In re: Redmond ( 2017 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    Nos. COA15-699-2, COA15-763-2, COA15-829-2
    Filed: 6 June 2016
    N.C. Industrial Commission, I.C. No. U00037
    IN THE MATTER OF HUGHES, by and through V.H. INGRAM, Administratrix of
    the Estate of Hughes, Claim for Compensation Under the North Carolina Eugenics
    Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program, Claimant-Appellant.
    ____________________________________
    No. COA15-763-2
    Filed:
    N.C. Industrial Commission, I.C. No. U00438
    IN THE MATTER OF REDMOND, by and through L. NICHOLS, Administratrix of
    the Estate of Redmond, Claim for Compensation Under the North Carolina Eugenics
    Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program, Claimant-Appellant.
    ____________________________________
    No. COA15-829-2
    Filed:
    N.C. Industrial Commission, No. U00750
    IN THE MATTER OF SMITH, Claim for Compensation Under the North Carolina
    Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program, Claimant-
    Appellant.
    Appeal by Claimant-Appellant Hughes, by and through V.H. Ingram,
    Administratrix of the Estate of Hughes, from amended decision and order entered 28
    April 2015 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Appeal by Claimant-
    Appellant Redmond, by and through L. Nichols, Administratrix of the Estate of
    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    Redmond, from decision and order entered 27 April 2015 by the North Carolina
    Industrial Commission. Appeal by Claimant-Appellant Smith from decision and
    order entered 7 May 2015 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard
    originally in the Court of Appeals 16 November 2015. Reversed and remanded by the
    Supreme Court of North Carolina to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the
    merits of Claimants’ constitutional challenge to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.50(1).
    Pressly, Thomas & Conley, PA, by Edwin A. Pressly; and UNC Center for Civil
    Rights, by Elizabeth McLaughlin Haddix, for Claimant-Appellants.
    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Marc X. Sneed, for
    North Carolina Department of Justice, Tort Claims Section.
    McGEE, Chief Judge.
    I. Facts and Procedural History
    The General Assembly enacted the Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization
    Compensation Program (“the Compensation Program”), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-
    426.50 et seq., in 2013, in order to provide compensation to victims of the North
    Carolina Eugenics laws.            2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 360, s. 6.18(a).               Ms. Hughes
    (“Hughes”), Ms. Redmond (“Redmond”), and Mr. Smith (“Smith”)1 (Hughes,
    Redmond, and Smith together, “the Victims”) were all “sterilized involuntarily under
    the authority of the Eugenics Board of North Carolina [‘Eugenics Board’] in
    1   We avoid using the full names of these individuals in order to protect their anonymity.
    -2-
    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    accordance with Chapter 224 of the Public Laws of 1933 or Chapter 221 of the Public
    Laws of 1937.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.50(5) (2013).2 Hughes died in 1996,
    Redmond died in 2010, and Smith died in 2006.
    Because the North Carolina Industrial Commission (“Industrial Commission”)
    concluded that the Victims were “asexualized involuntarily or sterilized involuntarily
    under the authority of the Eugenics Board of North Carolina in accordance with
    Chapter 224 of the Public Laws of 1933 or Chapter 221 of the Public Laws of 1937[,]”
    they were all “qualified recipients” pursuant to the Compensation Program. N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.50(5) (2013).            However, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.50(1)
    limited which qualified recipients could become successful claimants as follows:
    “Claimant. – An individual on whose behalf a claim is made for compensation as a
    qualified recipient under this Part. An individual must be alive on June 30, 2013, in
    order to be a claimant.”          N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.50(1) (emphasis added).
    Therefore, pursuant to the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.50(1), the
    Victims, all of whom died before 2013, are not considered “claimants” for the purposes
    of the Compensation Program. The Compensation Program states that only “[a]
    2  The Compensation Program, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B–426.50 et seq., “[e]xpired pursuant to
    Session Laws 2013-360, s. 6.18(g), as amended by Session Laws 2014-100, s. 6.13(e), effective June 20,
    2015.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.50 (2015). However, because these claims were timely initiated
    pursuant to the rules of the Compensation Program, we apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B–426.50 et seq.
    (2013), as these statutes were still in effect at the time these claims were filed.
    -3-
    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    claimant determined to be a qualified recipient under this Part shall receive
    compensation[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.51(a) (2013) (emphasis added).
