Lawson v. Lawson , 236 N.C. App. 576 ( 2014 )


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  •                             NO. COA14-286
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed: 7 October 2014
    JOHNNIE LEE LAWSON and BARBARA G.
    LAWSON,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.                               Person County
    No. 10 CVS 828
    NOEL LAWSON, HESTER LAWSON JONES,
    KWAME LAWSON, CLEOTIS LAWSON, JR.
    and wife, KATRINA LAWSON and PERRY
    LAWSON,
    Defendants.
    Appeal by plaintiffs from order entered 16 July 2013 by
    Judge W.O. Smith, III, in Person County Superior Court.    Heard
    in the Court of Appeals 26 August 2014.
    Oertel, Koonts & Oertel, PLLC, by Geoffrey K. Oertel, for
    plaintiff-appellants.
    The Law Offices of Brian L. Crawford, P.A., by Brian L.
    Crawford, for defendant-appellees.
    BRYANT, Judge.
    Where the trial court properly considered the evidence and
    the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, we affirm
    the decision of the trial court to affirm the referee’s report
    in its entirety.
    -2-
    On    18    November       2010,    plaintiffs    Johnnie      Lee    Lawson    and
    Barbara G. Lawson filed a complaint against Noel Lawson, Hester
    Lawson    Jones,    Kwame      Lawson,     Cleotes    Lawson,      Jr.,    and      wife
    Katrina   Lawson,    and       Perry    Lawson   (“defendants”).          Plaintiffs
    brought claims for quiet title and trespass to real property
    against all defendants, and a claim for destruction of trees
    against    defendant       Perry       Lawson.       Plaintiffs      alleged        that
    defendants had trespassed onto, erected buildings and fences on,
    and removed trees from plaintiffs’ property “without consent or
    permission.”        On    18    January     2011,    defendants      answered        and
    counterclaimed for abuse of process, malicious use of process,
    compensatory damages, and punitive damages.
    On    23    March,     plaintiffs      filed     a   reply    and    motion      to
    dismiss defendants’ counterclaims.                  On 24 October, defendants
    filed a motion for summary judgment.                  Plaintiffs then filed a
    motion    for   reference        for    appointment       of   a   referee     on     28
    November, which was granted by order of the trial court on 28
    March 2012.        The trial court entered an amended order on 24
    April after it was determined that the surveyor appointed as the
    referee had merged with another surveying company.
    On 18 June, the referee filed a report which concluded that
    the placement of the disputed property line was correct as it
    -3-
    was currently designated by physical boundary markers and that
    based on this determination of the property line, defendants had
    not     committed        trespass    or    damage        to    plaintiffs’      property.
    Plaintiffs timely filed a motion for exceptions to findings of
    referee on 16 July.              Defendants filed a motion for judgment on
    the pleadings on 21 September.
    On 3 October 2012, a hearing was held on plaintiffs’ motion
    for exceptions to findings of referee.                        In an order entered 16
    July 2013, the trial court upheld the findings of the referee
    and concluded that the plat map generated by the referee should
    be    entered       as   the    judgment    and        resolution    for      plaintiffs’
    complaint.      Plaintiffs appeal.
    ______________________________
    On appeal, plaintiffs raise sixteen issues which can be
    divided into two central issues: (I) whether the trial court
    erred    by    failing     to    consider    the       evidence    and   give    its   own
    opinion and conclusion as to the referee’s report; and (II)
    whether       the    referee      erred     in     its        findings   of     fact   and
    conclusions of law.
    I.
    Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by failing to
    consider the evidence and give its own opinion and conclusion as
    -4-
    to the referee’s report.          Specifically, plaintiffs raise three
    arguments as to whether the trial court: abused its discretion
    in    confirming   the       referee’s   report   without    independently
    evaluating the evidence and giving its own opinion; erred by
    failing to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law
    in confirming the referee’s findings; and erred by failing to
    make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law during its
    independent evaluation of the referee’s report.             As these three
    issues are closely related and plaintiffs cite little case law
    in support of them, we address them as a single argument.
