In re C.O.W. ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-517
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 7 October 2014
IN THE MATTER OF: Alamance County
C.O.W. No. 12 JT 101
Appeal by respondent-father from order entered 29 January
2014 by Judge Kathryn Overby in Alamance County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 September 2014.
Jamie L. Hamlett, for appellee Alamance County Department
of Social Services.
Derrick J. Hensley, for guardian ad litem.
Ryan McKaig, for respondent-appellant father.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Respondent-father (“respondent”) appeals from the order
terminating his parental rights to the minor child C.O.W.
(“Clay”)1. Since Clay’s mother relinquished her parental rights,
she is not participating in this appeal. We affirm.
The Alamance County Department of Social Services (“DSS”)
1
We use pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the juveniles
discussed in this opinion and for ease of reading.
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became involved with the family after receiving reports of,
inter alia, domestic violence and drug abuse in the home. In
July 2012, DSS obtained nonsecure custody of Clay and his half-
sisters F.M. (“Freda”) and B.M. (“Bonnie”), who also lived in
the home.2 DSS filed petitions alleging that Clay was a
neglected and dependent juvenile and that Freda and Bonnie were
abused, neglected, and dependent. The trial court subsequently
adjudicated Freda and Bonnie as abused, neglected, and dependent
juveniles. Clay was adjudicated neglected and dependent.
In its dispositional order, the trial court found that
respondent had been charged with felony child abuse based on
events involved in the case and had additional pending criminal
charges. The trial court ordered respondent to obtain
psychological, parenting, and substance abuse evaluations and
follow any recommendations; to participate in “ongoing mental
health treatment” regarding issues of domestic violence and
anger management; to establish and comply with a child support
schedule through the local enforcement agency; and to maintain
regular contact with DSS and sign releases with his service
providers to allow DSS access to relevant information.
After a permanency planning review hearing in June 2013,
2
The juveniles have different fathers. Only Clay is the subject
of this appeal.
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the trial court found that further efforts to reunify respondent
with Clay would be futile. The trial court ceased reunification
efforts as to respondent and established a primary permanent
plan of adoption with a secondary permanent plan of
guardianship.
On 16 August 2013, DSS filed a petition to terminate
respondent’s parental rights. DSS alleged grounds existed to
terminate respondent’s parental rights based upon neglect,
failure to make reasonable progress, and failure to pay a
reasonable portion of the cost of care pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (3) (2013). At the hearing, the
trial court heard testimony from the juveniles’ mother, Meredith
Davis and Adrien Crawford of the Alamance County Child Support
Agency, DSS social worker Ginger Kunkel, and respondent. After
finding that Clay’s mother had previously relinquished her
parental rights, the trial court also found and concluded that
all three grounds that DSS alleged existed. The court further
concluded that it was in Clay’s best interests to terminate
respondent’s parental rights. Respondent appeals.
As an initial matter, respondent states that he challenges
the existence of evidence to justify the three grounds for
termination found by the trial court. However, respondent fails
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to present an argument or any supporting authority for this
statement regarding the grounds for termination. Therefore, any
such argument is deemed abandoned. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6)
(“Issues not presented in a party’s brief, or in support of
which no reason or argument is stated, will be taken as
abandoned.”).
Respondent argues that the trial court erred in terminating
his parental rights because the evidence presented at the
hearing and the trial court’s findings demonstrate that
respondent and Clay shared a bond, and that respondent is
capable of appropriately interacting with Clay. Therefore,
respondent contends, termination of his parental rights is not
in Clay’s best interests because they share a loving parent-
child bond.
“We review the trial court’s determination that a
termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the
juvenile for an abuse of discretion.” In re S.R., 207 N.C. App.
102, 110, 698 S.E.2d 535, 541 (2010). “Abuse of discretion
exists when the challenged actions are manifestly unsupported by
reason.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“A finding of any one of the enumerated grounds for
termination of parental rights under N.C.G.S. 7B-1111 is
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sufficient to support a termination.” In re Humphrey, 156 N.C.
App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 426 (2003) (citation omitted).
“After an adjudication that one or more grounds for terminating
a parent’s rights exist, the court shall determine whether
terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best
interest.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2013). In determining
whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s
best interests, the court shall consider several factors,
including the juvenile’s age and the likelihood of adoption; the
parent-child bond; whether the termination of parental rights
will aid in the juvenile’s DSS permanent plan; the quality of
the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive
parent; and any other relevant consideration. Id.
The parent-child bond is only one of the factors considered
under the statute, and by itself is not dispositive. See id.;
see In re C.L.C., 171 N.C. App. 438, 448, 615 S.E.2d 704, 709-10
(2005) (upholding decision to terminate parental rights when a
respondent’s bond with her children was outweighed by other
facts, including, inter alia, her failure to complete parenting
classes, pay support, or obtain stable housing and employment).
“The fact that the parent loves or is concerned about his child
will not necessarily prevent the court from making a
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determination . . . . The welfare or best interest of the child
is always to be treated as the paramount consideration[.]” In re
P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 9, 618 S.E.2d 241, 246 (2005) (quoting
In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 109, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In the instant case, during the dispositional phase, the
trial court made detailed findings regarding the juvenile’s age,
likelihood of adoption, whether termination would aid in a
permanent plan for the juvenile, the bond between the juvenile
and the parent, and the quality of the relationship between the
juvenile and the proposed adoptive family. Specifically, the
trial court found that Clay enjoyed a high quality relationship
with his foster family, who wished to adopt him, and that
termination of respondent’s parental rights would aid in the
implementation of Clay’s permanent plan. The trial court
further found that due to Clay’s young age, permanency was very
important for him. The foster family had cared for Clay since
he was only a few months old. Furthermore, the foster family
also wished to adopt Clay’s half-sisters, ensuring that the
sibling group would remain intact. Moreover, respondent does
not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact. Therefore,
they are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93,
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97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). These uncontested findings
address the relevant factors in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a).
Although respondent regularly and appropriately visited
with Clay, and Clay and respondent had developed a relationship,
respondent was unable to provide a safe home for Clay, “despite
having had an extended period of time to work to resolve issues
of concern.” The trial court’s findings reflect its
consideration of respondent’s “bond and relationship” with Clay
as one of the necessary statutory factors at disposition.
However, the trial court was “entitled to give greater weight to
other facts that it found,” including respondent’s refusal to
cooperate with DSS, refusal to engage in court-ordered services,
minimal payment of child support, and inability to provide a
safe home for Clay. In re C.L.C., 171 N.C. App. at 448, 615
S.E.2d at 709.
The trial court’s findings indicate that the court
considered the relevant statutory factors in its determination
that termination of respondent’s parental rights were in Clay’s
best interests. “The welfare or best interest of the child is
always to be treated as the paramount consideration[.]” In re
P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. at 9, 618 S.E.2d at 246 (quoting In re
Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 109, 316 S.E.2d at 252). The trial
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court made a reasoned decision that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was in Clay’s best interests. Accordingly, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that terminating respondent’s parental rights was in
Clay’s best interests. Therefore, we affirm the order of the
trial court.
Affirmed.
Judges STEELMAN and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).