State v. Hutcheson ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-842
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 18 March 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Nash County
Nos. 11 CRS 051133,051314
MATTHEW KEITH HUTCHESON
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 28 February 2013
by Judge Thomas H. Lock in Superior Court, Nash County. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 21 January 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Teresa M. Postell, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant
Appellate Defender Barbara S. Blackman, for Defendant.
McGEE, Judge.
Matthew Keith Hutcheson (“Defendant”) was convicted on 25
February 2013 of second-degree murder and discharging a weapon
into an occupied dwelling. The evidence presented to the jury,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the State and giving
the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences, is set forth
below.
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Duwone Parker (“Mr. Parker”), Defendant, and others were
socializing at the home of Mr. Parker’s grandmother (the house)
on the evening of 25 February 2011. Mr. Parker and Defendant
left the house together in Defendant’s vehicle that evening
between 11:00 p.m. and midnight. A video recording from the
local Wal-Mart showed Defendant and Mr. Parker entering Wal-Mart
at 2:54 a.m. in the early hours of 26 February 2011, buying
food, and then leaving at 3:27 a.m.
At approximately 5:30 a.m. on the morning of 26 February
2011, several of Defendant’s neighbors heard gunfire coming from
the direction of Defendant’s house. Amy Feasel (“Ms. Feasel”),
who lived in front of Defendant’s house, heard five to seven
rapidly fired shots, a pause, and then another burst of five to
seven shots. After hearing the second burst of shots, Ms.
Feasel walked to a rear window of her home and saw a man smoking
on the back deck of Defendant’s house. The lights were on and
she watched the man for five minutes as he smoked, paced,
entered the house and turned off the lights.
John Kilpatrick (“Mr. Kilpatrick”), who lived directly in
front of Defendant’s house, also heard five to seven rapidly
fired shots, a pause, and then another burst of five to seven
shots. Mr. Kilpatrick thought it sounded like the shots were
fired from just outside his bedroom window. Upon hearing the
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first shots, Mr. Kilpatrick looked out a window, but saw
nothing. He heard the blinds in his spare room shake when the
second burst of shots were fired. He called 911.
Keen Gravely (“Mr. Gravely”) lived a couple of houses
behind Defendant’s house and recalled hearing two shots, a one-
second pause, and then another three to four shots. Mr. Gravely
looked out his windows, saw nothing, and then called 911. He
said it sounded like the shots were fired from the same gun.
At 8:06 p.m., 26 February 2011, the evening after the
alleged early morning gunshots, credit card records and store
video from a Home Depot indicated that Defendant had bought
plastic sheeting from the Home Depot. Mr. Parker’s body,
wrapped in plastic sheeting and secured with tie-down straps and
small strips of duct tape, was found four miles from Defendant’s
house on 2 March 2011. Burn marks were visible on the plastic
sheeting and on Mr. Parker’s body. Police found a half-roll of
plastic sheeting of identical size and thickness on Defendant’s
back deck. Police also found similar tie-down straps and duct
tape with small strips torn off in a shed on Defendant’s
property. Police recovered a butane torch, cigarette lighter,
and charcoal lighter fluid from Defendant’s truck. Police also
found Mr. Parker’s blood on Defendant’s living room rug, on the
outside and inside of a trashcan outside Defendant’s house, and
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in the bed of Defendant’s truck.
Karen Kelly (“Ms. Kelly”), a pathologist, testified at
trial that she had determined Mr. Parker died of a gunshot wound
to the neck “below and behind his right ear” and that the shot
had been fired from a distance of less than three inches. On
cross-examination, Ms. Kelly testified it was possible that Mr.
Parker’s wound could have been self-inflicted.
Police searched Defendant’s house and vehicle on 3 March
2011, and found a 9.0 mm handgun in Defendant’s truck. Jennifer
Pohlheber (“Agent Pohlheber”), a State Bureau of Investigation
firearms and ballistics expert, testified that the bullet
recovered from Mr. Parker’s body had the same general class
characteristics as the bullets test fired from Defendant’s 9.0
mm handgun, and could have been fired from a 9.0 mm, .38
caliber, or .357 caliber handgun. According to Agent Pohlheber,
rifling replication and damage to the bullets complicated her
ability to make a positive match.
Mr. Kilpatrick noticed bullets and bullet holes in his den,
trophy room, and shed on 3 March 2011. Police recovered one 9.0
mm bullet from Mr. Kilpatrick’s window facing, one 9.0 mm bullet
from inside his house, and two 9.0 mm bullets from his shed.
