MDT Pers., LLC v. APH Contr'rs, Inc. ( 2014 )


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  • An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
    controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
    with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    NO. COA13-802
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed: 18 March 2014
    MDT PERSONNEL, LLC,
    Plaintiff,
    v.                                      Guilford County
    No. 12 CVS 3555
    APH CONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a APH,
    INC., WILD BUILDING CONTRACTORS,
    INC., and CINCINNATI INSURANCE
    COMPANY,
    Defendants.
    WILD BUILDING CONTRACTORS, INC.,
    Cross-Claim Plaintiff,
    v.
    APH CONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a APH,
    INC.,
    Cross-Claim Defendant.
    APH CONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a APH,
    INC.,
    Cross-Claim Plaintiff,
    v.
    WILD BUILDING CONTRACTORS, INC.,
    and CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Cross-Claim Defendants.
    Appeal      by     defendant/cross-claim           defendant/cross-claim
    plaintiff     from     judgment   entered     31   December     2012   and    order
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    entered 6 March 2013 by Judge Patrice A. Hinnant in Guilford
    County   Superior    Court.        Heard    in   the   Court   of   Appeals    21
    November 2013.
    No brief filed on behalf of plaintiff-appellee.
    Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., by R. Steve DeGeorge and
    Kate E. Payerle, for defendant, cross-claim defendant,
    cross-claim plaintiff-appellant APH Contractors, Inc. d/b/a
    APH, Inc.
    Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., by Kevin S.
    Joyner, for defendant, cross-claim plaintiff, cross-claim
    defendant-appellee Wild Building Contractors, Inc. and
    defendant,    cross-claim   defendant-appellee   Cincinnati
    Insurance Company.
    GEER, Judge.
    Defendants    APH   Contractors,      Inc.   doing   business    as   APH,
    Inc. and Wild Building Contractors, Inc. asserted cross-claims
    against each other.       APH appeals from the trial court's judgment
    awarding Wild Building damages on its breach of contract cross-
    claim against APH and ordering that APH recover nothing on its
    cross-claims   against      Wild    Building     and    defendant/cross-claim
    defendant Cincinnati Insurance Company.                 APH also appeals the
    trial court's order denying APH's motion for a new trial.
    Based on the record on appeal submitted to this Court, we
    are unable to determine if the judgment and order appealed by
    APH   constitute    an    immediately      appealable    final   judgment     and
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    order rather than an interlocutory judgment and order.                           Since
    APH has failed to demonstrate that this appeal involves a final
    judgment and has further failed to argue that any interlocutory
    appeal affects a substantial right that would be jeopardized
    absent review prior to a final determination as to all claims,
    we dismiss the appeal.
    Facts
    On 7 February 2012, plaintiff MDT Personnel, LLC, filed a
    complaint against APH, Wild Building, and Cincinnati, alleging
    the following facts.            Laurinburg Housing Authority entered into
    a contract with Wild Building, hiring Wild Building to serve as
    the general contractor for a construction project.                        Cincinnati
    was    Wild    Building's   surety      on   the   contract.       Wild     Building
    entered into a subcontract with APH to furnish certain labor and
    materials for the project, and APH, in turn, entered into a
    subcontract with MDT to furnish labor.                 Ultimately, APH owed MDT
    an     outstanding      balance    of    $198,587.05      for     labor    supplied
    pursuant to the subcontract.
    MDT brought suit against APH for breach of contract.                       MDT
    further alleged that Wild Building and Cincinnati were jointly
    and severally liable for the balance due to MDT on its contract
    with    APH.      MDT    also    asserted     claims    against    APH     and   Wild
    Building for unjust enrichment.
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    Wild Building and Cincinnati jointly filed an answer to
    MDT's      complaint        and     asserted       cross-claims          against      APH   for
    contractual indemnity, equitable indemnity, breach of contract,
    breach     of    warranty,        and     fraud.        After        filing   an   answer   and
    amended answer to MDT's complaint and to the cross-claims, APH
    also asserted cross-claims against Wild Building and Cincinnati
    for   breach         of   contract,       joint    and     several       liability,     unjust
    enrichment, and attorney's fees.