    The estates of Hughes, Redmond, and Smith (“the Estates”) filed claims
    pursuant to the Compensation Program. However, because the Victims all died
    before 30 June 2013, they were determined not to meet the definition of “claimant”
    under the Compensation Program, and the Estates’ claims were denied. The Estates
    appealed the initial denial of their claims, and their claims were heard by deputy
    commissioners. Following denials by the deputy commissioners, the Estates filed
    appeals to the Full Commission. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.53 (2013). Following
    denial of their claims by the Full Commission, the Estates filed notices of appeal with
    this Court, arguing that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.50(1) was unconstitutional on its
    face because it arbitrarily denied compensation to the heirs of some victims while
    allowing compensation to others. This matter was heard originally in the Court of
    Appeals 16 November 2015, and this Court filed opinions on 16 February 2016, with
    one judge dissenting, in which we held that this Court lacked jurisdiction to address
    the Estates’ facial constitutional challenge to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.50(1). In re
    Hughes, __ N.C. App. __, 
    785 S.E.2d 111
    (2016); In re Redmond, __ N.C. App. __, 
    785 S.E.2d 111
    (2016); In re Smith, __ N.C. App. __, 
    785 S.E.2d 111
    (2016).
    Upon review, our Supreme Court reversed and remanded to this Court for
    consideration of the merits of Claimants’ constitutional challenge to subsection 143B-
    -4-
    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    426.50(1). In re Hughes, __ N.C. __, 
    796 S.E.2d 784
    (2017); In re Smith, __ N.C. __,
    
    797 S.E.2d 264
    , (2017); In re Redmond, __ N.C. __, 
    797 S.E.2d 275
    (2017). We now
    address the merits of the Estates’ facial constitutional challenge to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
    143B-426.50(1).
    II. Analysis
    On appeal, the Estates argue that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.50(1) violates
    the North Carolina and the United States constitutions by violating their rights to
    equal protection under the law. We cannot agree.
    A. History of the Compensation Program
    “North Carolina’s eugenics program was unlike most in the nation, sterilizing
    approximately 7,600 people over 45 years.” REP. PAUL STAM AND AMY O’NEAL, Eugenics
    in     North       Carolina,       3       (2016),       at    http://paulstam.info/wp-
    content/uploads/2016/10/Eugenics-in-North-Carolina-Updated-Oct.-2016.pdf.           In
    light of the history of eugenics in North Carolina,
    North Carolina leaders realized that, through its Eugenics
    Board, the State invaded the lives and bodies of thousands
    of its citizens and forcibly took away their ability to choose
    whether to have children. Commissions and task forces
    debated whether to compensate the victims. Many in the
    General Assembly, including Speaker of the House Thom
    Tillis and House Majority Leader Paul Stam, hoped to
    accomplish this through the Eugenics Compensation
    Program (HB 947) during the 2012 Short Session. They
    wished “to make restitution for injustices suffered and
    unreasonable hardships endured by the asexualization or
    sterilizations of individuals at the direction of the State
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    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    between 1933 and 1974.” The bill would have offered
    $50,000 in compensation to those who were sterilized
    under the N.C. Eugenics Board, but not to the families of
    victims who died before May 16, 2012. While HB 947
    passed the House by a vote of 86 to 31 and funds were
    appropriated in the budgets of the House and Governor,
    the bill never made it to the Senate floor.
    
    Id. at 4.
    One of the task forces mentioned above was created by executive order on 8
    March 2011: “The Governor’s Task Force [‘Task Force’] to Determine the Method of
    Compensation for Victims of North Carolina’s Eugenics Board[.]” N.C. Executive
    Order No. 83 (2011). In this executive order, the Governor recognized that the
    General Assembly had already “established panels to explore and make
    recommendations for compensating and counseling persons who were sterilized under
    the . . . Eugenics Board program[,]” and that “it is now appropriate to identify persons
    who were sterilized by force or coercion and to explore and determine the possible
    methods and forms of compensation to those persons.” 
    Id. The first
    duty assigned to
    the Task Force was to “[r]ecommend possible methods or forms of compensation to
    those persons forcibly sterilized under the . . . Eugenics Board program.”           
    Id. (emphasis added).
