Dewitt v. Dewitt ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-728
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 18 February 2014
BRADLEY JOAQUIN DEWITT,
Plaintiff,
v. Transylvania County
No. 12 CVD 426
LAURA ANNE DEWITT,
Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from order entered 21 December 2012 by
Judge Mack Brittain in Transylvania County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 November 2013.
No brief filed on behalf of plaintiff-appellee.
Donald H. Barton, P.C., by Donald H. Barton, for defendant-
appellant.
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
Laura Anne Dewitt (“Defendant” or “Mother”) appeals from a
child custody order granting joint legal custody to her and
Bradley Joaquin Dewitt (“Plaintiff” or “Father”), as well as
primary physical custody to Mother and secondary physical
custody to Father. Mother argues that the trial court erred by:
(1) denying Mother’s proffer of Defendant’s Exhibit 1; and (2)
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closing the proceedings before Mother’s witness appeared. We
affirm.
I. Facts & Procedural History
On 8 May 2012, Father filed a complaint for custody of the
parties’ minor child in Henderson County. Following a motion to
transfer venue and a stipulation to venue, the case was removed
to Transylvania County. The trial court heard testimony and
received exhibits from both parties at hearings before the
Honorable Mack Brittain in Transylvania County District Court on
22 October, 24 October, and 12 December 2012. The trial court’s
uncontested findings of fact showed the following.
Father and Mother met while both were serving in the United
States Navy and married on 12 February 2011. Father’s duties in
the Navy required him to be away from home for “all but a few
months of the marriage.” The parties separated on 29 November
2011. On 17 January 2012, the parties’ minor child was born.1
Mother had sole custody of the child from birth to the time
of the hearings. Although Father sought to be a part of the
child rearing, Mother refused to allow him to participate except
for hourly visits supervised by Mother and members of her
1
Although the 21 December 2012 order mistakenly lists 7 January
2012, the pleadings and testimony of the parties make it clear
that 17 January 2012 is the child’s birthday.
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family. At the time of the hearings, Mother lived with her
parents in Transylvania County and worked part time at the Food
Matters Market. Father lived in San Diego, California and was
still on active duty with the United States Navy. Father had
been paying $300 per month in child support and provided health
insurance for the child. The trial court also found the
following undisputed facts:
4. Father suffered with the abuse of alcohol
during the marriage. Father sought and
completed counseling regarding his alcohol
use/abuse and does not appear to continue
the abuse of alcohol. Father has never used
alcohol in the presence of the minor child
and father’s past abuse of alcohol does not
appear likely to effect the best interests
of the minor child. Mother has suffered
with mental health issues, specifically
depression, in the past. Mother sought and
completed counseling regarding her mental
health issues and does not appear to suffer
ongoing mental health issues. Mother’s past
mental health issues do not appear to have
effected the best interests of the minor
child nor does it appear the past issues are
likely to effect the child’s best interests
in the future.
. . . .
11. Mother alleged that father subjected
mother to domestic violence during the
marriage. The Court is not able to
determine whether or not domestic violence
occurred between the parties. Further,
there has not been sufficient evidence to
show that the child has been or will be
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effected by any past acts of domestic
violence.
12. The parties have not been able to
effectively communicate with one another
regarding visitation or other issues related
to the child.
At the 24 October 2012 hearing, during Mother’s testimony,
her counsel offered into evidence Defendant’s Exhibit 1. The
exchange was as follows:
[Mother’s Counsel:] I will show you
Defendant’s Exhibit 1. Do you recognize that
as a series of exchanges on a Facebook page?
(Tenders)
[Mother:] (Upon review) Yes, sir.
[Mother’s Counsel:] What is this and how did
you obtain it?
[Mother:] This is a message between Brad and
a woman, Ally Hoover. I obtained it through
his -- accessing his Facebook page, as I
knew all his passwords for his log-ins. When
we were married, he gave me permission to
log in to his accounts for various reasons.
[Mother’s Counsel:] Now, what does Mr.
Dewitt say in this series of exchanges
concerning your getting out of the navy?
[Father’s Counsel:] For the purpose of the
record, Judge, I object based upon privacy
when you get into somebody’s Facebook using
their password.
[The Court:] The objection is sustained.
[Father’s Counsel:] Thank you.
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[Mother’s Counsel:] Your Honor, Mr. Dewitt
has already looked at this, identified, and
agreed he made all these statements.
[The Court:] The objection is sustained.
