State v. Fleig , 232 N.C. App. 647 ( 2014 )


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  •                                NO. COA13-1001
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed: 4 March 2014
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.                                    Onslow County
    No. 11 CRS 55170-3
    MATTHEW PELHAM FLEIG
    Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 20 March 2013 by
    Judge W. Allen Cobb, Jr. in Onslow County Superior Court.               Heard
    in the Court of Appeals 3 February 2014.
    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
    Ann W. Matthews, for the State.
    James W. Carter, for defendant.
    ELMORE, Judge.
    On   20   March    2013,   a   jury   found   Matthew    Pelham     Fleig
    (defendant) guilty of multiple drug offenses.               The subject of
    this appeal concerns judgment entered on those offenses in 11
    CRS 055170 that stemmed from 10 August 2010: 1.) felony sale of
    marijuana; 2.) felony delivery of marijuana; and 3.) misdemeanor
    possession of marijuana.       Judge W. Allen Cobb, Jr. consolidated
    these convictions and imposed a term of imprisonment for six-
    months   minimum,     eight-months   maximum.       That     sentence     was
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    suspended,       and   defendant         was     placed    on    probation   for     thirty
    months   and      required        to    served     a   thirty-day     active      sentence.
    Defendant now appeals and contends that the trial court erred by
    sentencing him for both sale and delivery of marijuana.                                  After
    careful consideration, we remand for a new sentencing hearing
    with instructions to vacate either the 1.) sale of marijuana
    conviction or 2.) delivery of marijuana conviction.
    I. Facts
    On      5    August       2010,       the    Jacksonville       Police       Department
    conducted a traffic stop of Sarah Lyon’s vehicle, and it was
    discovered that the passenger in her car possessed marijuana, a
    marijuana        grinder,         and     digital        scales.          After     further
    investigation,         Lyon       was      never       charged     with    any     criminal
    offenses.       Thereafter, she was asked by the Jacksonville Police
    Department if she knew any individuals who were involved in the
    sale of narcotics in the local area.                        She provided the police
    with defendant’s name and agreed to assist them in conducting a
    controlled buy of marijuana from defendant.                         On 10 August 2010,
    officers        recorded      a        phone    conversation       between        Lyon     and
    defendant in which she asked to purchase marijuana from him.
    Defendant agreed, and the police department gave Lyon a twenty-
    dollar bill to buy the marijuana.                         Equipped with a recording
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    device, Lyon drove to defendant’s house, picked him up, and they
    drove to another location in the neighborhood to conduct the
    drug deal.      Lyon provided defendant with twenty dollars, and he
    gave her a “dime bag” of marijuana (bag) in return.                       Knowing
    that one bag was not a sufficient amount of marijuana for the
    price     of    twenty    dollars,     Lyon       immediately     requested   an
    additional bag.        Defendant did not have any additional marijuana
    on his person because he thought Lyon only wanted one bag, but
    he agreed to give Lyon the additional quantity she requested.
    They    drove   back     to   his   house    to    retrieve     more   marijuana,
    defendant obtained another bag, and he gave it to Lyon. Lyon did
    not pay defendant, nor did defendant request, additional money
    for the second bag.           After Lyon received the second bag, she
    left defendant’s house and relinquished                 the recording device
    and marijuana to the Jacksonville Police Department.
    II. Analysis
    a.) Writ of Certiorari
    Defendant seeks appellate review by petition for writ of
    certiorari because of his trial counsel’s failure to give proper
    notice of appeal pursuant to North Carolina Appellate Procedure
    Rule 4.    For the reasons that follow, we allow defendant’s writ
    of certiorari.
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    Rule 4 mandates that appeal from a judgment rendered in a
    criminal case must be given either orally at trial or by “filing
    notice of appeal with the clerk of superior court and serving
    copies thereof upon all adverse parties within fourteen days
    after entry of the judgment[.]”              N.C. R. App. P. 4.          Should a
    defendant fail to timely appeal, a writ of certiorari “may be
    issued in appropriate circumstances by either appellate court to
    permit review of the judgments[.]”               N.C.R. App. P. 21.           This
    Court has held that an appropriate circumstance to issue writ of
    certiorari occurs when “a defendant’s right to appeal has been
    lost because of a failure of his or her trial counsel to give
    proper notice of appeal.”          State v. Gordon, ___ N.C. App. ___,
    ___, 
    745 S.E.2d 361
    , 363 (2013) review denied, 
    749 S.E.2d 859
    (2013).
    Here,      defendant’s      counsel   did   not    give     oral   notice   of
    appeal at trial because he needed to speak with defendant to
    ascertain      whether   defendant     sought    to    appeal    the     judgment.
    After conferring with defendant, defendant’s attorney gave oral
    notice    of   appeal    five   days   later    in    Onslow    County   Superior
    Court.     However, defendant’s counsel failed to file a written
    notice of appeal with the Onslow County Clerk of Superior Court
    and serve copies upon the State within fourteen days after entry
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    of judgment.         As a result, defendant’s right to appeal was lost.
    However, the lost appeal was no fault of defendant’s but an
    error by his trial attorney.                 Accordingly, we grant defendant’s
    petition for writ of certiorari and address the merits of his
    appeal.
    b.) Sentencing Error
    Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing
    him    to     a    consolidated       judgment     of    6-8        months   for     the    two
    separate offenses of selling marijuana and delivering marijuana
    per    
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95
    (a)(1).            Specifically,        defendant
    argues      that     that    he    was     sentenced     twice        for    conduct       that
    constituted a single offense.                We agree.
    “[We review alleged sentencing errors for] ‘whether [the]
    sentence is supported by evidence introduced at the trial and
    sentencing hearing.’” State v. Deese, 
    127 N.C. App. 536
    , 540,
    
