State v. Lindley ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-944
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 15 April 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Mecklenburg County
No. 10 CRS 225348
TRAVIS LINDLEY,
Defendant
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 11 January 2013
by Judge Linwood O. Foust in Mecklenburg County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 December 2013.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Lauren T. Earnhardt,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
J. Edward Yeager, Jr. for defendant-appellant.
DAVIS, Judge.
Travis Lindley (“Defendant”) appeals from a judgment
entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of driving while
impaired and driving after consuming alcohol while under the age
of 21. On appeal, he contends that the trial court committed
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reversible error by (1) denying his motion to suppress based on
a lack of reasonable suspicion to justify his traffic stop; and
(2) denying his motion to dismiss due to the fact that he was
held in jail for an unreasonable amount of time after posting
bond. After careful review, we conclude that Defendant received
a fair trial free from error.
Factual Background
On 29 May 2010, Officer William Duncan (“Officer Duncan”)
of the Huntersville Police Department was on patrol shortly
before 5:00 p.m. in Birkdale Village when he parked his patrol
car in front of the Birkdale movie theater. Officer Duncan
exited his vehicle to walk across the street when two women on a
balcony overlooking the parking lot directly beside the movie
theater screamed for his attention. They informed Officer
Duncan that they had seen a silver Mitsubishi occupied by two
shirtless white males strike another vehicle in the parking lot
directly in front of them. The two women pointed in the
direction in which the silver Mitsubishi had driven off, and one
woman stated “that it went toward — back down Formb[y] Road
towards Sam Furr Road, the backside of Birkdale Village.”
Officer Duncan then ran back to his patrol car and issued a
“Be on the Lookout” (“BOLO”) for the silver Mitsubishi. He then
drove down Formby Road to search for the vehicle.
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Officer Vaughn Griffin (“Officer Griffin”) of the Cornelius
Police Department received the BOLO regarding the silver
Mitsubishi, which included a description of the vehicle and
indicated that it was heading towards the Redcliff Apartments.
Officer Griffin proceeded to a “cut through” he knew was heavily
used by commuters traveling from Birkdale Village to the
Redcliff Apartments. Approximately 45 seconds after receiving
the BOLO, he saw the silver Mitsubishi traveling north on West
Catawba Avenue. Officer Griffin turned around and activated his
blue lights and siren. However, the silver Mitsubishi did not
stop. Instead, the vehicle made a left turn off of northbound
West Catawba Avenue onto Kingspoint Drive, continuing for a
quarter of a mile before finally coming to a stop in the parking
lot of a townhouse community.
Officer Griffin exited his patrol car and approached the
driver’s side door of the silver Mitsubishi. He saw two
shirtless white males sitting in the front of the vehicle.
Defendant was the driver.
Officer Griffin asked for Defendant’s license and
registration and observed that Defendant “had slurred speech,
red glassy eyes, and . . . a strong odor of alcohol coming from
his breath.” Officer Griffin then asked Defendant to step out
of the car. He administered standardized field sobriety tests
on Defendant, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN), the
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walk-and-turn, and the one-leg stand. Based on the results of
these tests, the odor of alcohol on Defendant’s breath, and the
fact that Defendant was under 21 years old, Officer Griffin
charged Defendant with driving while impaired and driving after
consuming alcohol while under the age of 21. Defendant was
arrested, placed in the back of Officer Griffin’s patrol car,
and taken to the Cornelius Police Department.
At the police department, Defendant’s blood alcohol level
was measured with the Intoxilyzer EC/IR-II, revealing a blood
alcohol concentration of .18 grams per 210 liters of breath. At
7:08 p.m., Defendant was transported to the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Police Department, arriving there at 7:33 p.m. He
was taken before a magistrate, and his bond was set in the
amount of $4,000. He was permitted to call his mother.
At 10:42 p.m., bond was posted on behalf of Defendant. At
10:49 p.m., however, Defendant was taken to the “dress out” area
for placement in jail due to the fact that the officers in this
area had not received any information that Defendant’s bond had
been posted. Once they ultimately discovered that Defendant
had, in fact, posted bond, he was released at 11:37 p.m.