    The Task Force submitted its “Final Report” to the Governor on
    27 January 2012.      THE GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE TO DETERMINE THE METHOD OF
    COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF NORTH CAROLINA’S EUGENICS BOARD, Final Report to the
    Governor      of     the      State      of      North     Carolina      (2012),     at
    http://www.sterilizationvictims.nc.gov/documents/FinalReport-
    -6-
    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    GovernorsEugenicsCompensationTaskForce.pdf. In its “Letter of Transmittal” of the
    “Final Report,” the Task Force set forth its reasoning as follows:
    Compensation for these survivors serves two purposes. No
    amount of money can adequately pay for the harm done to
    these citizens, but financial compensation and other
    services we recommend will nonetheless provide
    meaningful assistance. Compensation also serves a larger
    purpose for all of us who live in North Carolina and rely on
    a government that respects our rights and leaves us free to
    live the lives we choose. The compensation package we
    recommend sends a clear message that we in North
    Carolina are a people who pay for our mistakes and that
    we do not tolerate bureaucracies that trample on basic
    human rights.
    ....
    We also want to clarify our thinking on whether
    compensation should cover the estates of all victims or be
    limited to living victims. We know that children of
    eugenics victims suffer from the hardships their parents
    endured, but we believe, nonetheless, that financial
    compensation should go only to living victims. Those who
    were sterilized suffered direct harm by the state and we
    would like the state to pay them for that pain.
    
    Id. at 1-2.
    In the conclusion of the Final Report, the Task Force acknowledged certain
    limitations and injustices that were a necessary byproduct of achieving a workable
    solution to the compensation issue:
    In an effort to balance the need to compensate victims for
    the pain and hardships that they endured and the need to
    pass an overdue compensation plan this year, the Task
    Force made a difficult choice to limit compensation to living
    -7-
    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    victims as defined in our recommendations. . . . .
    The Task Force recognizes that some of the descendants of
    deceased victims have expressed great frustration that the
    state could exclude them from a final compensation plan.
    The Task Force members hope that the descendants will
    recognize the difficult task faced in developing these
    recommendations. The final recommendation prioritized a
    need to provide justice before time runs out to the
    remaining 1,500 to 2,000 victims who endured the direct,
    frontline pain and humiliation of this program.
    
    Id. at 13.
    The Task Force defined “living victims,” and stated that once living victims
    had been properly verified, they should receive a vested interest in their
    compensation share:
    The phrase “living victims” shall mean all living victims
    who have been verified by the Foundation or other state
    agency at the time legislation is passed as well as living
    victims verified by the Foundation moving forward.
    Once these individuals have been properly verified as
    living victims, they should be deemed to have a vested
    interest in any compensation. Once they have this vested
    interest, if they should become deceased before any
    monetary sum is established and paid to them, then the
    vested interest becomes a part of their estate, and any
    compensation authorized by the legislature could be
    payable to their estate.
    
    Id. at 11
    (emphasis added).
    Members of the General Assembly also recognized a difference between the
    surviving relatives of deceased sterilization victims, “those ‘who were not the subject
    of any clear and direct harm . . . any harm suffered [by heirs] would be vague and not
    -8-
    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    individual in nature, but instead a generalized societal harm[,]’” and those
    “thousands of forced sterilizations victims [who] are still living.” Eugenics in North
    Carolina at 5 (citation omitted). Creation of the Compensation Program moved
    forward in 2013:
    While bills creating the Eugenics Compensation Program
    were introduced in the House and Senate Floor, the
    program was ultimately included in the budget. The
    General Assembly appropriated $10 million to be divided
    between the total number of qualified claimants. To
    qualify for compensation, sterilization victims must have
    been alive on June 30, 2013, provide adequate
    documentation of being involuntarily sterilized, and
    submit the appropriate form by June 30, 2014.
    Eugenics in North Carolina at 6 (citations omitted).
    The $10 million appropriated to cover compensation for the victims would
    clearly not result in compensation approaching $50,000.00 if even 1,500 victims were
    verified as claimants according to the method of payment established in N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 143B-426.51.        Put simply, once all claims have been processed by the
    Industrial Commission, and appeals from rejected claims finally decided, the $10
    million appropriation will be divided equally among each successful claimant. N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.51(a) (2014).3
    We note that the Task Force estimated between 1,500 and 2,000 victims, out
    3  The General Assembly has enacted legislation allowing some compensation to be disbursed
    to those individuals who have already been determined to be qualified recipient claimants. The
    remainder of the appropriated funds will be disbursed once all appeals have been decided. N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 143B-426.51(a).