    491 S.E.2d 682
    ,     685   (1997)    (quoting         N.C.    Gen.    Stat.    §    15A-
    1444(a1) (Cum. Supp. 1996)).                 Under N.C. Stat. § 90-94 (2013),
    marijuana is classified as a schedule VI controlled substance.
    Pursuant to 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95
    (a)(1) (2013), it is unlawful
    for an individual to              “manufacture, sell or deliver, or possess
    with    intent       to    manufacture,       sell      or    deliver,       a   controlled
    substance[.]”            The statute establishes three distinct offenses:
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    “(1) manufacture of a controlled substance, (2) transfer of a
    controlled substance by sale or delivery, and (3) possession
    with    intent     to   manufacture,          sell       or      deliver    a   controlled
    substance.”        State v. Moore, 
    327 N.C. 378
    , 381, 
    395 S.E.2d 124
    ,
    126 (1990) (emphasis in original).                          A sale is defined as “a
    transfer of property for a specified price payable in money”
    while a delivery is “the actual [sic] constructive, or attempted
    transfer     from       one     person        to     another          of    a   controlled
    substance[.]”        
    Id. at 382
    , 
    395 S.E.2d at 127
     (citations and
    quotations    omitted)         (emphasis       in       original).         In   addressing
    offense (2) above, our Supreme Court has ruled that “each single
    transaction        involving     transfer          of       a    controlled     substance”
    creates a single offense, “which is committed by either or both
    of two acts—sale or delivery.”                 
    Id.
           Thus, a defendant “may not
    . . . be convicted under N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(1) of both the sale
    and the delivery of a controlled substance arising from a single
    transfer.”    Id. (emphasis in original).
    Here, the transaction began when Lyon gave defendant twenty
    dollars,     and     defendant     gave       her       a       bag   in   return.       The
    transaction continued because neither sale nor delivery of the
    marijuana was complete.            A negotiation ensued as Lyon requested
    an   additional      bag      because    of    the       amount       of   money   she   had
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    provided      to    defendant.             Defendant       acquiesced,     retrieved       more
    marijuana from his house, and completed the sale by delivering
    the bag to Lyon.              Thus, the transaction concluded when defendant
    gave the second bag to Lyon.                       The transfer of the second bag
    from    defendant             to    Lyon    simultaneously         completed       sale     and
    delivery of the drug transaction because Lyon received the total
    quantity of marijuana she requested for the specified price of
    twenty dollars.                Since defendant’s acts of sale and delivery
    arose    from       a    single         transaction,        defendant      was     improperly
    sentenced      on       the    separate         offenses    of   sale    and     delivery    of
    marijuana.          Thus,          we     remand    this     matter      for     resentencing
    notwithstanding the consolidated judgment.                         See id. at 383, 
    395 S.E.2d at 127-28
     (holding that when separate convictions for
    sale    and    delivery            were    in    error     and   consolidated       into    one
    judgment,      this      Court       must       remand   because    we    are     “unable    to
    determine what weight, if any, the trial court gave each of the
    separate convictions for sale and for delivery” in calculating
    the imposed sentences);                   See also State v. Rogers, 
    186 N.C. App. 676
    , 678, 
    652 S.E.2d 276
    , 277 (2007) (remanding for resentencing
    where the trial court erred by sentencing defendant for both
    sale and delivery of a controlled substance).                            On remand, either
    the conviction for 1.) sale of marijuana or 2.) delivery of
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    marijuana in 11 CRS 055170 should be vacated to reflect that
    defendant was convicted of a single count of “sale or delivery”
    of marijuana.
    III.    Conclusion
    In sum, the trial court erred by sentencing defendant for
    the sale and delivery of marijuana when his conduct constituted
    a single offense.      Therefore, we remand for a new sentencing
    hearing   with   instructions    to    vacate   either   the   1.)   sale   of
    marijuana conviction or 2.) delivery of marijuana conviction in
    11 CRS 055170.
    Remanded.
    Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge HUNTER, Robert N., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-1001

Citation Numbers: 232 N.C. App. 647

Filed Date: 3/4/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023