Prior to trial, Defendant filed motions to dismiss the
charges against him and to suppress the evidence obtained as a
result of the stop of his vehicle. The trial court denied both
motions.
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A jury trial was held in Mecklenburg County Superior Court
on 8 January 2013. The jury convicted Defendant both of driving
while impaired and driving after consuming alcohol while under
the age of 21. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a 60-day
term of imprisonment, which was suspended and Defendant was
placed on supervised probation for 14 months. Defendant was
also required to complete 48 hours of community service and
obtain a substance abuse assessment within 30 days of
sentencing. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to this
Court.
Analysis
I. Denial of Motion to Suppress
Defendant’s first argument on appeal is that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Officer
Griffin did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that he was
committing a criminal offense at the time of the traffic stop.
This contention lacks merit.
Our review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to
suppress is “strictly limited to determining whether the trial
judge's underlying findings of fact are supported by competent
evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on
appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the
judge's ultimate conclusions of law.” State v. Cooke, 306 N.C.
132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). Furthermore, any
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unchallenged factual findings are “deemed to be supported by
competent evidence and are binding on appeal.” State v.
Roberson, 163 N.C. App. 129, 132, 592 S.E.2d 733, 735–36 (2004).
“The conclusions of law made from the findings of fact are
reviewable de novo.” State v. Brown, 199 N.C. App. 253, 256,
681 S.E.2d 460, 463 (2009).
A traffic stop must be based on reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity based on the totality of the circumstances.
State v. Maready, 362 N.C. 614, 618, 669 S.E.2d 564, 567 (2008).
Reasonable suspicion must arise from the officer’s knowledge
before the time of the stop. State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200,
208, 539 S.E.2d 625, 630 (2000).
Reasonable suspicion is a “less demanding
standard than probable cause and requires a
showing considerably less than preponderance
of the evidence.” Only “some minimal level
of objective justification” is required.
This Court has determined that the
reasonable suspicion standard requires that
“[t]he stop . . . be based on specific and
articulable facts, as well as the rational
inferences from those facts, as viewed
through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious
officer, guided by his experience and
training.” Moreover, “[a] court must
consider the totality of the circumstances —
the whole picture in determining whether a
reasonable suspicion” exists.
Maready, 362 N.C. at 618, 669 S.E.2d at 567 (quoting State v.
Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (citations
omitted), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 914, 172 L.Ed.2d 198 (2008)).
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A tip from an informant can provide the reasonable
suspicion necessary to initiate an investigatory traffic stop.
State v. Nixon, 160 N.C. App. 31, 34, 584 S.E.2d 820, 822
(2003). When the basis for a vehicle stop comes from an
informant’s tip, “the indicia of the tip’s reliability” must be
taken into account when assessing the totality of the
circumstances. Maready, 362 N.C. at 619, 669 S.E.2d at 567.
Moreover, in evaluating the reliability of an informant’s tip,
there is a difference between a tip from a known and reliable
source, a tip to an officer stemming from a face-to-face
encounter, and an anonymous tip. See id. at 619, 669 S.E.2d at
567 (discussing reliability of tip received from an informant
face-to-face); see also State v. McRae, 203 N.C. App. 319, 324,
691 S.E.2d 56, 60 (2010) (addressing known reliable informant);
State v. Hudgins, 195 N.C. App. 430, 435, 672 S.E.2d 717, 720
(2009) (examining indicia of reliability of tip from anonymous
informant).
Defendant claims Officer Griffin lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop his vehicle because the information he
received from dispatch was no more than “a basic description”
that originated from an informant’s anonymous tip. Therefore,
Defendant argues, no reasonable suspicion existed.
