State v. Long ( 2014 )


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  • An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
    controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
    with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    NO. COA13-922
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed: 4 March 2014
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.                                     Mecklenburg County
    No. 07 CRS 238137-38, 238140
    ANTHONY DARRELL LONG
    Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 20 February 2013
    by Judge C. Thomas Edwards in Mecklenburg County Superior Court.
    Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 January 2014.
    Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Gary R. Govert, Assistant
    Solicitor General, for the State.
    Cheshire Parker Schneider & Bryan, PLLC, by John Keating
    Wiles, for defendant-appellant.
    STEELMAN, Judge.
    Where defendant raised a diminished capacity defense, the
    trial court did not err in allowing an examining psychiatrist,
    presented as part of the State’s rebuttal evidence, to testify
    as to defendant’s statements upon which her opinion was based.
    This   testimony     did   not    implicate    defendant’s      Fifth   Amendment
    rights concerning self-incrimination.               The trial court did not
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    err in refusing to charge the jury on the lesser offense of
    voluntary manslaughter.
    I. Factual and Procedural Background
    Anthony Darrell Long (defendant) and Sonia Long (wife) were
    married in 2000.       As of 16 August 2007, however, defendant and
    wife had separated, and wife            was living with her boyfriend,
    Roderick Phillips (Phillips).
    On 16 August 2007, wife, with Phillips and his son Daniel,
    drove    to   defendant’s      home   in    Charlotte   to   pick   up   some
    paperwork.    Wife entered the home while Phillips remained in the
    car.       After     waiting    about      forty-five   minutes,    Phillips
    approached the door; defendant answered, and informed Phillips
    that wife would be out shortly.             Phillips returned to his car,
    and shortly thereafter defendant emerged from the house, urging
    Phillips to rush inside, informing him that wife needed his
    help.    Phillips, with Daniel, followed defendant into the home.
    As Phillips entered the master bedroom, he felt defendant strike
    him in the back with something; he turned and saw defendant come
    at him and Daniel with a knife.             Phillips fled with Daniel.     He
    did not see wife inside the home.
    Police arrived at the home, and discovered wife, almost
    completely nude, with a black leather belt tightened around her
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    neck.        She was pronounced dead.              Forensic examination showed
    recent sexual contact.
    Defendant was charged with the first-degree murder of wife,
    attempted first-degree murder of Phillips, assault with a deadly
    weapon with intent to kill as to Phillips, and second-degree
    sexual offense as to wife.1
    Prior to trial, defendant gave notice of his intent to
    raise a defense of diminished capacity.                   The trial court ordered
    that    defendant     submit    to   a     psychological      examination      by   Dr.
    Nicole    Wolfe.       Defendant      presented     two      expert   witnesses     who
    testified       on   the   issue     of    diminished      capacity,    Drs.    Moire
    Artigues and Dan Chartier.            Dr. Wolfe testified as to her report
    during the State’s rebuttal presentation.
    The    jury   found     defendant     guilty     of    first-degree      murder
    based    upon    premeditation       and    deliberation,       and   felony    murder
    based upon the sex offense; the jury also found defendant guilty
    on all other charges.              The trial court sentenced defendant to
    life     imprisonment      without        parole    for      first-degree      murder,
    followed by a consecutive term of 100-129 months for second-
    degree sexual offense, followed by a consecutive term of 151-191
    1
    Defendant was also charged with                  second-degree       rape.        This
    charge was dismissed by the State.
    -4-
    months for attempted murder.           The trial court arrested judgment
    on the assault conviction.
    Defendant appeals.
    II. Admission of Statements Made During Examination
    In his first argument, defendant contends that the trial
    court    erred   in   admitting    statements     made   by    him   during   a
    psychological examination into evidence.           We disagree.
    A. Standard of Review
    “[T]he trial judge is afforded wide latitude of discretion
    when making a determination about the admissibility of expert
    testimony.” State v. Bullard, 
    312 N.C. 129
    , 140, 
    322 S.E.2d 370
    ,
    376 (1984).      “The trial court’s decision regarding what expert
    testimony   to   admit   will     be   reversed   only   for    an   abuse    of
    discretion.” State v. Alderson, 
    173 N.C. App. 344
    , 350, 
    618 S.E.2d 844
    , 848 (2005).
    B. Analysis
    Prior to trial, defendant gave notice of his intent to
    raise a defense of diminished capacity.           The trial court ordered
    defendant to submit to a psychological examination by Dr. Nicole
    Wolfe.    Prior to Dr. Wolfe’s testimony at trial, but subsequent
    to the testimony of defendant’s experts, defendant raised the
    following objection:
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    I would certainly object to any statements
    made by Mr. Long in this case from Dr.
    Wolfe's   interviews  that   were   conducted
    during January when I was actually there.
    . . .
    Certainly we don't object to the state
    asking what questions were asked. We would
    just object to quotations on what Mr. Long
    said in response to those questions by Dr.
    Wolfe on those different interviews that
    happened this January.
    The trial court held that “the statements may be received
    for   the    limited   purposes   of    establishing      the     basis      for    Dr.
    Wolfe's opinion as to the defendant's medical status and for no
    other   purpose.”         The   trial    court    further       held   that        “the
    objections to Dr. Wolfe's report in their entirety, then, are
    overruled.”