    It    appears        from     the    record       that    MDT     and   Wild    Building
    reached an agreement pursuant to which Wild Building agreed to
    pay   MDT    the       principal        balance    owed        for    MDT's   labor    on   the
    project in the amount of $184,327.24.                          After that agreement was
    in place, the trial court entered an order granting summary
    judgment        in    favor    of    MDT     against       APH,        Wild   Building,     and
    Cincinnati       for      interest        owed    on     the    principal      balance,     but
    denying MDT's motion for summary judgment with respect to its
    request for attorney's fees.                      On 7 December 2012, MDT took a
    voluntary dismissal without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)
    of the Rules of Civil Procedure, of its claims for "breach of
    contract        only      as   to    the     recovery          of     principal      balance,"
    attorney's fees, and unjust enrichment.
    The case proceeded to trial on the cross-claims of APH,
    Wild Building, and Cincinnati.                         Following a jury verdict, the
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    trial     court     entered        a     judgment     awarding     Wild        Building
    $133,856.34       plus    post-judgment          interest    on   Wild    Building's
    cross-claim against APH for breach of contract.                    The trial court
    further ordered that APH "shall have and take nothing" from any
    of its cross-claims against Wild Building and Cincinnati.
    APH filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of
    the Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that the jury foreperson
    had revealed to the trial court, parties, and counsel after the
    verdict    that    he    had   a   "severe       hearing    impairment"    and    was,
    consequently, "incapable of performing his duties."                      Following a
    hearing, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial in an
    order entered 6 March 2013.              APH appealed to this Court from the
    judgment and the order denying its motion for a new trial.
    Discussion
    We must first address this Court's jurisdiction to hear
    this appeal.        "A final judgment is one which disposes of the
    cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially
    determined between them in the trial court.                       An interlocutory
    order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does
    not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the
    trial     court    in    order     to     settle     and    determine    the    entire
    controversy."       Veazey v. City of Durham, 
    231 N.C. 357
    , 361-62,
    
    57 S.E.2d 377
    , 381 (1950) (internal citations omitted).
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    "Generally,      there    is       no   right    of     immediate    appeal     from
    interlocutory orders and judgments."                         Goldston v. Am. Motors
    Corp., 
    326 N.C. 723
    , 725, 
    392 S.E.2d 735
    , 736 (1990).                             However,
    "immediate      appeal    of    interlocutory           orders     and     judgments     is
    available in at least two instances.                    First, immediate review is
    available when the trial court enters a final judgment as to one
    or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties and certifies
    there is no just reason for delay [under Rule 54(b) of the Rules
    of    Civil    Procedure].      .     .    .         Second,    immediate       appeal   is
    available from an interlocutory order or judgment which affects
    a substantial right."           Sharpe v. Worland, 
    351 N.C. 159
    , 161-62,
    
    522 S.E.2d 577
    , 579 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Here, all of MDT's claims were resolved prior to trial
    through the voluntary dismissal, and all of APH's cross-claims
    against Wild Building and Cincinnati were resolved by the trial
    court's judgment.         The judgment also resolved Wild Building's
    cross-claim against APH for breach of contract.                            The judgment
    did    not,    however,    address         Wild      Building's     and     Cincinnati's
    cross-claims against           APH for         contractual indemnity,            equitable
    indemnity, breach of warranty, and fraud.
    While it is possible that Wild Building's and Cincinnati's
    cross-claims      for    contractual           indemnity,       equitable       indemnity,
    breach    of    warranty,       and       fraud      were    resolved      or   otherwise
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    disposed of prior to, or during, the trial, the record does not
    contain any mention of any resolution of those claims.                              The
    parties submitted to this Court a truncated trial transcript
    that includes only the final day of trial.                    The oral rendering
    of the verdict provided in that truncated transcript does not
    clearly indicate what claims were decided by the jury.                        There is
    also no verdict sheet included in the record on appeal.