    -9-
    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    of an estimated 7,600 total victims, were still living in 2012. Had 2,000 surviving
    victims been found to be proper claimants, each claimant’s share of the $10 million
    would have been $5,000.00. Had the number of claimants been 1,500, each claimant’s
    share would have been $6,667.00.4 Had all of the estimated 7,600 total victims – or
    their estates – been compensated, each victim or estate would have received
    approximately $1,300.00. However, only 780 claims were filed by the deadline,5 less
    than 250 claims have been currently approved by the Industrial Commission, and
    only a handful are still awaiting final resolution on appeal. Therefore, compensation
    for each claimant could reach close to the $50,000.00 goal recommended by the Task
    Force and originally requested in HB 947.
    The General Assembly set forth its intent in creating the Compensation
    Program in the preambles of the enacting bills of the successful legislation (HB 7 and
    SB 464):
    Whereas, it is the policy and intent of this State to provide
    compensation for certain individuals who were lawfully
    asexualized or sterilized under the authority of the
    Eugenics Board of North Carolina in accordance with
    Chapter 224 of the Public Laws of 1933 or Chapter 221 of
    the Public Laws of 1937; and
    Whereas, the General Assembly recognizes that the State
    has no legal liability for these asexualization or
    sterilization procedures and that any applicable statutes of
    limitations have long since expired for the filing of any
    4  See also Eugenics in North Carolina at 5, (“the cost of compensating 1,500 victims at $50,000
    per victim would be $75 million”).
    5 Eugenics in North Carolina at 7.
    - 10 -
    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    claims against the State for injuries caused; and
    Whereas, the General Assembly wishes to make restitution
    for injustices suffered and unreasonable hardships
    endured by the asexualization or sterilization of
    individuals at the direction of the State between 1933 and
    1974[.]
    ....
    Now, therefore,
    The General Assembly of North Carolina enacts:
    SECTION 1. Article 9 of Chapter 143B of the General
    Statutes is amended by adding a new Part to read:
    Part 30. Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization
    Compensation Program.
    2013 North Carolina Senate Bill 464; 2013 North Carolina House Bill 7.
    Specifically, the General Assembly stated that the “policy and intent [was] to
    provide compensation for certain individuals who were lawfully asexualized or
    sterilized under the authority of the Eugenics Board of North Carolina[,]” and that
    “the General Assembly wishe[d] to make restitution for injustices suffered and
    unreasonable hardships endured by the asexualization or sterilization of individuals
    at the direction of the State between 1933 and 1974[.]” 
    Id. There is
    nothing in this
    preamble indicating that the General Assembly intended to compensate the heirs of
    individuals who had been sterilized under the authority of the Eugenics Board. In
    fact, the Compensation Program contains both specific and inferred evidence that the
    - 11 -
    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    General Assembly intended to provide compensation to those identified sterilization
    victims who were still living, and to exclude the heirs of those victims who had already
    died. In short, the Compensation Program seems to have been designed in accordance
    with the stated goals of certain members of the General Assembly, and the Final
    Report of the Task Force, to provide restitution to the living survivors of involuntary
    asexualization or sterilization by the Eugenics Board.
    Much of the Compensation Program tracks the recommendations of lawmakers
    and the Task Force. Most relevantly for the purposes of our review, the General
    Assembly’s enactment of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.50(1) explicitly limited
    compensation to living victims – thus excluding heirs of deceased victims – in order
    to maximize payment amounts to those who actually suffered involuntary
    sterilization: “An individual must be alive on June 30, 2013, in order to be a claimant.”
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.50(1). Further, the General Assembly mandated: ”If any
    claimant shall die during the pendency of a claim, or after being determined to be a
    qualified recipient, any payment shall be made to the estate of the decedent.” N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.51(b).
    The General Assembly provided compensation solely to living victims in order
    to allow greater compensation to those individuals who personally suffered the pain
    and indignity of involuntary sterilization. The General Assembly also provided that,
    once a living victim was determined to be a valid claimant, or a potential claimant
    - 12 -
    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    properly initiated a claim, that claim would vest in the claimant or potential claimant.
    Therefore, should that claimant or potential claimant die before final resolution
    and/or compensation was completed, any appropriate compensation would be made
    to the estate of the deceased claimant.
    B. Equal Protection Law
    As this Court has stated:
    The Equal Protection Clause of Article I, Section 19 of the
    North Carolina Constitution and the Equal Protection
    Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
    United States Constitution forbid North Carolina from
    denying any person the equal protection of the laws, and
    require that all persons similarly situated be treated alike.