Police found two shell casings in flowerpots outside Defendant’s
home. Agent Pohlheber testified that the shell casings were
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fired from Defendant’s 9.0 mm handgun. Agent Pohlheber also
stated the bullets recovered from Mr. Kilpatrick’s home and shed
bore class characteristics similar to the test bullets she fired
from Defendant’s handgun and thus could have been fired from
Defendant’s handgun. Defendant was arrested on 3 March 2011 and
charged with discharging a weapon into an occupied dwelling and
injury to real property. Defendant was subsequently indicted on
6 June 2011 for first-degree murder and on 11 July 2011 for
discharging a weapon into occupied property and injury to real
property.
During Defendant’s opening statement at trial, Defendant’s
counsel stated that, at some point on 26 February 2011,
Defendant woke up from “a drug-induced, intoxicated alcohol
binge” with no memory of events from earlier that day.
Defendant found his friend, Mr. Parker, lying dead on the floor.
Defendant presented expert testimony from Dr. Claudia
Coleman (“Dr. Coleman”), a forensic psychologist; Dr. Wilkey
Wilson (“Dr. Wilson”), a neuropharmacologist; and Dr. George
Corvin (“Dr. Corvin”), a forensic psychiatrist. These experts
testified that Defendant suffered from long-term polysubstance
dependence (addiction to anti-anxiety medications, pain
medications, and crack cocaine), bipolar disorder, chronic
depression, major depressive episodes overlaying the chronic
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depression, anxiety disorder, and possibly obsessive compulsive
disorder. Dr. Coleman and Dr. Corvin testified that these
conditions prevented Defendant from being able to deliberate or
form a specific intent to kill, an element of first-degree
murder.
In his closing argument, Defendant’s counsel argued that
the State had failed to prove Defendant fired the shots into Mr.
Kilpatrick’s house or that Defendant killed Mr. Parker. In the
alternative, defense counsel maintained that, if the jury was
convinced Defendant had killed Mr. Parker, Defendant was at most
guilty of second-degree murder as Defendant was unable to form
the specific intent necessary for first-degree murder due to his
demonstrated substance abuse and mental health issues.
The jury returned verdicts of guilty of second-degree
murder and of discharging a weapon into occupied property.
Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of one hundred
forty-four to one hundred eighty-two months for second-degree
murder and sixty to eighty-one months for discharging a weapon
into occupied property. Defendant appeals.
I. Standard of Review
The standard of review on a motion to dismiss is de novo.
Neier v. State of N.C., 151 N.C. App. 228, 232, 565 S.E.2d 229,
232 (2002) (citations omitted). Under this standard, the Court
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“considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own
judgment” for that of the trial court. State v. Williams, 362
N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (citations
omitted).
When considering the denial of a “defendant’s motion for
dismissal, the question for the [trial] [c]ourt is whether there
is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the
offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and
(2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense. If
so, the motion is properly denied.” State v. Powell, 299 N.C.
95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980) (citations omitted). Where
the evidence merely “raise[s] a suspicion or conjecture as to
either the commission of the offense or the identity of the
defendant as the perpetrator of it,” the evidence is
insufficient and the motion to dismiss should be granted.
Powell, 299 N.C. at 98, 261 S.E.2d at 117. However, if the
evidence “is relevant and adequate to convince a reasonable mind
to accept a conclusion,” it is substantial and the case should
be submitted to the jury. State v. Robinson, 355 N.C. 320, 336,
561 S.E.2d 245, 255 (2002) (citations omitted). Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient even where it does not rule out every
hypothesis suggesting innocence. State v. Mann, 355 N.C. 294,
301, 560 S.E.2d 776, 781 (2002) (citations omitted).
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When determining whether substantial evidence exists, the
trial court views the evidence in the light most favorable to
the State, “giving the State the benefit of all reasonable
inferences.” State v. Benson, 331 N.C. 537, 544, 417 S.E.2d
756, 761 (1992) (citations omitted). “Contradictions and
discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of the case” but should
be resolved by the jury. Benson, 331 N.C. at 544, 417 S.E.2d at
761. Furthermore, the “defendant’s evidence should be
disregarded unless it is favorable to the State or does not
conflict with the State’s evidence.” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C.
373, 379, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000) (citation omitted).
II.
Defendant first argues the trial court erred by denying his
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence for the
charge of discharging a weapon into an occupied dwelling. We
disagree.
In reviewing Defendant’s motion to dismiss, this Court must
determine whether there was substantial evidence of the crime
and also whether Defendant was sufficiently identified as the
perpetrator. Powell, 299 N.C. at 98-99, 261 S.E.2d at 117.