    Pursuant to our North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,
    “the court may, upon the application of any party or on its own
    motion, order a reference in the following cases: . . . [w]here
    the   case    involves   a    complicated   question   of    boundary,   or
    requires a personal view of the premises.”             N.C. Gen. Stat. §
    1A-1, Rule 53(a)(2)(c) (2013).           Where, as here, a party takes
    exception to the referee’s report,
    it is the duty of the [trial] judge to
    consider the evidence and give his own
    opinion and conclusion, both upon the facts
    and the law. He is not permitted to do this
    in a perfunctory way, but he must deliberate
    and decide as in other cases — use his own
    faculties in ascertaining the truth and form
    his own judgment as to fact and law. This is
    required not only as a check upon the
    referee and a safeguard against any possible
    -5-
    errors on his part, but because he cannot
    review the referee's findings in any other
    way.
    Quate v. Caudle, 
    95 N.C. App. 80
    , 83, 
    381 S.E.2d 842
    , 844 (1989)
    (citation and emphasis omitted).                “After conducting this review,
    the   trial    court   may   adopt,   modify,       or   reject   the   referee's
    report   in    whole   or    in   part,    remand    the   proceedings    to   the
    referee, or enter judgment.”              Gaynor v. Melvin, 
    155 N.C. App. 618
    , 622, 
    573 S.E.2d 763
    , 766 (2002) (citations omitted).
    In reviewing the trial court's judgment
    entered   on   the    referee's   report,   the
    findings of fact by a referee, approved by
    the trial [court], are conclusive on appeal
    if supported by any competent evidence.
    Similarly, as the trial court has the
    authority to affirm, modify, or disregard
    the referee's findings and make its own
    findings   upon    review   of   the   parties'
    exceptions    to    the    referee's    report,
    different or additional findings by the
    court are binding on appeal if they are
    supported   by   competent   evidence.      Any
    conclusions of law made by the referee,
    however, are reviewed de novo by the trial
    court, and the trial court's conclusions are
    reviewed de novo by the appellate court.
    Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. Ellis-Don Constr., Inc., 210 N.C.
    App. 522, 531—32, 
    709 S.E.2d 512
    , 520                    (2011) (citations and
    quotation omitted).
    -6-
    Plaintiffs        contend     the   trial    court    erred    by      failing    to
    consider the evidence and give its own opinion and conclusion
    both as to the evidence and the law.                 We disagree.
    In    his    report,    the     referee      noted    that     he      interviewed
    plaintiffs         and   defendants,        researched      the   deed        history    of
    plaintiffs’ property, and conducted fieldwork of the property.
    This     fieldwork       included     walking       the    property      to     look    for
    physical boundary markers, utilizing both GPS observations and
    traditional survey methods, noting “numerous signs of continuous
    long     term       possession        by     both    the     plaintiff          and     the
    defendants[,]” and comparing the referee’s property measurements
    to those recorded in deeds held by plaintiffs and defendants.
    As such, it appears that the referee’s findings of fact were
    based on competent evidence. Moreover, plaintiffs have failed to
    provide any evidence on appeal to disprove this determination.
    Although the trial court did not make its own findings of fact
    in     its   order       upholding    the     referee’s      report,       it    was    not
    obligated to; rather, the trial court could, as it did here,
    chose to affirm the referee’s report in whole.                             See 
    id. As such,
    the referee’s findings                 of fact, approved by the trial
    court and supported by the evidence, are binding on appeal.