In rejecting Defendant’s argument, we find our Supreme
Court’s decision in Maready instructive. In Maready, the driver
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of a minivan noticed a silver Honda driving in an erratic
fashion in her rearview mirror. She informed law enforcement
officers in a face-to-face encounter of her observations of the
silver Honda’s erratic driving. Maready, 362 N.C. at 617, 669
S.E.2d at 566. The officers then found the Honda driven by the
defendant stopped at a stoplight. They activated their blue
lights and conducted an investigatory stop of the vehicle. Id.The defendant argued that the officers lacked reasonable
suspicion for the stop of his vehicle. Our Supreme Court
disagreed, noting that the tip was not anonymous because the
officers received it from an individual who approached the
officers in a face-to-face encounter and informed them of the
defendant’s unsafe driving. The Court further noted that the
informant was traveling immediately in front of the defendant's
vehicle and was thus in a position to view the alleged traffic
violations she had reported. Id. at 619, 669 S.E.2d at 567.
The Court gave “significant weight” to the fact that the
informant approached the police and “gave them information at a
time and place near to the scene of the alleged violations”
because the informant would have had “little time to fabricate
her allegations against defendant.” Id. Our Supreme Court also
noted the informant’s willingness to place “her anonymity at
risk” and concluded that, under these circumstances, her tip was
reliable. Id. at 620, 669 S.E.2d at 568.
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Likewise, here, the tip received by Officer Duncan — which,
in turn, resulted in the dispatch heard by Officer Griffin —
stemmed from Officer Duncan’s face-to-face encounter with two
witnesses. Like the informant in Maready, the witnesses in this
case initiated an in-person encounter with Officer Duncan,
putting their anonymity at risk in order to report conduct they
had just observed. Moreover, the witnesses were able to provide
details concerning (1) the make, color, and model of Defendant’s
car; (2) a description of the driver and his passenger; (3) the
location of the damage sustained by Defendant’s car; and (4) its
last known direction of travel. See State v. Hughes, 353 N.C.
200, 203, 539 S.E.2d 625, 628 (2000) (holding that
“[r]eliability could be established by showing that . . . the
informant demonstrated personal knowledge by giving clear and
precise details in the tip”).
Even though Officer Duncan did not make the investigatory
stop himself, Officer Griffin was responding to the information
he received as a result of Officer Duncan’s BOLO. Officer
Griffin used this information to determine the likely path of
Defendant’s vehicle and then observed the car matching the
description provided by the dispatcher.
We have previously held that
[i]f the officer making the investigatory
stop (the second officer) does not have the
necessary reasonable suspicion, the stop may
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nonetheless be made if the second officer
receives from another officer (the first
officer) a request to stop the vehicle, and
if, at the time the request is issued, the
first officer possessed a reasonable
suspicion that criminal conduct ha[d]
occurred, was occurring, or was about to
occur.
State v. Battle, 109 N.C. App. 367, 370-71, 427 S.E.2d 156, 159
(1993).
Defendant cites State v. Peele, 196 N.C. App. 668, 675
S.E.2d 682, disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 587, 683 S.E.2d 383(2009), in which this Court reversed the trial court's denial of
the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained following a
stop of his vehicle based on information provided by an
anonymous tipster. In Peele, the officer received a dispatch
indicating that a burgundy Chevrolet pickup truck was “a
possible careless and reckless, D.W.I., headed towards the . . .
intersection.” Id. at 669, 675 S.E.2d at 684. The officer
arrived at the designated intersection within seconds and saw a
truck that matched the description of the vehicle. The officer
followed the truck for approximately one-tenth of a mile. After
observing the truck weave once within its lane of travel, the
officer pulled the truck over and charged the driver with
driving while impaired. Id. at 669, 675 S.E.2d at 684–85.
This Court held that while the anonymous caller had
accurately described the vehicle, the caller gave police no way
to test his or her credibility. Id. at 674, 675 S.E.2d at 687.
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We noted that “[t]he record contains no information about who
the caller was, no details about what the caller had seen, and
no information even as to where the caller was located.” Id. at
673, 675 S.E.2d at 686.