Defendant does not dispute that a crime was committed, but
rather challenges the sufficiency of the evidence identifying
him as the perpetrator.
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Multiple witnesses testified they heard shots fired from
the direction of Defendant’s house in the early hours of 26
February 2011. There was also evidence presented at trial that
showed: (1) Defendant was at his house that night, (2) around
the time the shots were fired, only one person was observed
standing outside Defendant’s house, (3) the only other person at
Defendant’s house that night was Mr. Parker, and (4) Mr.
Parker’s body was found less than a week later in woods near
Defendant’s house. While Defendant presented a theory that Mr.
Parker, in fact, fired the shots into Mr. Kilpatrick’s home and
then committed suicide, the test for determining whether the
charge should have been submitted to the jury is not whether
Defendant offered a plausible alternative explanation, but
rather whether a “reasonable inference of [Defendant’s] guilt
may be drawn from the circumstances.” State v. Stone, 323 N.C.
447, 452, 373 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1988).
We hold the testimony of the State’s witnesses and the
physical evidence constituted evidence “relevant and adequate to
convince a reasonable mind to” conclude that Defendant committed
the crime. The charge of firing into an occupied dwelling was
properly submitted to the jury. Robinson, 355 N.C. at 336, 561
S.E.2d at 255 (citation omitted). The trial court did not err
in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss this charge.
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III.
Defendant next argues the trial court erred by denying his
motion to dismiss the State’s first-degree murder charge for
insufficiency of the evidence. We disagree.
Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. In
reviewing a motion to dismiss, this Court must determine whether
there was substantial evidence of the crime and also whether
Defendant was sufficiently identified as the perpetrator.
Powell, 299 N.C. at 98-99, 261 S.E.2d at 117. Defendant
contends the State failed to prove both that Mr. Parker died by
virtue of a criminal act and that the criminal act was
perpetrated by Defendant.
The State’s evidence, even if circumstantial, need not rule
out every hypothesis offered by Defendant suggesting innocence.
Mann, 355 N.C. at 301, 560 S.E.2d at 781. Thus, Defendant’s
implied alternative theory that Mr. Parker did not die by virtue
of a criminal act, but rather committed suicide, has no bearing
on our determination as to whether the trial court’s denial of
Defendant’s motion to dismiss was proper.
Circumstantial evidence may also provide the requisite
evidence of motive, opportunity, capability and identity needed
to identify the accused as the perpetrator of the offense.
Stone, 323 N.C. at 452, 373 S.E.2d at 434. The evidence, viewed
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in the light most favorable to the State and giving it the
benefit of all reasonable inferences as this Court is required
to do, State v. Benson, 331 N.C. at 544, 417 S.E.2d at 761,
tended to show Defendant was at the scene of the murder,
establishing Defendant’s opportunity to commit the crime. The
evidence also demonstrated that Defendant possessed a 9.0 mm
handgun capable of firing the bullet recovered from Mr. Parker’s
body. Furthermore, during the early morning of 26 February
2011, gunshots were heard coming from the direction of
Defendant’s house where both Defendant and Mr. Parker were
present. Defendant emphasizes in his brief that there was no
history of violence between Defendant and Mr. Parker, and that
on the evening in question, they had socialized together without
any incident, and that Defendant had no motive to kill Mr.
Parker. While motive can be “relevant to identify an accused as
the perpetrator of [the] crime” State v. Bell, 65 N.C. App. 234,
238, 309 S.E.2d 464, 467 (1983), it “is not an element of [a
crime], nor is its absence a defense.” State v. Elliot, 344
N.C. 242, 273, 475 S.E.2d 202, 216 (1996).
Additionally, there is substantial evidence that Defendant
disposed of Mr. Parker’s body.
The conduct of the accused at the time of
the offense or after being charged with it,
such as flight, the fabrication of false and
contradictory statements, the concealment of
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the instruments of violence, the destruction
or removal of proofs tending to show that an
offense had been committed or to ascertain
the offender, all are reviewable in evidence
as circumstances connected with and throwing
light upon the question of imputed guilt.
State v. Spencer, 176 N.C. 709, 715, 97 S.E. 155, 158 (1918).
Defendant’s failure to contact the police, along with evidence
of his concerted efforts to conceal Mr. Parker’s body, is
“relevant and adequate” evidence upon which “a reasonable mind
[could] accept [the] conclusion” that Defendant killed Mr.
Parker. Robinson, 355 N.C. at 336, 561 S.E.2d at 255.
We hold this evidence was sufficient to survive Defendant’s
motion to dismiss the charge of murder. The trial court did not
err in submitting this charge to the jury.
No error.
Judges HUNTER, Robert C. and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).