    Dr. Wolfe testified that defendant informed her that he had
    not been hearing voices or seeing hallucinations on 16 August
    2007.       She then testified that defendant informed her that he
    was   “feeling    frustrated,     confused”       that    day,    that    he       “had
    started drinking again that week,” and that “he hadn't been
    exercising,     playing    with   his    kids,    and    that     he   was    having
    occasional     violent    sporadic     thoughts    of    things    such      as    dogs
    biting, dragons fighting, thoughts of sometimes when his mom
    used to beat him, and even thoughts of various plane crashes or
    -6-
    train     crashes.”        Dr.     Wolfe    then    testified        that     defendant
    informed her that, on 16 August 2007, “he had knocked [wife] to
    the ground and she did not appear to be resisting, and that he
    took    her    clothes     off,    had   sex     with   her   both    vaginally     and
    anally,       and   that   he     estimated      that   the    sexual       act   lasted
    somewhere between five and ten minutes.”                      Defendant repeatedly
    objected to this testimony, and the trial court consistently
    overruled the objections.
    On appeal, defendant contends that this testimony violated
    his privilege against self-incrimination pursuant to the Fifth
    Amendment of the United States Constitution.                     However, we have
    previously held that:
    When a defendant attempts to establish a
    diminished capacity defense and introduces
    expert   testimony   regarding   his   mental
    status, the State may then introduce expert
    testimony derived from prior court-ordered
    psychiatric examinations in order to rebut
    that testimony without implicating the fifth
    amendment   of  the   U.S.  Constitution   or
    Article I, Section 23 of the North Carolina
    Constitution.
    State v. Clark, 
    128 N.C. App. 87
    , 94, 
    493 S.E.2d 770
    , 774
    (1997).       In Clark, we cited to our Supreme Court’s decision in
    State v. Huff, 
    325 N.C. 1
    , 
    381 S.E.2d 635
     (1989), vacated on
    other grounds, 
    497 U.S. 1021
    , 
    111 L.Ed.2d 777
     (1990), in which
    [O]ur   Supreme     Court    specifically       addressed
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    the constitutional propriety of multiple
    psychiatric examinations when used by the
    State for the purpose of rebutting a
    defendant's   assertion   of   the insanity
    defense. There, the Court held that “a fair
    opportunity to rebut may include more than
    one examination of defendant.”
    Clark, 128 N.C. App. at 94, 
    493 S.E.2d at 774
     (quoting
    Huff, 
    325 N.C. at 47
    , 
    381 S.E.2d at 661
    ).      Our holding in Clark
    is explicit.     Where a defendant raises a defense of diminished
    capacity, and expert testimony regarding his mental state is
    introduced, no Fifth Amendment privilege is implicated.      In the
    instant case, Dr. Wolfe’s testimony was introduced to rebut the
    testimony of defendant’s experts.       The trial court explicitly
    limited the jury’s consideration of Dr. Wolfe’s testimony to
    “the purpose of showing intent and motive, as well as for the
    purpose of establishing the basis for the formulation of mental-
    health diagnosis.”      The jury was not to consider defendant’s
    statements during Dr. Wolfe’s examination for the purpose of
    determining guilt or innocence.
    We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
    in   admitting    Dr.   Wolfe’s    rebuttal   testimony   concerning
    statements by defendant, made pursuant to her examination of
    defendant, which formed the basis of her opinion of defendant’s
    mental state.
    -8-
    This argument is without merit.
    III. Refusal of Trial Court to Charge on Voluntary Manslaughter
    In his second argument, defendant contends that the trial
    court erred in declining to instruct the jury upon the lesser
    included offense of voluntary manslaughter.           We disagree.
    A. Standard of Review.
    “An instruction on a lesser-included offense must be given
    only if the evidence would permit the jury rationally to find
    defendant guilty of the lesser offense and to acquit him of the
    greater.” State v. Millsaps, 
    356 N.C. 556
    , 561, 
    572 S.E.2d 767
    ,
    771 (2002).
    B. Analysis
    During the jury charge conference, defendant requested that
    the trial court instruct the jury on the lesser included offense
    of   involuntary     manslaughter.      Defendant     cited,   as   evidence
    supporting    this   charge,   Dr.   Wolfe’s    testimony   regarding   what
    defendant had told her about “the poking in the chest and the
    words you'll never see your children again or something to that
    effect.”      The trial court declined to give the instruction,
    holding    that   those   statements   –   as   per   defendant’s    earlier
    -9-
    motion – were not to be considered as evidence of guilt or
    innocence.
    A    “killing          committed    in     the    heat      of     passion          suddenly
    aroused         by    adequate         provocation          .     .      .        is     voluntary
    manslaughter.”          State v. Huggins, 
    338 N.C. 494
    , 497, 
    450 S.E.2d 479
    , 481 (1994) (citations and quotations omitted).                                       However,
    “[m]ere     words,           however     abusive       or       insulting[,]             are     not
    sufficient provocation to negate malice and reduce the homicide
    to    manslaughter.             Rather,       this     level      of     provocation            must
    ordinarily amount to an assault or threatened assault by the
    victim against the perpetrator.”                     
    Id. at 498
    , 
    450 S.E.2d at 482
    (citations omitted).
    In    the       instant    case,        defendant         cites,       as    evidence       of
    provocation, statements that wife poked defendant, and taunted
    him that she would keep his children away.                               We recognize that
    the     trial        court     issued     a    limiting          instruction             that   the
    statements constituting this evidence would be admitted solely
    to establish the basis for Dr. Wolfe’s report, and not for the
    purpose     of       determining       guilt     or    innocence.                 Even    assuming
    arguendo that this limiting instruction had not issued, however,
    there     was    no    evidence     of    adequate      provocation               sufficient      to
    support an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.                                  We hold that
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    the trial court did not err in declining to instruct the jury on
    the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.
    This argument is without merit.
    NO ERROR.
    Judges STEPHENS and DAVIS concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).