    On     this    record,    we   cannot      determine      that      the   appealed
    judgment   and     order   "dispose[d]        of   the     cause   as    to   all   the
    parties,   leaving    nothing      to   be    judicially      determined       between
    them in the trial court."          Veazey, 
    231 N.C. at 361-62
    , 
    57 S.E.2d at 381
    .     "It is well established that the appellant bears the
    burden of showing to this Court that the appeal is proper."
    Johnson v. Lucas, 
    168 N.C. App. 515
    , 518, 
    608 S.E.2d 336
    , 338,
    aff'd    per   curiam,       
    360 N.C. 53
    ,     
    619 S.E.2d 502
        (2005).
    Similarly, "'it is the appellant's responsibility to make sure
    that the record on appeal is complete and in proper form.'"
    Smith v. Heath, 
    208 N.C. App. 467
    , 470, 
    703 S.E.2d 194
    , 196
    (2010) (quoting Miller v. Miller, 
    92 N.C. App. 351
    , 353, 
    374 S.E.2d 467
    , 468 (1988)).
    Moreover, Rule 28(b)(4) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure
    requires    that    the    appellant's       brief    include      a    statement   of
    grounds for appellate review that "shall include citation of the
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    statute    or   statutes      permitting       appellate    review."      Further,
    "when an appeal is interlocutory, the appellant must include in
    its statement of grounds for appellate review 'sufficient facts
    and argument to support appellate review on the ground that the
    challenged order affects a substantial right.'"                     Johnson, 168
    N.C. App. at 518, 
    608 S.E.2d at 338
     (quoting N.C.R. App. P.
    28(b)(4)).
    In   this    case,    APH's   statement       of    grounds   for   appellate
    review does not indicate that the appeal has been taken from a
    final judgment and order, does not cite any statute permitting
    appellate review, and does not otherwise address whether this
    appeal has been taken from a final judgment or whether it is
    interlocutory.     Rather, APH's statement of grounds for appellate
    review simply summarizes APH's argument on the merits.                    Further,
    nothing    else   in    APH's    brief     or    reply     brief   explains   what
    happened to the other cross-claims.1
    APH has also failed to demonstrate that an interlocutory
    appeal would be appropriate.             The trial court did not include a
    Rule 54(b) certification in its judgment or its order denying
    APH's    motion   for   new     trial.     Consequently,       APH's     appeal   is
    properly before this Court only if APH has met its burden of
    1
    We note also that nothing in Wild Building's and
    Cincinnati's brief suggests any resolution of the apparently
    outstanding cross-claims.
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    showing this Court that the judgment and order deprive it of "a
    substantial right which would be jeopardized absent a review
    prior to a final determination on the merits."                           Jeffreys v.
    Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 
    115 N.C. App. 377
    , 380, 
    444 S.E.2d 252
    ,   254     (1994).         APH   has   not,   however,       made   any   argument
    regarding a substantial right.
    We cannot simply assume that we have jurisdiction.                      Nor is
    it the duty of this Court "to construct arguments for or find
    support for appellant's right to appeal from an interlocutory
    order; instead, the appellant has the burden of showing this
    Court that the order deprives the appellant of a substantial
    right which would be jeopardized absent a review prior to a
    final determination on the merits."                 
    Id.
         See also Viar v. N.C.
    Dep't of Transp., 
    359 N.C. 400
    , 402, 
    610 S.E.2d 360
    , 361 (2005)
    (holding that "[i]t is not the role of the appellate courts . .
    . to create an appeal for an appellant").
    Since    APH      has    failed     to     show    that    this    Court    has
    jurisdiction over this appeal, we must dismiss the appeal.                         See
    Jeffreys, 
    115 N.C. App. at 380
    , 
    444 S.E.2d at 254
     (dismissing
    interlocutory         appeal     because        appellant    "presented       neither
    argument nor citation to show this Court that [appellant] had
    the right to appeal the order dismissing its counterclaims").
    Dismissed.
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    Judges STEPHENS and ERVIN concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).