Mother did not make an offer of proof at that time or anytime
during the 24 October 2012 hearing.
At the 12 December 2012 hearing, Mother completed her
testimony and her father, Alejandro Echeverry, testified on her
behalf. After Mr. Echeverry’s testimony, Mother’s counsel
requested a five-minute recess to locate the maternal
grandmother of the child to testify as a witness. The following
exchange between counsel and the court occurred after this
recess:
[The Court:] You folks decided to have her
away from here rather than have her here for
court this morning. You indicated it would
be five minutes, and then you’ve indicated
it would be longer than that. Is there
further evidence from Mom?
[Mother’s Counsel:] Judge, I did not
indicate five minutes. What I said was that
she was at home. I needed to have time to
make a call to try to get her going. We did.
She was going when I got the update. She’s
en route right now. She’s actually in the
car. She’ll arrive whatever time it takes to
drive down here, normally about 20 minutes.
[The Court:] Yes, sir. Is there further
evidence from Mom?
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[Mother’s Counsel:] We would beg the Court’s
indulgence for that witness. That’s our
witness, Your Honor.
The trial court did not directly address Mother’s counsel’s
request at that point, but instead moved on and asked whether
there was rebuttal evidence from Father. Father then requested
a temporary custody order until the written order was issued.
At that time, Mother’s counsel asked to make a proffer of
Defendant’s Exhibit 1. The following exchange occurred:
[Father’s Counsel]: It’s with an unrelated
third party, Judge, who has not been here to
testify.
[Mother’s Counsel]: It’s several
communications between the plaintiff and
someone else, and I simply want to have
Defendant’s Exhibit 1 -- if Your Honor would
admit it simply to put in the record to
preserve that issue. I’m now asking the
Court (inaudible) offer of proof.
[The Court]: So after the close of the
evidence, you’re desiring to make an offer
of proof regarding an item of evidence that
was not admitted; is that correct?
[Mother’s Counsel]: Judge, you’re putting me
in a position of arguing with the Court. I
don’t want to do that. I didn’t close the
evidence. I have another witness I want to
call. You apparently ruled. You didn’t rule
specifically. You just said, “We’re moving
on.” But I have another witness. I never
rested my case. You may be assuming that. I
have not rested at this point. I’m making an
offer of proof on Defendant’s Exhibit 1.
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[The Court]: [Mother’s Counsel], I asked you
several times if you had further evidence.
The response every time was that some
witness, that being the mother of the -- the
maternal grandmother of the child, would be
here from Connestee. We delayed the start of
court this morning so you could call that
witness so that witness could be here when
she was called to take the witness stand. We
then delayed court 30 minutes later for five
minutes for you to check on her progress.
You then reported that she was just leaving
Connestee and it would be approximately 20
minutes, is my recollection, until she would
arrive. I can ask you 100 more times. If you
don’t call a witness, I deem that you have
no further evidence to present.
[Mother’s Counsel]: Well, as I said, I can
only say I never rested my case.
(Inaudible), but I did not rest my case. I
tender, that is an offer of proof,
Defendant’s Exhibit 1 excluded (inaudible).
That’s all.
[The Court]: Motion to tender that is
denied, and that the evidence in this case
has been heard, the case is closed. I will
ask you again the question that I asked that
precipitated this which was whether or not
you agree to or object to the Court
considering temporary custody at this time.
Mother noted for the record that the hearing began about 9:00
a.m. and ended at 9:47 a.m.
The trial court granted joint legal custody and granted
primary physical custody to Mother, with secondary physical
custody to Father. Father received custody for two weeks every
other month, with an additional week during the summer. Father
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must pick up the child from Mother at the beginning of his
visitation, and Mother must pick up the child from Father at the
end of his visitation. When the minor child begins
Kindergarten, Father will have custody for six weeks in the
summer and will alternate breaks and holidays with Mother. The
order also required Father to pay child support of $716 per
month.
On 22 January 2013, Mother filed timely notice of appeal
with this Court.
II. Jurisdiction
As a final judgment from a district court in a civil
action, appeal lies with this Court under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-
27(b)(2) (2013).
III. Analysis
Mother contends that the trial court erred by: (1) denying
Mother’s proffer of Defendant’s Exhibit 1; and (2) closing the
proceeding before Mother’s final witness appeared. We disagree
and affirm the trial court.