    Krueger v. N.C. Criminal Justice Educ. & Training Standards Comm’n, 230 N.C.
    App. 293, 301, 
    750 S.E.2d 33
    , 40 (2013). The Estates argue that the requirement in
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.50(1)
    that a victim be alive on 30 June 2013 violates the equal
    protection guarantees of Article 1, § 19 of the N.C.
    Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
    Constitution. The government can show no valid state
    interest that is rationally served by the differential
    treatment of heirs of victims alive on 30 June 2013 and
    heirs of victims who had died by that date.
    This Court has reviewed the requirements of analysis pursuant to the Equal
    Protection Clause:
    “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
    Amendment provides that no State shall ‘deny to any
    person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
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    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    laws.’ The United States Supreme Court has ‘explained
    that the purpose of the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause of the
    Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within
    the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
    discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a
    statute or by its improper execution through duly
    constituted agents.’”      Thus, while the principle of
    substantive due process protects citizens from arbitrary or
    irrational laws and government policies, the right to equal
    protection guards against the government’s use of
    invidious classification schemes. “Of course, most laws
    differentiate in some fashion between classes of persons.
    The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications.
    It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from
    treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects
    alike.”
    Wang v. UNC-CH Sch. of Med., 
    216 N.C. App. 185
    , 202–03, 
    716 S.E.2d 646
    , 657–58
    (2011) (citations omitted). Therefore,
    “[t]o establish an equal protection violation, [Petitioner]
    must identify a class of similarly situated persons who are
    treated dissimilarly.” Thus, “[i]n addressing an equal
    protection challenge, we first identify the classes involved
    and determine whether they are similarly situated.”
    For that reason, Petitioner was required to show as an
    integral part of her equal protection claim that similarly
    situated individuals were subjected to disparate treatment.
    Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 
    316 F.3d 368
    , 379 (2d Cir.
    2003) (stating that “[a] Plaintiff relying on disparate
    treatment evidence must show that she was similarly
    situated in all material respects to the individuals with
    whom she seeks to compare herself”)[.]
    
    Wang, 216 N.C. App. at 204
    , 716 S.E.2d at 658 (citations omitted).
    Generally, Equal Protection claims are subject to rational basis review:
    - 14 -
    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    The Equal Protection Clause is not violated merely because
    a statute classifies similarly situated persons differently,
    so long as there is a reasonable basis for the distinction.
    When a statute is challenged on equal protection grounds,
    it is subjected to a two-tiered analysis. . . . . If a statute
    does not burden the exercise of a fundamental right or
    operate to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class, the
    statute is analyzed under the second tier and the
    government need only show that the classification in the
    challenged statute has some rational basis. A statute
    survives analysis under this level if it bears some rational
    relationship to a conceivable, legitimate interest of
    government. Statutes subject to this level of review come
    before the Court with a presumption of constitutionality.
    Town of Beech Mountain v. County of Watauga, 
    91 N.C. App. 87
    , 90-91, 
    370 S.E.2d 453
    , 454-55 (1988) (citations omitted). The Estates seem to acknowledge that their
    Equal Protection claim is subject to “rational basis” review in stating: “Generally, a
    law will survive the scrutiny if the distinction rationally furthers a legitimate state
    purpose. However, courts have repeatedly struck down arbitrary classifications such
    as that made by the living victim threshold in N.C.G.S. §146B-426.50 under the
    rational basis standard.” (Citation omitted).6              Therefore, we must approach the
    present matter presuming N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.50(1) is constitutional. 
    Id. at 91,
    370 S.E.2d at 455.
    6  In the concluding paragraphs of the argument sections in the Estates’ briefs, they make a
    brief argument that “compelling state interest” review should be applied because the harm done,
    involuntary sterilization, was a “violation of fundamental constitutional rights[.]” We do not find the
    Estates’ argument for heightened review persuasive, and we apply “rational basis” review.
    - 15 -
    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    As the United States Supreme Court has held, it does not violate the Equal
    Protection Clause to provide special benefits to certain citizens based upon sacrifices
    they have made, voluntarily or involuntarily, in the furtherance of some
    governmental objective. See Hooper v. Bernalillo Cty. Assessor, 
    472 U.S. 612
    , 620, 
    86 L. Ed. 2d 487
    , __ (1985) (citation omitted) (special state benefits granted Vietnam
    veterans was constitutional as a means to “compensate in some measure for the
    disruption of a way of life . . . and to express gratitude[;]” however, conditioning
    benefits on length of residency in the state does not survive equal protection review).7
    The General Assembly’s decision to compensate the victims of our State’s eugenics
    program does not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause as a general matter.