    -7-
    In reviewing the referee’s conclusions of law, the trial
    court was to consider these conclusions de novo.                       See 
    id. The trial
    court, in its order, made the following conclusion of law:
    “The Court hereby orders the                  Report of the Referee entitled
    ‘Final     Plat     Court[-]ordered           Survey       for   [plaintiffs]        and
    [defendants]’ by [the referee] dated June 14, 2012 to be entered
    into     the    record    as      the   judgment     and     resolution    for     this
    Complaint.”         As   such,       plaintiffs’    contention     that    the     trial
    court     was    required      to     give    its   own     separate     opinion     and
    conclusion as to the referee’s report is without merit.
    Here, upon plaintiffs’ exceptions to the referee’s report,
    the trial court conducted a hearing and evaluated the evidence.
    The trial court, by ordering the referee’s report to be entered
    into     judgment    as     the      resolution     of     plaintiffs’     complaint,
    clearly signaled its opinion and conclusion that, based on the
    evidence       presented,      the    referee’s     report   was   the    appropriate
    resolution of plaintiffs’ boundary dispute.                      Moreover, although
    we cannot rely on a transcript1 to determine whether the trial
    court made oral statements of opinion and conclusions of law
    1
    Although plaintiffs ordered a transcript of the trial court’s
    hearing to be filed with this Court, a transcript could not be
    prepared as the court reporter’s notes from the hearing were
    deemed lost.   As such, the record on appeal does not contain a
    transcript of the hearing.
    -8-
    during the hearing, it is well-established that “[w]here the
    record is silent upon a particular point, it will be presumed
    that the trial court acted correctly in performing his judicial
    acts and duties.”           State v. Fennell, 
    307 N.C. 258
    , 262, 
    297 S.E.2d 393
    , 396 (1982) (citations omitted).                Accordingly, the
    trial court did not err in affirming the referee’s report as the
    judgment and resolution for plaintiffs’ complaint.              Plaintiffs’
    argument is overruled.
    II.
    Plaintiffs       next    argue   that   the    referee   erred   in   its
    findings     of    fact   and   conclusions   of    law.      Specifically,
    plaintiffs raise thirteen arguments as to whether the referee
    erred in its findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding
    the referee’s use of physical boundary markers, signs of long-
    term possession, and research into and use of deeds other than
    plaintiffs’ deed.         However, as plaintiffs have failed to raise
    issues 4—10 in their brief, these arguments are therefore deemed
    abandoned.        See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2014) (“Issues not
    presented in a party’s brief, or in support of which no reason
    or argument is stated, will be taken as abandoned.”).
    As to plaintiffs’ remaining issues contending the referee
    erred in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, these
    -9-
    issues   lack    merit.       As     discussed      in   Issue     I,    the     referee’s
    findings of fact are deemed binding on appeal if supported by
    competent    evidence     and      approved       by     the    trial     court.        The
    referee’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo by the trial
    court, and the trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de
    novo on appeal to this Court.                See Cleveland Constr., 210 N.C.
    App. at 
    531—32, 709 S.E.2d at 520
    .                  Our review finds no error in
    the conclusions reached by the referee and by the trial court.
    Here,       the   trial    court,       after      conducting        a    hearing    on
    plaintiffs’     exceptions      to    the    referee’s         report,       affirmed   the
    referee’s report in its entirety and ordered the referee’s plat
    map to be entered as the judgment and resolution of plaintiffs’
    complaint.      The record indicates that the referee’s report was
    supported by competent evidence and, although no transcript of
    the hearing was filed, plaintiffs have not shown that the trial
    court failed to properly review the evidence and the referee’s
    findings of fact and conclusions of law before entering its
    order    affirming     and    adopting        the      referee’s        report    in    its
    entirety.        As   indicated,       by    ordering      the     referee’s       report
    entered into judgment, the trial court indicated its conclusion
    that the resolution of the boundary dispute was appropriately
    -10-
    resolved by the referee.   Accordingly, plaintiffs’ argument is
    overruled.
    Affirmed.
    Chief Judge McGEE and Judge STROUD concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-286

Citation Numbers: 236 N.C. App. 576

Filed Date: 10/7/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023