Rule 43 of our Rules of Civil Procedures provides as
follows:
In an action tried before a jury, if an
objection to a question propounded to a
witness is sustained by the court, the court
on request of the examining attorney shall
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order a record made of the answer the
witness would have given. . . . In actions
tried without a jury the same procedure may
be followed, except that the court upon
request shall take and report the evidence
in full, unless it clearly appears that the
evidence is not admissible on any grounds or
that the witness is privileged.
N.C. R. Civ. P. 43(c). “Rule 43(c) thus requires the trial
court upon request, to allow the insertion of excluded evidence
in the record.” Nix v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 N.C. App. 280,
282, 314 S.E.2d 562, 564 (1984). We recognize the importance of
allowing attorneys to make a proffer of evidence and that a
judge “should be loath to deny an attorney his right to have an
excluded answer placed in the record.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted). In Nix, this Court found that the evidence
in question should have been admitted. Id. at 283, 314 S.E.2d
at 564. Because the proffer of testimony was excluded, however,
this Court was unable to determine whether the exclusion was
prejudicial and therefore remanded the case for a new trial.
Id. at 283, 314 S.E.2d at 564–65.
Although we recognize the importance of allowing a proffer
of evidence, “[t]he trial judge . . . is not required to allow
insertion . . . in the record if it clearly appears that the
proffered testimony is not admissible on any grounds.” Id.; see
also N.C. R. Civ. P. 43(c) (requiring a judge to accept a
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proffer “unless it clearly appears that the evidence is not
admissible on any grounds”); see also Sheppard v. Sheppard, 38
N.C. App. 712, 714, 248 S.E.2d 871, 874 (1978) (“In actions
tried without a jury, such evidence need not be placed into the
record if it is clearly not admissible on any grounds.”).
Unlike Nix, in the present case we do not see anything on
the face of the record that indicates Defendant’s Exhibit 1
should have been admitted, and Mother makes no such argument in
her brief. We decline to order a new trial in the absence of
any argument that Defendant’s Exhibit 1 was admissible. To hold
otherwise would require a new trial any time a trial court
refused a proffer of evidence, even where the trial court found
the evidence was inadmissible and the appellant presents no
argument to the contrary. Such a holding would be inconsistent
with Rule 43. N.C. R. Civ. P. 43(c) (finding it unnecessary to
take a proffer where “it clearly appears that the evidence is
not admissible on any grounds”).
Mother also argues that the trial court erred in closing
the proceedings prior to the arrival of one of her witnesses.
Mother cites generally to the North Carolina Constitution,
Article I, Section 19, which states:
No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or
disseized of his freehold, liberties, or
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privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in
any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or
property, but by the law of the land. No
person shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws; nor shall any person be
subjected to discrimination by the State
because of race, color, religion, or
national origin.
Mother asserts that the refusal of the trial court to allow more
time for the arrival of Mother’s witness deprived her of her
“right to due process and fundamental fairness in presenting
Defendant’s case.”
Mother’s witness was not present when the hearing started
and was, according to Mother’s counsel, at home at the time of
the hearing. After Mother presented all of her other evidence,
Mother’s counsel asked for a five minute recess, which was
granted, and called the witness to “get her going.” Mother’s
counsel stated that it would take approximately 20 minutes for
the witness to arrive. There was no reason given as to why the
witness was not present at the beginning of the hearing or why
Mother was waiting to have the witness “get going” until the
rest of the evidence had been presented. We see nothing in
these facts that indicates a deprivation of due process or
fundamental fairness.
Mother cites to two cases, the relevance and importance of
which is not clear, as there are no pinpoint cites,
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parentheticals, or argument relating to the cases. See Roanoke
Chowan Reg’l Hous. Auth. v. Vaughan, 81 N.C. App. 354, 358–60,
344 S.E.2d 578, 581–82 (1986) (laying out due process
requirements in the context of an eviction hearing); State v.
Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 356–57, 226 S.E.2d 353, 361 (1976)
(upholding the trial court’s denial of a continuance in a
criminal case where the defendant claimed the trial court denied
his right to compel out-of-state witnesses according to N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-811 Et seq.). “It is not the duty of this
Court to supplement an appellant’s brief with legal authority or
arguments not contained therein.” Eaton v. Campbell, ___ N.C.
App. ___, ___, 725 S.E.2d 893, 894 (2012) (quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also Viar v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 359
N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (2005). Accordingly, we find
no basis for Mother’s claim that the trial court deprived Mother
of her rights to due process and fundamental fairness by failing
to leave the proceedings open.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
Judges ROBERT C. HUNTER and CALABRIA concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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