    Therefore, we must consider (1) whether the Estates were similarly situated with
    other beneficiaries and, if so, (2) whether there is some rational relationship between
    any disparate treatment and “a conceivable, legitimate interest of government.”
    Beech 
    Mountain, 91 N.C. App. at 90-91
    , 370 S.E.2d at 454-55 (citation omitted).
    C. Similarly Situated
    7   We further note that the Compensation Program is similar to the Civil Liberties Act of 1988,
    in which Congress established a fund to pay certain Americans who were interred during World War
    II. That Act limited eligibility to the American citizens of Japanese ancestry who were still living on
    the effective date of the Act. These criteria have been challenged, but have been consistently upheld.
    See, e.g., Jacobs v. Barr, 
    959 F.2d 313
    (1992); Shibayama v. United States, 
    55 Fed. Cl. 720
    (2002);
    Obadele v. United States, 
    52 Fed. Cl. 432
    (2002).
    - 16 -
    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    The Estates focus on the heirs of victims, instead of the victims themselves, in
    their Equal Protection analysis when they state: “The government can show no valid
    state interest that is rationally served by the differential treatment of heirs of victims
    alive on 30 June 2013 and heirs of victims who had died by that date.” However, the
    “differential treatment” argued by the Estates is not between heirs of living victims
    and heirs of deceased victims – it is between heirs of victims and the victims
    themselves. Without discounting in any manner the injuries suffered by the families
    of the victims due to the eugenics program, the estates of the victims are not similarly
    situated to the actual victims themselves, who were forced to undergo involuntary
    sterilization.
    In an effort to circumvent this distinction, the Estates argue that it is the
    estates of all victims who are similarly situated and, therefore, disparate treatment
    between the estates of victims must pass rational basis review.            However, the
    intended beneficiaries of the Compensation Program are the living victims of the
    eugenics program.      The Estates’ focus on the estates of deceased victims is
    inappropriate in the Equal Protection analysis before us, and we hold that the Estates
    are not similarly situated to the intended beneficiaries of the Compensation Program.
    The Estates’ Equal Protection challenge fails for this reason.
    Further, assuming arguendo that the appropriate analysis is whether the
    estates of all victims of the eugenics program are receiving disparate treatment, we
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    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    still hold that the Estates fail to pass the threshold required to show they were
    similarly situated to the estates of victims who died after 30 June 2013, but before
    receiving compensation due. There are thousands of estates of deceased victims, and
    it is likely that some of these victims initially began dying long ago. The General
    Assembly clearly intended to limit compensation to living victims, not victims long-
    ago, or even recently, deceased.
    As we do not think it requires probing constitutional analysis to determine that
    deceased victims and living victims are not similarly situated for Confrontation
    Clause purposes, we have little difficulty in finding that the heirs of the victims who
    died before enactment of the Compensation Program are not similarly situated with
    the heirs of the victims who lived to witness the enactment of the Compensation
    Program, and who took the steps necessary to initiate claims for compensation.
    The former had no expectation of compensation, even following the enactment
    of the Compensation Program, as they were specifically therein excluded. The latter
    were able to join their victim benefactors-to-be in anticipation that these living
    victims were finally going to receive compensation.8 More importantly, because the
    intent of the Compensation Program was to compensate the living victims
    themselves, both monetarily and emotionally, these living victims all received the
    reassurance and compensation of knowing that if their claims were ultimately
    8In fact, heirs could file compensation claims on behalf of living victims. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
    143B-426.50(1); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.52(a) (2014).
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    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    successful, the compensation would be granted, even if the actual victims failed to
    survive the full claims process. We hold that the Estates were not similarly situated
    with any intended victim beneficiaries of the Compensation Program.
    D. Rational Basis
    Assuming, arguendo, that the Estates had survived the “similarly situated”
    prong of an Equal Protection Clause analysis, we further hold that the challenged
    legislation demonstrates a “rational relationship between the disparate treatment
    and ‘a conceivable, legitimate interest of government.’” Beech 
    Mountain, 91 N.C. App. at 90-91
    , 370 S.E.2d at 454-55 (citation omitted).