Here, unlike in Peele, the information dispatched to
Officer Griffin originated from a face-to-face encounter with an
informant rather than from an anonymous tip. Therefore, Peele
is inapposite. Accordingly, there was reasonable suspicion to
stop Defendant’s vehicle and Defendant’s motion to supress was
properly denied.
II. Denial of Motion To Dismiss
Defendant’s final argument is that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him on the
theory that his rights were violated when he was held in the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Jail for an unreasonable amount of
time following the posting of his bond. We disagree.
Our review of the denial of a motion to dismiss based upon
alleged violations of statutes is limited to “‘whether there is
competent evidence to support the findings and the conclusions.
If there is a conflict between the [S]tate's evidence and
defendant's evidence on material facts, it is the duty of the
trial court to resolve the conflict and such resolution will not
be disturbed on appeal.’” State v. Labinski, 188 N.C. App. 120,
124, 654 S.E.2d 740, 743 (quoting State v. Lewis, 147 N.C. App.
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274, 277, 555 S.E.2d 348, 351 (2001)), disc. review denied, 362
N.C. 367, 661 S.E.2d 889 (2008). “Findings of fact which are
not challenged are presumed to be correct and are binding on
appeal.” State v. Eliason, 100 N.C. App. 313, 315, 395 S.E.2d
702, 703 (1990).
“In order to warrant dismissal of a charge under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 20-138.1(a)(2) [the statute prohibiting driving while
impaired], a defendant must make a sufficient showing of a
substantial statutory violation and of prejudice arising
therefrom.” Eliason, 100 N.C. App. at 315, 395 S.E.2d. at 703.
“Dismissal of charges for violations of statutory rights is a
drastic remedy which should be granted sparingly. Before a
motion to dismiss should be granted . . . it must appear that
the statutory violation caused irreparable prejudice to the
preparation of defendant’s case.” Labinski, 188 N.C. App. at
124, 654 S.E.2d at 742-43 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-534.2, a defendant
subject to detention for driving while impaired has the right to
pretrial release when a judicial official determines either that
(1) the defendant is “no longer impaired to the extent that he
presents a danger of physical injury to himself or others or of
damage to property if he is released”; or (2) a sober,
responsible adult assumes responsibility for the defendant until
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he is no longer impaired. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-534.2(c)
(2013). Although the judicial official sets the conditions for
a defendant’s pretrial release, those conditions may not impede
on a defendant’s right to communicate with counsel and friends.
Here, the trial court made the following oral findings in
denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss:
The Court finds that the magistrate set a
reasonable bond for the defendant. That the
defendant was able to make the bond, and
there was never an issue as to the bond or
its amount. The defendant was not prejudiced
by the setting of the secured bond by the
magistrate.
The Court finds that the approximate fifty
minute delay between the time of the release
of the defendant . . . and the defendant
having met the bond requirement . . . was an
unintentional delay on the part of the
Sheriff’s Department. And that it was a
reasonable time period that passed between
the time the defendant met the bond
requirements and the time that the defendant
was released.
The Court further finds that the defendant
at no time requested an opportunity to have
a witness present to observe any part of the
arrest.
That the defendant was advised of his
constitutional rights, that his rights were
on the wall in the jailhouse area where he
was, and that he made no efforts for a
single request [sic] to have any person
present.
The Court further finds that even after the
mother came to . . . the Mecklenburg County
Jail, she did not enter the jail to attempt
to make any observation of the defendant.
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The Court further finds that the information
the mother received regarding her ability to
see the defendant at the jail was given to
her by her bondsman, or the bondsman that
she was talking to, and not by the Sheriff’s
Department in any effort to preclude the
defendant from having witnesses to observe
his condition.
The Court finds that . . . there was no
substantial violation of the defendant’s
constitutional rights.
The Court finds that the defendant has not
been deprived of an opportunity to obtain
evidence to support any defense.
That the Court finds that the defendant’s
breathalyzer reading was .18, which was
substantially higher than the .08
requirement under the law. And that the
defendant, while operating the vehicle, was
alleged to have struck another vehicle and
failed to stop.
