nor GMAC support defendants’
position. In Fisher, this Court found that the description of a
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property which was to be condemned was sufficient when “the
description of the [property to be condemned] utilize[d] terms
that are well defined in the referenced portion of the
Administrative Code, such that a surveyor with experience in
oceanfront properties could accurately determine the
[property].” ___ N.C. App. at ___, 725 S.E.2d at 105. While
the Court noted that the condemnation notice also included “the
PIN Number and Tax Parcel for each . . . particular piece of
property[,]” those identifying factors were not cited as part of
the Court’s analysis in upholding the description. Id. In GMAC,
an unpublished case which “does not constitute controlling legal
authority[,]” N.C.R. App. P. 30(e)(3) (2013), this Court upheld
the description in a deed of trust based upon a tax parcel
identification number in conjunction with a deed which was also
referenced in the deed of trust. 216 N.C. App. 416, 716 S.E.2d
876. Thus, contrary to defendants’ argument, neither Fisher nor
GMAC stands for the proposition that a tax PIN, standing alone,
provides a legally sufficient property description. Instead,
those cases required additional identifying information together
with a tax PIN in order for a description to be valid.
Moreover, unlike the descriptions at issue in Fisher and
GMAC, the purported description in the quitclaim deed in the
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instant case does not clearly state that the parcel number
refers to a tax parcel number. Defendants’ interpretation of
the term “Parcel #” as referring to a tax PIN requires an
inference that is not supported by any other portion of the
deed. Without this unsupported inference, it is, ultimately,
just a number recorded in a random location on the deed. Since
neither Winifred’s address as grantor nor the parcel number on
the deed provide a legally sufficient description of the
property to be conveyed, the trial court correctly determined
that the quitclaim deed was void ab initio because it failed to
“sufficient[ly] . . . identify the land or refer[] to something
extrinsic by which the land may be identified with certainty.”
Maurice, 38 N.C. App. at 590, 248 S.E.2d at 432. This argument
is overruled.
Defendants also briefly contend that the affidavit, which
attempted to add a legal metes and bounds description to the
deed, was merely a minor correction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47-
36.1 (2013) which further clarified the description of the
property that Winifred attempted to convey. However, as
defendants concede in their brief, “a defective deed cannot be
‘cured’ by filing an affidavit of correction.” Since we have
already determined that the quitclaim deed was defective due to
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the lack of a sufficient legal description, defendants’ argument
necessarily fails.
In conclusion, the trial court correctly determined that
the quitclaim deed, which did not include a valid description of
the property to be conveyed, was void ab initio. Accordingly,
the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
the Garrens. The trial court’s order is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges STROUD and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).