    The only accommodation made by the General Assembly in which a payout
    pursuant to the Compensation Program would be made to the heirs of a deceased
    victim who was involuntary sterilized under the authority of the Eugenics Board was
    to the estates of those victims who were living at the time claims for compensation
    could be filed on their behalves. At least one governmental interest supporting this
    particular exception was identified in the Final Report:
    The phrase “living victims” applies to those living victims
    who have been verified by the state at the time legislation
    is approved and any living victim who applies for
    compensation from then on. In fairness to living victims
    who have already been verified, should any die before
    receiving compensation, the payment would go to their
    heirs.
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    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    Final Report, at 2 (emphasis added).         Stated differently, the purpose of the
    Compensation Program was to monetarily compensate living victims only, not the
    heirs of deceased victims. However, a living claimant would have the comfort of
    knowing that his or her compensation would be awarded, even if that claimant pre-
    deceased the payout. The comfort of that knowledge constituted a form of “restitution
    for injustices suffered and unreasonable hardships endured by the asexualization or
    sterilization of [those] individuals at the direction of the State between 1933 and
    1974[.]” 2013 North Carolina Senate Bill 464; 2013 North Carolina House Bill 7.
    Compensating heirs of victims who died before enactment of the Compensation
    Program could afford no such comfort or “restitution” to those sterilization victims,
    as they had never established any expectation of compensation. Such a scheme could
    only benefit the heirs, not the victims of involuntary sterilization themselves. This
    option was clearly considered and rejected by the General Assembly.
    We readily identify several rational reasons for limiting compensation to living
    victims: (1) addition of all heirs of deceased victims to the compensation pool could
    have reduced the amount of compensation received by the actual victims to an
    inconsequential amount; (2) the difficulty and cost of determining legitimate heirs of
    deceased victims, some of whom had died more than eighty years earlier, would likely
    be prohibitive; (3) the objective of the Compensation Program was not limited to
    financially compensating living victims, but also included recognition of the
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    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    particular wrong that had been done to them and, therefore, the Compensation
    Program was focused only upon those living victims who could still benefit from both
    the financial compensation and the emotional vindication accompanying the State’s
    recognition, in a concrete manner, of the wrongs it had done to them.
    We entered our analysis with the presumption that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-
    426.50(1) is constitutional. Beech 
    Mountain, 91 N.C. App. at 90-91
    , 370 S.E.2d at
    454-55. We hold the Estates have failed to rebut this presumption because we hold
    that the intent of the General Assembly to limit compensation to the living victims,
    or, in rare instances, to the heirs of victims who had been living at the time
    compensation through the Compensation Program became available to those victims,
    as codified in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-426.50(1) and related statutes, “bears some
    rational relationship to a conceivable, legitimate interest of government.” Beech
    Mountain, 91 N.C. App. at 
    91, 370 S.E.2d at 455
    (citation omitted).
    III. Conclusion
    This Court reaches this determination following thorough review, and in no
    manner means to suggest that the Estates in this matter, or the estates of other
    victims excluded by the Compensation Program, are unworthy of recognition,
    assistance, or compensation. We are limited to determining whether N.C. Gen. Stat.
    § 143B-426.50(1), on its face, violates the Equal Protection Clause rights of the
    Estates by limiting compensation to victims whose rights in the Compensation
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    IN RE HUGHES; IN RE REDMOND; IN RE SMITH
    Opinion of the Court
    Program had vested, and denying compensation to heirs of victims whose rights in
    the Compensation Program never vested.           We hold that the Estates have not
    demonstrated they were similarly situated to other beneficiaries, and have not shown
    that the legislation fails to bear a rational relationship to any legitimate
    governmental interest. Therefore, we must reject the Estates’ arguments pursuant
    to the constitutions of the United States and North Carolina.
    Pursuant to the mandates of our Supreme Court set forth in In re Hughes, __
    N.C. __, 
    796 S.E.2d 784
    (2017); In re Smith, __ N.C. __, 
    797 S.E.2d 264
    , (2017); and
    In re Redmond, __ N.C. __, 
    797 S.E.2d 275
    (2017), we determine that N.C. Gen. Stat.
    § 143B-426.50(1), on its face, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, and we
    therefore remand to the Industrial Commission with instruction to deny the claims
    of the Estates.
    DECIDED AND REMANDED.
    Judges DILLON and DAVIS concur.
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