That these are also factors that the
magistrate could consider in setting the
bond, which information was contained in the
affidavit of the arresting officer.
The Court further finds that according to
the defendant’s own evidence the mother of
the defendant talked to the defendant
multiple times, and that that [sic] also is
or could be some evidence to support the
defendant’s position at trial as to his
sobriety.
The defendant’s mother lived in the same
household with the defendant, and . . . she
would be a suitable person to evaluate his
condition during the relevant period.
The Court finds that there’s insufficient
evidence of any direct injury to the
defendant as a result of any delay that may
have been alleged to have occurred during
the time of the defendant’s arrest and the
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defendant’s release. The motion of the
defendant is denied.
Defendant challenges only the trial court’s findings that
(1) the delay between the posting of his bond and his release
was unintentional; (2) this delay was reasonable; and (3) there
was no substantial violation of his rights.
Deputy James Ingram (“Deputy Ingram”) testified that
Defendant was taken to the “booking, dress out” area — the area
where inmates are given a standard orange uniform before being
admitted into the jail — at 10:49 p.m. He stated that it was
not until after Defendant left the “dress out” area at 11:15
p.m. that deputies were informed that he had actually posted his
bond at 10:42 p.m., thereby satisfying the conditions for his
release. Once they were made aware that his bond had been
posted, he was released from the jail at 11:37 p.m. Deputy
Ingram explained that this misunderstanding occurred because
the deputies in the jail reception, dress
out area, they wouldn’t know that
[Defendant] had met his conditions at that
time. So his paperwork had been placed in
dress out before knowing that the conditions
were met. And after he was dressed out it
was acknowledged in dress out that he had a
bond posted, and at that time he was taken .
. . back to jail reception.
We believe that Deputy Ingram’s testimony provides
competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings that
the delay between the time bond was posted and the time
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Defendant was released was both unintentional and reasonable.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
finding that no substantial violation of Defendant’s rights
occurred.
We also reject Defendant’s contention that because of the
delay in his release, his right to have his friends and family
members observe his condition was compromised. Defendant points
to our Court’s decision in Labinski, in which we held that
[i]f the provisions of the foregoing
pretrial release statutes are not complied
with by the magistrate, and the defendant
can show irreparable prejudice directly
resulting from a lost opportunity to gather
evidence in his behalf by having friends and
family observe him and form opinions as to
his condition following arrest . . . and to
prepare a case in his own defense, the DWI
charge must be dismissed.
188 N.C. App. at 126, 654 S.E.2d at 744 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
In the present case, the trial court did not err in finding
that Defendant had failed to show prejudice. Defendant had a
passenger in his vehicle who had the opportunity to observe his
condition at the time of his arrest. Furthermore, although
Officer Griffin gave Defendant the option of having a witness
present during the performance of the Intoxilyzer test,
Defendant voluntarily waived that right and did not request to
have anyone present. Defendant’s mother was also allowed to
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communicate with him over the phone while he was in custody and
was present at the time of his release. Moreover, we note that
upon her arrival at the jail, she did not make any request to
observe Defendant’s condition.
For these reasons, we believe competent evidence existed to
support the trial court’s finding that “[D]efendant [was] not .
. . deprived of an opportunity to obtain evidence to support any
defense.” See State v. Daniel, 208 N.C. App. 364, 366, 702
S.E.2d 306, 308 (2010) (holding that defendant’s detention for
nearly 24 hours after being taken into custody for driving while
impaired did not violate her statutory rights “to the point of
irreparably prejudicing any preparation of a defense to the
charge”); Labinski, 188 N.C. App. at 128, 654 S.E.2d at 745(although defendant alleged that magistrate committed statutory
violation in delaying her release from jail, she failed to show
prejudice because she had opportunity to contact witnesses
before submitting to Breathalyzer test, was informed of that
right, and was not denied access to friends and family who could
serve as witnesses).
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the trial
court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress or
in denying his motion to dismiss.
NO ERROR.
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Judge STEELMAN and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).